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ABSTRACT 
INTRODUCTION: 
Today an agreement between two parties is often embodied in a 
standardized document, which has been specially drafted. Such standard 
form contracts probably account for more than 90% of all contracts made 
today. If a person goes to market to purchase a cell phone or wants to get 
his cell phone repaired, he gets a bill or receipt. On its reverse side it 
contains a list of written terms and conditions. If a person wants buy an 
airplane ticket through Internet, he pays for the ticket by entering his 
credit card number in the seller's form. On the bottom of the page there is 
a request to accept th^ seller's standard terms and two buttons one 
marked "I accept" and the alter "I do not accept". If he wants to buy the 
ticket, he is bound to accept the terms and conditions of the seller without 
even seeing or reading it. These transactions are ordinary and routine in 
our daily life and aim at purchasing a simple product or service. 
Freedom of contract stands for the idea that co-ordinations and co-
operation for common purposes is best achieved in a given society by 
allowing individuals to make their significant decisions by entering into 
enforceable agreements based on freely given consent. The notion of 
freedom of contract is one of the basic principle of the law of contract. 
This notion entitles everybody to conclude a contract with a freely chosen 
person and allows one to freely determine the terms of the contract 
without arbitrary or unreasonable legal restrictions. In other words, each 
person should be free to decide whether, with whom, and on what terms 
to conclude a contract. 
Freedom of contract is not a creation of modem contract law. Its 
roots can be found in the social, economic and political philosophies of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in attempts to define basic human 
rights. Liberty exists only where a person is free to act unrestricted by 
external legal or social impediments. John Stuart Mill, too, considered 
freedom of contract as being part of the general freedom of action. In his 
opinion, the function of the law was to ensure that contractual intentions 
were carried out. Finally, the notion of freedom of contract and action 
became widespread in conjunction with the doctrine of laissez faire in the 
nineteenth century. In a laissez faire market place individuals interact 
freely and without governmental restrictions. In this system of natural 
liberty, freedom of contract was considered to be vital for the continuance 
of trade and industry. 
From the sixteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
notion of freedom of contract was almost unrestricted. However 
economic growth in Europe and the aggregation of the capital within 
fewer hands as well as the growing use of standard form contracts 
enabled powerfril contracting parties to impose contractual terms upon 
weaker parties. Thus consumers often became subjected to oppressive 
contract terms by trade and industry. Due to superior position of most of 
the sellers, freedom of contract for the consumers existed only 
theoretically. In practice, the notion of freedom of contract became a 
fiction, though it still remains the basic principle of the law of contract 
both in the United Kingdom and in India. According to J.S. Mill, it did 
not matter that one contracting party had bargained from a position of 
economic inferiority. Nor did it matter that the superior party had 
imposed unconscionable provisions upon the inferior party. 
The roots of consumer protection can be found in the nineteenth 
century. The industrial revolution, which led to mass production and the 
increase of business transactions between sellers and consumers, as well 
as the development of laissez faire philosophy, which relied on self-
regulation of the market and sought to remove every restriction of trade 
or competition, gave rise to an abuse of the superior business positions by 
the sellers and oppressive contract terms for consumers. As a result 
modem contract law have been developed in order to protect the weaker 
consumer by placing limitations on the notion of freedom of contract. 
Freedom of contract and consumer protection illustrate different 
policies present in the law of contract. Thereby the principle of social 
control over private decisions opposes the notion of freedom of contract. 
In this context, government activities have been directed at protecting the 
consumer's interest. In protecting the consumer, the Government have 
remained careful in keeping the notion of freedom of contract intact. 
A standard form contract is an agreement between two parties that 
contains pre-drawn terms and is used by a business entity or firm in 
transaction with consumers. The contract is used to supply mass demands 
for goods and services. Generally the will of the party in superior 
bargaining position dominates the transaction. The consumer is required 
to accept contractual terms without negotiations notwithstanding some 
particulars. Often the consumer accepts harsh, oppressive and one-sided 
terms without understanding or even knowing it. Often this position 
exists as the one party to the contract is in strong bargaining position, 
whereas the consumer has little choice other than to accept the terms 
contained in the standard form contract. Clearly an unequal situation 
exists. 
Furthermore the development of the Internet transaction has given 
standard term contracts an increased importance. The extensive use of 
standard form contracts reflect today's underlying economic realities and 
are evidence of their economic necessity. Standard form contracts are the 
consequence of mass production and play an integral part to it. Although 
advantage and disadvantage do exist in their usage. 
On the one hand, standard form contracts fulfill an important 
efficiency role in society. Standard form contracts facilitate the 
functioning of modem society which is dependent on the mass production 
of goods. Generally, mass production can be characterized by high 
specialization, division of labour and the production of large amounts of 
standardized products. As a result it provides very inexpensive products. 
However, the extreme specialization of the functions of modem life 
require the formation of detailed contracts on an almost daily basis. In 
this context standard form contracts provide information about the 
transaction and enforce order by setting out the terms and conditions of 
transaction in writing. They ensure low transaction cost, through being 
mass-produced like the goods and services, which they regulate. 
Increased transaction cost in individually negotiated contracts would lead 
to an increase in the price of the product, thus depriving many consumers 
the opportunity to enter into the transaction. Therefore standard form 
contracts ensure an efficient delivery of mass-produced products and 
benefit the consumer. Additionally, they assure uniformity and quality of 
the transactions. Pre-drawn terms are often better adapted to the special 
needs of the particular bargain as sales persons and consumers are neither 
able and in some cases not permitted to set out their own terms and 
conditions. 
For the above some reasons it can be said that standard form 
contracts serve a useful purpose in enabHng parties to conclude their 
negotiations efficiently and without unnecessary cost. However, the 
benefits received by the consumers in this regard are not without their 
disadvantages. 
The use of standard form contracts often results in unjust harsh, 
oppressive and one-sided terms to the detriment of the party in weaker 
bargaining position. There exists a high potential for abusing standard 
form contract terms as the party in the stronger bargaining position does 
not allow the consumer to negotiate over the terms of the contract 
because of the simple reason that the terms of the contract are pre-drafted 
and pre-drawn. Often the consumer does not read the standard form 
contract terms. This may occur due to the small print and the complicated 
legal language in which the document is written. Oppressive, harsh, 
unreasonable and one-sided terms can therefore easily escape the notice 
of the consumer. In this context terms governing warranty, damages, 
attorney's fees, refiind and repair, indemnification, risk of loss and waiver 
of rights have a particular potential for abuse. 
By using standard form contracts an economic disparity arises 
whereby the party in stronger bargaining position gains advantages and 
the consumer disadvantages. In effect, standard form contracts 
institutionalize the disparity. An example of this disparity is that the risk-
transaction-failure is allocated to the economically weaker consumer. 
Unequal standard form contracts terms constitute a costless benefit for the 
party in the stronger bargaining position. Practically, if the party in 
stronger bargaining position fails to take this advantage of these benefits, 
his competitors will take that. These competitive pressures have been in 
existence for a substantial duration. This has resulted in a situation 
whereby consumers do not even notice the unfairness contained in the 
standard form contract terms anymore. Consumers, do not read or 
necessarily understand the terms contained in the standard form contract. 
As a result the importance of standard form contracts in modem 
business life and the potential for abuse, policing mechanism are 
necessary to balance the advantages of standard form contracts and their 
negative "side-effects." 
Selection of Topic: 
Business and commercial organizations enter into numerous 
contracts with its customer, clients and consumers everyday due to 
enormous increase in the volume of business. When a large number of 
contracts have got to be entered into by giant and leviathan size 
commercial organization, it is practically not possible for these 
commercial entities to draft and prepare a separate agreement for each of 
its customer or clients. It is also not possible for them to negotiate over 
the terms and conditions of the agreement with their customers. To save 
time and for the purpose convenience it was felt necessary to draft and 
prepare an agreement in standard form. Nowadays the use of these 
standard form contracts are very common in every business, trade and 
industry. Thus the purpose for selecting this topic for research is to 
critically analyse its importance and its misuse by stipulating harsh, 
oppressive and one-sided excluding and limiting terms in it by the party 
in the stronger bargaining position. 
Statement of Research Problem and Hypothesis: 
Standard form contracts are very common due to its useftilness. 
Contractual terms are set out in standard forms which are nowadays used 
for all contracts of some kind. Such standard terms are often settled by a 
trade or business association for the use of its members for contracting 
with its customers. In standard form contracts, generally the terms of the 
contract are pre-drafted by one of the parties and the other party having 
inferior bargaining position is supposed to sign on the dotted line without 
having any opportunity to get the terms changed or altered to suit his 
needs. The party in inferior bargaining position has no time to read the 
terms of the contract then the party in superior bargaining position taking 
undue advantage of the situation stipulates such terms in the contract 
which suits him most either by limiting his liability or excluding his 
liability under the contract. 
The research problem of our research work is to study about the 
legislative steps taken by the Legislature till date to curb the menace of 
excluding and limiting terms in standard form contracts and to ascertain 
as to how far the courts in India and in other countries including the 
United Kingdom tried to strike a balance between the right of freedom of 
contract and the restriction thereon to prevent misuse and menace of 
unfair, arbitrary, harsh, oppressive and one-sided exclusion and 
exemption clause in consumer contracts especially those which are in 
standard form. 
Objectives of the Study: 
The enforcement of the standard form contracts in general is 
justified by the assumption that both the parties have adopted the standard 
form contract. This fictional consent is consistent with the objective 
character of law of contract in general. Freedom of contract entitles 
everybody to conclude a contract with a freely chosen person and freely 
determine the provisions of the contract without arbitrary or unreasonable 
legal restrictions. In this regard, judicial enforcement of contracts derives 
from the notion of freedom of contract. Accordingly, all contracts 
generally are enforceable. This feature of the law of contract is expressed 
in the Latin maxim, pacta sunt servanda (contracts are to be kept). The 
effect of this maxim is inexistence in both United Kingdom and India. It 
requires the enforcement of contractual obligations created in 
circumstances, which are consistent with freedom of contract. 
The main object of the present study is to examine the use and the 
misuse of the standard form contracts in India and also to analyse that 
whether the present statutory provisions relating to contract are sufficient 
to meet any situation and are capable to do justice, or there is dearth and 
scarcity of the statutory provisions in this field, and if so to make suitable 
suggestions in this regard. 
Research Methodology: 
The present study is based on the doctrinal method. An effort is 
made to study the case laws enunciated by the Supreme Court of India 
and various High Courts of India and as well as of the United Kingdom 
and to ascertain the attitude and the judicial response of the courts 
regarding the principles of the law of contract and its interpretation in 
relation to standard form contracts. The present study is designed to 
examine the role of the judiciary and to study the judicial response in 
India in relation to standard form contracts. Apart from the case law 
study, the materials relied on are the Reports of the Law Commissions, 
Discussion Paper and the statutory provisions relating to commercial law 
in India and of other countries especially of the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America. 
Presentation of Study: 
To cover all aspects, the entire work is arranged in six chapters. 
Chapter I deals with the meaning, definition, nature and the scope 
of the standard form contracts. It also discusses other aspects of standard 
form contracts the usefulness and the misuse of the standard form 
contracts. 
In Chapter II the researcher has discussed different types of 
excluding and limiting terms, meaning of exemption clauses, law 
regarding exemption clauses and principles of construction of exemption 
clauses. It also discusses the principle and circumstances of fundamental 
term and fundamental breach of contract. 
In Chapter III he has made an effort to survey the statutory 
provisions in India in the field of law of contract and also the other 
provisions who could deal the problems created by the standard form 
contracts. This chapter also analyses the statutory provisions in the other 
countries in relation to the law to deal with unfair terms in contracts 
especially of United Kingdom and United States of America. 
In Chapter IV he has endeavoured to discuss and analyse the 
Reports of the Law Commission of India and the recommendations 
contained in it to enact laws to deal the problem of unfair terms. An 
attempt has been made to analyse the Reports very minutely. 
Chapter V deals with judicial protection and treatments. In this 
chapter an effort is made to study and analyse the case law enunciated by 
the English Courts and the Supreme Court of India and also the 
judgments of different High courts of India. For Indian cases only those 
cases have taken up for study where the contractual document is in 
standard form, and its term creates the "cause of action." 
Last Chapter VI deals with conclusion and suggestions. In this 
chapter the researcher has made an effort to recapitulate the chief points 
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of the discussion discussed earlier along with a few suggestions in the 
light of the present position. 
The common law subject to some restrictions based on public 
policy, permits persons to make whatever contractual bargains they 
please and will enforce those bargains. Standard form contracts drafted 
by the big commercial organization contains numerous clauses printed in 
minuscule characters which the individual do not in fact read and if he 
did, he would be incapable to understand it, in most of the cases, and if he 
understood, he would be not in a position to negotiate over the terms or 
get it changed to suit his requirement. In consequence the judges in the 
U.K. tried to apply and adapt the doctrines of common law so as to do 
justice. An unfair, irrational and unconscionable clause in a contract is 
regarded as unjust and amenable to judicial review at common law. Lord 
Denning in John Lee & Son V. Railway Executive (1949) 2 All ER 581, 
while interpreting and analysing a term in a contract observed that "... 
above all there is the vigilance of the common law which, while allowing 
freedom of contract, watches to see that it is not abused. "He reiterated 
his same view in the case of Gillespie and Co. Ltd. V. Roy Bowles 
Transport Ltd. (1973) 1 All ER 193, while construing an indemnity 
clause in a contract and questioned that are the courts to permit party to 
enforce his unreasonable clause, even when it is so unreasonable, or 
applied so unreasonably, as to be unconscionable and said, 
"When it gets to this point, I would say, as I said many year ago ... 
there is the vigilance of the common law while allowing freedom of 
contract, watches to see that it is not abused. It will not allow the party to 
exempt himself from his liability at common law when it would be quite 
unconscionable for him to do so." 
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Denning L.J. in Spurling V. Bradshaw (1956, Ail ER 121 at 125) 
stated that, 
"Some clauses which I have seen would need to be printed in red 
ink on the face of the document with a red hand pointing to it before the 
notice could be held to be sufficient." 
What the parties to the contract meant to say or write is a question 
of construction of the words used having regard to the tenor of the 
agreement and to the surrounding circumstances. However, a number of 
rules of construction have been developed to assist the courts to ascertain 
the meaning of the words and phrases in various circumstances. The 
"Contra proferentem" rule is the principle whereby the words or terms of 
a written contract are construed more strictly, forcibly and narrowly 
against the party putting forward the contractual document. This rule of 
construction had been applied by the common law courts where there was 
doubt or ambiguity in the phrases used in the contractual document. The 
courts in cases of doubts or ambiguity resolved against the party who put 
it forward and in favour of the other party. 
Earlier the courts in the United Kingdom decided the cases of 
breaches on the basis of construction of contract, but later some judges 
went beyond the construction approach and held that a party who had 
committed a "fundamental breach" or "breach of a fundamental term" 
could not rely on an exclusion clause no matter how widely it was 
worded. Denning L.J. in Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. V. Wallis (1956, 2 All 
ER 866) said that it a party to the contract is guilty of a breach of those 
obligation in a respect which goes to the very root of the contract, he 
cannot rely on the exempting clauses. 
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Over the years, however, exemption and exclusion clauses have 
become wider and wider, giving the powerful party greater protection 
against contractual liability, for what would normally be a breach of his 
contract. The court's respect for the principle of "freedom of contract" 
has limited their ability adequately to control such clauses, and the 
statutory intervention is the only way to deal satisfactorily with what is 
widely recognized as a real problem. In the United Kingdom various 
legislative measures have been taken for the welfare of the consumers. 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 and Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations, 1999 are very important legislations in the field of 
law of contract. 
The Constitution of India provides social and economic justice for 
all the citizens of India. It protects freedom of profession, occupation, 
trade and business. If also provides that in economic system there should 
not be concentration of wealth and resources in the hands of a few 
persons. Article 39 of the Constitution of India provides for certain 
principles of policy to be followed by the State. Article 39 (b) says that 
the State shall in particular, direct its policy toward securing that the 
ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so 
distributed as best to subserve the common good. Article 39 (c) of the 
Constitution of India also provides that the operation of the economic 
system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of 
production to the common detriment. The problem which needs to be 
examined is that what principles have been developed by the courts in 
interpreting and applying the constitutional and other statutory provisions 
in relation to freedom of contract and misuse of standard form contract 
through harsh, oppressive, unfair, unreasonable arbitrary and one-sided 
exemption and exclusion clauses in the garb of free consent. 
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Yet another principle laid down by the courts is that the term of the 
contract must be reasonable and should not be opposed to public policy. 
In Lilly White V. Munnuswami, (A.I.R. 1966 Mad. 13) the Madras High 
Court held that a term which is prima facie opposed both to public policy 
and to the fundamental principles of the law of contract cannot be 
enforced by a court merely because it is printed on the reverse of a bill 
and there is a tacit acceptance of the term when the bill was received by 
the customer. 
There is also a practice in many business concerns which deal in 
the supply of goods or rendering services, that they have contracts or 
order forms in standard forni in which there is found a so called term of 
the contract which is an incomplete sentence in minuscule character 
written at the foot or on the top of a bill or order form that is "subject to 
(name of place) jurisdiction." This type of practice is also very common 
in the contracts of transportation of goods. By this they try to avoid 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter by a particular court, which it 
otherwise possesses and try to vest jurisdiction in a court of their choice. 
The Supreme Court in Hakam Singh V. M/s Gammon India Ltd. (A.I.R. 
1971 S.C. 740) laid down the principle regarding this and said that it is 
not open to the parties by agreement to confer by their agreement 
jurisdiction on a court which it does not possess under the Code of Civil 
Procedure. But where two courts or more have jurisdiction under the 
Code of Civil Procedure to try a suit or proceeding, an agreement 
between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of 
such courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not 
contravene section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 
But Justice M.P. Thakkar of Gujarat High Court (as he then 
was) sounded a note of caution regarding this practice of excluding the 
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jurisdiction of a court which it possesses otherwise under the Code of 
Civil Procedure, in the case of Snehalkumar Sarabhai V. M/s Economic 
Transport Organization (A.I.R. 1975, Guj. 72) and observed, 
"A new approach to this question deserved to be made, for, the 
ouster clause is calculated to operate as a engine of oppression and as a 
means to defeat the ends of justice." 
The principle laid down by the Apex Court in Hakam Singh's case 
was reiterated in a number of cases later on. Recently in Harshad Chiman 
Lai V. D.L.F. Universal Ltd. (A.LR. 2005 S.C. 4446) the Supreme Court 
said that it is not open to the parties to confer jurisdiction by their 
agreement on a court which it does not possesses under the Code of Civil 
Procedure. The parties can restrict their choice by a specific agreement to 
anyone of the two or more courts only in cases where the selected court 
otherwise possesses the jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Thus the established legal position is that the parties by their 
agreement are not permitted to totally exclude the jurisdiction of civil 
court which has been created by statute. But the parties may by their 
agreement restrict their choice to one or more such courts which 
otherwise possesses territorial jurisdiction under the Code of Civil 
Procedure. The parties cannot vest jurisdiction in a court which it does 
not have under the Code of Civil Procedure. Where several courts have 
territorial jurisdiction in respect of suit, parties may by their agreement 
confine themselves to anyone of such civil courts and such an agreement 
is not voilative of section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 
In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. V. Brojo Nath 
Ganguly (A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1571) the Hon'ble Supreme Court for the first 
time considered the principle of unconscionability outside the purview of 
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section 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and tried to broaden its limits. 
The Court discussed unconscionability, distributive justice and inequality 
of bargaining power. The court also explained the concept of 
unreasonableness. Justice D.P. Madon (as he then was) when speaking 
for the Bench in this case asked a question, 
"Under which head would an unconscionable bargain fall?" 
To this question he answered himself and said, 
"If it falls under the head of undue influence, it would be voidable 
but if it falls under the head of being opposed to public policy, it would 
be void." 
The Apex Court earlier in Gherulal Prakash V. Mahadeodas Maiya 
(A.I.R. 1959, S.C. 782) observed that the doctrine of public policy is 
governed by precedents, its principles have been crystallized under the 
different heads and though it was permissible to expound and apply them 
to different situations it could be applied only to clear and undeniable 
cases of harm to the public. Although theoretically it was permissible to 
evolve a new head of public policy in exceptional circumstances such a 
course would be inadvisable in the interest of stability of society. 
The Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan V. Basant Nahata (A.I.R. 
2005, S.C. 3401) again took the discussion regarding "public policy" out 
of the confines of statute to the general area and observed that the public 
policy is not capable of being given a precise definition. What is 
"opposed to public policy" would be a matter depending upon the nature 
of the transacfion. The pleadings of the parties and the materials brought 
on record would be relevant so as to enable the court to judge the concept 
as to what is for public good or in the public interest or what would be 
injurious or harmful to the public good or the public interest at the 
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relevant point of time as contra-distinguished from tiie policy of a 
particular government. 
Conclusion: 
The different High Courts and the Supreme Court of India apart 
from some Sections of Indian Contract Act, 1872 such as Sections 16, 23, 
27 and 28 the Courts have invoked Article 14, 16, 19 and 21 of the 
Constitution of India to strike down certain unreasonable terms of the 
contract entered into by the Government, its instrumentalities, Public 
Sector Undertakings and Statutory Bodies which are "State" within the 
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The High Courts and 
the Supreme Court of India exercised the power of judicial review given 
to it by the Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India to strike down 
arbitrary and unreasonable clauses in contracts entered into by the 
Government and its instrumentalities with the individuals, and have 
confined and restricted the area of exercising this power only in cases 
when it was felt necessary to strike down a clause, in public service 
employment, as being unreasonable arbitrary and unfair. The courts are 
not inclined and are reluctant to extend this principle to strike down 
unfair and unreasonable clauses in commercial contracts. There is no law 
in India which can deal to curb the menace of unfair terms mostly found 
in standard form contracts. The courts refrained from interfering in 
commercial contracts. Though the courts are willing to do the needful for 
the consumers who have inferior or no bargaining power at all who suffer 
in the hands of commercial organization but due to dearth of statutes in 
this field the courts are toothless and hence helpless and thus unable to 
help individuals in inferior bargaining position. 
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The Law Commission of India in its 103'"'^  Report on "Unfair 
Terms in Contract", 1984 observed, that the entire basis of a contract, that 
it was freely and voluntarily entered into by parties with equal bargaining 
power, completely falls to the ground when it is practically impossible for 
one of the parties not to accept the offered terms." 
The Law Commission further said that, "the net result is that the 
Indian Contract Act, 1872, as it stands today cannot come to the 
protection of the consumer when dealing with big business. Further, the 
ad hoc solutions given by courts in response to their innate sense of 
justice without reference to a proper yardstick in the form of a specific 
provision of statute law or known legal principle of law only produce 
uncertainty and ambiguity." 
The Law Commission in its 103*^"^  Report of 1984 recommended the 
amendment in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and insertion of chapter IV 
A with a single section 67A in it which would combine the advantages of 
the "English Unfair Contract Terms Act" and Section 2. 302 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code of the United States. 
The Law Commission again in its 199 Report on Unfair 
(Procedural and Substantive) Terms in Contract, 2006 while agreeing 
with the observation and suggestion given in its 103'^ '' Report in 1984 
opined that the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and other 
laws are not sufficient to meet the problems of today. The Law 
Commission observed that there is need to protect consumers and 
particularly to grant protection from the disadvantages of extensive 
introduction of standard terms of contracts which are one-sided and it has 
become necessary to evolve general principles regulating unfairness in 
contracts. The Law Commission prepared a draft of the Proposed Bill on 
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"Unfair (Procedural and Substantive) Terms in Contract Bill 2006" and 
recommended for its enactment. 
Suggestions: 
The researcher finds that the recommendation of the Law 
Commission of India whether it were in 103''' Report or m 199'^  Report, 
2006, fell into deaf years of the Government. Central Government did not 
pay any heed to the recommendations of the Law Commission. 
Government's lackadaisical approach is responsible for the non-
implementation of the recommendations of the Laws Commission. 
Governments are more keen to pass and enact those laws and ordinances 
for which they are getting political mileage or increase in vote bank tally 
of the political party to which that particular Government belongs. 
The researcher's humble suggestions are that the recommendations 
of the Law Commission of India should be implemented by the 
Government of India at the earliest. 
Secondly, till the recommendations of the Law Commission is not 
implemented, the court should be more susceptible to pain felt by 
consumers by these unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary, harsh, oppressive, 
irrational and one-sided excluding and limiting terms in standard form 
contracts which are giving undue advantage to parties who have superior 
bargaining power and only disadvantages to the party who is in a inferior 
bargaining position. 
Thirdly there should also be an office of "Fair Trading" on the 
Bridsh pattern in each revenue district of India to deal and curb the 
menace of unfair and unconscionable excluding, exempting and limiting 
terms usually contained in standard form contracts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The first essential of every contract is that there should be agreement 
upon its terms. Agreement is constituted by an offer made by one party and 
accepted by the other which expresses the terms of the agreement. For these 
purposes the law requires a specific type of agreement - a bargain. 
Agreement by offer and acceptance is the standard method of forming a 
contract. The parties to a contract must be of the same mind, that there must 
be ''consensus ad idem.'''' A party cannot, of course, be made to enter into a 
contract against his expressed will and without his consent. 
Business and commercial organizations enter into numerous contracts 
with its customers, clients and consumers everyday due to enormous 
increase in the volume of business. When a large number of contracts have 
got to be entered into by giant commercial organizations, it is practically not 
possible for these commercial entities to draft and prepare a separate 
agreement for each of its customer or clients. It is also not possible for them 
to negotiate over the terms and conditions of the agreement with their 
customers. To save time and for the purpose of convenience it was felt 
necessary to draft and prepare an agreement in standard form. These 
contracts in standard form became very popular due to its usefulness. 
Contractual terms are set out in standard forms which are nowadays used for 
all contracts of same kind. Such standard terms are often settled by a trade or 
business association for the use of its members for contracting with its 
customers. One of the basic object of these standard form contracts is to save 
time and energy, otherwise the work of insurers, carriers, bankers and other 
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giant commercial organizations would become impossible if all the terms of 
every contract they made had to be newly settled for each transaction. 
In standard form contracts, generally the terms of the contract are pre-
drafted by one of the parties and the other party having inferior bargaining 
position is supposed to sign on the dotted line without having any 
opportunity to get the terms changed or altered to suit his needs. The party in 
inferior bargaining position has no time to read the terms of contract then the 
party in superior bargaining position taking the undue advantage of the 
situation stipulates such terms in the contract which suits him most, and 
mostly the party in superior bargaining position stipulates such terms in the 
contract which either limits the liability or exclude him from any liability 
under the contract. 
Thus the use of exemption and exclusion clauses in the standard form 
contract without any reasonable notice or any knowledge to the other party 
in inferior bargaining position or in no bargaining position at all is nothing 
but the exploitation of the individual and abuse of superior bargaining power 
of the big and giant commercial suppliers of goods and services when 
contracting with the individuals. These commercial organizations usually 
draft the standard terms in ways highly favourable to themselves both by 
means of clauses which excludes or limits their liability for failure to 
perform or for defective performance and also by the provision in the 
standard form contract which confers rights on them. 
The Constitution of India provides social and economic justice for all 
the citizens of India. It protects freedom of profession, occupation, trade and 
business. It also provides that in economic system there should not be 
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concentration of wealth and resources in the hands of a few persons. Article 
39 of the Constitution of India provides for certain principles of policy to be 
followed by the State. Article 39 (b) says that the State shall in particular, 
direct its policy toward securing that the ownership and control of the 
material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve 
the common good. Article 39(c) of the Constitution of India also provides 
that the operation of the economic system does not result in the 
concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. 
Consensus ad idem is one of the essential requisites of the formation 
of a valid contract. The entire basis of a valid contract is that it should be 
freely and voluntarily entered into between the parties with equal bargaining 
power. But this principle and the philosophy behind this principle fails when 
it becomes practically impossible for the individuals to have equal 
bargaining due to numerous use of standard form contracts these days by the 
commercial organizations. There is no provision in the Indian Contract Act, 
1872 which could deal the menace created by the unfair, unreasonable and 
arbitrary exclusion and exemption clauses in the standard form contracts. In 
the absence of any general provision in this regard the courts too are unable 
to give relief to the party in inferior bargaining position. 
The problem which needs to be examined is that what principles have 
been developed by the courts in interpreting and applying the constitutional 
and other statutory provisions in relating to freedom of contract and misuse 
of standard form contracts through unfair, unreasonable and arbitrary 
exemption and exclusion clauses in the garb of free consent. 
XVll 
The purpose of present study is to ascertain as to how far the courts in 
India and other countries including the United Kingdom tried to strike a 
balance between the right of "freedom of contract" and the restrictions 
thereon to prevent misuse and menace of unfair unreasonable and arbitrary, 
exclusion and exemption clauses in consumer contracts especially those 
which are in standard form. 
1. SELECTION OF TOPIC: 
Business and commercial organizations enter into numerous contracts 
with its customer, clients and consumers everyday due to enormous increase 
in the volume of business. When a large number of contracts have got to be 
entered into by giant and leviathan size commercial organization, it is 
practically not possible for these commercial entities to draft and prepare a 
separate agreement for each of its customer or clients. It is also not possible 
for them to negotiate over the terms and conditions of the agreement with 
their customers. To save time and for the purpose convenience it was felt 
necessary to draft and prepare an agreement in standard form. Nowadays the 
use of these standard form contracts are very common in every business, 
trade and industry. Thus the purpose for selecting this topic for research is to 
critically analyse its importance and its misuse by stipulating harsh, 
oppressive and one-sided excluding and limiting terms in it by the party in 
the stronger bargaining position. 
2. STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS: 
Standard form contracts are very common due to its useftilness. 
Contractual terms are set out in standard forms which are nowadays used for 
all contracts of some kind. Such standard terms are often settled by a trade or 
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business association for the use of its members for contracting with its 
customers. In standard form contracts, generally the terms of the contract are 
pre-drafted by one of the parties and the other party having inferior 
bargaining position is supposed to sign on the dotted line without having any 
opportunity to get the terms changed or altered to suit his needs. The party in 
inferior bargaining position has no time to read the terms of the contract then 
the party in superior bargaining position taking undue advantage of the 
situation stipulates such terms in the contract which suits him most either by 
limiting his liability or excluding his liability under the contract. 
The problem of our research work is to study about the legislative 
steps taken by the Legislature till date regarding to curb the menace of 
excluding and limiting terms in standard form contracts and to ascertain as 
to how far the courts in India and in other countries including the United 
Kingdom tried to strike a balance between the right of freedom of contract 
and the restriction thereon to prevent misuse and menace of unfair, arbitrary, 
harsh, oppressive and one-sided exclusion and exemption clause in 
consumer contracts especially those which are in standard form. 
3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY: 
The enforcement of the standard form contracts in general is justified 
by the assumption that both the parties have adopted the standard form 
contract. This fictional consent is consistent with the objective character of 
law of contract in general. Freedom of contract entitles everybody to 
conclude a contract with a freely chosen person and freely determine the 
provisions of the contract without arbitrary or unreasonable legal 
restrictions. In this regard, judicial enforcement of contracts derives from the 
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notion of freedom of contract. Accordingly, all contracts generally are 
enforceable. This feature of the law of contract is expressed in the Latin 
maxim, pacta sunt servanda. The effect of this maxim is existent in both 
United Kingdom and India. It requires the enforcement of contractual 
obligations created in circumstances, which are consistent with freedom of 
contract. 
The main object of the present study is to examine the use and the 
misuse of the standard form contracts in India and also to analyse that 
whether the present statutory provisions relating to contract are sufficient to 
meet any situation and are capable to do justice, or there is dearth and 
scarcity of the statutory provisions in this field, and if so to make suitable 
suggestions in this regard. 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: 
The main purpose of the present study is to examine the use and the 
misuse of the standard form contracts in India and also to analyse that 
whether the present statutory provisions relating to contract are sufficient to 
meet any situation and are capable to do justice or there is dearth and 
scarcity of the statutory provisions in this field, and if so to make suitable 
suggestions in this regard. Methodology of present research work is based 
on the doctrinal method. An effort is made to study the case law enunciated 
by the Supreme Court of India and various High Courts of India and the 
English Courts. An effort is also made to study the Reports of the Law 
Commission of India and as well as of the U.K. and to ascertain the attitude 
of the courts regarding the principles of the law of contract and its 
interpretation in relation to standard form contracts. The present study is 
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designed to examine the role of judiciary and to study the judicial response 
in India in relation to standard form contract. Apart from the case law study, 
the other materials relied on are the Reports of the Law Commissions, 
Discussion paper and the statutory provisions relating to commercial law in 
India and of other countries especially of U.K. and U.S.A. 
5. PRESENTATION OF THE STUDY: 
To cover all aspects, the entire work is arranged in six chapters. 
Chapter I deals with the meaning definition, nature and the scope of 
the standard form contracts. It also discusses other aspects of standard form 
contracts the usefulness and the misuse of the standard form contracts. 
In Chapter II the researcher has discussed the different types of 
excluding and limiting terms, meaning of exemption clauses, law regarding 
exemption clauses and principles of construction of exemption clauses. It 
also discusses the principle and circumstances of fundamental term and 
fundamental breach of contract. 
In Chapter III he has made an effort to survey the statutory provisions 
in India in the field of law of contract and also the other provisions who 
could deal the problems created by the standard form contracts. This chapter 
also analyses the statutory provisions in other countries in relation to the law 
to deal with unfair terms in contracts especially of United Kingdom, United 
States of America. 
In Chapter IV he has endeavoured to discuss and analyse the Reports 
of the Law Commission of India and the recommendations contained in it to 
enact laws to deal the problem of unfair terms. An attempt has also been 
made to analyse the Reports very minutely. 
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Chapter V deals with judicial protection and treatments. In this 
chapter an effort is made to study and analyse the case law enunciated by the 
English courts and the Supreme Court of India and also the judgments of 
different High Courts of India. For Indian cases only those cases have taken 
up for study where the contractual document is in standard form, and its 
term creates the "cause of action." 
Last Chapter VI deals with conclusion and suggestions. In this chapter 
the researcher has made an effort to recapitulate the chief points of the 
discussion discussed earlier along with a few suggestions in the light of 
present position. 
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CHAPTER - 1 
STANDARD FORM CONTRACT 
1. Meaning and Definition 
A standard form contract sometimes referred to as an adhesion 
contract or boilerplate contract is a contract between two parties that does 
not allow for negotiations, i.e. take it or leave it. It is often a contract that 
is entered into between unequal bargaining partners, such as when an 
individual is given a contract by the sales - person of a multinational 
corporation. The consumer is in no position to negotiate the standard 
terms of such contracts and the company's representative often does not 
have the authority to do so. 
An example of a standard form contract is a standardized contract 
form that offers goods or services to consumers on essentially a "take it 
or leave it" basis without giving consumers realistic opportunities to 
negotiate terms that would benefit their interests. When this occurs, the 
consumer cannot obtain the desired product or service unless he or she 
acquiesces to the pre-drafted terms of the contract. 
Standard form contract is a legally binding agreement between two 
parties to do a certain thing, in which one party has all the bargaining 
power and uses it to write the contract primarily to his or her advantage. 
There is nothing unenforceable or even wrong about standard form 
contracts. In fact, most business would never conclude their volume of 
transactions if it were necessary to negotiate all the terms of every 
consumer contract. Insurance, carriers, banks courier and residential 
leases are other kinds of standard form contract. This does not mean, 
however, that all standard form contracts are valid. Many standard form 
contracts are unconscionable; they are so unfair to the weaker party 
(mostly individual) that a court will refuse to enforce them. For example 
there would be severe penalty provisions for failure to pay loan 
installments promptly that are physically hidden by small print located in 
the middle of an obscure paragraph of a lengthy agreement. In such a case 
a court can find that there is no meeting of minds of the parties to the 
contract and that the weaker party has not accepted the terms of the 
contract. One cannot give consent to a term which he or she did not read 
or understand. 
Mostly the terms and conditions in a standard form contract are in 
small print and written in such language and style often seems irrelevant 
and unnecessary to a person. The prospect of an individual finding any 
usefial or important information from reading such terms is very low, and 
even if such information is discovered the individual is in no position to 
bargain as the contract is presented on a "take it or leave it" basis. Very 
often large amount of time is needed to read the terms, the expected 
payoff from reading the contract is low and few people would be 
expected to read it. Access to the full terms may be difficult or impossible 
before acceptance. Often the document being signed is not the ftill 
contract; the purchaser is told that the rest of the terms are in another 
location. This reduces the likelihood of the terms being read and in some 
situations, such as contract through internet the terms of the contract can 
only be read after they have been notional ly accepted by purchasing the 
goods. 
The most important terms to purchasers of a good are generally the 
price and the quality; which are generally understood before the contract 
is signed. Terms relating to events which have very small probabilities of 
occurring or which refer to particular statutes or legal rules do not seem 
important to the purchaser. This further lowers the chance of such terms 
being read and also means they are likely to be ignored even if they are 
read. 
Standard form contracts are usually pre-printed and pre-drawn, 
conditions and terms in the contract are pre-established on which the 
weaker party is to adhere, the individual has no option to change or 
discuss about the terms of the contract. The standard terms and conditions 
unilaterally prepared by stronger party are offered to the other on a "take 
it or leave it" basis. The individual participation in the contract is only 
adherence to the document drafted unilaterally, he has to sign only on 
dotted line, and the contract is made. Often consumer do not have the 
opportunity to negotiate or read the terms. Extreme example in this 
context is insurance policies. Purchaser of insurance policies often do not 
receive their policies before entering into the contract. 
"The standardized contracts are really pretended contracts that 
have only the name of contract. They are called contracts of 
adhesion from the French term contracts & adhesion because, in 
these, a single will is exclusively predominant, acting as unilateral 
will, which dictates its terms not to an individual but to an 
indeterminate collectivity. The standard terms and conditions 
prepared by one party are offered to the other on a "take-it-or-
leave-it" basis. The main terms are put in a large print, but the 
qualifications are buried in small print. The individual participation 
consists of a mere adherence, often unknov/ing to the document 
drafted unilaterally and insisted upon by the powerful enterprise: 
the conditions imposed by the document upon the customer, are 
not open to discussion, nor are they subject to negotiation between 
the parties, but ule contract has to be accepted or rejected as a 
whole. The contracts are produced by the printing press. The pen 
of the individual signing on the dotted line does not really 
represent his substantial agreement with the terms in it, but creates 
a fiction that he has agreed to such terms. The characteristics, 
usually and traditionally associated with a contract, such as 
freedom to contract and consensus, are absent from these so called 
contracts."' 
Standard from contracts are known by different names in different 
places. In France it is called contracts d' adhesion. In U.S. they are called 
'Adhesion contract' or contracts of adhesion. In U.K. it is called standard 
form contract. In India too, it is called standard form contract or contracts 
in standard form. 
In Black's Law Dictionary, the standard form contract is defined 
as under, 
"A standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by 
the party in a weaker position, usually a consumer, who has little choice 
about the terms. Also termed contract of adhesion, adhesory contract; 
adhesionary contract; take it or leave it contract; leonire contract." 
What the French call "contracts d-adhesion", the American call 
"adhesion contracts" or "contracts of adhesion". An "adhesion contract" 
is defined in Black's Law Dictionary. Fifth Edition, at page 38 as follows: 
" 'Adhesion contract'. Standardized contract form offered to consumers 
of goods and services on essentially 'take it or leave it' basis without 
affording consumer realistic opportunity to bargain and under such 
conditions that consumer cannot obtain desired product or services except 
by acquiescing in form contract. Distinctive feature of adhesion contract 
is that weaker party has no realistic choice as to its terms. Not every such 
contract is unconscionable." 
The position under tlie American Law is stated in "Restatement of 
the Law - Second" as adopted and promulgated by the American Law 
Institute, Volume II which deals with the law of contracts, in section 208 
at page 107, as follows: 
"S.208 Unconscionable Contract or Term 
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the 
contract is made a Court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may 
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or 
may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any 
unconscionable result." 
In the Comments given under that section it is stated at page 107: 
"Like the obligation of good faith and fair dealing (S.205), the 
policy against unconscionable contracts or terms applies to a wide variety 
of types of conduct. The determination that a contract or term is or is not 
unconscionable is made in the light of its setting, purpose and effect. 
Relevant factors include weaknesses in the contracting process like those 
involved in more specific rules as to contractual capacity, fraud and other 
invalidating causes; ihe policy also overlaps with rules which render 
particular bargains or terms unenforceable on grounds of public policy. 
Policing against unconscionable contracts or terms has sometimes been 
accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manipulation of 
the rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations that the clause is 
contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract. 
Uniform Commercial Code S 2-302 Comment 1....A bargain is not 
unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal in bargaining 
position, nor even because the inequality results in an allocation of risks 
to the weaker party. But gross inequality of bargaining power, together 
with terms unreasonably favourable to the stronger party, may confirm 
indications that the transaction involved elements of deception or 
compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful 
choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to 
the unfair terms." 
There is a statute in the United States called the Universal 
Commercial Code which is applicable to contracts relating to sales of 
goods. Though this statute is inapplicable to contracts not involving sales 
of goods, it has proved very influential in, what are called in the United 
States, "non-sales" cases. It has many times been used either by analogy 
or because it was felt to embody a general accepted social attitude of 
fairness going beyond its statutory application to sales of goods. In the 
Reporter's Note to the said section 208, it is stated at page 112: 
"It is to be emphasized that a contract of adhesion is not 
unconscionable per se, and that all unconscionable contracts are not 
contracts of adhesion. Nonetheless, the more standardized the agreement 
and the less a party may bargain meaningfully, the more susceptible the 
contract or a term will be to a claim of unconscionability." 
The position has been thus summed up by John R. Peden in "The 
Law of Unjust Contracts" published by Butterworths in 1982, at pages 
28-29. 
"... Unconscionability represents the end of a cycle commencing 
with the Aristotelian concept of justice and the Roman law laesio 
enormis, which in turn formed the basis for the medieval church's 
concept of a just price and condemnation of usury. These philosophies 
permeated the exercise, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
of the Chancery Court's discretionary powers under which it upset all 
kinds of unfair transactions. Subsequently the movement towards 
economic individualism in tiie nineteentii century liardened the exercise 
of these powers by emphasizing the freedom of the parties to maice their 
own contract. While the principle of pacta sunt servanda held dominance, 
the consensual theory still recognized exceptions where one party was 
overborne by a fiduciary, or entered a contract under duress or as the 
result of fraud. However, these exceptions were limited and had to be 
strictly proved. 
It is suggested that the judicial and legislative trend during the last 
30 years in both civil and common law jurisdictions has almost brought 
the wheel full circle. Both courts and Parliaments have provided greater 
protection for weaker parties from harsh contracts. In several jurisdictions 
this included a general power to grant relief from unconscionable 
contracts, thereby providing a launching point from which the courts have 
the opportunity to develop a modem doctrine of unconscionability. 
American decisions on article 2.302 of the UCC have already gone some 
distance into this new arena ..." 
The expression ''laesio enormis'" used in the above passage refers 
to ''laesio ultra dimidium vel enormis" which in Roman law meant the 
injury sustained by one of the parties to an onerous contract when he had 
been overreached by the other to the extent of more than one-half of the 
value of the subject-matter, as for example, when a vendor had not 
received half the value of property sold, or the purchaser had paid more 
than double value. The maxim ''pacta sunt servanda" referred to in the 
above passage means "contracts are to be kept." 
Standard form contract is called as contracts d' adhesion by French 
lawyCiS. 'ine term contract d' adhesion is employed to denote the type of 
contract of which the conditions are fixed by are of the parties in advance 
and are open to acceptance by anyone. The contract which frequently 
contains many conditions is presented for acceptance en bloc and is not 
open discussion.^ 
Thus standard form contract which is so highly restrictive of one 
party's rights, but not of other, that it is doubtful that it is a truly 
voluntary and uncoerced agreement. The concept typically arises in this 
context of standard-form contracts that are prepared by one party, not 
subject to negotiation, and offered on "take it or leave it" basis. 
Lord Diplock in Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. V. 
Macaulay' defined standard form contract and observed as under, 
"Standard forms of contracts are of two kinds. The first, of very 
ancient origin, are those which set out the terms on which 
mercantile transactions of common occurrence Eire to be carried 
out. Examples are bills of lading, charter parties, policies of 
insurance, contracts of sale in the commodity markets. The 
standard clauses in these contracts have been settled over the years 
by negotiation by representatives of the commercial interests 
involved and have been widely adopted because experience has 
shown that they facilitate the conduct of trade. Contracts of these 
kinds affect not only the actual parties to them but also others who 
may have a commercial interest in the transactions to which they 
relate, as buyers or sellers, charterers, or ship owners, insurers or 
bankers. If fairness or reasonableness were relevant to their 
enforceability the fact that they are widely used by parties whose 
bargaining power is fairly matched would raise a strong 
presumption that their terms are fair and reasonable. 
The same presumption, however, does not apply to the other kind 
of standard form of contract. This "is of comparatively modem 
origin. It is the result of the concentration of particular kinds of 
business in relatively few hands. The ticket cases in the 19'*^  
century provide what are probably the first examples. The terms of 
this kind of standard form of contract have not been the subject of 
negotiation between the parties to it, or approved by any 
organization representing the interests of the weaker party. They 
have been dictated by the party whose bargaining power, either 
exercised alone or in conjunction with others providing similar 
goods or services, enables him to say, ' If you want these goods or 
services at all, these are the only terms on which they are 
obtainable. Take, it or leave it."^ 
Thus it seems that the standard form contracts are two way swords. 
They enable business to save costs but they may enable one party to 
dictate terms to the other. The result is this that the weaker party to the 
contract has no option, he has either to accept the contract on the terms 
already fixed or reject the contract in toto. There may be certain clauses 
included in the contract which may define what the other party has to do 
in an unacceptably narrow way. Insurance policies, for example often has 
exception clauses which allows the Insurance company to increase price 
or can terminate the contract at its convenience without compensation. 
2. Nature and Object: 
Standard form contracts have prefixed terms and condition. The 
terms are drafted and incorporated in the contract by the stronger party 
and the weaker party has only one function i.e. is to sign on the dotted 
line and the contract is made. Whether the weaker party, who does not 
have any bargaining power, knows that there is any term in the contract, 
whether there is limiting or exclusion clauses or not, that is immaterial. 
The consent is inferred fi'om the fact that the party has put his signature 
on the contract. 
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In this context the question now arises, whether a standard form 
contract can be considered a contract in a classical sense? In order to 
ascertain this answer a standard form contract has to be analysed within 
the framework of the definition of a classical contract. Where there is 
total freedom of contract i.e. freedom of a party to choose to enter into a 
contract on whatever terms it may consider advantageous to its interest or 
choose not to enter into a contract. The other element is consensus ad 
idem i.e. meeting of minds that is one of the essential requisites of the 
formation of a valid contract. 
As submitted earlier, the standard form contracts have pre-fixed 
terms and condition drafted by the stronger party often individual do not 
have the opportunity to negotiate or even read the terms. Extreme 
examples in this context are insurance policies where purchaser of 
insurance policies often does not receive their policies before entering 
into the contract. Therefore these ingredients are lacking in the standard 
form contract. So standard form contract cannot be said a contract in a 
classical sense. 
Another example again is given regarding the insurance sector. The 
law requires every vehicle owner to get his vehicle insured for third party 
risk i.e. risk of injury to any person by accident. Here the law compels 
vehicle owner to get the insurance cover for the benefit of the third 
person. Here freedom of a person not to enter into a contract has been 
taken away by the legislation. 
But freedom of contract also referred to the idea that as a general 
rule there should be no liability without consent embodied in a valid 
contract. This second and negative aspect of freedom of contract was 
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influential in narrowing the scope of those parts of the law of obligation 
which deal with liability imposed by law: tort and restitution.^ 
Today the position is seen in a different light. Freedom of contract 
is generally regarded as a reasonable social ideal only to the extent that 
equality of bargaining power between contracting parties can be assumed, 
and no injury is done to the economic interests of the community at large. 
In the more complicated social any industrial conditions of modem 
society it has ceased to have much idealistic attraction except, perhaps, to 
the proponents of a completely free market economy, who have advanced 
it in recent years in a modem and sophisticated way, some using the tools 
of micro-economic analysis. But whatever its status may be as an ideal, 
the concept of freedom of contract has suffered severe inroads as the 
result of developments in modem social life and policy. 
The extensive uses of standard form contracts reflect today's 
underlying economic realities and are evidence of their economic 
necessity. Mass production for mass consumption gave birth to this new 
type of contract, contracts in standard form in which conditions is pre-
fixed terms settled by the party who is strong in bargaining power. 
On the one hand standard form contracts fulfill and important 
efficiency role in the society. Standard form contracts facilitate the 
functioning of modem society which is dependent on the mass production 
of goods. Generally, mass production can be characterized by high 
specialization, division of labour, the production of large amounts of 
standardized products which requires quality control. The result of this is 
the product becomes expensive. Then to reduce the cost of transactions 
the standard form contracts are the only altemative which are used to 
keep a check on the price of the product by incorporating the standard 
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terms and conditions in the contract. Standard form contracts ensure low 
transaction cost. In standard form contracts there is no need to settle 
terms and condition afresh for each contract, time is saved, money is 
saved and this will result in reduction of prices of the goods and services 
and this is for the benefit of the consumers. 
Contractual terms are often set out in standard form which are used 
for all contracts of the same kind, and are only varied so far as the 
circumstances of each contract require. Such terms may be settled by a 
trade association for use by its members for contracting with each other 
or with members of the outside public. Standard contract forms are even 
provided by legislation or under statutory authority. 
One object of these standard forms is to save time. The work of 
insurer, carriers and bankers, for example, would become impossibly 
complicated if ail the terms of every contract they made had to be newly 
settled for each transaction. Standard form contracts are also device for 
allocating contractual risk. They can be used to determine in advance who 
is to bear the expense of insuring against those risks, and they also 
facilitate the quotation of differential rates, e.g. where a carriers form 
provides for goods to be carried either at his or at the customer's risk, and 
the charge is adjusted accordingly. Between the businessmen bargaining 
at arm's length such uses of standard forms can be perfectly legitimate, 
and this may be true even where the party to whom the standard terms are 
presented is a private consumer who has or is likely to have insured 
against the loss which has occurred. But a less defensible object of the 
use of standard terms has been the exploitation or abuse of the superior 
bargaining power of commercial suppliers when contracting with such 
consumers. The supp'ier cx)uld draft the standard terms in ways highly 
favourable to himself both by means of clauses which excluded or limited 
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his liability for failure to perform or for defective performance and by 
provisions which conferred rights on him under the contract.' 
The standard forms contracts reduce the transaction cost, but the 
consumer in a non-standard form contract would have to pay more as the 
transaction cost increases in non-standard form contract. Such increased 
cost would lead to an increase in the price of the product. Thus depriving 
many consumers the opportunity to enter into the transaction. Therefore, 
standard form contracts ensure an efficient delivery of mass produced 
products and benefit the consumer.'° 
Additionally, they assure uniformity and quality of the 
transactions. Pre-drawn terms are often better adapted to the special needs 
of the particular bargain as sales persons and consumes are neither able 
and in some cases not permitted to set out their own terms and 
conditions." 
Kessler in his analysis of contract of adhesion pointed out: 
"The standard clauses in insurance policies are the most striking 
illustrations of successful attempts on the part of business 
enterprises to select and control risks assumed under a contract. 
The insurance business probably deserves credit also for having 
first realized the full importance of the so-called 'juridical risk', 
the danger that a court or jury may be swayed by 'irrational 
factors', to decide against a powerful defendant. Standardized 
contracts have thus become an important means of excluding or 
controlling the 'irrational factors' in litigation. 
"In so far as the reduction of costs of production and 
distribution thus achieved is reflected in reduced prices, society as 
a whole ultimately benefits from the use of standard contracts. 
And there can be no doubt that this has beer the -^ase to a 
considerable extent. The use of standard contracts has however, 
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another aspect which has become increasingly important. 
Standard contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong 
bargaining power. The weaker party, in need of the goods or 
services, is frequently not in a position to stop around for better 
terms, either because the author of the standard contract has a 
monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the 
same clauses. His contractual intention is but subjection more or 
less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms 
whose consequences are often understood only in vague way if at 
all. Thus standardized contracts are frequently contracts of 
adhesion they are a prender on a laisser. Not frequently the 
weaker party to a prospective contract even agrees in advance not 
to retract his offer while the offeree reserves for himself the 
power to accept or refuse, or he submits to terms or change of 
terms which will be communicated to him later." 
In a standard form contract the consumer is unaware and ignorant 
of both the contents and the existence of excluding or limiting terms in 
the contract, hence the so-called consent taken of the consumer is not and 
cannot be said his true consent or true manifestation of consumer's will. 
The idea of an agreement freely negotiated between the parties has 
given way to the necessity for a uniform set of printed conditions which 
can be used time and again and for a large number of persons, and at a 
less cost than an individually negotiated contract. Thus reduction of cost 
of production and distribution thus achieved is reflected in reduced 
prices, society as a whole ultimately benefits from the use of standard 
contracts. 
The basic principle of the law of contract is "Freedom of contract". 
This doctrine of "Freedom of Contract" has two key aspect: that every 
person of majority of age and otherwise competent to contract is free to 
enter into a contract with any person he chooses and to contract on any 
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terms he wants. In vice versa it could also be said that a person has also 
the freedom to refuse to enter into a contract if either the terms of the 
contract or the party is not suitable to him. It is also an underlying theme 
of Indian as well as of common law that contracts freely entered into will 
be enforced by the courts. The philosophy of freedom of contract implies 
that the parties to the contract are able to negotiate on an equal footing, 
have equal bargaining power, are equally able to look after their own 
interests and have a full understanding of the consequences of their 
actions and the terms of the contract. 
But in recent times, it is the development of standard form contract 
which has become focus of allegations of unfairness. The use of standard 
form contracts is a consequence of the industrial revolution with its 
exponential growth in the mass production of goods for mass 
consumption and the provision of services. Business and commercial 
transactions with large number of consumer and customers is not possible 
without pre-drafted and pre-printed standard form contracts. Business 
with large number of customer clearly found it more convenient to have a 
pre-printed, contract in standard form to be used in all the dealings rather 
than negotiating each contract on an individual basis. To negotiate 
contracts on individual basis is time consuming, hence costly affair, so 
not in practice in many or rather in most fields of business. 
Standard form contracts can have advantages to both supplier and 
purchaser provided that a fair balance is achieved between both parties to 
the contract. They reduce transaction cost which is passed on to the 
consumer. They allow for lengthy and detailed contracts to be finalized 
with the minimum of time and by lay persons who only need to negotiate 
the specifics such as price, description of goods and services and delivery 
times. Over a period of time, people become familiar with the contracts 
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because they are standard and may encourage a general understanding of 
trading practice. They are also a so-called symbol of fairness and 
equality, as they have fixed terms and conditions for everyone whosoever 
he may be. 
However there are problems with standard form contracts. They do 
pose problems. These types of contract are often drafted by trade 
associations and highly qualified legal professionals on behalf of 
manufacturer and suppliers. The purchaser of goods or services very 
often has either no time or opportunity to read and understand the terms 
and conditions in the contract before signing it, let alone obtain the same 
standard of legal advice and assistance as of the supplier of goods and 
services. If there is time to read the terms and conditions in the contract, it 
is doubtfiil whether the purchaser is in position to understand the meaning 
and the impact of each term in the light of whole contract. Even if the 
purchaser did read and understand the terms and conditions of the 
contract, then the supplier of the goods or services may not be prepared to 
change the clauses at his request. 
Thus standard form contracts are contracts in standard form on 
"take it or leave it" basis. This 'take it or leave it' attitude places 
purchasers of goods or services in a difficult or unfavourable 
circumstances in which either he has to agree to the terms of the contract 
or forgo the product or service. Since, however it is not feasible to go 
without many such goods or services, the individual is effectively 
compelled to adhere to those terms.'^ Although at law it not the 
circumstance of coercion, undue influence or fraud but the onerous or one 
sided terms in the contract and conduct on the part of supplier prior to or 
at the tim^ thdt the contract is made, the purchaser may have no option 
but to agree it he or she wants the product or service. 
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The customer is the king of the market but upto the time he did not 
enter into a standard form contract. His position is same as of a Hon in the 
jungle, but afterwards when he entered into a standard form contract, he 
finds himself in a peculiar situation, entangled in the tentacles of terms 
and conditions which are there in tandem in the contract, and in the cob-
web of intrigues made by the supplier of the goods. Then he becomes a 
lion in the cage of ringmaster he has no option but to dance to the tunes of 
the supplier. 
Many such standard form contracts contain clauses which are 
unfair or unnecessarily one sided to the detriment of the purchaser. 
Purchaser may go anywhere but the terms and conditions of the contract 
are either same or similar. Whether he goes to a market where, there is a 
monopoly then there is no other alternative he has to adhere to the terms 
if he/or she wants the service or goods. For example a contract of electric 
supply connection or a contract of water supply from the local municipal 
corporation. Similar, if not the same position of the consumer is where, 
there is monopolistic competition such as the contract of general or life 
insurance with insurance company or a contract with mobile service 
provider company for a mobile service. Though the situation in area is 
different, where, there is perfect competition but the tenns and condition 
of the contract for goods or services is fixed and the contract is on the 
pre-drafted and preprinted terms. 
Finally, the development of technology gave birth to another type 
of contract in standard form. They are totally non-negotiated and having 
standard clauses, that are contract made through internet. The advent of 
computers and internet allows for contracts to printed as and when 
needed. One can by clicking the electronic-mouse of the computer may 
enter into the contract having fixed terms and conditions. In this type of 
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contract there is no need even to put the signature on the dotted line, one 
click on the mouse is sufficient and the contract is made. The peculiarity 
of this type of contract is, the individual first have to say "yes" to enter 
into a contract for the purchase of any product through internet and after 
that he can have access to the terms of contract. Before entering into the 
contract he can only know about the product and the price only but not 
the terms of the contract. In these type of contracts the consent of the 
individual is taken before when he or she does not know, what the terms 
of the contract are, and after that terms of the contract are presented to 
him or her. Thus this type of contract, where the consent of the individual 
is taken before the terms of the contract is shown to him, cannot be said a 
contract in a classical and conventional sense. There is no negotiation in 
this type of contract. Need here play an important role, if you need a 
product you will have to accept the terms of the contract and if you do not 
accept the terms then forgo the product. 
In an industrial society, whether advanced or developing, the 
individual craftsman, catering to the tastes of individual customers, 
slowly fades out, giving place to mass production of standardized 
products. Such standardization leads to standardized dealings with 
customers that is, to standardized contracts with customers. They are 
found in all areas where operations are on a large scale. In the case of 
such large scale organizations, which enter into innumerable contracts 
with individuals, it is very difficult for them to draw up a separate 
contract with each individual. For example, the Life Insurance 
Corporation of India has to issue thousands of covers every day. 
Similarly, the Railway administration has to enter into several contracts 
of carriage. Therefore, they have standardized printed forms of contracts, 
with blank spaces to be filled in by each individual; and when the form is 
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filled in and signed, a completed contract comes into existence between 
the organization and the individual. These standardized contracts are 
really pretended contracts that have only the name of contract. They are 
called contracts of adhesion from the French term (contracts d' adhesion) 
because, in these, a single will is exclusively predominant, acting as a 
unilateral will, which dictates its terms not to an individual but to an 
indeterminate collectively. The standard terms and conditions prepared 
by one party are offered to the other on a "take-or-leave it" basis. The 
main terms are put in large print but the qualifications are buried in small 
print. The individual's participation consists at a mere adherence, often 
unknowing to the document drafted unilaterally and insisted upon by the 
powerftil enterprise: the conditions imposed by the document upon the 
customer, are not open to discussion nor are they subject to negotiation 
between the parties, but the contract has to be accepted or rejected as a 
whole. The contracts are produced by the printing press. The pen of the 
individual signing on the dotted line does not really represent his 
substantial agreement with the terms in it, but creates a fiction that he has 
agreed to such terms. The characteristics, usually and traditionally 
associated with a contract, such as freedom to contract and consensus, are 
absent from these so-called contracts."' 
Apart from the fact that the abstract theory of a contract as an 
agreement arrived at through discussion and negotiation is completely 
given the go-by, these contracts turn out to be a case of the big business 
enterprises legislating in a substantially authoritarian manner. Such large-
scale business concerns get expert advice and introduce terms, in the 
printed forms, which are most favourable to themselves. They contain 
many wide exclusion and exemption clauses favourable to the large 
enterprise. The clauses are introduced, not always with the idea of 
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imposing harsh terms as a result of superior bargaining power, but 
because (a) as the executive of one commercial enterprise remarked, 'we 
trust our lawyers to get us out of jam, but we don't trust them not to get 
us into one; (b) when liquidated damages clauses are used, the enterprise 
feels it is a genuine attempt to pre-estimate damages; (c) there is a desire 
to avoid proceedings in a court; and (d) because every one else does it. 
These favourable terms are often in a small print which the individual 
never reads. That is because, it is a laborious and profitless task to 
discover what these terms are. The individual cannot bargain for a change 
in any of the terms, since he has to accept the giant organization's offer, 
whether he likes the terms or not. They are there for him to take or leave. 
Because of the monopolistic or near monopolistic position of big 
business, and even if there is no monopoly, all similar commercial 
enterprise introduce similar exclusion clauses in there standard form 
contracts, and because the individual customer has no choice or freedom 
in the matter but has to accept whatever terms are offered since he cannot 
negotiate them. And this gives an opportunity to the organization to 
exploit the helplessness of the individual and impose on him clauses 
which may, and often do, go to the extent of exempting the organization 
from all liability under the contract.'^ 
A meagre attempt may be made here to illustrate this problem with 
the help of a few decided cases of different High Courts of India relating 
to carriers. 
The Assam High Court in Rukmanand Ajitsaria v/s Airways (India) 
Ltd}^ h^ld that the liability of internal carrier by airways who is not 
governed by the Indian carriage by Air Act 1934 or by the Carriers Act, 
lo65 is governed by the English Common Law since adopted in India and 
not by the contract Act. Under the English common law, the carrier's 
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liability is not that of bailee only, but that of an insurer of goods, so that 
the carrier is bound to account for loss or damage caused to the goods 
delivered to it for carriage, provided the loss or damage was not due to an 
act of God or the King's enemies or to some inherent vice in the thing 
itself 
The decisions, barring a few notable exceptions, appear to be 
unanimous that the liability of the carrier in such cases is governed by the 
English common law since adopted in India an not by the contract Act. 
Where those circumstances do not exist, the carrier cannot take the plea 
that it should be exempted from liability, because it had taken every 
reasonable care to avoid the loss or damage. At the same time the 
common law allows, the carrier almost an equal freedom to limit its 
liability by any contract with the consignor. In such a case, its liability 
would depend upon the terms of the contract or the conditions under 
which the carrier accepted delivery of the goods for carriage. The terms 
could be very far reaching. Indeed it could claim exemption even if the 
loss was occasioned on account of the negligence or misconduct of its 
servants or even if the loss or damage was caused by any other 
circumstances whatsoever, in consideration of a higher or lower amount 
of freight charged. 
However, amazing a contract of this kind may appear to be, yet that 
seems to be the state of the law as recognized by the common law of 
England and adopted by the courts in India. The carriers Act, 1865 (Act 
III of 1865) also recognized the same principle and under Ss. 6 and 7 it 
specifically provided to what extent it was possible for the common 
carrier to limit its liability by a special contract. The Indian Railway Act 
1890 (Act IX of 1890) vas v^ugnisant of the application of the law of 
carriers in India and therefore, under section 72 of the Act it specifically 
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provided that the liability of the Railways would be that of a bailee 
governed by Sees. 15 land 152 of the Act, except where the consignment 
was governed by the terms of a risk note.'^ The Division Bench of Sarjoo 
Prasad C.J. and H. Deka J. of Assam High Court held that the clause in a 
contract of carriage by air gave the carrier-company complete immunity 
from liability and it could not be impugned on the ground that it is hit by 
section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, because the contract Act has no 
application to the case nor it can be said to be opposed to public policy. 
Exemption clauses of this nature have been upheld by the courts and there 
being no other statutory bar as provided under the Indian Carriers Act or 
under the Indian Carriage by Air Act which have no application to this 
case, under the common law a contract of this nature was permissible. 
In the case of Indian Airlines Corporation v/s Madhury 
Chowdhuri the Calcutta High Court held that the obligation imposed by 
law on common carriers in India is not founded upon contract, but on the 
exercise of public employment for reward. The liability of common 
carriers in India is not affected by the contract Act 1872. 
The facts of the case are as: 
The suit arose out of a tragic air crash at Nagpur when a Dakota air 
plane VT-CHF crashed soon after it started flying from Nagpur to 
Madras. The plaint stated that the plaintiffs were the heir and legal 
representatives of the deceased Sunil Baran Chowdhury and that the 
action was brought for their benefit. Sunil Baran was a passenger by air 
from Calcutta to Madras via Nagpur in the Aircraft of the defendant 
Indian Airlines Corporation and had duly purchased the ticket. It was 
pleaded in the plaint that as a result of the accident Sunil Baran was 
killed. In the particulars of the accident given in the plamt it was said that 
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the accident took place on the 12 December 1953 at 3:25 a.m. about two 
miles from the end of the runway of Sonegaon Airport Nagpur when the 
said plane attempted to land owing to engine trouble immediately after it 
had taken off from the said aerodrome. On that ground it was pleaded that 
the defendant Indian Airlines Corporation was liable for damages for 
breach of contract in not safely carrying the passenger and for breach of 
duties under the carriage by Air Act and/or the notification there under. 
There was an alternative plea in the plaint which alleged that the deceased 
died of the said accident which was caused by the negligence and/or 
misconduct of the defendant corporation or its agent. In the written 
statement the defendant Indian Airlines Corporation relied on the terms 
and conditions of the passenger's Air Ticket dated the 11* December 
1953 issued by the defendant to the said Sunil Baran Chowdhury. In 
particular the defendant corporation relied on the exemption clause as an 
express term and condition of the said ticket which read inter alia as 
follows: 
"The carrier shall be under no liability whatsoever to the passenger, 
his/her Levis, legal representatives or dependents or their respective 
assigns for death, injury or delay to the passenger or loss, damage, 
detention or delay to his baggage or personal property arising out of the 
carriage or any other services or operations of the carrier whether or not 
caused or occasioned by the act, neglect or negligence or default of the 
carrier or of pilot flying operational or other staff or employees or agents 
of the carrier or otherwise howsoever and the carrier shall be held 
indemnified against all claims, suits actions, proceedings, damages, costs, 
charges and expenses in respect thereof arising out of or in connection 
with such carriage or other services or operations of the carrier." 
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These conditions exempting the carrier from liability were duly 
brought to the notice of the passenger and he had every opportunity to 
know them. 
The Calcutta High Court held that the obligation imposed by law 
on common carriers in India is not founded upon contract, but on the 
exercise of public employment for reward. The liability of common 
carriers in India is not affected by the Contract Act 1872. Therefore, no 
question of testing the validity of this exemption clause with reference to 
section 23 of the Contract Act could at all arise. The Contract Act does 
not profess to be a complete code dealing with law relating to contracts. 
An exemption clause of this kind was not hit by any section of the 
Contract Act, be it S. 23 or any other section, because the Contract Act 
itself had no application. No Act applies to internal carriage by air. The 
Warsaw convention did not apply, nor was there any statute which 
prevented or limited the scope or content of such an exemption clause. 
Both in respect of Contract Act and tort the present exemption clause set 
out above was good and valid and it legally excluded all liability for 
negligence. It could not be held to be bad under section 23 of the Contract 
Act. 
The Rajasthan High Court has held: 
"Wherever, on the face of the goods ticket words to the 
effect "For conditions see back" are printed the person 
concerned is as a matter of law held to be bound by the 
conditions subject to which the ticket is issued whether he takes 
care to read the conditions if they are printed on the back or to 
ascertain them if it is stated on the back of the ticket where they 
are to be found. Where on the other hand the words printed on 
the face of the ticket do not indicate that the ticket is issued 
subject to certain conditions but there are merely words to the 
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effect "See Back" then it is a question of fact whether or not the 
carrier did that which was reasonably sufficient to give notice of 
the condition to the person concerned. If however, conditions 
are printed on the back of the ticket, but there are no words at all 
on the face of it to draw the attention of the person concerned to 
them .then it have been held that he is not bound by the 
conditions." 
In the present case on the face of the ticket there was a declaration 
to the effect that the consignor was fully aware of and accepted the 
conditions of carriage given on the back side of the consignment receipt. 
Any prudent consignor would read the ticket to see that his goods and the 
transport charges payable were correctly entered in it and in doing so he 
would read the above declaration or if he did not know English he would 
have the ticket read by someone else knowing English who could come to 
know that it was subject to conditions printed on the back. The man must 
be taken to know that which he has the means of knowing, whether he 
has availed himself of those means or not. If he does not he must bear the 
consequences of his carelessness. 
The Madras High Court'^ '* has held: 
(!) A common carrier is a person who professes himself ready 
to carry goods for everybody. He is considered to be in the 
position of an insurer with regard to the goods entrusted to 
him and so his liability is higher. 
(ii) But when it is expressly stipulated between the parties that 
a carrier is not a common carrier that conclusively shows 
that the carrier is not liable as a common carrier. And even 
assuming that the carrier would be deemed to be a common 
carrier or held liable as such, it was open to such a carrier 
to contract himself out of the liability as common carrier or 
fix the limit of liability. 
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As early as in 1909 Shankaran Nair J. in the case of Shaikh Mohd. 
Ravuther V. B.I.S.N. Co. in his dissenting judgement expressed the 
opinion that section 23 of Indian Contract Act 1872 hits such exemption 
clauses but his view has been rejected by the High Courts in later 
decisions i.e. Rukmanand V. Airway (India) Ltd. and Indian Airlines 
Corporation V. Madhuri Chowdhury. 
The very important and crucial question is, that we suppose, that 
the person who entering into this type of standard form contract knows 
the terms and conditions even before entering into the contract but if he 
wanted to change them or alter any term or any condition, can he do so, 
or could he negotiate on terms and conditions? If he cannot then how the 
court can come to his rescue and give relief to the individual. 
This is not so that the courts did not come to the relief of the 
weaker party but there are a few cases and the legal basis of such 
decisions is elusive, vague and obscure. There is no general provision in 
the Contract Act itself under which courts can give relief to the weaker 
party. The existing sections in the Contract Act do not seem to be capable 
of meeting the mischief. Section 23 of the Contract Act which provides 
that 
"The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless -
it is forbidden by law; or 
is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions 
of any law; or is fraudulent; or 
involves or implies, injury to the person or property of another; or 
the court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy." 
The Madras High Court^ ^ held that a clause in the contract for the 
supply of jaggery by the Appellant to the Railway Administration of the 
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respondent, which empowered the administration to cancel the contract at 
any stage was void and unenforceable. 
In the present case the Railway Administration accepted the tender 
submitted by the plaintiff for the supply of certain quantity of jaggery. 
The plaintiff paid the requisite amount as security deposit for fulfillment 
of the contract. Thereafter the Railway Administration placed an order 
with the plaintiff for the supply of jaggery in certain installments. 
After the first installment was supplied, the Administration 
informed the plaintiff that the balance of quantity of jaggery outstanding 
was treated as cancelled and the contract closed, without explaining the 
reason for cancellation. The Administration took the stand on the 
following clause in the tender 
"This Administration reserves the right to cancel the contract at any 
stage during the tenure of the contract without calling upon the 
outstandings on the unexpired portion of the contract." 
The court held: 
1. That there was in law a concluded contract between the parties; 
2. That the clause was not a limiting provision only providing for 
contingencies subject to which the contract was enforceable. 
The effect of the clause was that there was an enforceable 
contract subject to the condition that it was open to one of the 
parties to say that it was not enforceable. 
3. That the clause did not indicate that the Railway should give 
any reasons, still loss, valid and sufficient reasons, for the 
cancellation of the contract. The clause purported to confer an 
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absolute and arbitrary power on one of the parties to cancel the 
contract, and was therefore void and unenforceable. 
This judgement of the High Court was confirmed by the Supreme 
Court but on a different ground. The Supreme Court did not pronounce 
on the validity of the clause in the contract. The Supreme Court held: 
(i) that the acceptance of the tender did not amount to the 
placing of the order for any definite quantity of jaggery on 
a definite date and, therefore, did not amount to a contract 
in the strict sense of the term in view of the provisions of 
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the tender requiring a deposit of 
security and the placing of the formal order; 
(ii) that the condition mentioned in the note to para 2 of the 
tender or in the letter, dated February 16, 1948, referred to 
a right in the appellant to cancel the agreement for such 
supply of jaggery about which no formal order had been 
placed by the Deputy General Manager with the respondent 
and did not apply to such supplies of jaggery about which a 
formal order had been placed specifying definite amount of 
jaggery to be supplied and the definite date or definite short 
period for its actual delivery. Once the order was placed for 
such supply on such dates that order amounted to a binding 
contract making it incumbent on the respondent to supply 
jaggery in accordance with the terms of the order and also 
making it incumbent on the Deputy General Manager to 
accept the jaggery delivered in pursuance of that order. 
The Supreme Court in the judgement's para 17 referred an 
illustration from "Law of Contract" by Cheshire and Fifoot 5'^  Ed. At p. 
36: 
"There are at least two possible cases. First, the corporation 
may have stated that it will definitely require a specified 
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quantity of goods, no more and no less, as, for instance 
where it advertises for 1000 tons of coal to be supplied 
during the period January 1^ ' to December 31 '^. Here 
acceptance of the tender is an acceptance in the legal sense 
and it creates an obligation. The trader is bound to deliver, 
the corporation is bound to accept, 1000 tons and the fact 
that delivery is to be by installments as and when 
demanded does not disturb the existence of the obligation." 
The other case illustrated by Cheshire and Fifoot is: 
"Secondly, the corporation advertises that it may require articles of 
a specified description upto a maximum amount, as, for instance where it 
invites tenders for the supply during the coming year of coal not 
exceeding, 1000 tons altogether, deliveries to be made if and when 
demanded, the effect of the so-called "acceptance" of the tender is very 
different. The trader has made what is called a standing offer. Until 
revocation he stands ready and willing to deliver coal upto 1000 tons at 
the agreed price when the corporation from time to time, demands a 
precise quantity. The 'acceptance' of the tender, however, does not 
convert the offer into a binding contract, for a contract of sale implies that 
the buyer has agreed to accept the goods. In the present case the 
corporation has not agreed to take 1000 tons, or indeed any quantity of 
coal. It is merely stated that it may require supplies upto a maximum 
limit." 
"In this latter case the standing offer may be revoked at any time 
provided that it has not been accepted in the legal sense; and acceptance 
in the legal sense is complete as soon as a requisition for a definite 
quantity of goods is made. Each requisition by the offeree is an individual 
act of acceptance which creates a separate contract." 
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The Supreme Court observed: "we construe the contract between 
the parties in the instant case to be of the second type. To reserve a right 
to cancel an outstanding contract is then consistent with the nature of the 
agreement between the parties as a result of the offer of the respondent 
accepted by the appellant and a similar note in the formal order, dated the 
16 February 1948 had no reference to the actual orders but could refer 
only to such contemplated supplies of goods for which no orders had 
been placed. 
In view of the construction we have placed on the contract between 
the parties it is not necessary to decide the other contention urged for the 
appellant that the stipulation in the note amounted to a term in the 
contract itself for the discharge of the contract and, therefore, was valid, a 
contention to which the reply of the respondent is that any such term in a 
contract which destroys the contract itself according to the earlier terms is 
void as in that case there would be nothing in the alleged contract which 
would have been binding on the appellant. We are of the opinion that the 
order of the High Court is correct."''^ 
In another case before the Madras High Court^', the laundry receipt 
of the appellant contained the condition, on the reverse of the bill which 
was handed over by the firm of launderers to his customer when receiving 
the article, that the customer would be entitled to claim only 50 per cent 
of the market price or value of the article in case of loss. A garment of a 
customer given for cleaning was lost due to the negligence. The firm 
insisted that in accordance with terms, they were bound to pay only 50 
per cent of the market value of the lost garment. The question arose 
whether the condition printed on the bill was valid in law and if it could 
be enforced as between the parti'"s. -
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Held that the term being prima facie opposed to public policy and 
to the fundamental principles of the law of contract would not be 
enforced only because it was printed on the reverse of the bill and there 
was a tacit acceptance of the term when the bill was received by the 
customer, it would put a premium upon the abstraction of the clothes by 
an employee of the firm, intent on private gain though the firm itself 
might be blameless with regard to the actual loss. 
The High Court observed: 
"It appears to me to very clear that a term which is prima facie 
opposed both to public policy and to the fundamental principles 
of the law of contract cannot be enforced by a court, merely, 
because it is printed on the reverse of a bill and there is a tacit 
acceptance of the term when the bill was received by the 
customer certainly, the conditions printed on the reverse of a bill 
may well govern or modify any simple contract, such as the 
contract in the present case, which was to entrust an article for 
dry cleaning, and to pay due charges for that service, subject to 
the obligation on the part of the businessman to perform the 
process properly, and to return of the articles safe and intact. 
But, if a condition is opposed, which is in flagrant infringement 
of the law relating to negligence, and a bill containing this 
printed condition is served on the customer, the court will not 
enforce such a term, which is not in the interest of the public and 
which is not in accordance with public policy."^^ 
In case of a contract of supply of kerosene by defendant to the 
plaintiff^ ,^ the contract reserves a right to the defendant to cancel the 
plaintiffs dealership at any time without assigning any reason. On 
cancellation by the defendant, the plaintiff filed a suit and the suit was 
decreed on the ground that the term was an unfair term of the contract. 
32 
In this case the second appeal arise out of a suit instituted by the 
plaintiff, the proprietor of International Oil Co. against the Indian Oil 
Corporation, for an injunction restraining the defendant from withholding 
the supply of kerosene to the plaintiff The supply of kerosene was on the 
basis of a contract entered into between the parties on 06.02.1964. The 
defence to the suit was that since the plaintiff had not complied with the 
terms of the agreement embodied in the agreement, he is not entitled for 
any continuous supply of kerosene and in any event, the suit itself is not 
maintainable. The plaintiff after some correspondence with the defendant 
had to file a suit for an injunction restraining the defendant, Indian Oil 
Corporation, from continuing the breach of contract, namely, withholding 
supply of kerosene and for damages for non-supply of kerosene. After the 
suit was filed, the Indian Oil Corporation terminated the contract itself 
The questions that were considered by the courts below were whether the 
suit for injunction is maintainable, whether the defendant committed a 
breach of the contract and whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. 
The courts below gave a concurrent finding that the plaintiff is not 
entitled to any injunction against the Indian Oil Corporation as those was 
a valid termination of the agency, that the corporation did not commit any 
breach of contract when it did not supply any kerosene to the plaintiff and 
that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any damages. The suit was 
dismissed. Against the dismissal of the suit the second appeal was 
preferred before the High Court of Madras. 
The only question that arose before the High Court for 
consideration was whether the Indian Oil Corporation can terminate the 
agency with the plaintiff without any notice. 
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The High Court referred to the observation of McNair J. in Martin 
Baker Aircraft Co. Ltd. V. Canadian Flight Equipment Ltd. and Martin 
Baker Aircraft Co. V. Murison 1955 2 Q.B. 556. 
"If it were a pure agency agreement and nothing more, there 
is much to be said for the view that it would be terminable 
summarily at any moment. But if an agreement of this nature 
has to be looked at as a whole, and the whole of its contents 
considered, and if one finds (as one finds here) that the person 
who is described as sole selling agent has to expend a great 
deal of time and money and is subject to restriction as to the 
sale of other persons' products which may be competitive, it 
seems to me that it is a form of agreement which falls much 
more closely within the analogy of the strict master and 
servant cases where admittedly the agreement is terminable 
not summarily except in the event of misconduct but by 
reasonable notice." 
The Hon'ble Court further observed that "Following the above 
observation we are of the view that this is a case where the appellant can 
validity contends before this court that the agency cannot be terminated 
without any notice. In M. Thathiah V.M. and S.M. Railway, 1956-2 Mad 
LJ 584 = (AIR 1937 Mad 82) a bench of this court has observed that an 
absolute power of cancellation of contract cannot be validly reserved in 
favour of one of the parties. In the instant case, the Indian Oil 
Corporation has reserved an absolute power of cancellation of the 
contract and has actually cancelled the agency without assigning any 
valid reasons. We are of the view that such a clause in the contract is 
absolutely illegal, irregular and void. It is true that the plaintiff-appellant 
had knowledge of the existence in the agreement of the sort of 'Sword of 
Damocles' termination clause. Even then, it is unfair on the part of 
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corporation to terminate the agency without due regard to the equities of 
an agent and without just provocation to cancel. Therefore, we are not 
able to agree with the findings of the court below that the suit is not 
maintainable and that the corporation is not bound to supply kerosene to 
the appellant. On the other hand it is a clear case of a breach of a contract 
and also termination of the agency without assigning any cause to such 
termination. On the review of the events that took place rapidly between 
the parties there appears to be something wrong which we are not able to 
understand. All that we can say is that the agency cannot be terminated 
without proper notice, and it is quite contrary to the principles established 
by law."^^ 
If any of terms of the contract are unconscionable, it would be 
against public policy and the party affected can approach the court for 
relief But the court did not lay down any test as to when a term would be 
unconscionable and opposed to public policy. The decisions where relief 
was given to the aggrieved person are based on the observations in 
various judgements of the English Courts, but do not seem to be based on 
any legal principle of Indian Law. The decisions are based on 
unconscionable nature of term or the term being opposed to public policy 
or the term not being in public interest. 
The Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan V. Basant Nahata''^  took 
the discussion regarding 'public policy'. The court observed that the 
public policy is not capable of being given a precise definition. Even 
though the doctrine has been crystallized under different heads. In this 
case the court observed. 
"The word, 'Public Policy' or 'opposed to public policy', inter 
alia, find re^ srenCe in Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 
Section 7(l)(b)(ii) of Foreign Awards (Recognitioin and 
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Enforcement) Act, 1961, Section 3 (1) of U.P. (Temporary 
Control of Rent and Evictions) Act 1947 and Section 34(2)(b) 
(ii) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. By reason of the 
said provisions the judiciary has been conferred with power to 
determine as to the factors of public policy which may form the 
basis for interference with a contract or award. It may not be 
necessary for us to deal with extensively the case laws dealing 
with the relevant provisions of the said statutes but it would 
not, in our opinion, be correct to contend that public policy is 
capable of being given a precise definition. What is 'opposed 
to public policy' would be a matter depending upon the nature 
of the transaction. The pleadings of the parties and the 
materials brought on record would be relevant so as to enable 
the court to judge the concept as to what is for public good or 
in the public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to 
the public good or the public interest at the relevant point of 
time as contra-distinguished from the policy of a particular 
government. A law dealing with the rights of a citizen is 
required to be clear and unambiguous. Doctrine of public 
policy is contained in a branch of common law, it is governed 
by precedents. The principles have been crystallized under 
different heads and though it may be possible for the courts to 
expound and apply them to different situations but it is trite 
that the said doctrine should not be taken recourse to in 'clear 
and incontestable cases of harm to the public though the heads 
are not closed and though theoretically it may be permissible to 
evolve a new head under exceptional circumstances of a 
changing world." 
A contract being "opposed to public policy" is a defence under 
Section 23 of Indian Contract Act and the courts while deciding the 
validity of a contract has to consider: 
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(a) Pleadings in terms of order VI, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
(b) Statute governing the case. 
(c) Provisions of Part III and IV of the Constitution of India. 
(d) Expert evidence, if any. 
(e) The materials brought on record of the case. 
(f) Other relevant factors, if any. 
A party in a suit against whom illegality is pleaded also gets an 
opportunity to defend himself. Hence this essential function to decide on 
what is pubic policy cannot be delegated to executive through a 
subordinate legislation. 
Thus the court laid dovm the general principles regarding public 
policy: 
(i) since public policy is not capable of precise definition, it is not for 
the executive to file the grey areas as the said power rests with the 
judiciary; 
(ii) even the power of the judiciary is very limited; 
(iii) public policy, which itself is so uncertain, cannot provide sufficient 
framework or work as guidelines for the executive to function 
under it. 
Thus it is submitted that standard form contract, is common in 
today's complex structure of giant corporations with vast infrastructural 
organization. The use of standard terms and conditions is not confined 
only to contracts in commercial transactions but contracts with 
multinational corporations, public authorities, insurance and banking 
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business, railways and airlines. Nowadays tliey are found in almost 
everywhere in consumer contracts, employment, hire-purchase any form 
of travel, courier services or while downloading software contracts from 
the internet. 
The standard form contracts are very useful as it saves time. One 
object of these standard forms is to save time, otherwise the work of 
insurers, carriers and bankers would become impossibly complicated if 
all the terms of every contract they made had to be newly settled for each 
transaction. Standard form contract is very useful but its misuse also 
cannot be denied, i.e. exploitation or abuse of superior bargaining power 
of commercial suppliers when contracting with consumers. The 
bargaining power of the individual is not always on equal terms and one 
party invariably has to sign on the dotted line, with no opportunity for 
that party to negotiate over the terms at all. 
Secondly the individual may be unfamiliar or ignorant with the 
terms or language used in the contract by the other party to the contract. 
The exclusionary and limiting terms are incorporated in the contract. 
Thus the characteristics traditionally associated with a contract, such as 
freedom of contract and consensus ad idem are absent in these standard 
form contract. 
A standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by 
the other party in a weaker position or in a position of no bargain usually 
a consumer who has little choice about the terms. In some cases these 
standard form contracts are extremely one sided grossly favouring one 
party against the other and are commonly referred to as contract^ of 
adhesion. 
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Standard forms contracts are usually are pre-printed and fore-
drafted contracts that are only contracts in name. The standard terms and 
conditions unilaterally prepared by one party are offered to the other on 
take-it or leave it basis. In some cases the unilateral terms and conditions 
are forced by stronger party on the weaker party to the contract. The 
individual participation consists of a mere adherence to the contract 
drafted unilaterally by the powerfiil business enterprises. The traditional 
concept of free consent is lacking here or is nowhere is the standard form 
contracts. The conditions imposed by one party on the other are never put 
into discussion. One has to fill his name in the fore-printed and pre-
drafted contract and sign on the dotted line. 
In cases of mediclaim policy very often there are restricting clause 
which says that pre-existing illness that the policyholder suffers from will 
not be covered. There are also contracts where one party is authorized 
unilaterally to alter the terms of the contract at his own fi-ee will and that 
too without the notice to the other party. 
Employment contracts also contain certain clauses enabling the 
employer to terminate the service contract without assigning any reason 
whatsoever and some contracts of service the employer is authorized by 
virtue of the contract that in case of any dispute between the parties the 
employer can nominate his own employee, consultant or lawyer to act as 
arbitrator. These type of contracts cannot be said the contracts having 
equal bargaining power. Here one party to the contract is in dominating 
position and the other party is in weaker position having no bargaining 
power. Such terms incorporated in the standard form contract could never 
be part of contract, if parties were to negotiate the terms on equal level. 
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The standard form contract can be beneficial to both the parties to 
the contract if the terms constitute a fair balance between them. For this it 
is necessary for that the stronger party to the contract should not 
incorporate the harsh and one sided limiting terms in the contract. There 
should be a mechanism to check this menace, so that the stronger party 
should not be in a position to draft the standard terms in ways highly 
favourable to himself, both by means of clauses which excludes or limits 
his liability for failure to perform or for defective performance, and by 
provisions which confer rights on him under the contract. In cases 
concerning exemption clauses the courts are not in a position to redress 
the balance in favour of the parties prejudicially affected by standard 
form contracts. This is so because there is no specific law or any 
provision in the contract Act under which the courts in India could give 
the relief to the weaker party to the contract who is prejudiciously 
affected by the contract. 
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CHAPTER - II 
EXEMPTION CLAUSES 
Business organization enters into numerous contracts with its 
customers and clients, consumers everyday due to enormous increase in 
the volume of business. When a large number of contracts have got to be 
entered into by a business organizations it is not possible for the 
organization to draft a separate contract for each of its customer or 
consumer and negotiate with him about the terms and conditions of the 
contract. To save time and for the purpose of convenience a standard 
form contract is drafted by big business organization. Contractual terms 
are set out in standard forms which are used for all contracts of the same 
kind. Such terms are often settled by a trade association for the use of its 
members for contracting with its consumers and customers. One of the 
basic object of these standard form contract is to save time otherwise the 
work of insurers, carriers and bankers would become impossible if all the 
terms of every contract. They made had to be newly settled for each 
transaction. 
In standard form contracts, generally, the terms of the contract are 
pre-drafted by one of the parties and the other party having weaker 
position is supposed to sign on the dotted line without having any 
opportunity to get the terms changed. The party in a weaker position of 
bargaining have no time to read the terms of contract then the stronger 
party taking the undue advantage of situation incorporates such terms in 
the contract which suits him most, and sometime the party in stronger 
bargaining position incorporates such terms in the contract which either 
limits or excludes them from a'^ -y liability under the contract. 
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Thus the use of limiting terms and exclusion clauses in the standard 
form contract without any knowledge of the party in a weaker position is 
nothing but exploitation of the individual in weaker bargaining position 
or abuse of the superior bargaining power of the commercial suppliers 
when contracting with individual. Giant commercial organization usually 
drafts the standard terms in ways highly favourable to himself, both by 
means of clauses which excluded or limited his liability for failure to 
perform or for defective performance, and by provisions which conferred 
rights on him under the contract. 
1. Meaning of Exemption or Exclusion Clauses: 
An exemption clause or an exclusion clause is a term of a contract 
which either excludes or limits any liability of party to the contract for a 
breach that would have arisen in the absence of such a term. A party to 
the contract signing a written contract is bound by its terms whether he 
has read or understood them or not. 
As a general rule, in the absence of any fraud, mistake or 
misrepresentation, a party signing a written contract is bound by its terms. 
Where a document containing contractual terms is presented by one party 
to the other before or at the time when the contract is made, the recipient 
who accepts the document will be bound by those terms, in the absence of 
fraud, misrepresentation, if he knows the document contains contractual 
terms or if the other party has taken reasonable steps to draw his attention 
to the presence of such terms. 
Often a party to the contract having strong bargaining position and 
aware of future and potential liability and anxious to limit or exclude it, 
drafts an exemption clause and incorporates it into the contract. In many 
cases the other party having weaker bargaining position does not 
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appreciate that this is being done or understand its legal effect on his 
rights. The real problem with standard form contract is that they may 
contain unfair terms. In particular they frequently contain exemption, 
exclusion or limitation clauses which exclude some rights which one of 
the parties would otherwise have had under the common law or reduce 
the remedies available to him. 
(i) EXCLUDING AND LIMITING TERMS 
There are many types of exemption, exclusion or limitation 
clauses, a few may be cited here: 
(a) Limiting the compensation for a breach of contract: In the case 
of Harbutt's Plasticine Ltd. V. Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd}, the 
defendants agreed with the plaintiff to design and install equipment for 
storing and dispensing stearine in a molten state at their factory. The 
defendants specified durapipe, a form of plastic pipe. In fact this was 
wholly unsuitable for the purpose. It burst at the very first testing leading 
to a fire which destroyed the factory. The defendants had limited their 
liability under the contract for any accident etc. to £ 2330. The plaintiffs 
loss was much greater. 
The court of Appeal held that the defendants were guilty of 
fundamental breach and therefore, they could not avail of the limitation 
clause and were liable for the cost of reinstating the factory. The court 
pointed out that one must look not merely at the quality of breach but also 
at its result. If the result of the breach is the total destruction of the 
subject- matter of the contract then the contract is automatically at the end 
along with all its exception clauses. 
Widgery LJ observed, "I must now turn to the issues raised as 
to the measure of damage. The distinction between those cases 
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in which the measure of damage is the cost of repair of the 
damaged article, and those in which it is the diminution in 
value of the article, is not clearly defined. In my opinion each 
case depends on its own facts, it being remembered, first, that 
the purpose of the award of damages is to restore the plaintiff 
to his position before the loss occurred, and secondly, that the 
plaintiff must act reasonably to mitigate his loss. If the article 
damaged is a motor car of popular make, the plaintiff cannot 
charge the defendant with the cost of repair when it is cheaper 
to buy a similar car on the market. On the other hand, if no 
substitute for the damaged article is available and no 
reasonable alternative can be provided, the plaintiff should be 
entitled to the cost of repair. It was clear in the present case that 
it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to rebuild their factory, 
because there was no other way in which they could carry on 
their business and retain their labour force. The plaintiffs 
rebuilt their factory to a substantially different design, and if 
this had involved expenditure beyond the cost of replacing the 
old, the difference might not have been recoverable, but there 
is no suggestion of this here. Nor do 1 accept that the plaintiff 
must give credit under the heading "betterment" for the fact 
that their new factory is modem in design and materials. To do 
so would be the equivalent of forcing the plaintiff to invest 
their money in the modernizing of their plant which might be 
highly inconvenient for them. Accordingly I agree with the 
sum allowed by the trial judge as the cost of replacement." 
In ''Suisse Atlantique Societe d' Armament Maritime SA V. 
Rotterdamsche Kalen Centrale 's case , a contract of charter party 
whereby a ship was to be leased for two consecutive years was entered 
into by the owners of the ship and the charters. The purpose of the charter 
party was that, on each voyage, the vessel should proceed in ballast to an 
Atlantic port in the United States and there load coal to be carried to a 
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port in the Netherlands, During the relevant period of time the vessel 
made only eight voyages and spent some 380 days in ports of loading or 
discharge. There was a provision in the contract for payment of 
demurrage (i.e. delay beyond the time agreed upon) except where the 
delay was beyond the control of the charterer. The owners claimed that 
by reason of the failure of the charterers to perform their contractual 
obligations to load and discharge they were deprived of earnings 
amounting to at least $ 5,80,000. However, the agreed rate of demurrage 
was $ 1,50,000, and the charterers pleaded that the owners were entitled 
to demurrage only. 
Lord Reid observed: 
"Exemption clauses differ greatly in many respects. 
Probably the most objectionable are found in the complex 
standard conditions which are now so common. In the ordinary 
way the customer has no time to read them, and if he did read 
them, he would probably not understand them. If he did 
understand and object to any of them, he would generally be told 
that he could take it or leave it. If he then went to another 
supplier, the result would be the same. Freedom to contract must 
surely imply some choice or room for bargaining. At the other 
extreme is the case where parties are bargaining on terms of 
equality and stringent exemption clause is accepted for a quid 
pro quo or other good reason; but this rule appears to treat all 
case alike. There is no indication in the recent cases that the 
courts are to consider whether the exemption is fair in all the 
circumstances or is harsh and unconscionable, or whether it was 
freely agreed by the customer. It does not seem to me to be 
satisfactory that the decision must always go one way if, e.g. 
defects in a car or other goods are just sufficient to make the 
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breach of a contract a fundamental breach, but must always go 
the other way if the defects fall just short of that." 
(b) Limiting the time during which a remedy is available: 
Sometime a party to the contract imposes such terms by which he is not 
bound by any liability under the contract after the expiry of certain 
specified period. 
In Beck V. Szymanowski '^ cotton threads delivered under the 
contract were found to be 6% shorter than they should have been and the 
seller sought to get rid of the liability for short delivery by sheltering 
himself under the exemption clause under which it was provided that the 
goods actually delivered would be taken to be in accordance with the 
contract in all respects unless the sellers were informed within 14 days of 
delivery of something wrong. The buyers discovered the shortage when 
they put the threads to actual use and that was much later than 14 days. 
The court did not permit the seller to use his clause for creating this 
phenomenon that goods not delivered should be taken to have been 
delivered. 
(c) Excluding express or implied terms: 
Clauses by which a seller of goods or any other person for breach 
of express or implied terms have always been looked upon by the courts 
with disfavour and very often they are construed against the person who 
put it forward where a substance quite different from that contracted for 
has been delivered, the exemption clause has no application because the 
difference cannot be said to constitute "defect." This principle also 
applies where a used car is supplied instead of a new car. 
An example of excluding express or implied term is afforded by 
Karsale's case. In Karsale's (Harrow) Ltd. V. Wallis"^, a man named 
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Stinton offered a Buick car to Wallis, the defendant. Wallis wished to buy 
it, but could only afford to do so on credit. Stinton was not a dealer and 
could not arrange hire-purchase directly, so he sold car to Karsales, who 
sold it to a finance company who let it on hire-purchase to Wallis, Stinton 
retained possession of the car throughout, but when he delivered it to 
Wallis the cylinder head had been removed, the valves in the engine had 
been burnt out, two of the pistons had been broken, the tyres had been 
damaged and the radio removed. The car was towed to Wallis' premises 
late at night. Wallis refused to accept the car and got Stinton to take it 
away. The finance company got Karsales to take over the hire-purchase 
agreement, and Karsales Sued Wallis for arrears. Karsales relied on CI. 3 
(g). 
'No condition or warranty that the vehicle is roadworthy, or as to 
its age, condition or fitness for any purpose is given by the owner or 
implied herein.' 
The defendant refused to accept it or pay the hire-purchase 
installments; and when sued for these, pleaded the state of the so-called 
car. In reply to this plea, the plaintiffs relied on the excluding term. The 
court of Appeal held that the thing delivered was not the thing contracted 
for. The excluding term therefore did not avail the plaintiffs and 
judgement was given for the defendant. The court of Appeal found that 
because there had been a fundamental breach of the contract the assignee 
could not rely upon the exemption clause. 
Denning LJ observed: 
"The law about exempting clauses has been much developed 
in recent years, at any rate about printed exempting clauses, 
which so often pass unread. Notwithstanding earlier cases 
which might suggest the contrary, it is now settled that 
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exempting clauses of this kind, no matter how widely they are 
expressed, only avail the party when he is carrying out his 
contract in its essential respects. He is not allowed to use them 
as a cover for misconduct or indifference to enable him to 
turn a blind eye to his obligations. They do not avail him 
when he is guilty of a breach which goes to the very root of 
the contract. The thing to do is to look at the contract apart 
from the exempting clauses and see what are the terms, 
express or implied, which impose an obligation on the party. 
If he has been guilty of a breach of those obligation in a 
respect which goes to the very root of the contract he cannot 
rely on the exempting clauses." 
Excluding and limiting terms and its use in the contract is not new. 
The problem which an individual faces is not by the excluding and 
limiting terms but by its increased use in standard form contracts. In a 
contract where the parties enter after negotiation and have equal 
bargaining power they can alter the terms and incorporate the terms in the 
contract which suits them most, but in standard fonn contract where one 
party to the contract signs on the dotted line and the other party who has 
strong bargaining position prepared and drafts the contract and in this 
process incorporates excluding and limiting terms in the contract which 
comes as a utter shock before an individual. When a person enters into a 
contract which is in the standard form he simply signs on the dotted line, 
he has no idea of the existence of excluding and limiting terms in the 
contract. Thus neither the standard form contract nor the excluding and 
limiting terms poses any problem for an individual but problem arises 
when both come together i.e. excluding and limiting terms are 
incorporated in the standard form contract. 
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A party to the contract who is guilty of breach or has broken a 
'fundamental term' or a 'fundamental contractual obligation which goes 
to the very root of the contract disentitles him from relying on the 
exempting clause. He is not allowed to use exempting clause as a cover 
for misconduct or indifference or to enable him to turn a blind eye to his 
obligations.^ 
If a party to the contract wants to govern the contractual relation 
with the other party on the basis of the provisions of an unsigned 
document introduced during the course of negotiation, it is necessary for 
the party relying on the document to show that it was intended by the 
parties to be a contractual document and that the other party has 
reasonable notice of its terms. The particular document relied on as 
containing notice of excluding or limiting terms should be an integral part 
of the contract. It must have been intended as a contractual document and 
not as a mere acknowledgement of payment. Thus in order to be 
contractual, a document must be introduced at or before the making of the 
contract and must be of such a nature that a reasonable person would 
expect it to contain terms governing the contract. 
In the case of Chapelton V. Barry Urban District Council, a pile 
of deck chairs belonging to the defendant Barry U.D. Council were 
placed on a beach. Beside the deck chairs was a notice which said "Hire 
of chairs, 2 d per session of three hours." Then followed words which 
said that the public were respectfully requested to obtain tickets for their 
chairs from the attendants, and that tickets were to be retained for 
inspection. Chapelton who was visiting the beach, took two chairs from 
an attendant and received two tickets in return. He merely glanced at the 
tickets c;nd slipped them into his pocket without reading them. When he 
sat on one of the chairs, it collapsed and he was injured. Chapelton sued 
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the Barry Council for damages. At the hearing he said in evidence that he 
had no idea that there were any conditions on the tickets but the council 
relied upon an exemption clause on the ticket which said "The council 
will not be liable for any accident or damage arising from the hire of 
chairs." The court of Appeal found that the exemption clause did not 
avail the council because a reasonable man would not have expected the 
ticket to contain contractual terms but would have regarded it merely as a 
receipt. No reasonable man would assume that the ticket was anything but 
a receipt for the money. The notice on the beach constituted the offer, 
which the plaintiff accepted when he took the chair, and the notice 
contained no statement limiting the liability of the council. The defendant 
had failed to satisfy the court that the ticket was a contractual document. 
Similarly a parking ticket issued by an automatic machine been 
held to be a non-contractual document. 
In the case of Thornton V. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd., the plaintiff 
went to park his car at a multi-storey car park owned and operated by the 
defendants. He had not been there before. At the entry to the car park 
there was a sign stating the charges and that parking was 'at owner's 
risk', the plaintiff then drove in past a machine which dispensed ticket. 
The ticket bore the time of entry and, in small print, the words: 
'This ticket is issued subject to the conditions of issue as displayed 
on the premises.' 
Inside the premises were notices displaying the conditions, which 
purported to exclude liability to customers, not only for damage to cars 
but for personal injuries. On his return to collect his car, the plaintiff was 
injured. The defendants argued that the conditions excluded their liability 
but the court of Appeal held that the ticket came too late, as by that stage 
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the plaintiff had driven up the entrance ramp and it was practically 
impossible for him to withdraw from his intended entry. 
Lord Denning MR observed: 
"The customer pays his money and gets a ticket. He cannot 
refuse it. He cannot get his money back. He may protest to the 
machine, even swear at it; but it will remain unmoved. He is 
committed beyond recall. He was committed at the very moment 
when he put his money into the machine. The contract was 
concluded at that time. It can be translated into offer and 
acceptance in this way. The offer is made when the proprietor of 
the machine holds it out as being ready to receive the money. 
The acceptance takes place when the customer puts his money 
into the slot. The terms of the offer are contained in the notice 
placed on or near the machine stating what is offered for the 
money. The customer is bound by those terms as long as they 
are sufficiently brought to his notice before hand, but not 
otherwise. He is not bound by the terms printed on the ticket if 
they differ from the notice, because the ticket comes too late. In 
the present case the offer was contained in the notice at the 
entrance giving the charges for garaging and saying "at owner's 
risk", i.e. at the risk of the owner so far as damage to the car was 
concerned. The offer was accepted when the plaintiff drove upto 
the entrance and, by the movement of his car, turned the light 
from red to green, and the ticket was thrust at him. The contract 
was then concluded, and it could not be altered by any words 
printed on the ticket itself." 
A similar example is afforded by Burnett V. Westminster Bank 
Ltd}, the plaintiff had for some years accounts at two of the defendants' 
branches - branch A and branch B. A new cheque book was issued to 
him by branch A, on the front cover of which was a no+ice that 'the 
cheques in this book will be applied to the account for which they have 
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been prepared'. These cheques were in fact designed for use in a 
computer system, operated by branch A, and magnetized ink was used 
which the computer could read. The plaintiff knew that there were words 
on the cover of the cheque book, but had not read them. He drew a 
cheque for £ 2300 but crossed out branch A and substituted branch B. 
The computer could not read the plaintiffs ink. He later wished to stop 
the cheque and told branch B. Meanwhile the computer had debited his 
account at branch A. He sued the defendants for breach of contract, and 
they pleaded the limiting words on the cover of the cheque book. 
But the court gave the judgement for the plaintiff. Mocatta J 
observed that the cheque book is not a contractual document. The cheque 
book could not reasonably assumed to contain terms of the contract and 
the defendants had not in fact given adequate notice of the restriction to 
the plaintiff. They were, in fact, seeking without his assent, to alter the 
terms of the contract. 
Thus the courts distinguished between two types of the documents 
namely contractual document and non-contractual document. If a 
document is unsigned then in order for the provisions of an unsigned 
document introduced during the course of negotiations to govern the 
contractual relations of both the parties, it is necessary for the party 
relying on the document to show that it was intended by the parties to be 
a contractual document and that the other party had reasonable notice of 
its terms. In order to be contractual, a document must be introduced at or 
before the making of the contract and must be of such a nature that a 
reasonable person would expect it to contain terms governing the 
contract. The terms of the contract should be introduced before the 
contract is made but not after the making of the contract where the 
contract is complete i.e. the offer is accepted by the person entering into 
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the contract then a notice of the terms and conditions or excluding terms 
is immaterial for the person as he is not bound by those terms. Only those 
terms which the person knows before the contract is made whether by his 
own knowledge or by information given by the other party directly or by 
reasonable notice are binding on the person entered into the contract, and 
for those excluding and limiting terms of which the person does not have 
any knowledge or information before entering into the contract he is not 
bound by those terms. Thus the notice of the terms and conditions of the 
contract should be given before the contract is made but if its notice is 
given afterwards on the ticket or any other thing when the contract is 
complete then the court will regard that document as non-contractual and 
the person entered into the contract will be not liable or bound by those 
terms and conditions. 
(2) Law regarding Exemption Clauses 
The idea of mass production for mass consumption and distribution 
is not possible unless we have standard form contracts having uniform set 
of pre-drafted terms and conditions printed on it. Standard form contracts 
can be used time to time and again and again and continuously for any 
number of persons who may come and wish to enter into the contract 
with a large and giant organization. Time is money, so one object of these 
standard form contracts is to save time, time is saved so money is saved. 
These contracts are cost fi^iendly when money is saved then the big and 
giant organization may give some additional benefit to its customers 
entering into the contract. The cost incurred in these type of contracts is 
less than the contracts negotiated individually. 
But a less defensible object of the use of standard form contracts 
has been the exploitation or abuse of the superior bargaining power of 
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commercial suppliers when contra«9t^|DtWwe532»^iduals. The party in 
strong bargaining position drafts the standard terms in ways highly 
favourable to himself both by means of clauses of exclusion and limiting 
clauses, which limits the liability under the contract, for failure to 
perform or for defective performance and also they incorporate such 
provisions in the contract which is extremely one sided and confers rights 
on him under the contract. In cases concerning exemption clauses, the 
courts were to a considerable extent able to redress the balance in favour 
of the parties prejudicially affected by standard form contracts; but they 
were less inclined to do so where standard terms conferred rights on the 
supplier. In both field, legislative intervention has become increasingly 
important.^ 
Until recently, the ordinary principles of the law of contract applied 
to such contracts. But these principles may not be capable of providing a 
just solution for a transaction in which freedom of contract exists on one 
side only. In particular, the party delivering the document may allocate 
the risks of non-performance or defective performance to the other party. 
While such allocation of risks should in principle lead to lower costs, it is 
only justifiable if at least some of the cost saving is passed on and if the 
other party is aware of the contractual allocation risks. In fact the party 
delivering the document may seek unfair exemption from certain 
common law liabilities, and thus seek to deprive the other party of the 
compensation which that person might reasonably expect to receive from 
any loss or injury or damage arising out of the transaction. Moreover, 
standard form contracts with consumers are often contained in some 
printed ticket, or notice, or receipt, which is brought to the attention of the 
consumer at the time th.e agreement, is made and which a prudent 
consumer would read from beginning to end. In fact, however, the 
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consumer normally has neither the time nor energy to do this, and, even if 
this was done, it would be of little assistance for the consumer could not 
vary the terms in any way. It is not until some dispute arises that the 
consumer realizes how few are the rights in the contract. Acting within 
the limitations imposed on them by the contractual framework of these 
transactions, the courts nevertheless endeavoured to alleviate the position 
of the recipient of the document by requiring certain standards of notice 
in respect of onerous terms, and by construing the document wherever 
possible in that person's favour.'*^ 
The courts evolved some models of protection for the individual. 
A. Reasonable notice: 
In order for the terms of an unsigned document to be binding, it is 
necessary for the party against whom the terms of the unsigned document 
are sought to be enforced to have knowledge of these terms or to have 
been given reasonable notice of the existence of such terms. What 
constitutes reasonable notice will depend upon the circumstances of each 
case. Where a party to the contract is delivering a document to the other 
party to the contract, he is duty bound to give the other party adequate 
notice of the terms and conditions printed on that document. If the 
adequate notice of the printed terms and conditions is not given than the 
offeree was held not liable and bound by those terms and conditions. 
In the case of Henderson V. Stevenson," the plaintiff lieutenants 
paid the fare for a passage from Dublin to Whitehaven and received a 
ticket which, on the face of it, had only the words "Dublin to 
Whitehaven" on the back of the ticket were words exempting the 
company from liability for loss of luggage. The ship was wrecked, and 
the lieutenant sued for loss of his luggage. 
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It was held by the House of Lords that the condition was no part of 
the contract. The company could not rely on the condition printed on the 
back, which, in fact, the plaintiff had not seen, and therefore had not 
assented to and to which his attention had not been directed. 
In the case of Parker V. South Eastern Railway Co.'^, the plaintiff 
deposited his bag in the cloakroom at the defendants' station. He paid 2d 
and was given a ticket, on the face of which was printed the times at 
which the cloakroom was open and the words 'see back'. On the back 
was a clause stating that the company would not be responsible for any 
package exceeding the value of £ 10, and a placard to the same effect 
hung in the cloakroom. The bag, which was worth more than £ 10, was 
lost or stolen, and the plaintiff claimed its value. The trial judge left two 
questions to the jury: 
1. Did the plaintiff read or was he aware of the special condition upon 
which the article was deposited? 
2. Was the plaintiff, under the circumstances, under any obligation in 
the exercise of reasonable and proper caution, to read or make 
himself aware of the condition? 
The jury answered both questions in the negative, and found a 
verdict for the plaintiff The court of Appeal ordered a new trial. The jury 
had not been asked the proper question, which was whether the 
defendants did what was reasonably sufficient to give the plaintiff notice 
of the conditions. Thus their finding did not support a verdict for the 
plaintiff Nor, on the other hand, did the mere fact that the plaintiff knew 
that there was writing on the ticket justify a judgement for the defendants, 
for the writing might not have been intended to have contractual effect. 
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The defendants would have to show that they gave "reasonable notice 
that the writing contained conditions." 
Mellish L.J. said, 
"The question then is, whether the plaintiff was bound by the 
conditions contained in the ticket. In an ordinary case, where an 
action is brought on a written agreement which is signed by the 
defendant, the agreement is proved by proving his signature, 
and, in the absence of fraud, it wholly immaterial that he has not 
read the agreement and does not know its contents. If the person 
receiving the ticket does not know that there is any writing upon 
the back of the ticket, he is not bound by a condition printed on 
the back. The plaintiffs admitted that they knew there was 
writing on the back of the ticket, but they swore not only that 
they did not read it, but that they did not know or believe that 
the writing contained conditions... 
Now, I am of the opinion that we cannot lay down, as a 
matter of law, either that the plaintiff was bound or that he was 
not bound by the conditions printed on the ticket, from the mere 
fact that he knew there was writing on the ticket, but did not 
know that the writing contained conditions. I think there may be 
cases in which a paper containing writing is delivered by one 
party to another in the course of a business transaction, where it 
would be quite reasonable that the party receiving it should 
assume that the writing contained in it no condition, and should 
put it in his pocket unread. 
Now the question we have to consider is whether the 
railway company were entitled to assume that a person 
depositing luggage, and receiving a ticket in such a way that he 
could see that some writing was printed on it, would understand 
that the writing contained the conditions of contract, and this 
seems to me to depend upon whether people in general would in 
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fact, and naturally, draw that inference. The railway company, 
as it seems to me, must be entitled to make some assumptions 
respecting the persons who deposits luggage with them: 1 think 
they are entitled to assume that he can read, and that he 
understands the English language, and that he pays such 
attention to what he is about as may be reasonably expected 
from a person such a transaction as that of depositing luggage in 
a cloakroom. The railway company must, however, take 
mankind as they find them, and if what they do is sufficient to 
inform people in general that the ticket contains conditions, I 
think that a particular plaintiff ought not to be in a better 
position than other persons on account of his exceptional 
ignorance or stupidity or carelessness. But if what the railway 
company do is not sufficient to convey to the minds of people in 
general that the ticket contains conditions, then they have 
received goods on deposit without obtaining the consent of the 
persons depositing them to the conditions limiting their liability. 
I am of opinion, therefore, that the proper direction to leave to 
the jury in these cases is, that if the person receiving the ticket 
did not see or know that there was any writing on the ticket, he 
is not bound by the conditions; that if he knew there was 
writing, and knew or believed that the writing contained 
conditions, then he is bound by the conditions; that if he knew 
there was writing on the ticket, but did not know or believe that 
the writing contained conditions, nevertheless he would be 
bound, if the delivering of the ticket to him in such a manner 
that he could see there was writing upon it, was, in the opinion 
of the jury, reasonable notice that the writing contained 
conditions.... 
I have lastly to consider whether the direction of the learned 
judge correct, namely, "was the plaintiff, under the 
circumstances, under any obligation, in the exercise of 
reasonable and proper caution, to read or to make himself aware 
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of the condition?" I think that this direction was not strictly 
accurate, and was calculated to mislead the jury. The plaintiff 
was certainly under no obligation to read the ticket, but was 
entitled do leave it unread if he pleased, and the question does 
not appear to me to direct the attention of the jury to the real 
question, namely, whether the railway company did what was 
reasonably sufficient to give the plaintiff notice of the condition. 
On the whole, I am of opinion that there ought to be a new trial." 
Thus it was held by the court of Appeal that the proper question to 
leave to the jury was whether the company had done that which was 
reasonably sufficient to give the plaintiff notice of the condition. If they 
had done so, he was bound by it as if he had read it. By tendering the bag 
and 2 d the plaintiff made an offer. The ticket with the condition (if the 
company gave the plaintiff notice of the condition) was not an 
unqualified acceptance, but an acceptance on the terms stated. If the 
plaintiff with that notice took the ticket and deposited the bag, he had 
accepted the company's counter offer, although he had not in fact read it. 
The defendant is duty bound to show, that the writing on the ticket 
contains conditions was brought to the notice of the plaintiff The party 
relying on the exemption clause need not to show that he has actually 
brought it to the notice of the other party, but only that he took reasonable 
steps to do so. 
If any exemption or exclusion term is written on a document which 
is simply handed by one party to the contract to the other or is posted up 
or hung nearby on the wall or building etc., where the contract is made, it 
will deemed as incorporated in the contract only when the reasonable 
notice of its existence is given to the other party who may be affected 
adversely by the exemption or exclasioiT clause. An exemption clause 
will not be deemed as incorporated in the contract if it is written or 
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printed on a document of which reasonable notice was not given to the 
other party at the time of entering into the contract. In Chapelton V. Barry 
Urban District Council,'^ the plaintiff lived deck chairs from the 
defendants for three hours. He paid 2d, and was given a ticket which he 
did not read. The ticket provided that the defendants were not to be liable 
for "any accident or damage arising from the hire of the chair." It was 
held that the defendants were not protected by the ticket from liability for 
personal injury to the plaintiff as the ticket was a mere voucher or receipt. 
Their purposes were to show that the plaintiff had paid his fee, and for 
how long the plaintiff was entitled to sit in the chair. It did not purport to 
set out the conditions on which the plaintiff had hired the chair. 
But on the other hand if a document is delivered to the other party 
to the contract, who knows it contained terms of the contract then that 
document is contractual or that document is delivered to the party in such 
circumstances as to give him reasonable notice of the fact that it 
contained conditions, in that case too it is a contractual document. 
Whether a document is contractual or non-contractual will depend upon 
the facts of each case or it will defer from time to time. After the decision 
in Parker V. South Eastern Railway''* it had been established at that time 
that railway ticket were not contractual as there was no general practice at 
that time, that they contained conditions. But nowadays such tickets are 
regarded as contractual document because everybody know that tickets 
contain conditions. 
Printed notices containing conditions exhibited at the counter of a 
left-luggage office at a railway station have been held to become part of 
the contract where the ticket or receipts refers to notices.'^ In Watkins V. 
Rymill'^ the plaintiff deposited a Wagonette with the defendant for bale 
on commission. He was given a receipt containing the words "subject to 
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the conditions exhibited on the premises." This receipt was held to be a 
contractual document. The transaction was not "a simple contract the 
terms of which are established by the common law in the absence of any 
special agreement by parties" but one in which special terms had to be 
made. 
In these types of contracts, in which the basis of the contract is 
issuing of ticket, cannot be formed until the ticket is issued and accepted 
by the passenger, especially in a situation in which everyone expects to 
receive a ticket with conditions in it, and even where the contract is 
formed at an earlier stage, the subsequent document may still be effective 
either, because the parties by conduct subsequently adopt its terms or 
because it is shown that the offeree, at the time of making the agreement 
must have realized that it was being made on the terms of the document 
which was to come. In this latter case, however, it may be that there must 
have been a consistent previous course of conduct. It is not sufficient that 
on some occasions a written document setting out the terms has been 
delivered, if on other occasions no document has been sent. The previous 
dealings of the parties must have been such as to lead the offeree to 
expect the document If the previous practice has varied then nothing short 
of actual notice of the terms of the contract will suffice the purpose. 
In Henry Kendall and Sons V. William Lillico & Sons Ltd. (appeals 
from Hardwick Game Farm V. Suffolk Agricultural and Poultry 
Producers Association-SAPPA) there had been three or four contracts a 
month between two of the parties, Grimsdale and SAPPA. The practice 
had been that when an oral contract had been made, Grimsdale would 
sent a contract note to SAPPA, either later on the same day or on the 
following day on the back of the notes were conditions, including one 
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that 'the buyer..,, takes the responsibility for latent defects'. The House 
of Lords held that it was, 
"reasonable to hold that when SAPPA placed an order to buy, they 
did so on the basis and with the knowledge that an acceptance of the 
order by grimsdale and their agreement to sell would be on the terms and 
conditions set out on their contract notes." 
The court may draw interference from the previous dealings 
between the parties. Another illustration is afforded by Spurling v. 
Bradshaw, in this case the plaintiff and the defendant had been 
contracting with each other for many years. The plaintiffs were 
warehouse owners and the defendant delivered eight barrels of orange 
juice to them for storage. After a few days the defendant, received a 
document acknowledging the receipt of the barrels and referring on its 
face to clauses printed on the back, from the plaintiff. There were clauses 
printed on the back of the document and one such clause exempted the 
plaintiffs 'from any loss or damage occasioned by the negligence, 
wrongful act or default' of themselves or their servants. When the 
defendant came to receive back the barrels from the plaintiffs, they were 
found to be empty. 
The defendant reftised to pay the charges for the storage and the 
plaintiffs sued the defendant. The plaintiff pleaded that there was a clause 
in the document of contract which exempted him from all liability. The 
defendant argued before the court that the document containing the 
clauses sent to him only after the conclusion of the contract and then it 
was too late to affect his rights. But he also admitted before the court that 
in previous dealings with the plaintiff he had often received a similar 
document, though he had never bothered to read it. 
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It was held by the court that the plaintiffs were protected by the 
exempting conditions which had become part of the contract. The 
documents gave reasonable notice of the exemption, and the defendant 
knew that such documents would be issued and took no objection to 
them. 
In this case of Spurling V. Bradshaw there was consistent cause 
of dealings between the parties and the defendant knew that there were 
terms on the document at earlier occasions, but another example may be 
given here where it was held that there were no evidence of consistent 
previous dealings between the parties. 
In McCutcheon V. David MacBrayne, the plaintiff had shipped 
his car several times on the dependents' ship between Islay and the 
mainland of Scotland. The evidence was that sometimes he was asked to 
sign a risk not containing exempting conditions, and sometimes not. On 
the relevant voyage, on which the ship sank owing to the defendants 
negligence, the plaintiffs brother had arranged the shipment and had not 
been asked to sign a risk note. 
The House of Lords held that MacBrayne could not rely on the 
conditions in their form because they had not proved that McCutcheon 
knew of the terms of the relevant condition and there was no consistent 
course of dealing between the parties. 
Another illustration on the 'course of dealing is afforded by Hollier 
V. Rambler Motors (AMC) Ltd?^ The plaintiff had taken his car for 
servicing to the defendants' garage three or four times over a five year 
period. On previous occasions he had been asked to sign a service 
'invoice' containing conditions, but on the relevant occasion this step was 
omitted. Normally he signed a form which provided: 
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"The company is not responsible for damage caused by five to 
customers' car on the premises." 
On this occasion in question the plaintiff did not sign the form. His 
car was damaged in a fire caused by the negligence of the garage. The 
court of Appeal held that the form was not incorporated into the contract 
by a previous course of dealing. 
Salmon L.J. Observed: 
"That really disposes of this appeal, but in case I am wrong on the 
view that I have formed, without any hesitation I may say, that the 
course of dealing did not import the so-called exclusion clause, 1 
think I should deal with the point as to whether or not the words on 
the bottom of the form, had they been incorporated in the contract, 
would have excluded the defendants' liability to compensate the 
plaintiff for damage to the plaintiffs car by a five which had been 
caused by the defendant's own negligence. It is well settled that a 
clause excluding liability for negligence should make its meaning 
plain on its face to any ordinarily literate and sensible person. The 
easiest way of doing that, of course, is to state expressly that the 
garage, tradesman or merchant, as the case may be, will not be 
responsible for any damage caused by his own negligence. No 
doubt merchant, tradesman, garage proprietors and the like are a 
little shy of writing in an exclusion clause quite so bluntly as that. 
Clearly it would not tend to attract customers, and might even put 
many off I am not saying that an exclusion clause cannot be 
effective to exclude negligence unless it does not so expressly, but 
in order for the clause to be effective the language should be so 
plain that it clearly bears that meaning. 1 do not think that 
defendants should be allowed to shelter behind language which 
might lull the customer into a false sense of security by letting him 
think-unless perhaps he happens to be a lawyer - th^ :t he 'would 
have redress against the person with whom he was dealing for any 
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damage which he, the customer, might suffer by the negUgence of 
that person." 
He further observed: 
"But here I think the ordinary man or woman would be equally 
surprised and horrified to learn that if the garage was so negligent 
that a fire was caused which damaged their car, they would be 
without remedy because of the words in the condition. I can quite 
understand that the ordinary man or woman would consider that, 
because of these words, the mere fact that there was a fire would 
not make the garage liable. Fires can occur from a large variety of 
causes, only one of which is negligence on the part of the occupier 
of the premises, and that is by no means the most frequent cause. 
The ordinary man would I think say to himself: 
"Well, what they are telling me is that if there is a fire due to any 
cause other than their own negligence they are not responsible for 
it.' To my mind, if the defendants were seeking to exclude their 
responsibility for a fire caused by their own negligence, they ought 
to have done so in far plainer language than the language here 
used. In my view, the words of the condition would be understood 
as being meant to be a warning to the customer that if a fire does 
occur at the garage which damages the car, and is not caused by 
the negligence of the garage owner is not responsible for damage." 
The requirement of reasonable notice may further be illustrated by 
the case of Richardson, Spence & Co. V. Rowntree, in this case the 
plaintiff took a ticket for a journey on the defendants' steamer. Her ticket 
was so folded that the writing inside could not be read without opening it. 
When the plaintiff claimed damages for personal injuries, the defendants 
relied on a clause printed inside the ticket limiting their liability to $ 100. 
The jury found that the plaintiff knew that there was writing on the ticket 
but not that it contained conditions; and that the defendants had not done 
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what was reasonably sufficient to give the plaintiff notice of the 
conditions. 
The House of Lords held that the plaintiff was entitled to 
judgement: and rejected the argument that there was no evidence to 
support the jury's finding and that the judgement should therefore be 
entered for the defendants notwithstanding the verdict. 
The case of Thompson V. London, Midland and Scottish Railway 
Co. turns in part on the way in which the ticket was presented to the 
plaintiff. It should be contrasted from this point of view with 
Richardson's^'* case. In this case the plaintiff, Mrs. Thompson, travelled 
on a excursion train from Manchester to Darwin and was injured while 
alighting from the train owing to the company's negligence. The train 
was on an excursion run on a special occasion for a special fare which 
was half the normal price. On the face of the ticket, which was purchased 
on Mrs. Thompson's behalf by her niece, were the words "Issued subject 
to conditions and regulations in the company's time table," which could 
be bought for 6d. In the company's time table there were words 
"Excursion tickets and tickets issued at fares less than the ordinary fares 
are issued subject to the condition that neither the holders or any other 
person shall have any right of action against the company in respect of 
injury (fatal or otherwise), loss damage or delay however caused." The 
claimant Mrs. Thompson could not read the words on the ticket as she 
was illiterate and nothing was said to her about the conditions. 
The jury found that the defendants had not taken reasonable steps 
to bring the conditions to the claimant's notice. But the court of Appeal 
held that there was no evidence to support this finding as the notice was 
68 
clear and as the ticket was a common form contractual document, and the 
exemption clause was held to be incorporated in the contract. 
Lord Hanworth M.R. observed that, 
"It appears to me important to bear in mind that we are dealing 
with a special contract made for a special transit by an excursion 
train. We are not dealing with the ordinary schedule of trains 
available to everyone at the usual rate. We are dealing with a 
particular transit, in respect of which the father (of the niece) went 
down to the station to know if and when such transit was available, 
and ascertained both the time and the price, and he could have 
learned all the conditions if he had been so minded. 
That consideration, that it was an excursion train and a special 
contract, must be borne in mind; for there are a number of cases 
which, if you do not bear that in mind, might be taken as applying 
and applying in a contrary sense to the present case. For instance, I 
think that in dealing with Parker V. South Eastern Railway Co. it 
must be remembered as regards the condition which was there 
relied upon as to limitation of liability in respect of goods 
deposited in a cloakroom, that the limit there arose upon a ticket 
which had been handed to the depositor; but it was unnecessary for 
the purpose of the deposit and the safe custody that there should be 
any terms or conditions at all, or indeed, that there should be a 
written contract at all. Therefore, the contract was one which could 
be made, and might very ordinarily be made, without any written 
conditions of any sort or kind; and that feature is dwelt upon as 
significant in the judgement of Lord Coleridge C.J. in the court 
below, where he says "Regard being had to the common and 
ordinary course of business, it seems to me to be reasonable that a 
man receiving such a ticket as this should look upon it as a mere 
voucher for the receipt of the package deposited, and a means of 
identifymg him as the owner when he sought to reclaim it," and in 
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that sense not containing any special condition to which his 
attention was to be drawn. And in the court of Appeal observation 
are made which must be taken with that qualifying factor arising 
upon the issue of the ticket. Bramwell L.J. (as he then was) there 
says: "Would the depositor be bound? 1 might content myself by 
asking: Would he be, if he were told 'our condition are on this 
ticket,' and he did not read them. In my judgement, he would not 
be bound in either case. I think there is an implied understanding 
that there is no condition unreasonable to the knowledge of the 
party tendering the document and not insisting or its being read -
no condition not relevant to the matter in hand. I am of opinion, 
therefore, that the plaintiffs, having notice of the printing, were in 
the same situation as though the porter had said: "Read that, it 
concerns the matter in hand': that if the plaintiffs did not read it, 
they were as much bound as if they had read it and had not 
objected. 
Now there is the present case. It was quite clear, and everybody 
understood and knew that there would have to be a ticket issued. 
Without such ticket, which is the voucher showing the money has 
been paid, it would not be possible for the lady to go on the 
platform to take her train, or on reaching the end of her transit to 
leave the platform without giving up a ticket. It is quite clear, 
therefore, that it was intended there should be a ticket; and on that 
ticket plainly on its face is a reference made to the conditions 
under which it is issued." 
It is submitted here that the decision of the court of Appeal in this 
case seems to be on the extreme side since it is impossible for an illiterate 
lady to pay an additional 6 d to purchase a railway time table to get it read 
from any other literate person and take information about the terms and 
conditions on which she bought the railway ticket and that too in the 
absence of any direction to her by railway administration that terms and 
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conditions, on wiiich this ticket is issued, is written elsewhere. The cost 
of the railway time table was approximately one fifth of the fare which 
the lady had already paid and the exemption clause was written on page 
no. 552 of the railway time table. In these circumstances the chances of 
voluminous railway time table being bought and get it read seems very 
bleak, and it seems that the findings of the jury "that the defendants had 
not taken reasonable steps to bring the conditions to the claimants 
notice," are correct but the court of Appeal held otherwise. 
Denning L.J. has rightly said in Spurling V. Bradshaw^^ that "some 
clauses which I have seen would need to be printed in red ink on the face 
of the document with a red hand pointing to it before the notice could be 
held to be sufficient." Also in a case where a ticket had the words "for 
conditions see back" printed on the face of the ticket, but these were 
obliterated by the date stamp, it was held that no steps reasonably 
sufficient to bring the conditions to the notice of the passenger had been 
taken. 
The requirement of notice is based on the principle of 'consensus 
ad idem' a meeting of mind, that is one of the essential requisites of the 
formation of valid contract. A person entering into a contract should 
know all of the terms and conditions of the contract, and if all the terms 
of the contract is not at one place or at a place where the contract is being 
made, then it is the duty of the other party to give adequate notice of all 
the terms of the contract. Notice of the terms should be at the place where 
the contract is made or at some conspicuous place, clear, visible and 
striking to eyes, so that any person wishing to enter into the contract can 
see it beforehand. The rule of fair play requires that the terms of the 
contract should not be Hidden, ambiguous, equivocal, obscure or written 
in such a legal or technical language which is difficult to understand for a 
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common man. If an exemption clause is unusual in that type of trade or 
business tiien there should be an extra and special measure be taken by 
the party taking advantage of that term, to intimate to the other party. 
When for instance one condition in a contract is particularly onerous then 
there should be an extra and special effort is required to draw customer's 
attention to that particular condition. If a exemption clause is so wide in 
its application and is unusual then an unusual and explicit notice is 
required, and the application of this rule is not limited to particular type 
of ticket cases where the parties exempts them from all type of liabilities 
but this is for general application. This is, what at least, appears from the 
decision of court of Appeal in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. V. Stiletto 
Visual Programmes Ltd. In this case the advertising agency of the 
defendant required photographs of the 1950s for a presentation for a 
client, from the plaintiff. On 5 March 1984 they telephoned the plaintiffs, 
who ran a library of photographic transparencies and with whom they had 
not dealt before, inquiring whether the plaintiffs had any photographs of 
that period which might be suitable for the presentation. On the same day 
the plaintiffs dispatched to the defendants 47 transparencies packed in a 
bag with a delivery note which clearly specified that the transparencies 
were to be returned by 19 March and which under the heading 
'conditions' printed prominently in capitals, set out nine printed 
conditions in four columns. Condition 2 stated that all transparencies 
were to be returned within 14 days from the date of delivery and that "A 
holding fee of £ 5.00 plus VAT per day will be charged for each 
transparency which is retained by you longer than the said period of 14 
days." The defendants accepted delivery of the transparencies but it was 
unlikely that they read any of the conditions. The defendants did not use 
the transparencies for their presentation but instead put them to one side 
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and forgot about them. The transparencies were not returned to the 
plaintiffs until 2 April. The plaintiffs sent the defendants an invoice for £ 
3,783.50 being the holding charge calculated at £ 5 per transparency per 
day from 19 March to 2 April. The defendants refused to pay and the 
plaintiffs brought an action against them claiming the amount of the 
invoice. The trail judge gave judgement for the plaintiffs and the 
defendants appealed. 
The court of Appeal held that the defendants are not liable to pay 
this amount i.e. £ 3783.50, because the plaintiffs failed to bring, onerous 
clause, into the attention of the defendants. Condition No. 2 was not 
incorporated into the standard printed conditions. 
Dillon L.J. observed: 
"The contract came into existence when the plaintiffs sent the 
transparencies to the defendants and the defendants, after opening 
the bag, accepted them by Mr. Beeching's phone call to the 
plaintiffs at 3:10 on March 5. The question is whether condition 2 
was a term of that contract. 
Condition 2 of these plaintiffs' conditions is in my judgement a 
very onerous clause. The defendants could not conceivably have 
known, if their attention was not drawn to the clause, that the 
plaintiffs were proposing to charge a 'holding fee' for the retention 
of the transparencies at such a very high and exorbitant rate." 
At the time of the ticket cases in the last century it was notorious 
that people hardly ever troubled to read printed conditions on a ticket or 
delivery note or similar document. That remains the case now. In the 
intervening years the printed conditions have tended to become more 
complicated and more and more one-sided in favour of the party who is 
imposing them, but the other parties, if they notice that there are printed 
73 
conditions at all, generally still tend to assume that such conditions are 
only concerned which ancillary matters of form and are not of 
importance. In the ticket cases the courts held that the common law 
required that reasonable steps to be taken to draw the other parties' 
attention to the printed conditions or they would not be part of the 
contract. It is in my judgement a logical development of the common law 
into modem conditions that it should be held, as it was in Thornton V. 
Shoe Lane Parking Ltd., that, if one condition in a set of printed 
conditions is particularly onerous or unusual, the party seeking to enforce 
it must show that, that particular condition was fairly brought to the 
attention of the party. 
In the present case, nothing whatever was done by the plaintiffs to 
draw the defendants' attention particularly to condition 2; it was merely 
one of four columns' width of conditions printed across the foot of the 
delivery note. Consequently condition 2 never, in my judgement became 
part of the contract between the parties. 
At the hearing of this appeal in the court of Appeal Binghan L.J. 
also presided and he stated as under: 
"... Turning to the present case, I am satisfied for reasons which 
Dillon LJ has given that no contract was made on the telephone 
when the defendants made their initial request. I am equally 
satisfied that no contract was made on delivery of the 
transparencies to the defendants before the opening of the jiffy bag 
in which they were contained. Once the jiffy bag was opened and 
the transparencies taken out with the delivery note, it is in my 
judgement an inescapable inference that the defendants would have 
recognised the delivery note as a document of a kind likely to 
contain contractual terms and would have seen that there were 
conditions printed in small but visible lettering on the face of the 
74 
document. To the extent that the conditions so displayed were 
common form or usual terms regularly encountered in this 
business. I do not think the defendants could successfully contend 
that they were not incorporated into the contract. 
The crucial question in the case is whether the plaintiffs can be 
said fairly and reasonably to have brought condition 2 to the notice 
of the defendants. The judge made no finding on the point, but I 
think that it is open to this court to draw an inference from the 
primary findings which he did make. In my opinion the plaintiffs 
did not do so. They delivered 47 transparencies, which was a 
number the defendant had not specifically asked for. Condition 2 
contained a daily rate per transparency after the initial period of 14 
days many times greater than was usual or (so far as the evidence 
shows) heard of. For these 47 transparencies there was to be a 
charge for each day of delay of £ 235 plus value added tax. The 
result would be that a venial period of delay, as here, would lead to 
an inordinate liability. The defendants are not to be relieved of that 
liability because they did not read the condition, although 
doubtless they did not; but in my judgement they are to be relieved 
because the plaintiffs did not do what was necessary to draw this 
unreasonable and extortionate clause fairly to their attention. I 
would accordingly allow the defendants' appeal and substitute for 
the judge's award^* the sum which he assessed on the alternative 
basis of quantum meruit." 
In this case condition No. 2 printed in standard form sent with the 
bag by the plaintiffs was held by the court of Appeal as onerous and 
unusual. There is no yardstick which can tell us what a usual term is and 
what is unusual. It will differ from business to business and place to 
place. Contractual terms are often set out in standard form which are used 
for all contracts of the same kind, and are only varied so far as the 
circumstances of each contract require. Such terms may be settled by a 
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trade association for use by its members for contracting with each other 
or with members of the outside public. What is normal and general 
practice in a particular trade or profession can be decided by the courts on 
the basis of evidence put forward by the litigating parties. The courts too 
on the basis common sense can come to a conclusion what is usual and 
what is unusual or onerous. In this case, the provision for the late 
payment after 14 days was not a unusual clause. The court felt it is 
unreasonable and extortionate to demand late payment after 14 days at 
the rate of £ 5 per transparency, per day and that without clear, specific 
and extra notice. Thus the principle to be seems that if there is unusual 
term in a standard form contract then an unusual and specific notice is to 
be given to the other party. There should be a reasonable notice of the 
contractual terms. In order that the unusual terms of a contract become 
binding all that is necessary to draw the attention of the other party, very 
clearly and specifically to the pre-drafted terms of the contract. If the 
attention of a party to the contract has been drawn to the terms of the 
contract by a reasonable notice will suffice the purpose or otherwise 
explaining clearly terms of the contract to the other party. If on the other 
hand reasonable and sufficient notice then the other party will be bound 
by these terms of the contract. The party to the contract for the purpose of 
drawing the attention of the other party to the contract may write boldly 
on the printed terms as "For conditions see back' or similar such type of 
reasonable sufficient notice about the terms of the contract has not been 
given then the other party is not bound by those terms. If any of the terms 
of the contract is onerous or unusual then it is the duty of the party taking 
advantage of that term to give extra clear and specific notice of that 
particular term. 
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In the case of M<s Prakash Road Lines (P) Ltd. V. H.M.T. Bearing 
Ltd?^, the 1^ ' defendant is a company registered under Company Act with 
its registered office at Bangalore which is a common carrier within the 
meaning of Section 2 of the Carriers Act 1865. The 2"** defendant is a 
branch of the 1^ ' defendant company at Hyderabad. The respondent 
plaintiff had entrusted to the 2"'* defendant at Hyderabad on 24.01.1983, 
26.02.1983, 09.03, 1983 and 23.03.1983 some consignments of bearings 
valued at Rs. 1,45,726.71 Ps. for the purpose of transporting them from 
Secunderabad to Delhi and for safe delivery to the consignee as per the 
lorry receipts/way bills. The 2"** defendant accepted those consignments 
and issued lorry receipts concerning those consignments. The plaintiff 
was informed through letter dated 15.04.1983 addressed by the 1^ ' 
defendant that the consignments booked by the plaintiff were burnt in a 
fire accident on the intervening night of 4/5.04.1983. The plaintiff 
accordingly demanded the defendants to pay the value of the 
consignments, which is a sum of Rs. 145726.71 Ps., towards the loss 
sustained by it. The V^ defendant, however, informed the plaintiff that the 
defendants are prepared to meet the loss to an extent of 10% out of the 
declared value in the first instance but later raised the same to 20%. The 
plaintiff did not accept the said proposal, but insisted on payment of the 
value of the goods with interest at 18% per annum and as there was no 
positive response from the defendants the plaintiff filed the suit. 
The learned trial court after considering the entire evidence on the 
record decreed the suit of plaintiff against the defendants, as prayed for 
but with future interest at 6% per annum on the principal amount of Rs. 
1,45,726.71 Ps. from the date of the suit till the date of the decree. 
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The defendants then preferrea^F^Ecppegfrn the High Court of 
Andhra Pradesh. Before the High Court there were four issues to be 
decided. 
1. Whether the plaintiff - respondent seeking to recover loss or 
damage is liable to prove negligence on the part of carrier? 
2. Whether by merely printing on vehicle (Lorry) receipts that 
goods are transported at owner's risk be deemed to be one of 
the terms of the agreement in absence of proof of the notice to 
the plaintiff? 
3. Whether parties by mutual consent can invest jurisdiction on 
court not having any jurisdiction? 
4. Can the carrier escape liability on the ground that the plaintiff 
failed to collect goods within reasonable time? 
The Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court presided by 
Justice P. Rama Krishnan Raju and T. Ranga Rao observed: 
" 'Common Carrier' as defined under Section 2 of the Carriers Act 
(3 of 1865) denotes a person engaged in the business of 
transporting property for hire from place to place for all persons 
indiscriminately. Section 9 of the said Act fixes the liability on the 
'common carrier' for any loss or damage or non-delivery of goods 
entrusted to him for carriage and the plaintiff need not establish 
that such loss damage or non-delivery was due to negligence on 
the part of the carrier, his servants or agents. Therefore, it is clear 
that the common carrier has the responsibility under the statute to 
ensure safe delivery of the goods at the destination. In case of loss 
or damage or non-delivery of goods, the plaintiff need not establish 
that the loss or damage or non-delivery occurred due to negligence 
on the part of the carrier, his servants or agents. In this case, 
admittedly, the goods were damaged due to fire accident that 
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occurred during the intervening night of 4/5.04.1983 before 
delivery to the consignee. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to 
recover the loss or damage that occurred to it due to the non-
delivery of the goods entrusted by it to the defendants .... 
Under Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) 
a suit can be instituted where any of the defendants resides or 
carries on business or where the cause of action arises wholly or in 
part. Therefore, law provides an option to the plaintiff to choose its 
forum where more than one court has jurisdiction to try the suit. It 
is op[en to the parties to choose one of the forums for filing the suit 
by agreement and exclude the other forums, but it not competent to 
the parties to invest jurisdiction on a court when it has no 
jurisdiction as consent can not confer jurisdiction. In this case 
extending the above principle the learned counsel for the 
appellants contends that the parties have by consent agreed to 
approach the court at Bangalore and therefore, the subordinate 
judges court, Ranga Reddy district has no jurisdiction. The note 
subject to Bangalore jurisdiction only printed in the lorry receipt is 
not signed by the plaintiff. There is no evidence that this condition 
was brought to the notice of the plaintiff and he has accepted the 
said clause. It must be remembered that people often sign order 
forms containing lot of printed material without caring to read or 
knowing what is printed and if everything that is printed on such 
form is taken as part of the contract, without anything further, it 
would be reading more terms into the contract for which there had 
been no consensus ad idem between the parties. Therefore, it is 
always necessary that the courts should insist that the printed 
material or the note made there under should be made known to the 
parties before the same is read into the contract as one of its 
integral terms. Therefore, we are of the view that more presence of 
a printed note at the bottom of the lorry receipt does not form part 
of the contract, which can be enforced in a court of law, in the 
absence of a proof that the same was brought to the notice of the 
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plaintiff and that it has accepted it as a term of the contract. We 
have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the more fact 
that a note is printed in the lorry receipt or consignment note, the 
same cannot be deemed to have been incorporated as one of the 
integral terms of the agreement."^' 
On the contention of the appellants' counsel that the goods were 
transported at owner's risk and, therefore, the plaintiff can not claim any 
damages. The printed form of a lorry receipt/way bill showed that the 
goods were transported at the carrier's risk but the word 'carrier' as 
printed was struck off and the word 'owner' was written. The court 
observed "Even here, there is no evidence whether this modification in 
the lorry receipt was brought to the notice of the plaintiff and whether it 
was accepted. The reasons given by us in this judgement in respect of the 
note regarding jurisdiction of the court also equally apply to this 
contention also. Apart from that, Section 9 of the Carriers Act positively 
imposes an obligation on the part of the defendants to transport the goods 
to the destination and deliver them safely to the consignee and the 
plaintiff has no duty to establish or prove any negligence on the part of 
the defendants in this regard."^^ 
For all above reasons given the court did not interfere with the 
findings of lower court and the appeal was accordingly dismissed. 
A similar question that whether a purchaser of lottery ticket is 
bound by the terms and conditions printed on the reverse of the lottery 
ticket in small print came for consideration before the High Court of 
Andhra Pradesh. In the case of Special Secretary, Government of 
Rajasthan V. Venkataramana SeshaiyeP^ this question arose before 
Andhra Pradesh High Court in an appeal filed by special secretary of 
Govt, of Rajasthan. 
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In this case, the State of Rajasthan which was the first defendant 
Appellant sponsored a welfare scheme of State Lotteries and appointed 
the 2"^ " defendant, the Director of Small Savings as the Director of State 
Lotteries. The lottery tickets were being sold by the State of Rajasthan in 
most of the states in India through agents and sellers. The plaintiff who 
was the resident of Visakhapatnam purchased one Rajasthan State Lottery 
ticket No. D 840618 of the 30 '^' draw to be held on 15.12.1972 from one 
D. Sudarsana Rao who was an employee of the defendants after paying 
Rs. 1 to D. Sudarsana Rao and on asking the residential address by him, 
the plaintiff gave him the address of Visakhapatnam. In the first week of 
December 1972 the plaintiff lost his purse at Poona market as the same 
was "pick pocketed" by someone and he did not mind the loss as the 
purse contained some small change and was unmindful of the lottery 
ticket and did not think of making a police report. When the plaintiff was 
informed by the salesman of lottery ticket that he had won the first prize 
at the draw of Rs. 2,50,000.00, he claimed the prize money from the 
defendants but they refused to pay it in the absence of the original lottery 
ticket, as the same was lost by a pickpocket. 
The plaintiff filed a suit in a sub-court at Visakhapatnam against 
the defendants. The defendants said in defence in the trial court that 
without production of the original ticket by the plaintiff he was not 
entitled for the lottery money according to the scheme which was 
published in the Gazette of Rajasthan dated 12.12.1968 which published 
the notification dated 10.12.1968. The stated that as per rule 12 unless the 
prize winner surrendered the prize winning ticket duly signed with the 
form annexed to the defendant within 30 days from the draw the prize 
need not be given to the plaintiff. They also contended that under the 
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scheme the courts of Rajasthan alone have jurisdiction and that therefore, 
the suit was not maintainable in the sub-court at Visakhapatnam. 
In the result the court below decreed the suit of the plaintiff. It is 
pertinent to mention here that initially by a separate order on an 
application filed by the defendants the lower court held that the 
Visakhapatnam court had the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the 
present suit.'''* 
The defendants at the lower court filed an appeal before the Andhra 
Pradesh High Court. The appellants contended that the sub-court at 
Visakhapatnam had no jurisdiction to try the suit and that the plaintiff 
should have filed the suit in the courts in the state of Rajasthan. The 
second contention by them was that the plaintiff had to produce the 
original ticket and had to follow the other procedure envisaged in the 
rules and that the plaintiff having failed to produce the ticket or comply 
with the procedure he was not entitled to the prize money. 
On the other hand it was contended by the plaintiff- respondent that 
the sub-court at Visakhapatnam had territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. 
He also contended that once the plaintiff was identified as the purchaser 
of the relevant ticket and there was no other claimant for the prize money, 
the plaintiff was entitled to receive the lottery amount and that the 
plaintiff had complied with the procedure envisaged in the rules. The 
production of the original ticket was not a condition precedent. 
On these contentions following two questions arose for 
consideration before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. 
1. Whether the sub-court, Visakhapatnam was competent to entertain 
and dispose of the present suit? 
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2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the prize money without 
production of the lottery ticket and whether he has otherwise 
complied with the procedure for receipt of the money? 
The appellants placed heavy reliance on the printed terms on the 
back side of the lottery ticket especially condition No. 1 & 6 which 
provided as: 
"Prize will be awarded to the prize winners only on surrendering 
the tickets to the Director, Small Savings and State Lotteries, Rajasthan, 
Jaipur within 30 days of the date of draw." 
Condition No. 6 provided "Legal jurisdiction of the lottery shall be 
at Jaipur only." 
The crucial question before the High Court was that upto what 
extent to which the plaintiff can be said to be bound by what is printed on 
the reverse of the ticket. The court said there is a basic difference between 
cases where parties enter into a regular contract after due negotiation and 
cases where one party just hands over a ticket or receipt containing 
certain terms to the other party. 
The High Court said that "The modem trend is that proof of and 
opportunity for negotiation is a necessary condition for imposing the 
rigour of the terms on the weaker party." The court further observed that: 
"That it follows that unless the terms of the contract are arrived at 
after due negotiation, they can not be held binding merely because a 
ticket is later issued containing the said terms. There must also be proof 
that the terms were meant to be contractual. The said terms must have 
been brought to the notice of the contracting party at or before the time 
when the contract was entered into. If the printed terms on the ticket do 
not as aforementioned become part of the contract they cannot be 
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enforced unilaterally for otherwise, it will amount to an alteration of the 
terms of the original contract."''^ 
Thus in this case the material on the reverse of the lottery ticket 
was in small print and there was nothing in the evidence to show that the 
attention of the purchaser of the ticket was drawn to the said matter at or 
before the time when the purchaser paid the price for purchasing the 
lottery ticket, and no copy of the notification published by the State 
Government sponsoring the lottery and containing the conditions printed 
on the reverse of the ticket was supplied to the purchaser when he 
purchased the ticket it would have to be inferred that there was nothing to 
suggest that the purchaser bound himself by what was printed on the 
backside of the lottery ticket. Consequently, when the condition printed 
on the reverse of the ticket that the dispute relating to the lottery ticket 
would be subject to Jaipur jurisdiction and another condition that the 
winner of the prize must produce the original lottery ticket were not 
brought to the notice the purchaser at the time of purchsise, the purchaser 
would not be bound by those conditions and the purchaser would be 
entitled to the prize when other evidence established that the prize 
winning ticket was sold to him. 
In a civil revision oiM/s Patel Roadways Pvt. Ltd. V. The Republic 
Forge Co. Ltd?^ The Andhra Pradesh High Court took the view that in 
the absence of proof that the parties agreed that only a particular court 
should have jurisdiction, it cannot be postulated that such a condition 
should be deemed to be an integral part of the agreement. In this case the 
petitioner-defendant had a transporting company. The respondent plaintiff 
laid the suit for recovery of the value of certain goods consigned. M/s 
Motor Industries Limited, Bangalore entrusted the goods to the petitioner 
for transshipment and delivery of the same to the respondent at 
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Hyderabad. Admittedly, they were consigned on 2.6.1978 and 
30.05.1978. They were lost, and ultimately though the petitioner collected 
the freight charges, did not give delivery of the goods, or its value 
thereof. As a result, the respondent laid the suit for the value of the goods 
consigned. An objection has been taken with regard to the territorial 
jurisdiction of the lower court contending that the consignment note 
postulates that any dispute would be subject to the adjudication of the 
courts at Bombay since the Head Office of the petitioner's company is 
situated at Bombay. The trial court negatives that contention and held that 
it had the jurisdiction to try the suit. Against the order of the lower court 
the revision petition was filed before the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 
The petitioner contended before the High Court that the 
respondent, having agreed by implication for transshipment, is bound by 
the consignment note, and therefore, there is a contract between the 
parties accepting the jurisdiction of the court at Bombay to adjudicate the 
dispute, and as a result, the lower court has no territorial jurisdiction to 
take cognizance of the claim in the suit. But the respondent on the other 
hand contended that the acceptance by implication cannot be inferred on 
the facts and circumstances in this case and therefore, the view of the 
lower court is perfectly legal, and is not vitiated by any material 
irregularity warranting interference in this revision. Upon these respective 
contentions, the question that arose before the High Court for 
consideration was, whether the lower court has got the jurisdiction to try 
the suit pending before it. 
The High Court observed, 
"The admitted facts are few and not in dispute. Admittedly, the 
consigner M/s Motor Industries Company Limited, Bangalore 
consigned the goods to the petitioner for transshipment and for 
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delivery of the same to the respondent at Hyderabad, and for that 
the respondent is not a party. The only contention raised by the 
petitioner is that by acceptance of the receipt of the goods at 
Hyderabad by the consigner, the necessary inference is that it 
should be deemed that the respondent has accepted the condition or 
not, is a question of fact, and on the facts in this case, there is no 
definite evidence to the effect that the respondent has accepted as a 
fact the conditions stipulated for transshipment by the petitioner. 
No part of the cause of action arose at Bombay. The cause of 
action partly arose at Bangalore and partly arose at Hyderabad. 
Admittedly, the courts at Hyderabad or at Bangalore had 
jurisdiction to try the dispute. The only question is by virtue of a 
contract between the parties, the jurisdiction of Bombay court is 
also invested. As I have said earlier, there is no definite material to 
come to the conclusion that the respondent has accepted the 
consigrmient subject to the conditions prescribed in the note that 
the dispute will be subject to the jurisdiction at Bombay."^' 
To the same effect there is another decision of Andhra Pradesh 
High Court in M/s B.A. Transport Co. BankatlaU^^ where the court said, 
"The parties by a concluded and binding agreement can choose to 
have the jurisdiction of one of the courts where part of the cause of action 
arose, and excluded the other court. The condition precedent for such 
exercise of choice is that part of the cause of action should arise in the 
court where the parties agree to have the disputes adjudicated and also in 
the courts excluded by agreement. The contract between the parties with 
regard to the exclusion of jurisdiction of a court can be either express or 
implied but the contract should be unequivocal and should be precise and 
definite. The contract is binding and conclusive on the parties to the 
agreement but it cannot be fastened on the third parties unless it is 
satisfactorily shown that the third party is privy to the contract or acted 
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upon the contract consciously knowing the fact and impUcations of the 
said agreement. It must be shown that the third party is made aware of the 
implications of the agreement." 
It is very pertinent to submit here that these two decisions'" of the 
Andhra Pradesh High Court have been approved by a full Bench of the 
Andhra High Court, in MJs East India Transport Agency V. National 
Insurance Co. Ltd.^^ This was a civil revision before a single judge Bench 
of Andhra Pradesh High Court headed by Bhaskar Rao J. but Hon'ble 
learned judge referred this revision petition to a Full Bench of the Andhra 
High Court stating that the decisions in Rajarao V.A.P.T. Company 
(1969) 2 APLJ 151 and Spl. Secy. Govt, of Rajasthan V. Venkataramana 
Seshaiyer, A.I.R. 1984 A.P. 5 run in divergence with each other on the 
question of deciding the territorial jurisdiction of the court to try the suit 
and that the divergence of the views of the two Division Benches has, 
therefore, got to be resolved by a Full Bench. The facts leading to the 
filing of the revision petition were briefly as follows: 
The sole defendant was the revision petitioner. The suit was filed 
by the first plaintiff Insurance Company and the second plaintiff, who 
was the owner of the goods for recovery of damages for short delivery of 
the goods. The second plaintiff had entrusted the consignment of 
Chlorinated Paraffin Wax to the branch of M/s East India Transport 
Agency at Delhi for being transported to Hyderabad. When the second 
plaintiff had taken delivery of the consignment at Hyderabad, a shortage 
of 300 kgs was detected. The defendant issued a shortage certificate. The 
first plaintiff insurer paid the value of the shortage found in the 
consignment delivered to the second plaintiff, and instituted the suit for 
recovery of the amount paid by it, in the Xth Assistant Judge, City Civil 
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Court, Hyderabad. The owner of the goods also joined as the second 
plaintiff. 
The defendant challenges the territorial jurisdiction of the City 
Civil Court, Hyderabad to entertain the suit on the ground that as per the 
contract, as evidenced by Ex. B.l, lorry receipt, only the courts in 
Calcutta have jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that by virtue of the 
specific term contained in Ex. B.l lorry receipt, the jurisdiction of the 
courts at Hyderabad to entertain the suit is specifically excluded. 
The learned lower court considered the question of jurisdiction as a 
preliminary issue and held that he had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 
In the High Court petitioner defendant argued that the consignee's 
name was shown at the time of delivery of the goods, that Ex. B. 1 lorry 
receipt contains the clause that any dispute arising between the parties 
should be determined by the courts situated in Calcutta only; that the 
second plaintiff has acted upon Ex. B.l and obtained delivery; that the 
plaintiff must rely upon Ex. B.l as a whole but not in part; that Ex. B.l is 
the whole basis for making a claim against the defendant; that the terms 
and conditions constitute inseparable part of the said document and that 
since the second plaintiff consignee is bound by the terms of the contract, 
the first plaintiff who is the Insurance Company is also equally bound by 
the terms of Ex. B. 1 lorry receipt and as such, only the courts in Calcutta 
can have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit.'*^ 
But on the other hand plaintiff-respondent argued that there is no 
concluded contract between the consignor and consignee with the carrier 
(the defendant). Therefore, there is no scope for any negotiation between 
the parties expressly undertaking to limit the jurisdiction of any particular 
court for determination of disputes arising under the contract. Respondent 
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also contended that the suit is not based upon the contract but it is based 
upon the statutory hability of the defendant to reimburse the loss caused 
to the consignment during transit. 
The petitioner-defendant in support of his contention relied upon 
the decision in Air India Corporation V. Jothaji.^^ In that case, the 
respondent who was the merchant at Madras sent a parcel of pen nibs 
valued at Rs. 1600/- to Calcutta through the Indians Airlines Corporation 
(the petitioner). Before accepting the goods for carriage, the petitioner 
issued Ex. P.l consignment note setting out the terms and conditions of 
the carriage. In the front portion of Ex. P. 1, the agent of the respondent 
who dispatched the goods signed a statement that he was aware of and 
was accepting the general conditions of carriage and special conditions, 
more particularly referred to and set out on the reverse of that document 
one of the special conditions which was legibly printed on the reverse of 
the consignment note limited the liability for loss or damage to the goods 
to the actual value thereof or the declared value thereof or Rs. 300.00, 
whichever is the lowest. The learned judge held that the contract limiting 
the liability of the carrier as contained in Ex. P.l is valid and enforceable. 
That decision is based upon the finding of fact that the consignor or his 
agent has signed the declaration expressly agreeing to all the conditions 
in the consignment note. 
But the High Court said that this decision has no application to the 
facts of this case because admittedly Ex. B.l does not contain the 
signature of any of the plaintiffs. In the instant case, the learned Xth 
Assistant Judge found as a fact that Ex. B.l contain the signature of the 
transport company at Delhi. Thus, there is no material to show that Ex. 
B.l in any way constitutes a contract entered into between the parties to 
J^M' 4» 
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the suit at the time of entrustment of the consignment to the defendant 
transport company in Delhi.'*^ 
The learned counsel for the revision petitioner also argued before 
the Hon'ble High Court that inasmuch as Ex. B.l was marked by consent 
in the lower court, it is deemed that the respondents plaintiffs have agreed 
to all the terms and conditions contained in Ex. B.l and as such, they are 
precluded from contending that the attention of the second plaintiff (the 
consignee) was not drawn to the specific term contained on the reverse of 
Ex. B.l as to the jurisdiction of the court. In support of his contention he 
relied upon a Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in A. V.S. 
Perumal V. Vadivelu Asari.^^ 
But the court observed, "that the decision relied upon by the 
learned counsel for the petitioner does not support his contention. It lays 
down that permitting a document to be marked by consent only means 
that the party consenting is willing to waive his right to have the 
document in question proved and that formal proof of the document 
which is marked by consent is not required. The marking of a document 
by consent does not mean that the opposite party has agreed to abide by 
all the terms and conditions contained therein. As held by the Division 
Bench, marking of a document by consent only dispenses with the formal 
proof of the document. It does not preclude the opposite party from 
challenging the validity of any of the terms contained in the document. 
By reason of the plaintiffs had no knowledge of the specific term and 
condition mentioned in Ex. B.l with regard to the jurisdiction of the court 
to entertain any dispute arising under Ex. B.l. The proof of a document is 
different from its admissibility and the binding nature of the document. 
The giving of consent only dispenses with the proof of the document but 
it does not stop the party giving the consent from challenging the validity 
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of the document or its contents thereof. Since the rights and liabilities of 
the parties are not contractual but arise under the statute against the 
defendant who is a carrier, Ex. B.l which shows the entrustment of goods 
is only a piece of evidence... 
The Full Bench of the Hon'ble High Court approved of the 
decisions of Ramaswamy, J. in M/s Patel Roadways Pvt. Ltd. V. Republic 
Forge Co. Ltd (A.I.R. 1985 Andh Pra 387) and of Rama Rao J. in M/s 
B.A. Transport Co. V. Bankatlal (1982) 1 APL J 288 and held that in the 
event of entrustment of goods to a carrier under a consignment note and a 
claim arising out of such a contract, the third party to the consignment 
note is not bound by the terms and conditions contained in the 
consignment note limiting the jurisdiction of the court to decide the 
dispute unless it is shown that such a third party's attention is specifically 
drawn to such a clause contained in the consignment note and he is made 
aware of its implications. Such a term excluding the jurisdiction the court 
camiot bind a third party unless it is shown that he acted upon the contract 
consciously knowing the effect and implications of such a contract. The 
decision in Rajarao V. A.P.T. Company (1969) 2 APLJ 151 is 
distinguishable on the facts of this case inasmuch as in that case, M/s 
Dumex and Co. was held to be aware of the term of the contract with 
regard to the jurisdiction of the court and that the plaintiff who has 
stepped into the shoes of M/s Fumex and Co., is bound by such a term. In 
the instant case, inasmuch as a part of cause of action has arisen at 
Hyderabad and held that the decision of the learned X Assistant judge 
holding that he has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit is perfectly correct 
and does not call for any interference."'*' 
Thus according to this judgement of the Full Bench of the Andhra 
High Court headed by M.N. Rao, I. Panduranga Rao and N.D. Patnaik 
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J.J., in the event of entrustment of goods to a carrier under a consignment 
note and a claim arising out of such a contract, the third party to the 
consignment note is not bound by the terms and conditions contained in 
the consignment note limiting the jurisdiction of the court to decide the 
dispute unless it is shown that such a third party's attention is specifically 
drawn to such a clause contained in the consignment note and he is made 
aware of its implications. Such a term excluding the jurisdiction of the 
court cannot bind a third party unless it is shown that he acted upon the 
contract consciously knowing the effect and implications of such a 
contract. In this case the Hon'ble High Court confirmed the order of 
learned lower court, that it has got the jurisdiction to try the suit, and 
dismissed the civil revision. 
In Rajarao V. A.P.T. Company,'^^ M/s Dumex and Co., having its 
Head Office at Madras consigned two cases of medicines to the plaintiff 
to be delivered at Vijayawada as per Ex. B.2 consignment note dated 
17.01.1961. When the plaintiff presented Ex. B.2 consignment note, only 
one of the cases of medicines was delivered by the lorry office at 
Vijayawada and the second case was not delivered. During the course of 
correspondence it was stated by the lorry office that attempts were being 
made to trace the second case and that it would be delivered, the moment 
it was traced. As the second case of medicines was not delivered in spite 
of long lapse of time, the plaintiff instituted the suit for compensation for 
the goods lost because of the negligence of the lorry office. The 
defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge's Court at 
Vijayawada to entertain the suit on the ground that Ex. B.2 lorry receipt 
executed by the defendant in favour of M/s Dumex and Co., contained a 
term that any dispute arising between the parties with regard to the 
contract of carriage will be got settled by filing a suit at Madras. The 
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learned Subordinate Judge upheld the objection with regard to the 
jurisdiction and returned the plaint for presentation to the proper court 
situated in Madras. The Division Bench of the Andhra High Court on 
perusal of Ex. B.2 lorry receipt held that it was transferred by M/s Dumex 
and CO., in favour of the plaintiff; that is only on the basis of Exs. A.3 
and B.2 which were transferred to the plaintiff that he claimed the 
delivery of the goods consigned by M/s Dumex and Co., that the plaintiff 
cannot accept delivery in so far as one case which was given to him on 
the basis of those notes and refuse to abide by the other term of the same 
contract that a suit arising out of that transaction could be laid only in the 
appropriate court in Madras; that the plaintiff steps into the shoes of M/s 
Dumex and Co, that therefore, any suit filed by him would have to be 
entertained only by the court at Madras and that the court at Vijayawada 
could have no jurisdiction to entertain any such suit. Their Lordships 
have endorsed the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge that the 
transfer (who is the plaintiff in that suit) under Exs. A.3 and B.2 steps 
into the shoes of M/s Dumex and Co. and since admittedly there is a 
privity of contract between the defendant £ind m/s Dumex and Co., the 
plaintiff is bound by the contract under which both the parties have 
undertaken to institute the suit arising out of that contract at Madras. 
Their Lordships repelled the contention of the counsel for the plaintiff 
therein that the term of contract entered into in Ex. B.2 in regard to the 
place where the suit can be brought is opposed to public policy referred to 
in section 28 of Indian Contract Act 1872 and the contract is, therefore, 
void, holding that what all section 28 of the Contract Act says is that no 
contract can be entered into by the parties, the effect of which would be 
to oust completely the jurisdiction of any court. The Division Bench 
further clarified that it is permissible for the parties to enter into a 
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contract to restrict their choice of forum to one or more places available. 
It is for the plaintiff to choose one of the forums provided under section 
20 of the code of Civil Procedure to institute the suit. That judgement 
proceeded on the basis that there is a privity of contract between M/s 
Dumex and Co. and the defendant, and the plaintiff who laid the suit by 
virtue of the transfer in his favour under Exs. A.3 and B.2 steps into the 
shoes of M/s Dumex and Co. and hence is bound by the term contained in 
Ex. B.2 limiting the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit when 
there is a specific agreement between the parties to oust the jurisdiction of 
a particular court, or agreement get the dispute arising out of the contract, 
if any, to be entertained by a particular court, then the parties is bound by 
the agreement. But then, where there is no specific agreement between 
the parties to the contract then it will be said that there is no meeting of 
minds or consensus ad idem, and the party not aware of the term to 
exclude the jurisdiction of a particular court, which he otherwise has, is 
not bound by that particular exclusion clause because the party did not 
give his consent to that particular term, or the party does not have any 
specific agreement regarding that. This may be further illustrated by a 
judgement of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in United India 
Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Associated Transport Corporation Pvt. Ltd."*' In this 
case the consignor entrusted to the respondent cotton yam for dispatch 
and delivery to the consignee in Delhi in three consignments. The 
appellant, insurer, had covered these consignments at the request of the 
consignor. The goods reached Delhi. The consignee refused to take 
delivery of fine bales of cotton yam since they were found to be in 
damaged condition. The damaged yam was re-booked through the Delhi 
Office of the carrier on the request of the consignor. They were taken 
delivery of by the consignor in a damaged condition. The damage was 
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assessed by the surveyor. The consignor submitted a claim to the insurer. 
The claim was settled at Rs. 10894.80 and paid by the insurer. The 
insurer became subrogated to the rights of the consignor in accordance 
with Section 89 of the Marine Insurance Act and Exs.A7 and A8. 
The appellant plaintiff filed a suit, for realization of damages from 
the carrier, in the lower court. The defendant raised several question in 
the lower court including the contention that the Bombay Court alone had 
jurisdiction and not the local court. The lower court took up the suit for 
trial and answered all the issues. In doing so, the trial court held that the 
Bombay Court alone had jurisdiction as the jurisdiction of all other courts 
had been excluded. As a result, the court returned the plaint for 
presentation in the proper court. This order of the lower court was 
challenged in the High Court of Kerala by the appellant. 
The question before the High Court for the consideration was 
whether the court below has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit? The 
respondent in the High Court had two-pronged contention, he contended 
that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court 
below and in any event the lorry receipts Ext. B.l conferred exclusive 
jurisdiction on the Bombay Court. The lower court had already held that a 
part of the cause of action arose within its own jurisdiction. The court 
further held that the parties agreed to exclude the jurisdiction of all courts 
except the Bombay Court and therefore, it had no jurisdiction to entertain 
the suit. 
The Division Bench after referring to the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Hakam Singh V. Gammon,^'^ held that "we are in respectful 
agreement with the view expressed in the above decision. Ext. B.l series 
in this case also contain printed words "subject to Bombay jurisdiction 
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alone." Apart from the existence of these printed words, respondent has 
no case that there was a meeting of minds between the consignor and the 
carrier and there was a specific agreement in that behalf The 
consignment was delivered to the carrier, the carrier took custody of the 
goods and thereafter issued the receipt or consignment note which 
contained in printed words. The note was signed only by an employee of 
the respondent. No doubt, they were handed over to the consignor. But 
there was nothing to indicate that there was an agreement between the 
parties to confer exclusive jurisdiction to Bombay Court. These printed 
words by themselves and without anything more would not be sufficient 
to constitute an agreement to oust the jurisdiction of all courts other than 
the court specified. In these circumstances, we set aside the finding of the 
court below that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. We find that 
the court below had answered all the issues either in favour of one party 
or the other. The parties have no right of appeal against those findings 
inasmuch as the plaint itself was returned. In these circumstances, we 
deem it expedient to direct the court below to re-try all the issues and 
dispose of the suit afresh." 
In this above case the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court set 
aside the finding of the lower court and said that mere printed words on 
the consignment note "subject to Bombay jurisdiction alone" and in the 
absence of any specific agreement or meeting of minds would not be 
sufficient to constitute an agreement to oust jurisdiction of all courts other 
than the court specified. 
A case having similar facts also came up for consideration before 
the Gujarat High Court. In the Civil Revision of 5*. Manuel Raj and Co. V. 
J. Manilal and Co!'^ the question for consideration before the High Court 
was, whether a party signing a order form, wherein it was printed in bold 
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letters "subject to Madras jurisdiction", is bound and the jurisdiction of 
otiier court is excluded? 
In this case the plaintiff placed an order on a printed form of the 
defendants on which it was printed in bold types "subject to Madras 
Jurisdiction." An order form was signed by the plaintiffs and sent to the 
defendants. 
The learned Judge of the court of Small causes, Ahmedabad, 
rejected the contention of the dependants that only the Madras Court had 
jurisdiction and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. The defendants then 
filed the revision before the Gujarat High Court. The main contention 
urged by them was that only the Madras Court had jurisdiction in view of 
the fact that the order form signed by the plaintiffs contained in bold 
types "subject to Madras jurisdiction" and it was also underlined in print. 
On the other hand the learned counsel for the opponents contended 
that the words "subject to Madras jurisdiction" do not mean that the 
Madras Court alone had jurisdiction. He also contended that the finding 
that the Ahmedabad Court had jurisdiction is a finding of fact and cannot 
be interfered within revision. He relied on the decisions of Amritsar 
Transport Co. Ltd. V. S. Sohanlal,^^ Patel Bros V. Vadilal Kashidas Ltd.^^ 
In the case of Amritsar Transport there was a receipt which was 
signed by one of the parties, and the party who signed the receipt relied 
on the receipt to show that only the courts of a particular place had 
jurisdiction. But the receipt which was relied on by him was not signed 
by the opposite party, but had been merely given to the opposite party. 
But the court said that case does not apply to the facts of the present case. 
The case of Patel Bros which was strongly relied on by the 
opponents, it was held that the words "subject to Bombay jurisdiction" 
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printed on a document which evidenced the contract did not exclude the 
jurisdiction of £iny other court and that the ouster of jurisdiction of a court 
to which a person is entitled to resort to under the Civil Procedure Code 
or any other statute cannot be matter of assumption or presumption but 
one to be proved by express words contained in the contract or at least by 
necessary or inevitable implication. The learned Judge in this case held 
that mere printing of the words "subject to Bombay jurisdiction" on the 
document which evidenced the contract cannot amount to a contract that 
both the parties agreed to have Bombay as the venue for the settlement of 
disputes. 
After referring to some decided English cases the Gujarat High 
Court said "when one of the parties to a contract signs a printed form 
printed by the other party containing the words "subject to the jurisdiction 
of a place Q" and sends the order form to the other party it must be 
assumed that, that party agreed that Q is the place for the settlement of 
disputes. It is not open to a person who signs an order form of the 
opposite party containing the printed words to say that the printed words 
are not part of the contract. To take the view taken by the learned Judge 
of the Madras High Court would be to upset the commercial practice of 
India and unless such a position is necessary in view of the wording of 
any particular section, the court was not prepared to take that view and 
said that we are not prepared to upset the commercial practice of India 
unless the law requires to do so. There is nothing in the law to hold that 
the expression "subject to jurisdiction of Q" printed at the top of a form 
may not bind M who signed the order form."^^ 
The court further observed that, "this is not a case of a ticket or a 
receipt taken by the plaintiffs but this is a case of an order form signed by 
them and whatever is contained in the form would be binding on them in 
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view of the signature on the form. It was easy for the plaintiffs to strike 
out the words "subject to Madras jurisdiction" before signing it. As they 
did not do so, these words are binding on the plaintiffs."^^ 
In the case of Sri Rajendra Mills Ltd. V. H.V.M. Haji Hasan^^ 
there was a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1, under 
which the parties agreed that all suits, arising on or out of the contract, 
would be instituted in the court at Salem. The defendant No. 2 was the 
Union of India, representing the two Railways over which the goods in 
question were carried. The opposite party No. 1 plaintiff filed a suit at 
Howrah Court claiming damages for the loss of certain goods against 
both the defendants. 
The learned trial Judge took the view that in view of the said 
contract the plaintiff could not be allowed to bring the suit at Howrah 
and, accordingly, the Salem Court could be the only proper court for 
entertaining the suit and the plaint should be returned for proper 
presentation to that court. 
But the learned lower appellate court Howrah, held that, although 
there was a contract as aforesaid, between the plaintiff and the defendant 
No. 1, defendant No. 2, not being a party to the same, was not bound by 
the said contract, and, therefore, the same should not be enforced so as to 
enable the court to direct return of the plaint for presentation to the court 
at Salem. 
The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed that, 
"There was a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant No. I, 
under which the parties agreed that all suits, arising on or out of the 
contract, would be instituted in the court at Salem. It is true that the 
instant suit could have been instituted either at Salem or at Howrah 
under Section 20 (C) of the Code of Civil Procedure as the case of 
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action, admittedly, arose in part in both the places. It was, therefore, 
a case, where two courts had concurrent jurisdiction and in such a 
case, it was open to the parties to make a choice, restricting the 
court in which the suit under or upon the contract could be 
instituted. In other words, both the courts having territorial 
jurisdiction, the parties by their agreement, waived their right to 
institute any action, as aforesaid except at Salem. The plaintiff, by 
reason of the above contract, had validity waived its right to institute 
the suit except at Salem. In such circumstances, it is not open to the 
plaintiff to object to the order for return of the plaint for presentation 
to the court at Salem. It is not also open to defendant No. 2 to object 
to the same course as the choice of forum in case of alternative 
forums, lies with the plaintiff and the plaintiff having debarred or 
precluded itself from going to any other court except the court at 
Salem, which would be a proper court as against defendant No. 2 
also it would not be just to allow the plaintiff, at the instance of any 
other party or under cover of its objection to institute the suit except 
in the court at Salem. We would therefore hold that in reversing the 
decision of the learned trial Judge, the lower appellate court has 
acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction and its decision should be reversed and that of the 
learned trial Judge restored."^* 
In this above case there was a agreement between the plaintiff and 
the defendant, there was meeting of minds or consensus ad idem. This 
case was different from the case of consignment notes. So the High Court 
rightly held that the plaintiff is bound by that specific agreement. 
In Hakam Singh V. M/s Gammon (India) Ltd.^^, on Oct. 5, 1960 the 
appellant agreed to do certain construction work for the respondent on the 
terms and conditions of a "written tender." The respondent had its 
principal place of business at Bombay. Clauses 12 & 13 of the tender 
were: 
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"Clause 1." In the event of any dispute arising out of this sub-
contract, the parties hereto agree that the matter shall be referred to 
arbitration by two arbitrators under the Arbitration Act of 1940 and such 
amendments thereto as may be enacted thereafter. 
Clause 13. Notwithstanding the place where the work under this 
contract is to be executed, it is mutually understood and agreed by and 
between the parties hereto that this contract shall be deemed to have been 
entered into by the parties concerned in the city of Bombay and the Court 
of law in the city of Bombay alone shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate 
thereon." 
Disputes arose between the parties and the appellant submitted a 
petition to the court of the Subordinate Judge at Varanasi for an order 
under Section 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act 10 of 1940 that the 
agreement be filed and an order of reference be made to an Arbitrator or 
Arbitrators appointed by the Court to settle the disputes between the 
parties in respect of the construction works done by him. The respondent 
contended that the Civil Courts in Bombay alone had jurisdiction, 
because of the terms contained in clause 13, to entertain the petition. 
The Trial Judge rejected that contention observing that the 
condition in clause 13 that "the contract shall be deemed to have been 
entered into by the parties concerned in the city of Bombay has no 
meaning unless the contract is actually entered into in the city of 
Bombay," and that there was no evidence to establish that it was entered 
into in the city of Bombay. The Trial Judge concluded that the entire 
cause of action had arisen at Varanasi and the parties could not by 
agreement confer jurisdiction on the courts of Bombay, which they did 
not otherwise possess. 
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The High Court of Allahabad in exercise of its revisional 
jurisdiction set aside the order passed by the Subordinate Judge and 
declared that the Courts in Bombay had jurisdiction under the general law 
to entertain the petition, and by virtue of the covenant in the agreement 
the second branch of clause 13 was applicable and binding between the 
parties and since the parties had agreed that the courts in Bombay alone 
had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the contract, the petition to file the 
arbitration agreement could not be entertained by the courts at Varanasi. 
Against the order of the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad directing that 
the petition be returned for presentation to the proper court, the appellant 
had appealed to the Supreme Court with special leave. 
In appeal before the apex court one of the questions that arose for 
consideration was whether the Courts at Bombay alone had jurisdiction 
over the dispute. 
The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "the Code of Civil 
Procedure in its entirely applied to proceedings under the Arbitration Act 
by virtue of section 41 of that Act. The jurisdiction of the courts under the 
Arbitration Act to entertain a proceeding for filing an award is 
accordingly governed by the provisions of the code of Civil Procedure. 
By Clause 13 of the agreement it was expressly stipulated between the 
parties that the contract shall be deemed to have been entered into by the 
parties concerned in the city of Bombay. In any event the respondents 
have their principal office in Bombay and they were liable in respect of a 
cause of action arising under the terms of the tender to be sued in the 
courts at Bombay. It is not open to the parties by agreement to confer by 
their agreement jurisdiction on a court which it does not possess under the 
code. But where two courts or more have under the code of Civil 
Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between 
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the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such 
courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not 
contravene section 28 of the Indian Contract Act."^° 
The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that since an application 
for filing an award in respect of a dispute arising out of the terms of the 
agreement could be filed in the courts in the city of Bombay, both 
because of the terms of Clause 13 of the agreement and because of the 
respondents had their Head Office where they carry on business at 
Bombay, the agreement between the parties that the Courts in Bombay 
alone shall have jurisdiction to try the proceeding relating to arbitration 
was binding between them. 
In Naziruddeen V. P.A. Annamali, ' where the question was 
whether the Rule 35 of the U.P. State Lottery Rules, 1969 confined the 
jurisdiction only to Lucknow. 
The Rule said: 
"35. The legal jurisdiction in all matters concerning the State Lottery 
shall be Lucknow." 
The sole question for consideration in this Civil revision petition 
was whether the above rule had the effect of vesting exclusive 
jurisdiction only in the courts in Lucknow and thereby taking away the 
jurisdiction which the Subordinate Judge's Court at Vellore would have, 
if it was established that the lottery ticket was stolen within the 
jurisdicfion of that court from the first respondent. 
The Hon'ble Court of Madras held that, 
"It is well established that the jurisdiction of a civil court can be 
taken away only by an express provision or by necessary 
implication and the ousting of jurisdiction of civil court should not 
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and ought not to be lightly inferred from an ambiguous provision. 
In this particular case, it is common case of the parties that Rule 35 
of the Uttar Pradesh Lottery Rules, 1969, extracted above does not 
expressly take away the jurisdiction of any other court and vest the 
exclusive jurisdiction only in the courts in Lucknow. I am of the 
opinion that such a conclusion cannot be drawn. The expression 
'legal jurisdiction' is so ambiguous, so nebulous and so tenuous to 
draw the inference that the said Rule 35 necessarily refers to the 
jurisdiction of the courts alone. Consequently I am unable to 
accept the argument of the learned counsel that by Rule 35 of the 
Rules referred to above the jurisdiction of the other courts has been 
taken away and the exclusive jurisdiction has been vested only in 
the courts in Lucknow."^^ 
Without referring to tlie decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 
Hakam Singh V. Gammon a Division Bench of the Madras High Court 
in Nanak Chand V. Tinnelvely Tuticorin Electric Supply Co. Ltd.^ 
Observed that competency of a court to try an action goes to the root of 
the matter and when such competency is not found, it has no jurisdiction 
at all to try the case. 
In this case the plaintiff respondent filed a suit in the court of 
Tuticorin alleging that it paid in excess to the defendant in the course of 
certain supplies of goods for which orders were placed by the plaintiff 
with the defendant. It also included in the claim a sum of Rs. 210.70 
towards demurrage charges which the plaintiff is said to have incurred 
due to the default on the part of the defendant as also a sum of Rs. 410.41 
towards bank charges which expense was also attributable to certain 
latches on the part of the defendant. Incidentally on a earlier occasion 
there was another consignment of goods which also suffered the same 
mistake and discrepancy and when a claim was made for refund of the 
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excess price paid by mistake, the defendant without any demur refunded 
the same. But this time the defendant refused to refund the excess price 
paid by the plaintiff. This resulted in the plaintiff issuing the suit notice. It 
was confronted with a reply where under the defendant repudiated their 
liability to refund the amount claimed. The plaintiff therefore filed a suit 
in the court of Tuticorin claiming a sum of Rs. 6556.78 being the excess 
price paid towards the supplies of the goods. 
After hearing the oral evidence and after considering in detail the 
documentary evidence filed on either side, the learned trial Judge decreed 
the suit for a sum of Rs. 11679.66 Ps. with proportionate costs. The 
defendant filed an appeal in the High Court of Madras after having 
participated fully in the trial in the lower court. 
The important question raised by the appellant in appeal was that 
the parties having contracted specifically to vest jurisdiction to decide 
disputes relating to the relative sales and purchase of goods in the courts 
at Madras, the Court at Tuticorin had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 
The relevant portion of the contract which reflected in the conditions of 
sale agreed to between the parties was: 
"All dealings are subject to Madras Jurisdiction." 
On the basis of the text of such a special clause in the agreement of 
sale it was contended before the High Court that there is an exclusion of 
jurisdiction of all courts including the court at Tuticorin and as such the 
judgement appealed against is a nullity and is without jurisdiction. It was 
also urged by the appellant, that when the parties have so specifically 
agreed to have all matters decided in Madras, there is no option left to the 
plaintiff to choose the court at Tuticorin though it might otherwise be a 
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competent court under the provisions of tlie Code of Civil Procedure, that 
being the place of performance of contract. 
The Division Bench of the Hon'ble Madras High Court held that, 
"A marked distinction exists between cases in which courts lack 
jurisdiction to try the cases and where jurisdiction is irregularly 
exercised by courts. In the former case the court ought not to have 
entered upon the trial of the suit: in the later it could have avoided 
trial, but necessarily not. Competency of a court to try an action 
goes to the root of the matter and when such competence is not 
found, it has no jurisdiction at all to try the case. But objection 
based on jurisdiction is a matter which parties could waive and it is 
in this sense if such jurisdiction is exercised by courts, it does not 
go to the core of it so as to make the resultant judgement a nullity. 
Equally well settled is the proposition that where there are two or 
more competent courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon 
a part of the cause of action having arisen within the jurisdiction of 
each of these courts, parties to the concerned transaction can 
contract to vest jurisdiction in one of such courts to try disputes 
which might arise as between themselves. If such a contract is 
clear, unambiguous, not vague and explicit, it is not hit by section 
28 of the contract Act. This should not be understood as parties 
contracting against statute. But this is one of many series of 
contracts available in mercantile practice and forged in the name of 
commercial expediency. However, invariably, the whole question 
resolves itself into one of the fact. If the parties at the inception 
applied their mind and chooses one of the competent courts as the 
court in which disputes have to be adjudicated and decided upon, 
and if such a consensus is demonstrable in a given case, courts 
ought not to be astute to find a different contract between the 
parties."^^ 
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The High Court further observed that in the instant case the term of 
the contract was "all dealings are subject to Madras jurisdiction." Even 
assuming that there was a consensus ad idem between the psirties as to the 
place where cause have to be brought, since it forms part of the contract 
itself it is for consideration as to how the specific terms can be worked 
out and enforced. The plaintiff is in the state of Madras. The defendant 
also is in the State of Madras. No particular or specific forum is agreed 
upon. The terms as to ouster of jurisdiction in the present case is vague 
and not unambiguous. The word "Madras" in the popular sense may 
geographically mean the original civil courts in the State of Madras. This 
may be obvious in cases where the defendant contracts with a party 
outside the state of Madras. If a particular dealing is not inter-state but 
intra-state, as in this case, it is difficult to hold that there has been such a 
deliberate attempt on the part of the parties when the contract was entered 
into so as to exclude the jurisdiction of all the civil courts in the state of 
Madras excepting that in the Madras City. The patent ambiguity in the 
terms of the contract considered in the light of the situs of trade of the 
parties in this case, prompts us to hold that it cannot be said that there has 
been an ouster of jurisdiction of the court at Tuticorim and that there been 
a demonstrable consensus between the parties to vest jurisdiction only in 
courts in the city of Madras."^^ 
Thus in line with the already established legal position that, where 
there are two or more competent courts which can entertain a suit parties 
to the concerned transaction can contract to vest jurisdiction in one of 
such courts to try the disputes but the condition precedent is that there 
should be a deliberate attempt on the part of the parties when the contract 
was entered into, so as to exclude the jurisdiction of all the courts except 
one, for which they deliberately agreed to get the dispute decided. When 
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this contract exists between the parties and the contract is clear, 
unambiguous and explicit, it is not hit by Section 28 of the Indian 
Contract Act. 
In the case of M/s Road Transport Corporation V. M/s Kirloskar 
Brothers Ltd!'^ The question for the consideration before the High Court 
of Bombay was whether a consignment note which was not signed either 
by the consignee or by the consignor operates as a special contract given 
though the carrier had not brought such terms and specifically to the 
notice of the consignor or consignee? The brief facts of the case is as 
under. 
One National Pipes and Tubes Co. Ltd. at Calcutta was instructed 
by plaintiff no. 1, a well known manufacturer of farm machinery and 
pumps in India, M/s Kriloskar Brothers Ltd., to supply high-tensile brass 
rods of various descriptions, sizes, quantities and values mentioned in the 
various orders placed by the plaintiff in the said company. Plaintiff No. 1 
also instructed the said National Pipes and Tubes Co. Ltd., to send the 
said goods by road from Calcutta through the defendants who were the 
common carrier and were carrying on business of transporting for hire, 
goods in their vehicles from one place to another all over the country and 
were common carriers within the meaning of Carriers Act III of 1865. 
Accordingly the said National Pipes and Tubes Co. Ltd. entrusted the 
contracted rods of the total value of Rs. 1,05,030.32 to the defendants. 
The defendant carried the rods entrusted by the said company in order to 
deliver them to the plaintiffs at Kirloskarwadi. However, defendants 
ultimately short delivered to the plaintiffs the said rods. All these goods 
were already insured by the plaintiff No. I with plaintiff No. 2, the New 
India Assurance Co. Ltd., were the insurers of the aforesaid consignment. 
The amount of Rs. 16252.06 was the value of the short delivered 
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consignment goods and therefore plaintiff No. 1 asked plaintiff No. 2, the 
insurer to pay the amount which plaintiff No. 2 paid and thereafter 
plaintiff No. 1 had passed in favour of the plaintiff No. 2 a letter of 
subrogation. Plaintiff No. 2 thus stepped into the shoes of plaintiff No. 1 
as a result of the document i.e. the letter of subrogation and therefore, 
plaintiff No. 2 claimed the amount to the extent of the damage caused due 
to the short delivery of the 53 rods on account of the negligence of the 
defendants. The plaintiffs filed the suit in the Court of Civil Judge Sr. 
Division at Sangli Maharashtra. The Civil Judge decreed the suit of the 
plaintiffs for recovery of the amount of Rs. 16252.06 together with the 
interest at 6% per annum till the date of realization and also awarding the 
costs of the suit from the defendants. 
Defendants - appellant argued before the High Court that in view 
of the terms and conditions mentioned on the reverse of the consignment 
note the court of the Civil Judge Sr. Division Sangli had no territorial 
jurisdiction to try the suit and therefore, as a result the decree passed by 
the said court became a nullity against him. 
But on the other hand plaintiff respondent argued that before the 
High Court that since the clause of ouster of jurisdiction of the court 
which tried the suit, on the reverse of the consignment note was not made 
known to the consignor or that matter to the consignee before entering 
into the contract and therefore, ouster of jurisdiction cannot be treated as 
a matter of assumption or presumption. He further contended that the 
exemption clause limiting the liability of the defendants which is to be 
found at the end of the consignment note is unreasonable and oppressive. 
He also contended that the ouster of jurisdiction should not be lightly 
assumed and when the suit had already been decided on merits the trial 
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court's findings as to jurisdiction is unassailable unless it is satisfactory 
shown that it has caused a failure of justice. 
But the Division Bench of the High Court observed that, "the most 
important question that has to be answered is: Did the defendant do what 
was sufficient to draw the plaintiffs attention to the relevant condition 
before the contract was concluded? In the facts of the present case the last 
condition was to restrict the jurisdiction to a particular court out of the 
two courts having concurrent jurisdiction. In order that terms or 
conditions on the overleaf of a consignment note passed by common 
carrier be binding on the consignor or consignee and in order that it 
should operate as special contract between the consignor or consignee on 
the one hand and the carrier on the other hand, the consignment note must 
be signed by the consignor and consignee and constitute a contractual 
document or at least must be identified as an integral part of the 
contractual document. In cases of unsigned consignment notes containing 
clauses limiting the liability of the carriers as well as excluding the 
jurisdiction of certain courts and restricting it to specific court only, such 
clauses or terms or conditions must be brought to the notice of the 
consignor of the goods. If such terms and conditions are not brought to 
the notice specifically and adequately then the consignor or the consignee 
would not be bound by these terms and it would be open for them to file a 
suit in any competent court having jurisdiction other than one mentioned 
in the clauses excluding jurisdiction of other courts. When more than one 
court have concurrent jurisdiction to try a suit in order to exclude 
jurisdiction of one court such condition required explicit warning. It was 
must be brought to the notice before hand and preferably printed in red 
ink or pointed by a hand in the red ink on the face of the document as 
observed by Lord Derming M.R. In the present case no sufficient and 
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adequate notice was given to the consignor or consignee by the carrier of 
term excluding the jurisdiction of the Sangli court and restricting it to the 
Calcutta court alone and therefore it was not binding on the plaintiffs i.e. 
the consignees in this case. It was therefore, open to the plaintiffs to have 
its claim instituted and settled in any one out of the two or more 
competent courts having territorial jurisdiction in respect of the subject 
matter in dispute."^^ 
Parties to contract are free to choose one of the two or more forums 
to try the suit if more than one court have concurrent jurisdiction. By an 
agreement between the parties they can restrict forum to one of the courts 
having such jurisdiction. Ouster of court's jurisdiction should not be 
easily construed and could not be assumed or presumed very easily. 
Ouster of jurisdiction must be proved by express words or by necessary 
or inevitable implications. 
In this above case the suit was decided on merits by the trial court 
at Sangli. The trial's court finding that the Sangli court had jurisdiction to 
try the suit cannot be challenged by the appellant defendant in the appeal 
because of the provision in the section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code. 
According to the provisions of the Section 21 if defendants wanted to 
take objections as to the venue of the trial it ought to have been taken at 
the earliest possible opportunity. Section of the Civil Procedure reads as 
follows: 
"21. No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by an appellate 
or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the court of first 
instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues 
are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a 
consequent failure of justice." 
I l l 
When the case had been tried by the court on merits and judgement 
is rendered, it can not be reversed only on technical grounds unless it had 
resulted in failure of justice. When the defendants appellants had 
admitted the liability for short delivery of goods than there would be no 
difference whether a suit is tried and decided by a Sangli court or a 
Calcutta court, and neither there is any failure of justice. The 
consignment note was not signed by either consignor or consignee and 
therefore, it cannot be said that the carrier and the consignor had arrived 
at a consensus ad idem or that either of them had applied their mind and 
had decided to create contractual obligations in terms of conditions 
written overleaf the consignment note. The consignment note was 
unsigned and no sufficient attention of the consignor or the consignee 
was drawn to the last clause restricting jurisdiction to Calcutta court 
alone. That is why the Hon'ble High Court rightly held that the 
consignment note is not a contractual document and is not an integral part 
of such a contractual document. 
It is also well settled that where there are two competent courts of 
concurrent jurisdiction which can deal with the subject matter of the 
dispute, parties have freedom to choose the forum of anyone to adjudicate 
their dispute that such an agreement is legally valid and not contrary 
either to the public policy and not violative of section 28 of the Contract 
Act in case of an unsigned document i.e. the consignment note in this 
case it cannot be said that parties were bound by the last clause limiting 
the jurisdiction to Calcutta courts alone in case of dispute when no 
attention was adequately or specifically drawn of the other side by the 
carrier to such a term. 
In the case of A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. V. A.P. Agencies Salem,^^ 
the question for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was 
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whether the clause in the agreement of sale between the parties ousted the 
jurisdiction of other court except that in the agreement? The brief facts of 
the case is as under: 
The first appellant was a manufacturer and supplier of metallic 
yam under the name and style "Rupalon Metallic Yam" having its 
registered office at Udyognagar, Mohammadabad, Gujarat within the 
jurisdiction of the Civil Court of Kaira. The respondent was the registered 
firm doing business in metallic yam and other allied products at Salem. 
The first appellant entered into an agreement with the respondent, where 
under the appellant were to supply 5000 bobbins of Rupalon Metallic 
Yam to the respondent at the rate of Rs. 35/- per bobbin as stipulated in 
different clauses at the agreement. Clause 11 of the agreement provided 
as follows: 
"Any dispute arising out of this sale shall be subject to Kaira 
jurisdiction." 
Dispute arose out of the contract and the respondent filed a suit 
against the appellants in the court of Salem for the recovery of a sum of 
Rs, 1,63,240.00 claiming to be the balance of the advance remaining in 
the hands of the appellants and also a sum of Rs. 2,40,000 towards 
damages. The appellants took a number of defences and also took a 
preliminary objection that the Subordinate Judge at Salem had no 
jurisdiction to entertain the suit as parties by express contract had agreed 
to confer exclusive jurisdiction in regard to all disputes arising out of the 
contract on the Civil Court at Kaira, Gujarat. 
The trial court fi-amed issue No. 2 as follows: 
"Issue No. 2. Has this court no jurisdiction to entertain on try this 
suit?" 
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The learned Trial Court treating it as a preliminary issue in its 
judgement found that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of 
clause 11 and accordingly it returned the plaint for presentation in the 
proper court. The respondent appealed there from to the High Court of 
Madras. The Hon'ble High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the 
judgement of the trial court with a direction to take the plaint on file and 
dispose of the suit on merits on other issues. 
The appellants filed an appeal in the Hon'ble Supreme Court by 
special leave against the order and judgement of the High Court of 
Madras allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgement of the 
Subordinate Judge at Salem on the preliminary question of jurisdiction. 
The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "where such an ouster 
clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction 
of other courts. When the clause is clear unambiguous and specific 
accepted notions of contract would bind the parties and unless the 
absence of ad idem can be shown, the other courts should avoid 
exercising jurisdiction. As regards construction of the ouster clause when 
words like 'alone', 'only', 'exclusive', and the like have been used there 
may be no difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cases the 
maxim "expressio unius est exclnsio alterius"" - expression of one is the 
exclusion of another may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall 
depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may 
imply exclusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a 
contract an intention to exclude all others from its operation may in such 
cases be inferred. It has therefore to be properly construed. 
Coming to clause 11 we already found that this clause was 
included in the general terms and conditions of sale and the order of 
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confirmation with the general terms and conditions was sent from 
Udyognagar, Mohammadabad, Gujarat to the respondent's address at 12 
Suramangalam Road Salem, Tamil Nadu. The statement made in the 
Special Leave Petition that the Udyognagar Mohammadabad, Gujarat is 
within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court of Kaira has not been 
controverted. We have already seen that making of the contract was a part 
of the cause of action and a suit on a contract therefore could be filed at 
the place where it was made. Thus Kaira court would even otherwise 
have had jurisdiction. The bobbins of metallic yam were delivered at the 
address of the respondent at Salem which, therefore, would provide the 
connecting factor for court at Salem to have jurisdiction. If out of the two 
jurisdictions one was excluded by clause 11 it would not absolutely oust 
the jurisdiction of the court and, therefore, would not be void against 
public policy and would not violative section 23 and 28 of the contract 
Act. The question then is whether it can be construed to have excluded 
the jurisdiction of the court at Salem. In the clause "any dispute arising 
out of this shall be subject to Kaira jurisdiction" ex facie we do not find 
exclusive words like "exclusive," "alone", "only" and the like can the 
maxim ''expressio unius est exclusio alterius" be applied under the facts 
and circumstances of the case? The order of confirmation is of no 
assistance. The other general terms and conditions are also not indicative 
of exclusion of other jurisdictions. Under the facts and circumstances of 
the case we hold that while connecting factor with Kaira jurisdiction was 
ensured by fixing the situs of the contract within Kaira, other jurisdictions 
having connecting factors were not clearly, unambiguously and explicitly 
excluded. That being the position it could not be said that the jurisdiction 
of the court at Salem which court otherwise had jurisdiction under law 
through connecting factor of delivery of goods thereat was expressly 
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excluded. We accordingly find no error or infirmity in the impugned 
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judgement of the High Court." 
Thus the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case confirmed the order 
and judgement of the Madras High Court. The principle underlying is one 
that there should either reasonable notice of the clauses of the contract or 
there should be a specific agreement for ousting the jurisdiction of a court 
which it otherwise possesses under the law, and the agreement between 
the parties should be clear, unambiguous and explicit. When the court has 
to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause it is 
necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. Often the 
stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a 
particular place. This provides the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the 
courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arising of that 
contract. It would not, however, ipso facto take away jurisdiction of other 
courts. Where an ouster clause occurs it is necessary for the courts to see 
whether there is specifically and clearly ouster of jurisdiction of other 
courts. There should also be consensus ad idem and the clause should be 
clear, unambiguous and explicit. 
The jurisdiction of the court in matter of a contract will depend on 
the situs of the contract and the cause of action arising through 
connecting factors. In the matter of the contract there may arise causes of 
action of various kinds. In a suit for damages for breach of contract the 
cause of action consists of the making of the contract and of its breach, so 
that the suit may be filed either at the place where the contract was made 
or at the place where at should have been performed and the breach 
occurred. The making of the contract is part of the cause of action. A suit 
on a contract therefore, can be filed at the place where it was made. The 
determination of the place where the contract was made is part of the law 
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of contract. But making of an offer on a particular place does not form 
cause of action in a suit for damages for breach of contract. Ordinarily, 
acceptance of an offer and its intimation result in a contract and hence a 
suit can be filed in a court within whose jurisdiction the acceptance was 
communicated. The performance of a contract is part of cause of action 
and a suit in respect of the breach can always be filed at the place where 
the contract should have been performed or its performance completed. If 
the contract is to be performed at the place where it is made, the suit on 
the contract is to be filed there and nowhere else. In suits for agency 
actions the cause of action arises at the place where the contract of 
agency was made or the place where actions are to be rendered and 
payment is to be made by the agent. Part of cause of action arises where 
money is expressly or impliedly payable under a contract. In cases of 
repudiation of contract, the place where repudiation is received is the 
place where the suit would lie. 
Under Section 23 of the Contract Act the consideration or object of 
an agreement is lawful, unless it is opposed to public policy. Every 
agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. An 
agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the court will be unlawful 
and void being against the public policy. Where the parties to a contract 
agreed to submit the disputes arising from it to a psirticular jurisdiction 
which would otherwise also be a proper jurisdiction under the law their 
agreement to the extent they agreed not to submit to other jurisdictions 
cannot be said to be void as being against public policy. If on the other 
hand the jurisdiction they agreed to submit to would not otherwise be 
proper jurisdiction to decide disputes arising out of the contract it must be 
declared void being against public policy. Where, there are two or more 
competent courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the 
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cause of action having arisen there within, if the parties to the contract 
agreed to rest jurisdiction in one of such court to try the dispute which 
might arise as between themselves the agreement would be valid. If such 
a contract is clear, unambiguous and explicit and not vague it is not hit by 
Section 23 and Section 28 of the Contract Act. This cannot be understood 
as parties contracting against the Statutes. Mercantile law and practice 
permit such agreements. 
In the matter of Patel Roadways Limited V. M/s Prasad Trading 
Co the question that arose for consideration before the Apex Court was 
whether in view of the relevant clause in the contract between the parties 
the courts at Bombay alone had jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the 
courts at Madras where the two suits were instituted was barred? 
There were two appeals before the Supreme Court having the 
identical question of law by the same appellant. Both appeals were 
decided by the court by a common judgement. Facts in nutshell necessary 
for appreciating the question involved may be stated as under: 
M/s Patel Roadways (P) Ltd., the appelleint in both there appeals 
were the carriers and were transporting the goods on hire. It had its 
principal office at Bombay and branch offices at various other places. 
M/s Prasad Trading Co., the respondent in one of the appeals was 
the dealer in cardamom entrusted a consignment of 850 kgs. of cardamom 
to the appellant at its branch office in Tamil Nadu to be delivered at 
Delhi. After the goods had been transported by the appellant and kept in a 
godown at Delhi the same got destroyed and damaged in a fire as a result 
whereof the consignee refused to take delivery. The respondent instituted 
a suit in the court of trial Judge Periakulam, Tamil Nadu within those 
jurisdiction the branch office of the appellant where the goods were 
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entrusted for the transport was situated, for damages alleging that the fire 
was due to the negligence and carelessness on the part of the staff of the 
appellant. 
In another civil appeal by the same appellant, one M/s Tropical 
Agro System Pvt. Ltd., the respondent on the other hand entrusted certain 
packets of pesticides insured with the second respondent. M/s Oriental 
Insurance Co., to the appellant at its branch office at Madras for being 
carried to New Delhi. The goods aforesaid were delivered at New Delhi 
in a damaged condition resulting in loss to the first respondent and a suit 
was instituted for recovery of the loss so sustained by the respondent in 
Civil Court at Madras. In both the suits the appellant took the plea in its 
defence that in the contract entered into between them the parties had 
agreed that jurisdiction to decide any dispute between them would be 
only with the courts at Bombay and consequently the courts in Madras 
where the two suits referred to above had been instituted had no 
jurisdiction. This plea of the appellant was rejected by the Trial Court. 
The order of the trial court in each of the two suits was challenged by the 
appellant before the High Court of Madras under section 115 of the Civil 
Procedure code through civil revisions. Both the civil revisions were 
dismissed by the Hon'ble High Court of Madras. Then the appellant 
preferred the civil appeals before the Supreme Court. The question that 
arose before the Supreme Court in both the civil appeals was whether in 
view of the relevant clause in the contract between the parties the courts 
at Bombay alone had jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the courts at 
Madras where the suits were instituted was barred? 
Before the Supreme Court it was contended by the appellant that 
apart fi*om the courts within whose territorial jurisdiction the goods were 
delivered to the appellant for transport, the courts at Bombay also had 
119 
jurisdiction to entertain a suit arising out of the contract between the 
parties in view of the Explanation to Section 20 of the Civil Procedure 
Code inasmuch as the principal office of the appellant was situated in 
Bombay. He also contended that since courts at two places namely 
Madras and Bombay had jurisdiction in the matter, the jurisdiction of the 
courts in Madras was ousted by the clause in the contract where under the 
parties had agreed that jurisdiction to decide any dispute under the 
contract would be only in the courts at Bombay. Consequently the courts 
where the two suits were instituted had no jurisdiction to entertain them 
and the trial court in each of the two cases as well as the High Court erred 
in law in taking a contrary view. 
The Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained and 
interpreted Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code and the Explanation 
annexed to it. The Bench also reiterated its views given earlier in Hakam 
Singh V. Gammon^ and Globe Transport Corp. V. Triveni Engg. Works 
(1983) 4 s e c 707) and observed that, "In view of the matter since in the 
instant cases clause (C) is not attracted to confer jurisdiction on courts at 
Bombay and the appellant has admittedly its subordinate offices at the 
respective places where the goods in these two cases were delivered to it 
for purposes of transport the courts at Bombay had no jurisdiction at all to 
entertain the suits filed by the respondents and the parties could not 
confer jurisdiction on the courts at Bombay by an agreement. 
Accordingly no exception can be taken to the findings in this behalf 
recorded by the trial court and the High Court in these two cases." 
Thus the Full Bench of the Apex Court held that where in a suit for 
damages for loss of goods due to fire in the godown of the carrier the 
defendant had its office at the respective place where the goods were 
delivered to it for the purpose of transport, the court at place of its 
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principal office would have no jurisdiction at all to entertain the suit and 
the parties could not confer jurisdiction on that court by agreement. Time 
and again the Hon'ble Supreme Court expressed its view that it is not 
open to parties by agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on 
a court which it does not possess under the Code. But where two courts or 
more have under the Code of Civil Procedure Jurisdiction to try a suit or 
proceeding on agreement between the parties that the dispute between 
them shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public policy. 
Such an agreement does not contravene section 28 of the contract Act. 
These views were expressed by the apex court in Hakam Singh V. 
Gammon.^ '* This was the first leading C£ise of the Apex Court on the point 
of conferring jurisdiction of a court. After this decision in number cases 
this principle was followed. The principle laid down in Hakam Singh 
reiterated in several cases thereafter. This principle was followed in 
Globe Transport Corp. V. Triveni Engineering Works (1983) 4 SCC 707, 
A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. V. A.P. Agency Salem (1989) 2 SCRl, A.I.R. 
1989 SC 1239, Patel Roadways Ltd. V. Prasad Trading Co. A.LR. 1992 
SC 1514, R.S.D.V. Finance Co. Ltd. V. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. 
(1993) 2 SCC 130, Angile Insulations V. Devy Ashmore India Ltd. A.I.R. 
1995 S.C. 1766, New Moga Transport Co. V. United India Insurance Co. 
Ltd. (2004) 4 SCC 677. 
Again this principle was followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court 
in Harshad Chiman Lai V. D.L.F. Universal LtdJ^ In this matter there 
was an appeal against the order passed by the Additional District Judge 
Delhi in an original suit and confirmed by the High Court of Delhi in 
Civil Revision holding that Delhi Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit 
and the plaint should be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the 
proper court. 
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To appreciate the controversy raised in this appeal the brief facts 
are as under: 
The appellant - original plaintiff entered into a "plot buyer 
agreement" with DLF Universal Ltd., respondent No. 1 - original 
defendant for purchase of a residential plot in Residential Colony, DLF 
Qutub Complex, Gurgaon, Haryana. The agreement was in the Standard 
Form Contract of the first respondent, and the agreement was made in 
Delhi. The Head Office of the respondent No. 1 was situated in Delhi and 
the payment was to made in Delhi. The appellant paid the first installment 
in Delhi according to the schedule of the agreement, Inspite of the 
payment of the amount, the first respondent unilaterally cancelled the 
agreement under the excuse that the appellant had not paid dues towards 
the construction. The appellant filed a suit of specific performance on the 
original side of the High Court for declaration, specific performance of 
the agreement, for possession of the property and for permanent 
injunction. This suit was filed in the High Court of Delhi in the year 
1988. A single Judge of the High Court granted interim injunction in 
favour of the plaintiff A common written statement was filed by both the 
defendants controverting the claim of the plaintiff on merits. So far as the 
jurisdiction of the court was concerned, it was clearly admitted and it was 
stated by the defendants in their written statement that the jurisdiction of 
the Hon'ble Court is admitted. But later due to the increase in pecuniary 
jurisdiction of the District Court, Delhi, the suit was transferred from the 
High Court of Delhi to the District Court Delhi. On February 17, 1997 the 
trial court fi-amed issues which did not include issue as to the jurisdiction 
of the court obviously because jurisdiction of the court was not disputed 
by the defendants. As late as on August 22, 1997, i.e. after more than 
eight years of the filing of the written statement, the defendants filed an 
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application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking 
amendment in the written statement by raising an objection as to 
jurisdiction of Delhi Court to entertain the suit. It was stated that the suit 
was for recovery of immovable property situated in Gurgaon, Haryana. 
Under Section 16 of the Civil Procedure Code, such suit for recovery of 
property could only be instituted within the local limits of whose 
jurisdiction the property was situated. Since the property was in Gurgaon, 
Delhi Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. This application was 
allowed and the written statement was permitted to be amended. The 
amended written statement was filed which also contained a statement 
that the jurisdiction of the court was "admitted". On the basis of the 
amendment of written statement, however, the learned Additional District 
Judge framed an additional issue as under: 
"Whether Delhi Civil Court has jurisdiction to try and entertain the 
present suit?" 
After hearing the parties the trial court upheld the contention of the 
defendants and ruled that Delhi court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. 
The plaintiff was therefore ordered to be returned to the plaintiff for 
presentation to the proper court. The trial court observed that, "In this 
view of the matter, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that 
the suit falls within the ambit of the Section 16(d) of the code of Civil 
Procedure and the proviso thereto has no application on the facts of the 
present case." 
Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant approached the 
High Court of Delhi by filing a civil revision which also had been 
dismissed by the Hon'ble High Court. Against the said order of the High 
Court the appellant filed the civil appeal in the Supreme Court. 
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The Supreme Court observed that, "In the instant case Delhi Court 
has no jurisdiction since the property is not situated within the 
jurisdiction of that court. The trial court was therefore, right in passing an 
order returning the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper 
court. Hence even though the plaintiff is right in submitting that the 
defendants had agreed to the jurisdiction of Delhi Court and in the 
original written statement, they had admitted that Delhi court had 
jurisdiction and even after the amendment in the written statement, the 
paragraph relating to jurisdiction had remained as it was, i.e. Delhi Court 
had jurisdiction, it cannot take away the right of the defendants to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the court nor it can confer jurisdiction on 
Delhi Court which it does not possess. Since the suit was for specific 
performance of agreement and possession of immovable property situated 
outside the jurisdiction of Delhi court, the trial court was right in holding 
that it had no jurisdiction."^^ 
Thus in this case the Supreme Court reiterated and expressed the 
same views as laid down in the matter of Hakam Singh V. Gammon that it 
is not open to the parties to confer jurisdiction by their agreement, on a 
court which it does not possess under the code. The parties can restrict 
their choice by specific agreement to anyone of the two or more courts 
only in cases where the selected court otherwise possess the jurisdiction 
under the code of civil procedure. In this case the court of Delhi did not 
have the territorial jurisdiction as this case was of specific performance 
relating to the contract of purchase of immovable property situated 
outside the territorial limits of Delhi and was situated in other state of 
Haryana. Section 16 of the Civil Procedure Code recognizes a well 
established principle that actions against property should be brought in 
the forum where such property is situated. A court within whose 
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territorial jurisdiction the property is not situated has no power to deal 
with and decide the rights or interest in such property. 
Jurisdiction of Civil courts is created by statute and cannot be 
created or conferred by the consent of the parties upon a court which has 
not been granted territorial or pecuniary or other jurisdiction by statute. 
Under Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, the parties by their 
agreement are not permitted to totally exclude the jurisdiction of civil 
court which has been created by statute. However, where several civil 
courts have territorial jurisdiction in respect of a suit, parties may by 
agreement confine themselves to any one or more of such civil courts and 
such an agreement would not be violative of Section 28 of the Contract 
Act. Generally, the courts are reluctant to accept ouster of the jurisdiction 
of the civil courts and therefore, ouster clauses in agreement are 
construed strictly and jurisdiction is held to be excluded only when it is 
inevitable result of the agreement. In this light the Supreme Court in the 
case A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. V. A.P. Agencies, laid down that either 
the agreement ousting jurisdiction of some courts and confining the 
jurisdiction to one or more courts should use the words like "alone", 
"only", "exclusive" etc. in the ouster clause with regard to the courts to 
which jurisdiction has been confined, or in the alternative where such 
isolating words have not been used, the maxim "expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius" meaning thereby expression of one is the exclusion of 
another may be applied in appropriate cases where the facts so demand. 
In case of M/s P.R. Transport Agency V. Union of India'^ the 
important question for consideration before the Allahabad High Court 
was whether by ouster clause in the agreement, can parties oust the 
jurisdiction of the High Court provided under Article 226 of the 
Constitution of India. Brief facts of the case is as under: 
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The respondent No. 2 and No. 3 held an e-auction for certain coal 
in different lots. The petitioner submitted its tender or bid in the said 
auction and the petitioner's bid was accepted for 4000 metric tons of coal. 
The acceptance letter was by e-mail at petitioner's e-mail address. Acting 
upon the said acceptance, the petitioner deposited the full amount of Rs. 
81,12,000/- through cheque in favour of respondent No. 3. The cheque 
was accepted and encashed by respondent No. 3. Subsequently, instead of 
delivering the coal to the petitioner, respondent No. 4 sent an e-mail to 
the petitioner saying that the sale as well as the e-auction in favour of the 
petitioner stands cancelled "due to some technical and unavoidable 
reasons." This communication had been challenged by the petitioner 
through writ petition in the Allahabad High Court. 
Before the court the respondent raised a preliminary objection 
regarding want of territorial jurisdiction on the part of the High Court to 
entertain and hear the writ petition. The objection in brief was that no part 
of cause of action arose within the territory of the state of Uttar Pradesh 
and the other was that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 
226 of the Constitution of India stands ousted in favour of the Jharkhand 
High Court under clause 10.5 of the tender agreement. The relevant part 
of the clause was: 
"That any dispute arising out of this scheme shall be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Jharkhand High Court." 
The contention of the petitioner with regard to territorial 
jurisdiction was that because the communication of the acceptance of the 
tender was received by him by e-mail at Chandauli Uttar Pradesh, 
therefore, the contract from which the dispute arose was completed at 
Chandauli, and in a case seeking performance of the contract or alleging 
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breach of contract by the respondents, the completion of the contract is a 
part of the cause of action. Thus the place where the contract was 
completed by receipt of communication of acceptance is a place where 
'part of cause of action' arises. 
The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court accepted the 
contentions of the petitioner and observed "In view of the facts read with 
Information Technology Act, the acceptance having been received by the 
petitioner at ChandauliA^aranasi, the contract became complete by the 
receipt of such acceptance at Varanasi/Chandauli, both of which places 
are within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. Therefore a part of the 
cause of action having arisen in U.P., this court has territorial jurisdiction 
to entertain the writ petition." On clause 10.5 in the tender agreement, 
whether this clause had the effect of excluding the writ jurisdiction of the 
High Court, the court observed that, "Section 20 of Civil Procedure Code 
for the civil court and Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the 
High Courts permit the exercise of territorial jurisdiction where the cause 
of action wholly or in part arises within their territories. To that extent, 
the words used in the two provisions are similar. But there is one vital 
difference, namely that while the jurisdiction to pass a decree accrues to 
the civil court only upon institution of suit filing of a plaint and the civil 
court cannot act suo motu, but under Article 226 of the constitution of 
India the power to issue writs, orders or directions is not necessarily 
dependent upon filing of a writ petition. The High Court has the power to 
act suo motu if an appropriate matter comes to its knowledge may be 
received by the High Court by means of a writ petition or otherwise." 
When the parties enter into an agreement confining themselves to 
the jurisdiction of one of the several courts having territorial jurisdiction 
in respect of a suit, basically the parties are placing a restraint upon 
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themselves from approaching the other civil courts whose jurisdiction has 
been excluded by the agreement. In this manner the jurisdiction of the 
other civil courts gets ousted, subject only to one restraint which is 
provided in Section 28 of the Contract Act. However, the power of 
judicial review given to the High Courts by Article 226 of the 
Constitution of India, and being a basic feature of the Constitution cannot 
be curtailed even by statute as held by the Supreme Court in the case of 
L. Chandra Kumar V. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 (A.I.R. 1997 SC 
1125). Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention that the said 
constitutional power of the High Court to issue a writ suo motu can be 
curtailed by an agreement between litigants. We, therefore, hold that the 
ouster clauses can oust a territorial jurisdiction only of civil courts and 
not of the High Court in respect of the power under Article 226 of the 
Constitution of India, provided such power exists in the High Court on 
account of part of cause of action having arisen within its territorial 
jurisdiction."''^ 
Thus the established legal position is that the parties by their 
agreement are not permitted to totally exclude the jurisdiction of civil 
court which has been created by statute. But the parties may by 
agreement restrict their choice to one or more such courts which 
otherwise possess territorial jurisdiction under the Code of Civil 
Procedure. The parties cannot vest jurisdiction in a court which it does 
not have under the code of Civil Procedure. Where several civil courts 
have territorial jurisdiction in respect of a suit parties may by agreement 
confine themselves to any one of such civil courts and such an agreement 
is not violative of Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act 1872. In the line 
with the already established legal position, Chhattisgarh High Court in 
M/s Shriram Steels, Raipur V. M/s Vandana Trailers, Sakti held that 
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making of contract gives rise to a cause of action and a suit can be filed at 
a place where this cause of action arises. Thus the suit can be instituted at 
a place where the contract is made or concluded. 
B. Time of Notice: 
In order for the provisions of an unsigned document introduced 
during the course of negotiations to govern the contractual relations of 
two parties it is necessary for the relying on the document to show that it 
was intended by the parties to be contractual document and that the other 
party had reasonable notice of its terms. In order to be contractual, a 
document must be introduced at or before the making of the contract and 
must be of such a nature that a reasonable person would expect it to 
contain terms governing the contract. In order for the terms of an 
unsigned document to be binding it is necessary for the party against 
whom the terms of the unsigned document are sought to be enforced to 
have knowledge of those terms or to have been given reasonable notice of 
the existence of such terms. A party to the contract who signs a document 
which contains the contractual terms is normally bound by those terms 
provided that he is aware by those terms and there is consensus ad idem. 
But if the document is not signed it is merely delivered to the other party 
to the contract, then the other party will not be bound by the terms of 
contract if his attention is not drawn to terms of contract adequately. 
Adequate notice of the terms and conditions of the contract is very 
necessary. 
Notice of the terms and conditions of contract should be given to 
the other party before or at the time of making of the contract. In order 
that a term should become binding on the other party to the contract it 
must be brought to the notice at the time when the contract is made or 
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before the making of the contract. If the terms and conditions of an 
agreement is not sufficiently brought to the other notice of the other 
contracting party till the time when the contract is complete, then 
communication of any term afterwards is of no use. A late notice of any 
term will be of no effect and it will be considered a modification of the 
original agreement and in the absence of belated consent to that to that 
particular term, the other party is not bound by that term. Thus notice of 
the terms and conditions of the contract should be contemporaneous with 
the contract. This need and necessity for contemporarily may ftirther be 
explained and illustrated with help of a decided case of Olley V. 
Marlborough Court Ltd. 
In this case Mrs. Olley with her husband hired a room in the 
defendants hotel and paid for a room in the defendants hotel and paid for 
one week's boarding and lodging in advance. When they went to occupy 
the room, they found a notice displayed there which stated. 
"The proprietors will not hold themselves responsible for articles 
lost or stolen unless handed to the manageress for safe custody." 
Due to the negligence of the hotel staff, their property was stolen 
from the room. In an action against the defendants to recover 
compensation for loss they sought exemption from liability on the basis 
of the notice displayed in the room. 
The court of Appeal held that the notice formed no part of the 
contract since Olley could not have seen it until after the contract was 
made and the defendant was accordingly held liable for the loss occurred 
to the plaintiff The dependants sought to incorporate the notice in the 
contract. But the court said that even if incorporated in the contract, the 
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term was not sufficiently clear to cover the defendants negligence and the 
contract was completed before the guests went to their room. 
Thus unless the plaintiff actually knew of the terms, a notice which 
is given only after the contract has been concluded is of no effect, and the 
plaintiff was held not affected by clauses in a notice in her hotel bedroom 
when she had made the contract earlier at the reception desk. 
Another illustration of the necessity for contemporaneity is also 
provided by Thornton V. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd}^ 
In this case the plaintiff went to park his car at a multi-storey car 
park owned and operated by the defendants. At the entry to the car park 
there was a sign stating the charges and that parking was "at owner's 
risk", the motorist then drove in past a machine which dispensed tickets. 
The ticket bore the time of entry and, in small print, the words: 
"This ticket is issued subject to the conditions of issue as displayed 
on the premises." 
Inside the premises were notices displaying the conditions, which 
purported to exclude liability to customers, not only for damages to cars 
but for personal injuries. On this return to collect his car, the plaintiff was 
injured due to the negligence of the defendants. 
The defendants argued before the court that the conditions 
excluded their liability but the court of Appeal held defendants liable, the 
court said "the offer was contained in the notice at the entrance giving the 
charges for garaging and saying "at owner's risk" so far as the damage to 
the car was concerned. The offer was accepted when the plaintiff drove 
up to the entrance and, by the movement his car, turned the light from red 
to green and the ticket was thrust at him. The contract was then concludea 
and it could not be altered by any words printed on the ticket itself." 
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Thus it is the duty of the party relying on any exclusion or 
exempting clause in the contract to make the clause clear to the other 
party before or at the time of making the contract but certainly not after 
the making of the contract. If a term of the contract is communicated after 
the contract is concluded then the ignorant party is not bound by that term 
and the party relying on that exclusion clause cannot take the advantage 
of that clause. That clause is of no effect and useless to him. 
C. There should be no misrepresentation: 
As a general rule, a person who signs a document containing 
contractual terms is precluded from denying that he is bound by the terms 
of that document and that he had notice of the terms contained therein. 
However, there are circumstances in which, owing to a mistake as to the 
nature of the document or to a misrepresentation by the other party, the 
signatory can avoid liability. 
Where an oral misrepresentation, whether innocent or fraudulent, 
as to a term of a document is made prior to signature, then the signatory 
of the document is not bound by that term to the person who makes the 
representation. 
In the case of L'Estrange V. Graucob the plaintiff L'Estrange 
bought an automatic slot machine from the defendant, Graucob and 
signed a document headed "Sales Agreement". The document was an 
order form containing printed conditions of sale. Several days later 
plaintiff was sent an "order confirmation" signed by the defendant. When 
the machine was delivered it did not work properly and the plaintiff 
brought an action in the county court in which she claimed that the 
machine was not fit for the purpose for which it was sold. In answer to 
the action defendant relied upon a clause which said, 
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"This agreement contains all the terms and conditions under which 
I agree to purchase the machine specified above and any express or 
implied condition, statement or warranty, statutory or otherwise, not 
stated herein is hereby excluded." 
The County Court Judge held that the sellers could not rely on the 
printed condition. The defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal held in 
favour of the defendant and said notwithstanding that the plaintiff had no 
knowledge of the contents of the document other than the installments 
payable by her and the arrangements made for installing the machine or 
her premises, still defendant not liable for damages. 
Scrutton L.J. observed, 
"In cases in which the contract is contained in a railway ticket or 
other unsigned document, it is necessary to provide that an alleged 
party was aware, or ought to have been aware, of its terms and 
conditions. These cases have no application when the document has 
been signed. When a document containing contractual terms is 
signed, then, in the absence of fraud, or, I will add 
misrepresentation, the party signing it is bound, and it is wholly 
immaterial whether he has read the document or not. 
The plaintiff contended at trial that she was induced by 
misrepresentation to sign the contract without knowing its terms and 
that on that ground they are not binding upon her. The learned judge 
in his judgement makes no mention of that contention of the 
plaintiff and he pronounces no finding as to the alleged 
misrepresentation. I have read the evidence with care, and it 
contains no material upon which fraud could be found. The plaintiff 
no doubt alleged that the defendants' agent represented her that the 
document which was given her to be signed was an order form, but 
"according to the defendants' evidence no such statement was mode 
to her by the agent. Moreover, whether the plaintiff was or was not 
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told that the document was an order form, it was in fact an order 
form, and an order form is a contractual document. It may be either 
an acceptance or a proposal which may be accepted, but it always 
contains some contractual terms. There is no evidence that the 
plaintiff was induced to sign the contract by misrepresentation. In 
this case the plaintiff has signed a document headed "Sales 
Agreement", which she admits had to do with an intended purchase, 
and which contained a clause excluding all conditions and 
warranties. That being so, the plaintiff, having put her signature to 
the document and not having been induced to do so by any fraud or 
misrepresentation, cannot be heard to say that she is not bound by 
the terms of the document because she had not read them." 
Thus in this case the court found that though the seller of the 
machine had made no serious effort to draw the attention of the plaintiff 
towards the sweeping exemption terms of the contract but still the court 
held that where a document containing contractual terms is signed, then, 
in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation the party signing it is bound 
and it is wholly immaterial whether he has read the terms or not. 
In Curtis V. Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co. Ltd. , the plaintiff 
took her a white satin wedding dress to the defendant for cleaning and 
was handed a slip of paper headed "Receipt which she was asked to sign. 
Before signing the document she asked the shop assistant why her 
signature was required and, on being told that the company would not 
accept liability for damage to beads and sequins. The plaintiff then 
signed. In fact, the document purported to exclude liability for any 
damage to clothing however caused. When the dress was returned to her 
there was a stain on it that had not been there before, which could not be 
explained. The defendants denied liability, relying on the clause. The 
court of Appeal held that the statement made to the plaintiff 
134 
misrepresented the effect of the clause and prevented the defendants from 
relying on it, and that the plaintiff was entitled to damages, and that the 
exemption clause did not avail the defendant company because it was 
accompanied by an oral misrepresentation. 
Denning L.J. observed that, 
"This case is of importance because of the many cases nowadays 
when people sign printed forms without reading them, only to find 
afterwards that they contain stringent clauses exempting the other 
side from their common-law liabilities. In every such case it must 
be remembered that, if a person wishes to exempt himself from a 
liability which the common law imposes on him, he can only do it 
by an express stipulation brought home to the party effected and 
assented to by him as part of the contract. If a party affected signs 
a written document, knowing it to be a contract which governs the 
relations between them, his signature is irrefragable evidence of his 
assent to the whole contract, including the exempting clauses, 
unless the signature is shown to be obtained by fraud or 
misrepresentation. In my opinion any behaviour by words or 
conduct, is sufficient to be a misrepresentation if it is such as to 
mislead the other party about the existence or extent of the 
exemption. If it conveys a false impression, that is enough. If the 
false impression is created knowingly, it is fraudulent 
misrepresentation, if it is created unwittingly it is an innocent 
misrepresentation, but either is sufficient to disentitle the creator of 
it to the benefit of the exemption. In the present case the customer 
knew, from what the assistant said that the document contained 
conditions. If nothing was said she might not have known it. In that 
case the document might reasonably be understood to be, like a 
boot repairer's receipt, only a voucher for the customer to produce 
when collecting the goods, and not understood to contain 
conditions exempting the cleaners from their common-law liability 
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for negligence. In that case it would not protect the cleaners. I say 
this because I do not wish to be supposed that the cleaners would 
have been better off if the assistant had simply handed over the 
document to the customer without asking her to sign it; or if the 
customer were not so inquiring as the plaintiff, but were an 
unsuspecting person who signed whatever she was asked without 
question. In those circumstances the conduct of the cleaners might 
well be such that it conveyed the impression that the document 
contained no conditions, or at any rate, no condition exempting 
them from their common-law liability, in which case they could 
not rely on it." 
Thus where an oral misrepresentation, whether innocent or 
fraudulent, as to a term of a documents is made prior to signature then the 
signatory of the document is not bound by that term to the person who 
makes the representation. Where a person signs a document which he 
knew or ought to have known contained contractual terms then in the 
absence of fraud or misrepresentation, is bound by the terms and 
conditions of the contract. 
D. There should be contractual document: 
The parties are bound by the term if the term is contained in a 
contractual document. In order to be contractual, a document must be 
introduced at or before the making of the contract and must be of such a 
nature that a reasonable person would expect it to contain terms 
governing the contract. In Chapelton V. Barry Urban District Council a 
pile of chairs belonging to Barry Council were placed on a beach. Beside 
the deck chairs there was a notice which said "Hire of chairs, 2d per 
session of 3 hours." Then followed the words which said that the public 
were respectfully requested to obtain tickets for their chairs from the 
attendants, and that tickets were to be retained for inspection. The 
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plaintiff who was visiting the beach took two chairs from an attendant 
and received two tickets in return. He merely glanced at the tickets and 
slipped them into his pocket without reading them. At the hearing he said 
in evidence that he had no idea that there were any conditions on the 
tickets. He set the chairs up on a flat part of the beach and when he sat 
down had the misfortune to go through the canvas of one of the chairs 
and to injure himself Chapelton said Barry Council for damages and the 
defendant council relied upon an exemption clause on the ticket which 
said "The Council will not be liable for any accident or damage arising 
from the hire of chairs." The Court of Appeal found that the exemption 
clause did not avail the council because a reasonable man would not have 
expected the ticket to contain contractual terms but would have regarded 
it merely as a receipt and the defendant cannot claim exemption from 
liability on the basis of anything printed on it. 
Thus the court held that the ticket was not a contractual document. 
Similarly in Burnett V. Westminster Bank the court held that the cheque 
book is not a contractual document. The cheque book could not be 
reasonably assumed to contain terms of the contract and the defendants 
had not in fact given adequate notice of the restriction to plaintiff about 
the use of the cheque book. Parking ticket issued by an automatic 
machine has similarly been held to be non-contractual document. 
E. The terms of the contract should be reasonable: 
Though it is necessary that the terms of the contract should be 
brought adequately to the notice of the party by a sufficient notice before 
the contract is entered into. Similarly it is also necessary that the terms of 
the contract should be reasonable. If the terms of the contract are 
unreasonable and opposed to public policy they will not be enforced 
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merely because they are printed on the reverse of bill or receipt or have 
been expressly or impliedly agreed upon between the parties. 
In the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. V. 
Brojo Nath , one of the clause in the service Rules of the Corporation 
provided that the service of an employee can be terminated without 
assigning any reason. Clause (i) of Rule 9 of the Corporation was one of 
the Rules which did not state in what circumstances a permanent 
employee can be removed from service. This is a landmark case relating 
to service contracts. On interpretation of the relevant Service Rule the 
Supreme Court held that the Rule empowering the Government 
Corporation to terminate services of its permanent employees by giving 
notice or pay in lieu of notice period is opposed to public policy and 
violative of Article 14 and directive principles contained in Articles 39(a) 
and 41 of Constitution of India. The brief facts of the case are as under: 
A company carrying on the business of maintenance and running of 
river services entered into a scheme of arrangement with the Central 
Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. A Government Company owned 
by Central Government and two State Governments and therefore "State 
within meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. That scheme 
was approved of, by the High Court of Calcutta and the Company was 
dissolved by the order of the High Court. The Officers of the company 
had no real choice when they accepted the job with the corporation as, in 
the alternative they would have received a meagre sum by way of 
compensation and would have been required to search for alternative 
jobs. They had no real choice when the rules were framed by the 
corporation for the officers as refusal to accept the rules would have 
resulted in termii:atioif of their services. A sub-clause in a rule provided 
for termination of services of the officers by giving three months' notice. 
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The Corporation framed Service Discipline and Appeal rules of 1979." 
The disputed relevant provision of Rule 9 Clause (i) was as follows: 
"Rule 9 Clause (i) - Termination of Employment for acts other 
than Misdemeanor. 
(i) The employment of a permanent employee shall be subject to 
termination on three months' notice on either side. The notice shall be in 
writing on either side. The company may pay the equivalent of three 
months' basic pay and deamess allowance, if any, in lieu of notice or may 
deduct a like amount when the employee failed to give due notice." 
In accordance with the above clause the services of the respondent 
Brajo Nath and another were terminated by giving them notice, 
accompanied by cheque for three months' salary. 
This clause (i) in Rule 9 was struck down by the High Court. Then 
corporation appealed before the Supreme Court. The main question for 
consideration before the Apex court was whether an unconscionable term 
in a contract of employment is void under section 23 of the Indian 
Contract Act 1872, as being opposed to public policy and when such a 
term is contained in contract of employment entered into with a 
Government Company, is also void as infringing Article 14 of the 
Constitution of India in case a Government Company is "The State" 
under Article 12 of the Constitution? 
The Supreme Court observed that, "The said Rules form part of the 
contract of employment between the corporation and its employees who 
are not workmen. These employees had no powerful workmen's union to 
support them. They had no voice in the framing of the said Rules. They 
had no choice but to accept the said Rules as part of their contract of 
employment. There is gross disparity between the corporation and its 
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employees, whether they be workmen or officers. The corporation can 
afford to dispense with the services of an officer. It will find hundreds of 
others to take his place but an officer cannot afford to lose his job because 
if he does so, there are hundreds of jobs waiting for him. A clause such as 
clause (i) of Rule 9 is against right and reason. It is wholly 
unconscionable. It has been entered into between parties between whom 
there is gross inequality of bargaining power. Rule 9 (i) is a term of the 
contract between the corporation and all its officers. A clause such as 
Rule 9(i) in a contract of employment affecting large sections of the 
public is harmful and injurious to the public interest for it tends to create 
a sense of insecurity in the minds of those to whom it applies and 
consequently it is against public good. Such a clause, therefore, is 
opposed to public policy and being opposed to public policy, it is void 
under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. As pointed out above, Rule 
9(i) is both arbitrary and unreasonable and it also wholly ignores and sets 
aside the audi alteram partem rule it, therefore, violates Article 14 of the 
Constitution."^' 
Thus the Supreme Court held and declared that Clause (i) of Rule 9 
of the "Service Discipline and Appeal Rules 1979" of the Central Inland 
Water Transport Corporation Ltd. Is void under Section 23 of Contract 
Act, 1872 as being opposed to public policy and is also ultra vires Article 
14 of the Constitution of India to the extent that it confers upon the 
corporation the right to terminate the employment of a permanent 
employee by giving him three months notice in writing or paying him the 
equivalent of three months' basic pay and deamess allowance in lieu of 
such notice. 
In Lilly White V. Munnuswami an action was brought by a 
customer of a firm of launderers and dry cleaners, M/S Lilly White, to 
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whom the customer had given a new saree costing Rs. 220.00 for 
cleaning but the same was lost. The plaintiff claimed full price of the 
saree i.e. Rs. 220.00 but the defendant offered to pay only 50% of the 
price on the ground that there was a printed term on the back of the 
receipt given to the customer stipulating that in case of loss of a 
government, the customer would be entitled to only 50% of the market 
price or value of the same. 
The Madras High Court held that a term which is prima facie 
opposed both to public policy and to the fundamental principles of the 
law of contract cannot be enforced by a court merely, because it is printed 
on the reverse of a bill and there is tacit acceptance of the term when the 
bill was received by the customer. Certainly conditions printed on the 
reverse of a bill may well govern or modify any simple contract such as 
the contract in the present case, which was to entrust an article for dry 
cleaning, and to pay due charges for that service, subject to the obligation 
on the part of the businessman to perform the process properly, and return 
the articles safe and intact. But if a condition is imposed which is in 
flagrant infringement of the law relating to negligence, and a bill 
containing this printed condition is served on the customer, the court will 
not enforce such a term which is not in the interests of the public and 
which is not in accordance with public policy. 
A similar example is also afforded by R.S. Deboo V. Dr. M.V. 
Hindelkar^ in this case the plaintiff - customer, entrusted various 
clothes to the defendant who was carrying cleaning on business of 
cleaners and launderers for drying cleaning and ironing as a bailee. The 
defendant was giving receipts for the articles received from the 
customers. Once the defendant failed to return some clothes entrusted to 
him by the plaintiff for dry cleaning and ironing. The suit was filed by the 
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plaintiff for recovery of damages for non-return of tlie clothes. The 
defendant in his defence relied on heavily on the laundry receipt which 
contained a printed condition on it reverse purporting to restrict 
launderers' liability for quantum of loss to twenty times the laundering 
charges or half of the value of returned articles, whichever was less, 
whatever be the cause of non-return of the article entrusted by the 
customer to the laundry for purpose of laundering. The defendant was 
prepared to pay the amount of compensation as per the condition printed 
on the receipt given to the plaintiff 
But the Bombay High Court held that the above referred printed 
condition was too wide, one sided and purported to restrict the liability of 
owner of the laundry arbitrarily and unreasonably. It was also opposed to 
public policy and fiindamental principles of law of contract and the same 
was thus void under section 23 of the Contract Act 1872. The court also 
said that no stipulation opposed to public policy can be given effect to or 
enforced by a court even where the stipulation is found to and have been 
assented to by the parties voluntarily and parties were sui juris. 
Similar was the position in Levison V. Patent Steam Carpet 
Cleaning Co. Ltd^'^ In this case the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Levison, who 
owned a Chinese carpet of the value of £900, gave the same for the 
cleaning to the defendants the Carpet Cleaning Co. At the time of 
delivery Mr. Levison signed an order form containing "Terms and 
conditions of processing." Two of the clauses contained in the form were 
as under: 
(i) "Clause 2(a) read: The maximum value of any carpet, rug or 
tapestry delivered to the company for any purpose whatsoever shall, if the 
area mereof exceeds four square yards be deemed to be £ 2 per square 
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yard, and if the area does not exceed 4 square yards shall be deemed to be 
£ 10." 
In this case the area of the carpet was 5 yards by 4 yards i.e. 20 
square yards and according to this clause the maximum value of the 
carpet was deemed to be only £ 40. 
(ii) Clause 5 read: "All merchandise is expressly accepted at the 
owner's risk." 
The carpet was lost and therefore not returned to the plaintiff. The 
form also recommended that the owners should insure their goods. The 
defendants never returned the carpet and were unable to explain its 
disappearance. The plaintiff brought an action to recover of £ 900, being 
the value of the carpet lost by the defendants. The defendants tried to 
exclude their liability for negligence under clause 5 or limit the same to £ 
40 under clause 2(a). Their plea was rejected and they were held liable to 
pay damages amounting to £ 900 to the plaintiff 
The court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover 
the full value of the carpet: the majority held that the words were not 
clear enough to exclude liability for fundamental breach, and that in the 
circumstances the burden of proving that the loss was not due to a 
fundamental breach was on the defendants. Lord Denning held the clause 
did apply, but was void at common law because it was unreasonable. An 
exemption clause or limitation clause should not be given effect in 
contracts where there is inequality of bargaining power or if it is 
unreasonable to apply the clause in the circumstances of the case. Since 
the defendants had not explained how the carpet was lost, they had not 
disproved that the loss had been due to a fundamental breach, and 
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therefore, the defendants were not entitled to rely on the exemption 
clause. 
In the matter of Delhi Transport Corporation V. D. T. C. Mazdoor 
Congress^^ the important question that arose for consideration before the 
constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was, whether the Regulation 
9(b) of Delhi Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and 
Service) Regulations (1952) framed under Section 53 of the Delhi Road 
Transport Act 1950 which provided for termination of services of 
permanent employees on giving simply one month's notice or pay in lieu 
thereof without recording any reason and without holding any inquiry 
was constitutionally valid? Regulation 9(a) and (b) was framed in 
exercise of the powers conferred u/s 53 of Delhi Road Transport Act 
1950. Regulation 9 was as under: 
" 9. Termination of service: (a) Except as otherwise specified in the 
appointment orders, the services of an employee of the authority may be 
terminated without any notice or pay in lieu of notice: 
(i) During the period of probation and without assigning any reason 
thereof. 
(ii) For misconduct 
(iii) On the completion of specific period of appointment. 
(iv) In the case of employees engaged on contract for a specific period, 
on the expiration of such period in accordance with the terms of 
appointment. 
(b) Where the termination is made due to reduction of establishment or 
in circumstances other than those mentioned at (a) above, one month 
notice or pay in lieu thereof will be given to all categories of employees. 
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Employees were terminated on the basis of above Regulation 9(b). 
Their union D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress filed writs in the High Court of 
Delhi challenging the constitutional validity of Regulation 9(b). The 
Division Bench of the Delhi High Court allowed the said writ petition and 
struck down Regulation 9(b) of the said Regulation and directed the 
D.T.C. Corporation to pay back the wages of the employees and benefits 
within three months from the date of the judgement. 
The D.T.C. Corporation filed an appeal against the order of the 
Delhi High Court. In this case the judges of the Supreme Court differ in 
their views. The majority view was taken by four judges and minority 
view by Sabjasachi Mukharji C.J. The Supreme Court held that there is 
no hesitation to conclude that the impugned Regulation 9(b) of the 
Regulations is arbitrary, unjust, unfair and unreasonable offending Article 
14, 16(1), 19(l)(g) and 21 of the constitution. It is also opposite to the 
public policy and thereby is void under section 23 of the Indian Contract 
Act.^ ^ 
In this case the Apex Court reiterated his views as expressed in 
Central Inland Case.^^ The court approved the judgement of that case and 
held that the ratio in that case was correctly laid and requires no 
reconsideration and the cases are to be decided in the light of the law laid 
above. 
In Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. V. State of West Bengaf^ 
the Supreme Court held that neither the petitioner nor the respondent has 
any right to enter into a contract but they are entitled to equal treatment 
with others who offer tender or quotations for the purchase of the goods, 
services etc. this privilege arises because it is the Government which is 
trading with the public and the democratic form of Government demands 
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equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in such 
transactions. Privilege is a form of liberty as opposed to a duty. When 
public element is involved in the activities of the Government, then there 
should be fairness and equality. If the State does enter into a contract, it 
must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure. 
Exclusion of a member of the public from dealing prevents him from 
entering into lawful contractual relations and discriminates him in favour 
of other people. Though the State in entitled to impose reasonable 
conditions but arbitrary conditions prevent entering into contractual 
relations with the state. The individual is entitled to fair and equal 
treatment without others. 
The House of Lords in McCutcheon V. David MacBrayane Ltd^ 
when hearing the argument about the risk note in small print displayed 
outside and inside the defendants' office and also printed on a risk-note 
which was not signed by one Mr. Sporran. They gave him a receipt which 
stated that all goods were carried subject to the conditions set out in the 
notices Lord Devlin pointed out that. 
"There is not one law for individuals and another for organizations 
that can issue printed documents. If the respondent had remembered to 
issue a risk note in this case, they would invited your Lordships to give a 
curt answer to any complaint by the appellant. He might say that the 
terms were unfair and unreasonable, that he had never voluntarily agreed 
to them that it was impossible to read or understand them and that 
anyway, if he tried to negotiate any change, the respondent would not 
have listened to him and observed further that what is sauce for the goose 
is sauce for gander. It will remain unpalatable sauce for both animals 
-until the legislature, if the courts cannot do it, intervenes to secure that 
when contracts are made in circumstances in which there is no scope for 
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free negotiation of the terms, they are made on terms that are clear, fair 
and reasonable and settled independently as such."'^° 
In Ramana Dayaram Shetty V. International Authority oflndia^'^^ a 
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that in a Welfare State a 
regulating and dispensing special services including contracts, the citizen 
derives rights or privileges by entering into favourable relations with the 
Government. The Government therefore cannot anchor its role as a 
private person. The exercise of power or discrimination to award contract 
etc. must be structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory 
standards or norms. 
In West Bengal State Electricity Board V. Desk Bandhu Ghosh,^^^ 
the first respondent, a permanent employee of the West Bengal Electricity 
Board, filed a writ petition out of which the appeal arises in the Calcutta 
High Court to quash an order dated March 22, 1984 of the Secretary, 
West Bengal State Electricity Board terminating his services as Deputy 
Secretary with immediate effect on payment of three months' salary in 
lieu of three months' notice. The order was made under Regulation 34 of 
the Board's Regulations which enables the Board to terminate the 
services of any permanent employee "by serving three months' notice or 
on payment of salary for the corresponding period in lieu thereof. The 
Regulation 34 reads as follows: 
" 34. In case of permanent employee, his services may be 
terminated by serving three months' notice or on payment of salary for 
the corresponding period in lieu thereof" 
This order of termination was challenged on the ground that 
Regulation 34 was arbitrary in nature and it was patently discriminatory. 
The High Court of Calcutta struck down the first paragraph of Regulation 
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34 and quashed the order of termination of ser\'ices of the employee, the 
first respondent. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Regulation is 
totally arbitrary and confers on the board a power which is capable of 
vicious discrimination. It is a naked "hire and fire" rule the time for 
banishing which altogether from employer employee relationship is fast 
approaching. Its only parallel is to be found in the Henry VIII class so 
familiar to administrative lawyers." 
In M.C. Mehta V. Union of India,^^^ a Constitution Bench of the 
Supreme Court held that it is dangerous to exonerate corporations from 
the need to have constitutional conscience which makes governmental 
agencies whatever their mien amenable to constitutional limitations; the 
court must adopt such standards as against the alternative of permitting 
them to flourish as an imperium in imperio.'" It was further held that law 
has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society and 
keep abreast with the economic developments taking place in the country. 
As new situations arise the law has to evolve in order to meet the 
challenge of such new situations. Law cannot afford to remain static. The 
court has to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which arise 
in highly industrialized economy. Therefore, when new challenges are 
thrown open, the law must grow as a social engineering to meet the 
challenges and every endeavour should made to cope with the 
contemporary demands to meet socio-economic challenges under rule of 
law and have to be met either by discarding the old and unsuitable or 
adjusting legal system to the changing socio-economic scenario. 
"The law of contract, like the legal system itself, involves a balance 
between competing sets of values. Freedom of contract emphasizes the 
need of stability, certainly and predictability. But, important as is values 
are, they are not absolute, and there comes a point where they "face 
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serious challenge" against them must be set the values of protecting the 
weak, oppressed and the thoughtless from imposition and oppressed. 
Naturally, at a particular time, one set of values tends to be emphasized at 
the expense of the other as the time changes the values get changed and 
the old values are under replacement and new values take their due place. 
Though certainty and predictability in ordinary commercial contract law 
is emphasized and insisted upon the need for progress of the society and 
to removing the disabilities faced by the citizens and their relations when 
encounter with the State or its instrumentalities are in conflict with the 
assured constitutional rights demand new values and begin to assert 
themselves, for no civilized system of law can accept the implications of 
absolute sanctity of contractual obligations and of their immutability."'*^ 
Every action of the public authority or the person acting in public 
interest or any act that gives rise to public element should be guided by 
public interest. It is the exercise of the public power or action hedged 
with public element (sic that) becomes open to challenge. It is shown that 
the exercise of the power is arbitrary, unjust and unfair, it should be no 
answer for the state, its instrumentality, public authority or person whose 
acts have the insignia of public element to say that their actions are in the 
field of private law and they have free to prescribe any conditions or 
limitations in their actions as private citizens, simpliciter do in field of 
private law. Its actions must be based on some rational and relevant 
principles. It must not be guided by irrational or irrelevant consideration. 
Every administrative decision must be hedged by reasons.'*^^ 
The distinction between private law and public law remedy is now 
settled by the Supreme Court in LLC. V. Escorts Ltd}^^ The Constitution 
Bench of the Supreme Court observed that, "If the action of the Stats is 
related to contractual obligation or obligations arising out of the tort, the 
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court may not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law 
character attached to it. Broadly speaking, the court will examine actions 
of State if they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from 
examining them if they pertain to the private law field. The difficulty will 
lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and private 
law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precision and we do not 
want to attempt it. The question must be decided in each case with 
reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or 
instrumentality of the state is engaged when performing the action, the 
public law or private law character of the action and a host of other 
relevant circumstances." 
The corporation must act in accordance with certain constitutional 
conscience and whether they have so acted must be discernible from the 
conduct of such corporations. Every activity of public authority must be 
informed by reasons and guided by the public interest. All exercise of 
discretion or power by public authority must be judged by that standard. 
Even in contractual relations the court cannot ignore that public authority 
must have constitutional conscience so that any interpretation put up must 
be to avoid arbitrary action, lest the authority would be permitted to 
flourish as imperium in imperio. Whatever be the activity of the public 
authority, it must meet the test of Article 14 and judicial review strikes an 
arbitrary action. 
In Mahabir Auto Stores V. India Oil Corporation^^^, it was held 
that the State when acting in its executive power enters into contractual 
relations with the individual. Article 14 would be applicable to the 
exercise of the power. The action of the state or its instrumentality can be 
checked under Article 14. Their action must be subject to rule of law. If 
the governmental action even in the matter of entering or not entering into 
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contracts, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness the same would be 
unreasonable. 
An unfair and untenable or irrational clause in a contract is also 
unjust and amenable to judicial review. In common law a party was 
relieved from such contract. In Gillespie Bros & Co. Ltd. V. Roy Bowles 
Transport Ltd. , Lord Denning for the first time construing the 
indemnity clause in a contract questioned that are the courts to permit 
party to enforce his unreasonable clause, even when it is so unreasonable, 
or applied so unreasonably, as to be unconscionable and said: 
"When it gets to this point, I would say, as I said many years ago 
.... there is the vigilance of the common law which while allowing 
freedom of contract, watches to see that it is not abused. It will not allow 
the party to exempt himself from his liability at common law when it 
would be quite unconscionable for him to do so." 
Lord Denning in John Lee & Son V. Railway Executive^^^ while 
interpreting and analyzing a term in the contract observed same and said 
"Above all there is the vigilance of the common law which, while 
allowing freedom of contract, watches to see that it is not abused." 
In Lloyds Bank Ltd. V. Bundy , Lord Denning enunciated the 
principle of inequality of bargaining power and observed that one who 
enters into a contract on terms which are very unfair or transfers property 
for a consideration which is grossly inadequate, when his bargaining 
power is impaired by reason of his own needs or desires or by his own 
ignorance or infirmity ... the one who stipulates for an unfair advantage 
may be moved solely by his own self-interest, unconscious of the distress 
he is bringing to the other ... one who is in extreme need may knowingly 
consent to a most improvident bargain, solely to relieve the strains in 
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which he finds himself. It would not be meant to suggest that every 
transaction is saved by independent advice. But the absence of it may be 
fatal. 
In Schroeder Music Publishing Co. V. Macaulay ' , the House of 
Lords considered and held that a party to a contract would be relieved 
from the terms of the contract. The doctrine of restraint of trade, which 
may render a contract wholly or partly void as contrary to public policy. 
In this case a song writer had contracted with the publisher on the terms 
more onerous to him and favourable to the publisher. The song writer was 
relieved from the bargain of the contract on the theory of restraint of trade 
opposed to public policy. Lord Diplock observed. 
"It is in my view, salutary to acknowledge that in refusing to 
enforce provisions of a contract whereby one party agrees for the 
benefit of the other party to exploit or to refrain from exploiting his 
own eaming-power, the public policy which the court is 
implementing is not some 19"^  century economic theory about the 
benefit to the general public of freedom of trade, but the protection 
of those whose bargaining power is weak against being forced by 
those whose bargaining power is stronger to enter into bargains that 
are unconscionable. Under the influence of Bentham and of laissez-
faire the courts in the 19"' century abandoned the practice of 
applying the public policy against unconscionable bargains to 
contracts generally, as they had formerly done to any contract 
considered to be usurious; but the policy survived in its application 
to penalty clauses and to relief against forfeiture and also to the 
special category of contracts in restraint of trade. If one looks at the 
reasoning of the 19' century judges in cases about contracts in 
restraint of trade on finds lip service paid to current economic 
theories but if one looks at what they said in the light of what they 
did, one finds that they struck down a bargain if they thought it was 
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unconscionable as between the parties to it, and upheld it if they 
thought that it was not. 
The distinction was made even in respect of standard forms of 
contract emphasizing that when the parties in a commercial 
transaction having equal bargaining power have adopted the 
standard form contract, it was intended to be binding on the parties. 
The court would not relieve the party from such a contract but the 
contracts are between the parties to it, or approved by any 
organization representing the interest of the weaker party they have 
been directed by that party whose bargaining power, either 
exercised alone or in conjunction with others providing similar 
goods or services, enables him to say. "If you want these goods or 
services at all, these are the only terms on which they are obtainable. 
Take it or leave it." 
114 In Photo Production Ltd. V. Securicor Transport Ltd. 
Considering the (English) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, Lord 
Wiiberforce during the course of his speech emphasized the unequal 
bargaining power as an invalidating factor upheld the contract in that case 
since it was commercial bargain between two competent parties to enter 
into a contract on equal bargaining power. Lord Diplock also reiterated 
his earlier view. Lord Scarman agreeing with Lord Wiiberforce described 
that a commercial dispute between the parties well able to look after 
themselves, in such a situation what the parties have agreed expressly or 
impliedly is what matters; and the duty of the courts is to construe their 
contract according to their tenor. It was held that in that case that party 
have equal bargaining power and intervention of the court to relieve the 
party from the contract was not called for. 
In U.S.A., the standard forms of contracts are called "Contracts of 
Adhesion." Assistant Professor Todd D. Rakoff of Harvard University in 
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his "Contracts of Adhesion"^ 1982-83, 95 Harvard Law Review 
surveyed the development of the standard form of contracts. He 
considered the social and the legal effect of the standard form of contracts 
and observed that if the presumption of enforceability is retained, it 
threatens to continue generate undesirable results, thus: 
"This expansion is made manifest by the explanatory comment 
which states that reason to believe that the adherent would not 
knowingly have signed may be inferred from the fact that the term 
is bizarre or oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates that non-
standard terms explicitly agreed to or form the fact that it 
eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction." 
He further stated that, 
"In the last decade or two, courts analyzing contracts of adhesion 
have applied the categories of 'public interest' and 'superior 
bargaining power' to a substantially broader set of situations than 
would fit within the analogous doctrines of ordinary contract law 
concerning business 'affected with a public interest' and 
transactions tainted by 'economic duress'." 
In chapter IV, "Towards the Development of New Doctrine" he 
states that there exists: 
"Gross inequality of bargaining power' or the like (in the usual 
sense of a wide disparity of economic resources) ought not to be a 
prerequisite to finding a contract of adhesion. Put simply, the practice of 
standard form contracting is not based on the exercise of pre-existing 
market power." 
In L.I.C. of India V. Consumer Education Research Centre"^ the 
conditions imposed and the denial to accept the policies were challenged 
before the Gujarat High Court. It was contended before the High Court 
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that the conditions is arbitrary and discriminatory violating Article 14, 
19(l)(g) and right to life in Article 21 of the Constitution. The High Court 
while upholding that prescription of conditions for first class lives as 
eligibility and other criteria laid down in the policy under Table 58 are 
neither unjust nor arbitrary, declared a part of the conditions, namely, 
"further, proposals for assurance under the plan will be entertained only 
from persons in Government or quasi-Govemment organization or a 
reputed commercial firm which can furnish details of leave taken during 
the preceding year under Table 58 as subversive of equality and, 
therefore, constitutionally invalid. Accordingly, it was struck down. The 
corporation filed the appeal, against the portion that was struck down and 
the respondents filed the cross appeal against the findings that went 
against them, before the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court held that, "It is, therefore the settled law that if 
a contract or a clause in a contract is found unreasonable or unfair or 
irrational, one must look to the relative bargaining power of the 
contracting parties. In dotted line contracts there would be no occasion 
for a weaker party to bargain or to assume to have equal bargaining 
power. He has either to accept or leave the services or goods in terms of 
the dotted line contract. His option would be either to accept the 
unreasonable or unfair terms or forgo the services for ever. With a view 
to have the services of the goods, the party enters into a contract with 
unreasonable or unfair terms contained therein and he would be left with 
no option but to sign the contract. An unfair and untenable or irrational 
clause in a contract is unjust and amenable to judicial review." 
The Apex Court while concluding the judgement stated that. 
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"We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that in issuing a general 
life insurance policy of any type, public element is inherent in 
prescription of terms and conditions therein. The appellants or any person 
or authority in the field of insurance owe a public duty to evolve their 
policies subject to such reasonable, just and fair terms and conditions 
accessible to all segments of the society for insuring the lives of eligible 
persons. The eligibility conditions must be conformable to the Preamble, 
Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of the Constitution." 
1 1 fi 
In Brojo Math's case , D.P. Madon J. speaking for the Bench 
said, "under which head would an unconscionable bargain fall? If it falls 
under the head of undue influence, it would be voidable but if it falls 
under the head of being opposed to public policy, it would be void. No 
case of the type before us appears to have fallen for decision under the 
law of contracts before any court in India nor has any case on all fours of 
a court in any other country been pointed to us."' ''^  
He observed further that "The Contract Act does not define the 
expression "public policy" or "opposed to public policy." From the very 
nature of the things, the expressions" public policy", "opposed to public 
policy" or contrary to public policy" is incapable of precise definition. 
Public policy, however, is not the policy of a particular government. It 
connotes some matter which concerns the public good and the public 
interest. The concept of what is for the public good or in the public 
interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or the 
public interest has varied from time to time. As new concept take the 
place of old, transactions which were once considered against public 
policy are now being upheld by the courts and similarly where there has 
been a well recognized hea'^  of public policy, the courts have not shirked 
from extending it to new transactions and changed circumstances and 
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lave at times not even flinched from inventing a new head of public 
policy. There are two schools of thought - " the "narrow view" and "the 
kroad view" school. According to the former, courts cannot create new 
leads of public policy whereas the latter countenances judicial law 
making in this area. The adherents of "the narrow view" school would not 
invalidate a contract on the ground of public policy unless that particular 
ground had been well established by authorities?'^° 
More than 100 years ago Lord Davey observed in Janson V. 
Driefontein consolidated Mines, Ltd. that "public policy is always an 
unsafe and treacherous ground for legal decisions." 
Sir William Holdsworth in his "History of English Law" said 
"In fact, a body of law like the common law, which has grown up 
gradually with the growth of the nation, necessarily acquires some fixed 
principles, and if it is to maintain these principles it must be able, on the 
ground of public policy or some other like ground, to suppress practices 
which, under ever new disguises, seek to weaken or negative them." 
D.P. Madon J. further said "that the principles governing the public 
policy must be and are capable, on proper occasion, of expansion or 
modification. Practices which were considered perfectly normal at one 
time have today become obnoxious and oppressive to public conscience. 
If there is no head of public policy which covers a case, then the court 
must in consonance with public conscience and in keeping with public 
good and public interest declare such practice to be opposed to public 
policy. Above all, in deciding any case which may not be covered by 
authority our courts have before them the beacon light of the Preamble to 
the Constitution. Lacking precedent, the courts can always be guided by 
that light and the principles underlying the Fundamental Rights and the 
157 
Directive Principles enshrined in our constitution. The types of contracts 
to which the principle formulated by us above applies are not contracts 
which are tainted with illegality but are contracts which contain terms 
which are so unfair and unreasonable that they shock the conscience of 
the court. They are opposed to public policy and require to be adjudged 
void." 
In O.N.G.C. V. Streamline Shipping Co. Pvt. Ltd}^^, the appellant 
floated a tender for manning, running, operating, repairing and 
maintenance on hire. The respondent was one of the tenderers. A contract 
was signed between the appellant and the respondent, for the primary 
term of two and half years. One of the terms of the contract was that: 
"That owner reserves its right to terminate the agreement at any 
time after expiry of one year of contract by giving 30 days notice in 
writing to the operator without assigning any reason whatsoever." 
The appellant issued notice terminating contract under the clause 
19.3 of the agreement before the expiry of even two years. The 
respondent moved to the High Court and sought injunction to restrain the 
appellant from acting on the notice of termination. 
The learned single Judge Bench of the High Court took the view 
that the clause 19.3 of the agreement is unconscionable and against public 
policy and violates section 23 of the Contact Act. In this behalf the 
learned Judge relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 
Kum. Srilekha Vidyarthi V. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1991 SC 537, M/s 
Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons V. Board of trustees of the Port of 
Bombay, A.I.R. 1989 SC 1642 and Mahavir Auto Stores V. Indian Oil 
Corporation A.I.R. 1990 SC 1031, the learned Judge concluded thus: 
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"The matter is no longer in the realm of private contract as 
explained by the Apex Court it is now in the public domain. To my mind 
therefore, considering all the aspects, it would be unjust to allow 
respondents who have not disclosed to the court the basis for their actions 
to contend that clause 19.3 is an answer to their action namely that the 
contract is terminable and they are not bound to give reasons. That 
argument was rejected by the Apex Court nearly a decade ago in Srilekha 
(Supra). All that such a clause means is that you need not communicate 
the reasons but reasons must exist when a challenge is thrown that the 
action is arbitrary, the reasons must be disclosed." 
Against this order of a single Judge of the High Court the appellant 
filed the appeal before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. 
Justice A.P. Shah speaking for the Bench said,'^'* 
"In our opinion, it is not possible to agree with the view expressed 
by the single Judge that clause 19.3 is unconscionable and opposed 
to public policy. Clause 19.3 gives power to the appellant to 
determine the contract after the expiry of one year without 
assigning any reasons. All that the appellant did was to exercise 
that right or power to terminate the contract whose terms and 
conditions were well known and agreed by the respondent. Thus 
the contract by virtue of clause 19.3 sets out the power of 
termination by the appellant and the appellant has so acted under 
that clause. The clause while setting out the right of termination 
further says that the appellant can do so without assigning any 
reasons for the same. It is the settled position of law that where the 
contracts are freely entered with the State there is no scope for 
invoking the doctrine of fairness and reasonableness for the 
purpose of altering or adding to the terms and conditions o the 
contracts. In such cases the question of public law based on Article 
14 of the Constitution do not arise and the matter must be decided 
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strictly in the realm of private law rights governed by the general 
law relating to contracts with reference to the provisions of 
Specific Relief Act providing for non-enforceability of certain 
types of contracts." 
Thus in this case the single Judge held for the respondent while the 
Division Bench delivered the judgement in favour of the appellant. The 
Division Bench said that the decision relied by the single Judge have no 
application to the facts of the present case and the mutual rights and 
liabilities of the parties are governed by the terms of the contract. The 
Bench also said that the learned single Judge has clearly committed an 
error in holding that clause 19.3 is unconscionable and opposed to public 
policy. Moreover, in the present case it is obvious that the contract in 
question was determinable. Admittedly under Section 14 (l)(c) of the 
Specific Relief Act, a contract which is in its nature determinable cannot 
be specifically enforced. Since in the present case the contract was 
determinable under clause 19.3 it is covered by the said provision of the 
Specific Relief Act. Under Section 14(e) of the Specific Relief Act no 
injunction can be granted to prevent breach of contract, performance of 
which cannot be specifically enforced. Thus once it is found that the 
contract cannot be specifically enforced because it is covered by Section 
14(l)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, no injunction can be granted to 
prevent breach of the said contract. In the instant case the respondent 
under the guise of interim injunction wanted specific performance of the 
contract which is not permissible in view of the provisions of Section 
14(l)(c) read with Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. 
In Director of Education V. Educomp Datamatics Ltd. The 
Supreme Court held that, 
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The terms of the invitation to tender are not open to judicial 
scrutiny the same being in the realm of contract. That the Government 
must have a free hand in setting the terms of the tender. It must have 
reasonable play in its joints as a necessary concomitant for an 
administrative body in an administrative sphere. The courts would 
interfere with the administrative policy decision only if it is arbitrary, 
discriminatory, mala fide or actuated by bias. It is entitled to pragmatic 
adjustments which may be called for by the particular circumstances. The 
courts cannot strike down the terms of the tender prescribed by the 
Government because it feels that some other terms in the tender would 
have been fair, wiser or logical. The courts can interfere only if the policy 
decision is arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. 
In Sudist Narain Thakur V. Bihar State Financial Corporation^^^ 
the main question for consideration, that arose for the Jharkhand High 
Court, was whether the respondents - Bihar State Financial Corporation 
was entitled to charge interest on the sanctioned amount of loan from the 
date of sanction or from the date when the actual possession of the assets 
had been delivered to the petitioner. In this case a unit of M/s Bihar 
Wood Product was auction sold by the respondent - corporation and the 
bid of the petitioner was accepted. The corporation approved the sale of 
mortgaged assets in favour of the petitioner and accordingly sale order 
was issued in which it was provided that the interest @ 18% will be 
realized from the purchaser before handing over the possession and 
thereafter, current interest will be paid on due date and as such, as per the 
terms of sale order interests up to date of handling over possession from 
01.09.1994 was to be paid by the petitioner. The corporation issued the 
sale order on 23.09.1994 and the sale agreement was executed between 
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the petitioner and the respondent on 31.01.1995 and on the same day 
actual possession of the premises was given to the petitioner. 
The High Court held that the clause contained in the agreement is 
unfair, unreasonable and against public policy and violative of section 23 
of the Contract Act. 
In Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. V. District 
Registrar Cooperative Societies , a person became member of a 
cooperative society formed for the purpose of constructing house for 
residential use of its members. The membership was confined to the Parsi 
Community. No member was free to sell the property obtained by way of 
membership to anyone outside the Parsi community. He challenged this 
particular provision in the byelaws alleging that it is infringing his 
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19( 1 )(c) of the Constitution of 
India and thus is against the public policy. 
The Supreme Court did not agree with the contention and observed 
that, 
Section 23 of the Contract Act provides that where consideration 
and object are not lawful the contract would be void. But for section 23 to 
apply it must be forbidden by law or it must be of such a nature that it 
would defeat the provision of any law or it is fraudulent or it involves or 
implies injury to the person or property of another or the court regards it 
as immoral or opposed to public policy. If we proceed on the basic 
premise that public policy in relation to a cooperative society is to be 
looked for within the four comers of the Act, the very enactment under 
which the very society is formed, a bye-law that does not militate against 
any of the provisions of the Act cannot be held to be opposed to public 
policy unless it is immoral or offends public order. In the context of 
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section 23 of the Contract Act, something more than possible or plausible 
argument based on the constitutional scheme is necessary to nullify an 
agreement voluntarily entered into by person. 
I OS. 
Supreme Court in gherulal Prakash V. Mahadeodas Maiya said 
that the doctrine of public policy is governed by precedents, its principles 
have been crystallized under the different heads and though it was 
permissible to be expound and apply them to different situations it could 
be applied only to clear and undeniable cases of harm to the public. 
Although theoretically it was permissible to evolve a new head of public 
policy in exceptional circumstances such a course would be inadvisable 
in the interest of stability of society. 
In State of Rajasthan V. Basant Nahata the Supreme Court 
observed that public policy is not capable of being given a precise 
definition. What is 'opposed to public policy' would be a matter 
depending upon the nature of the transaction. The pleadings of the parties 
and the materials brought on record would be relevant so as to enable the 
court to judge the concept as to what is for public good or in the public 
interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or the 
public interest at the relevant point of time as contra-distinguished from 
the policy of a particular government. A law dealing with the rights of a 
citizen is required to be clear and unambiguous. Doctrine of public policy 
is contained in a branch of common law it is governed by the precedents. 
The Apex Court reiterated the same view as in Gherulal Prakash's 
case'"'^  that doctrine of public policy is governed by precedents and its 
principles have been crystallized under different heads and though it may 
be possible for the courts to expound and apply them to different 
situations but it is trite that the said doctrine should not be taken recourse 
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to in clear and incontestable cases of harm to the public though the heads 
are not closed and though theoretically it may be permissible to evolve a 
new head under exceptional circumstances of a changing world. 
The Supreme Court further gave some guidelines that a contract 
being "opposed to public policy" is a defence under Section 23 of the 
Indian Contract Act and the courts while deciding the validity of a 
contract has to consider: 
(a) Pleadings in the terms of Order VI. Rule 1 of the Code Civil 
Procedure. 
(b) Statute governing the case 
(c) Provisions of Part III and IV of the Constitution of India. 
(d) The materials brought on record of the case. 
(e) Other relevant factors if any. 
Thus the court laid down the general principles regarding the 
public policy that since it is not possible to define the term 'public 
policy," then the essential function to decide what public policy is cannot 
be delegated to executive through subordinate legislation. The power to 
decide what is against public policy is with the judiciary. The legislature 
of a state, however, may lay down as to which acts would be immoral 
being injurious to the society. Such a legislation being substantive in 
nature must receive the legislative sanction specifically and not through a 
subordinate legislation or executive instructions. The doctrine which is so 
vague or uncertain cannot and does not provide any guideline whatsoever 
and the executive while making a subordinate legislation cannot be 
permitted to open new heads of public policy in its whims. 
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Professor Winfield in his article "Public Policy in the English 
Common Law" reported in 42 Harvard Law Review 76 stated: 
"First among these is the principle that it cannot conflict with 
existing Parliamentary Legislation. It may be useful in resolving a 
doubtful point in the interpretation of an enactment. But there cannot be 
public policy leading to one conclusion when there is a statute directing a 
precisely opposite conclusion. Moreover, where a rule of common law is 
itself clear, arguments based upon public policy are beside the mark, 
however, useful and admissible they may be where a new or doubtful 
question arises. There has been a noticeable tendency to regard public 
policy as a last resort for moulding the law." 
In BCPP Mazdoor Sangh V. NTPC^^^ there was dispute of 
employees of NTPC, a public sector undertaking who were transferred to 
a private concern (BALCO) on the basis of a bi-partite agreement entered 
into between the two concerns. The services of 236 employees, appointed 
before this agreement, were also transferred. The employees challenged 
this agreement in the High Court Chattisgarh on the ground that it 
unilaterally changed the service conditions of even those employees who 
were not a party to the agreement, the High Court dismissed all writ 
petitions of the employees then the employees appealed against the order 
of High Court and filed appeals in the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
IT? 
Court referred to its earlier judgement in Brojo Nath's case in which it 
was held that in the vast majority of cases, however, such contracts are 
entered into by the weaker party under pressure of circumstances, 
generally economic which results in inequality of bargaining power. Such 
contracts will not fall within the four comers of the definition of "undue 
influence" given in Section 16(1). pLiither the majority of such contracts 
are in a standard or prescribed form or consist of a set of rules. They are 
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not contracts between individuals containing terms meant for those 
individuals alone contracts in prescribed or standard forms or which 
embody a set of rules as a part of the contract are entered into by the party 
with superior bargaining power with a large number of persons who have 
far less bargaining power or no bargaining power at all. Such contracts 
which affect a large number of persons or a group or groups of persons, if 
they are unconscionable, unfair and unreasonable, are injurious to public 
interest. To say that such a contract is only voidable would be to compel 
each person with whom the party with superior bargaining power had 
contracted to go to court to have the contract adjudged voidable. This 
would only result in multiplicity of litigation which no court should 
encourage and would also not be in the public interest. Such a contract or 
such a clause in a contract ought, therefore, to be adjudged void. While 
the law of contracts in England is mostly judge-made, the law of 
contracts in India is enacted in a statute, namely the Indian Contract Act 
1872. In order that such a contract should be void, it must fall under one 
of the relevant sections of the Indian Contract Act. The only relevant 
provision in the Indian Contract Act which can apply is Section 23 when 
it states that "The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, 
unless ... the court regards it as ... opposed to public policy." 
The Supreme Court held that materials placed clearly show that 
clause 14 in the appointment letter and obtaining undertakings from the 
employees is against the public policy and contrary to Section 23 of the 
Indian Contract Act as well as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution 
of India for the reason that undue influence was exercised by NTPC 
management and the selected candidates to accept the terms and 
conditions stipulated therein. By virtue of clause 14 the status nf these 
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public servants have been sought to be changed which is again violative 
of Article 14. 
According to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in 
State of Rajas than V. Basant Nahata it is amply clear that it is not 
possible to define public policy with precision at any point of time. It is 
not for the executive to fill these grey areas as the said power rests with 
judiciary. Whenever interpretation of the concept "public policy" is 
required to be considered it is for the judiciary to do so and in doing so 
even the power of the judiciary is very limited. Even for the said purpose, 
the part dealing with public policy in section 23 of the Indian Contract 
Act is required to be construed in conjunction with other parts thereof A 
further question which arises is whether having regard to the doctrine of 
separation of powers what is essentially within the exclusive domain of 
the judiciary can be delegated to the executive unless policy behind the 
same is finally laid down. The view of the apex court is that a thing which 
itself is so uncertain cannot be a guideline for any thing or cannot be said 
to be providing sufficient framework for the executive to work under it. 
Essential functions of the legislature cannot be delegated and it must be 
judged with touchstone of Article 14 and Article 246 of the Constitution 
of India. It is, thus, only the ancillary and procedural powers which can 
be delegated and not the legislature point. 
(3) Construction of Exclusion Clauses: 
What the parties to the contract meant to say or write is a question 
of construction of the words used having regard to the tenor of the 
agreement and to the surrounding circumstances. However a number of 
rules of construction have been developed to assist the courts to ascertain 
the meaning of the words and phrases in various circumstances. 
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(i) General Principles: 
The General principle is that the words or phrases receive the 
construction which will best give effect to the intentions of the parties to 
the contract so far as they can be ascertained from whole of the terms of 
the agreement in the light of surrounding circumstances. However, where 
the terms of a contract are contained in a document, extrinsic evidence 
whether oral or otherwise are admissible to alter or to explain express 
terms which are clear and unambiguous. In cases where, there is disparity 
between the bargaining powers of consumers and large enterprises 
whether public or private means that the terms have often been imposed 
upon consumers which are unfair or unreasonable in their application 
which exempt the enterprise putting forward the document, either wholly 
or in part from its liability under the contract. The practice of imposition 
of unfair terms in the contract by the big-enterprises compelled the courts 
at common law to evolve certain canons of construction which normally 
work in favour of party seeking to establish liability against the party in a 
superior bargaining position seeking to claim the benefit of exclusion 
clause in the contract. 
One of the functions of the court is to interpret the terms of the 
contract and give effect to them. The courts have no power to alter or add 
the terms which the parties have made. The courts can interpret the terms 
of the contract in a manner consistent with the rules normally applicable 
to contracts of the class in question. 
The interpretation of the contract is no formal or mechanical task. 
On the contrary, it is one of the most intractable tasks which a court have 
to face, and it is not made easier by the utter inadequacy of the tools 
which the courts have forged to assist them. Perhaps nowhere does the 
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law of the twentieth century seem more inadequate to its purposes than in 
the rules for the interpretation of written documents. These rules are 
based on the assumption that words have a 'plain' or 'simple' or 
'ordinary' meaning, and that the only function of a court in interpreting a 
document is to find out what that meaning is and give effect to it, or in 
other words that the judge is just a kind of legal dictionary.'^ "* 
The purpose of interpretation of a term in the contract is to seek, 
search and explore plain meaning of the words in cases where the 
meaning of the contract or its term is doubtful, ambiguous, obscure or not 
clear. The courts have to choose the simple literal meaning between the 
various possible meanings available. An exclusion clause may take any 
form but the purpose of all the clauses are to exempt the party from 
certain liability under the contract which the other party to the contract in 
ignorance or otherwise considers the liability is of the party who is taking 
the advantage or seeking the exemption of that exclusion clause. 
In The Metropolitan Gas Company V. The Federal Gas Employees 
Industrial Union^^ Isaacs and Rich JJ. said that, 
"It is a received canon of interpretation that every passage in a 
document must be read, not as if it were entirely divorced from its 
context, but as part of the whole instrument. In construing an instrument 
"every part of it should be brought into action, in order to collect from the 
whole one uniform and consistent sense, if that may be done; or, in other 
words, the construction must be made upon the entire instrument, and not 
merely upon disjointed parts of it; the whole context must be considered, 
in endeavouring to collect the intention of the parties, although the 
immediate object of inquiry be the meaning of an isolated clause." 
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Thus where the words of a document or meaning of the terms in 
the contract is clear they must be followed but where the alternative 
construction is equally open then that alternative should be chosen which 
will be consistent with the rules normally applicable to the contracts of 
that particular class or category and that other alternative should be 
rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion. 
(ii) Exemption Clauses and Strict Construction: 
A clause in the contract which purports to exempt or limit the 
liability of one of the parties under a contract is to be strictly construed 
against the party relying upon it. An exemption clause will always be 
construed narrowly, against the party who put it forward. 
The 'contra proferentem' rule -
The principle whereby the words or terms of a written contract are 
construed more strictly, forcibly and narrowly against the party putting 
forward the document of contract. The word 'contra proferentem' is from 
the Latin maxim that is ' Verba chartarem fortius accipiuntur contra 
proferentem", meaning thereby the words of written documents are 
construed more forcibly against the party putting forward. This rule of 
construction is only applied where there is doubt or ambiguity in the 
phrases used and provides that such doubt or ambiguity must be resolved 
against the party putting forward the written document and in favour of 
the other party. Ambiguous words in exemption clauses are construed in 
the way least favourable to the party relying on them. When the court is 
construing a clause which exempts a party from liabilities which would 
normally rest upon him, its approach is to construe it restrictively against 
him, contra proferentem, and to resolve ambiguities in favour of the other 
party. 
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An example of the contra proferentem rule being applied is 
Andrews Bros. Ltd. V. Singer & Co. Ltd}^^ In this case the defendant was 
a manufacturer of motor vehicles and the plaintiff was a retailer. The 
plaintiff ordered a new vehicle from the defendant and the defendant 
tendered a vehicle which, though never resold, had undergone a 
considerable mileage in being demonstrated to prospective purchasers. 
The plaintiff noticed that the car had done a considerable mileage but 
took it notwithstanding. Later plaintiff brought an action against the 
defendant alleging that it had delivered a car which was not in accordance 
with the contract. The contract provided that "all conditions warranties 
and liabilities provided by statute common law or otherwise are 
excluded." 
The question before the court of Appeal was whether the defendant 
having supplied a car which did not comply with the contract, could say 
that the plaintiff having accepted the car, was prevented by the exemption 
clause from suing for breach of contract. 
The court of Appeal held that the defendants could not rely on the 
exemption clause, which dealt only with implied terms, since the 
obligation to deliver a new car was an express term. 
Scrutton L.J. observed that, 
"In my opinion this was a contract for the sale of a new Singer car. 
The contract continually uses the phrase "New Singer Cars." At 
the end of the agreenaent I find this: "In the event of the dealer 
having purchased from the company during the period of this 
agreement 250 new cars of current season's models;" and in the 
very beginning of the agreement I find this: "The company hereby 
appoint the dealer their sale dealer for the sale of new Singer cars." 
The same phrase also occurs in other parts of the agreement, and 
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the subject matter is therefore expressly stated to be "new singer 
cars...." 
In my view there has been in this case a breach of an express term 
of the contract. If a vendor desires to protect himself from liability 
in such a case he must do so by much clearer language than this, 
which, in my opinion, does not exempt the defendants from 
liability where they have failed to comply with the express term of 
the contract." 
In Adler V. Dicksor?^^ Mrs. Adler, the plaintiff was a first class 
passenger aboard the 'Himalaya' which was berthed at Trieste. While she 
was boarding the ship the gangway fell onto the wharf and she suffered 
serious injuries. One of the terms of the ticket under which she was 
travelling said "The company will not be responsible for and shall be 
exempt from all liability in respect of any injury to the person of any 
passenger." Mrs. Adler brought an action for negligence against the 
master and boatswain of the ship and recovered damages against them. 
The court of Appeal held that the exemption clause was not sufficiently 
wide to exempt the servants of the company from liability. 
Denning L.J. said that, "My conclusion therefore is that in the 
carriage of passengers as well as of goods, the law permits a carrier 
to stipulate for exemption from liability not only for himself but also 
for those whom he engages to carryout the contract; and this can be 
done by necessary implication as well as by express words. When 
such a stipulation is made, it is effective to protect those who render 
services under the contract, although they were not parties to it, 
subject however to this important qualification. The injured party 
must assent to the exemption of those persons. His assent may be 
given expressly or by necessary implication, but assent he must 
before he is bound: for it is clear law that an injured party is not to 
be deprived of his rights at common law except by a contract freely 
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and deliberately entered into by him; and all the more so when the 
wrongdoer was not a party to the contract, but only participated in 
the performance of it.... 
Applying those principles to the present case, the important thing to 
notice is that the steamship company only stipulated for the 
exemption from liability for themselves. They did not in terms 
stipulate for exemption for their servants or agents, and 1 see no 
reason to imply any such exemption." 
In Beck & Co. V. Szymanowski & Co}^^ clause 5 of a contract for 
the sale goods delivered should be deemed to be in all respects in 
accordance with the contract unless the sellers were notified within 14 
days of delivery. After 18 months the buyers complained that on average 
each reel contained only 188 yards of cotton instead of the stipulated 200. 
The House of Lords held that sellers were not protected by clause 5 
which referred to "goods delivered" whereas the buyers were 
complaining that a portion of the goods had not been delivered. 
A particular application of the contra proferentem approach is 
found in a group of cases involving the question of whether the clause 
covers negligence. In White V. John Warwick & Co. Ltd}^^ the plaintiff 
hired a bicycle from the defendants. Clause 11 of the agreement provided: 
'Nothing in this agreement shall render the owners liable for any 
personal injuries....' 
The plaintiff was thrown from the bicycle and injured when the 
saddle tilted as he was riding it. The Court of Appeal held that the 
defendants were liable for negligence: clause 11 excluded their strict 
liability in contract, but they were also under a duty in tort to take 
reasonable care, and clause 11 did not cover that. 
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In Hollier V. Rambler Motors (AMC) Ltd}^^ The plaintiff took his 
car to a garage for repairs, as he has done on several previous occasions. 
Normally he signed a form which provided: 
'The company is not responsible for damage caused by fire to 
customers' cars on the premises.' 
On the occasion in question he did not sign the form. His car was 
damaged in a fire caused by the negligence of the garage. The court held 
that the form was not incorporated into the contract by a previous course 
of dealing. The court said that even if this provision was incorporated into 
the contract it would not operate to provide a defence. The defendants 
argued that in the circumstances the only way in which they could be 
liable for damage by fire was if they were negligent and that the words 
were therefore appropriate to exclude liability for negligence. 
But the court said if the dependants were seeking to exclude their 
responsibility for a fire caused by their own negligence, they ought to 
have done so in for plainer language than the language here used. The 
words of the condition would be understood as being meant to be a 
warning to the customer that if a fire does occur at the garage which 
damages the car, and is not caused by the negligence of the garage owner, 
then the garage owner is not responsible for damage. It was not therefore 
sufficiently unambiguous to exclude liability for negligence. 
In John Lee & Son (Grantham) Ltd. V. Railway Executive^^\ goods 
stored in a railway warehouse let to a tenant were damaged by fire and 
the tenant brought an action against the Railway Executive alleging that 
the accident was due to their negligence because a spark or other 
combustible material ejected from their railway engine had caused the 
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fire. The Railway Executive set up a clause in the tenancy agreement 
providing that: 
"The tenant shall be responsible for and shall release and 
indemnify the company and their servants and agents from and against all 
liability for personal injury (whether fatal or otherwise) loss of or damage 
to property and any other loss damage costs and expenses however 
caused or incurred (whether by the act or neglect of the company or their 
servants or agents or not) which but for the tenancy hereby created or 
anything done pursuant to the provisions hereof would not have arisen." 
The court of Appeal held that applying contra proferentem rule, the 
operation of the clause was confined by the words 'but for the tenancy 
hereby created' to liabilities which arose only by reason of the 
relationship of landlord and tenant created by the agreement. 
Sir Raymond Evershed M.R. said that the argument of counsel for 
defendants is to the effect that these words must be construed to mean 
what they say, and that they were intended to throw the widest possible 
obligation for indemnity and release on the tenants. The real question, 
however, turns on the meaning to be given to the last two lines: "which 
but for the tenancy hereby created or anything done pursuant to the 
provisions hereof would not have arisen." It is plain that it is those words 
which give the real content to the clause as a whole. Without them the 
clause would have been of such wide import as could not possibility have 
been intended in a document of this sort. The last two lines define the 
scope of the obligation. Counsel for the defendants may well say, 
"Everything is covered: But it is covered and I would agree with the 
argument that, reading, "but for the tenancy hereby created" as equivalent 
to "but for the existence of the tenancy," it would be covered men the 
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clause has a scope which I regard as too vague and too extravagant to be 
supported if a narrower construction presents itself and can be adopted 
with equal justice to the language. 
"There is an alternative construction equally available on the 
language, namely, that the words "which but for the tenancy hereby 
created would not have arisen" mean, and are confined to, liabilities 
which only arise by reason of the relationship of landlord and tenant 
which this document creates. Because of the extravagant result which the 
former view involves, I think that the latter construction is the one which 
the court ought to adopt. We are presented with two alternative readings 
of this document and the reading which one should adopt is to be 
determined, among other things, by a consideration of the fact that the 
defendants put forward the document. They have put forward a clause 
which is by no means free from obscurity and have contended that, on the 
view for which they argued, it has a remarkably, if not extravagantly, 
wide scope, and I think that the rule contra proferentem should be applied 
and that the result is that the present claim is not one which obliges the 
first plaintiff to give to the defendants a release and an indemnity." 
Lord Denning L.J. while in agreement with the view of Lord 
Raymond wrote his judgement separately and observed that, if the wide 
construction contended for were correct, there would be a serious 
question whether a contract in such wide terms would be enforced by the 
courts. There are many provisions in the Railway Acts which restrict the 
freedom of contract of railway companies. There are provisions which 
specify their responsibility in respect of the construction of their engines 
and the maintenance and carrying on their works and make them liable to 
compensate people who are damaged. There are provisions which make 
them liable for injury done in the receiving and delivery of goods and so 
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forth. Above all, there is the vigilance of the common law which, while 
allowing freedom of contract, watches to see that it is not abused. It 
would, therefore, be a very serious question whether the defendants are 
free to exempt themselves in the wide terms which are here contended 
for. It seems to me preferable that a limited construction should be put on 
the clause so that it should be valid."''^ ^ 
In J. Evans & Son (Portsmouth) Ltd. V. Andrea Merzario Ltd}^^ 
The defendants had orally promised to arrange that the container holding 
the plaintiff's goods would be stored below decks. The contract was held 
to be partly oral and partly on the standard conditions of the forwarding 
trade, which exempted the defendants from liability for loss or damage to 
the goods unless it occurred while the goods were in their actual custody 
and by reason of their wilful neglect or default. Clause 4 provided: 
"Subject to the express instructions in writing given by the 
customer, the company reserves to itself complete freedom in respect of 
the means, route and procedure to be followed in the handling and 
transportation of goods." 
The Court of Appeal held that the defendants could not rely on the 
printed conditions. Lord Denning said after analyzing the exemption 
clause and the facts of the case that the oral assurance as amounting to a 
collateral contract. Geoffrey and Roskill JJ held that there was a single 
contract, partly written and partly oral. 
Roskill L.J. said, "It is suggested that even so these exemption 
clauses apply. I ventured to ask counsel for the defendants what the 
position would have been if when the defendants' first quotation had 
come along there had been stamped on the face of that quotation: "No 
containers to be shipped on deck;" and this container had been shipped on 
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deck. He bravely said that the exemption clauses would still have applied. 
With great respect, I think that is an impossible argument. In the words 
which Devlin J. used in Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. Ltd. V. Vokins & 
Co. Ltd. and approved by Lord Denning MR in Mendelssohn V. 
Normand Ltd., the defendants' promise that the container would be 
shipped on deck would be wholly illusory. 
.... It is a question of construction. Interpreting the contract as I 
find it to have been, I feel driven to the conclusion that none of these 
exemption clauses can be applied because one has to treat the promise 
that no container would be shipped on deck as overriding any question of 
exempting condition. Otherwise, as I have already said, the promise 
would be illusory." 
In Glynn V. Margetson & Co.''*'* the plaintiff shipped oranges at 
Malaga for carriage to Liverpool under a printed bill of lading which 
stated that the ship should have "liberty to proceed to and stay at any port 
or ports in any station in the Mediterranean, Levant, Black Sea, or 
Adriatic, or on the coasts of Africa, Spain, Portugal, France, Great Britain 
or Ireland, for the purposes of delivering coals, cargo or passengers, or 
for any other purpose whatsoever." 
The ship left Malaga and proceeded to a port 350 miles further 
away from Liverpool to pick up a cargo. Because of the delay the oranges 
arrived at Liverpool damaged. 
Lord Herschell said that the main object and intent of this charter 
party is the carriage of the oranges from Malaga to Liverpool. This the 
matter with which the shipper is concerned and it seems to me that it 
would be to defeat what is the manifest object and intention of such a 
contract to hold that it was entered into with a power to the ship owner to 
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proceed anywhere that he pleased, to trade in any manner that he pleased, 
and to arrive at the port at which the oranges were to be delivered when 
he pleased. But it must in my view, be a liberty consistent with the main 
object of the contract - a liberty only to proceed to and stay at the ports 
which are in the course of voyage. 
Lord Halsbury observed that construing this document, which is a 
contract of carriage between the parties, one must in the first instance 
look at the whole of the instrument and not at one part of it only. Looking 
at the whole of the instrument, and seeing what one must regard, for a 
reason which I will give in a moment, as its main purpose, one must 
reject words, indeed the whole provision, if they are inconsistent with 
what one assumes to be the main purpose of the contract. The main 
purpose of the contract was to take on board at one port and to deliver at 
another port a perishable cargo. 
Thus in this case the court said that the exemption clause should 
not be inconsistent with the main object of the contract and one must 
reject the words or the whole provision if they are inconsistent with the 
main purpose of the contract. Now the question is that this decision 
would have been the same if the liberty to deviate clause had not been 
part of a standard printed form but part of a contract specially typed up 
after negotiation. In this case there was no specific reference in the 
contract to any obligation to go directly to the port of discharge. The 
court struck down the clause as inconsistent with the implicit main 
purpose of the contract. The court considered to deliver a perishable 
cargo as an essential implied term of the contract and that the ship will go 
directly with a liberty only to proceed to and stay ports which are in the 
course of voyage. 
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Now another question is, how does the court decide whether a 
clause is inconsistent with the main purpose, and therefore, to be rejected, 
and when it is merely a qualification to or definition of what is being 
undertaken by the carrier? In G.H. Renton & Co. Ltd. V. Palmyra Trading 
Corporation of Panama^'^^, timber was shipped under bills of lading from 
Canada to London and Hull 'or as near thereunto as the vessel may safely 
get....' By clause 14(c) of the bills it was provided that in the event of 
strikes preventing discharge at the named port, 'the master may discharge 
the cargo at. . . any other safe and convenient port.' 
Clause 14(f) stated 'The discharge of any cargo under the provision 
of this clause shall be deemed due fulfillment of the contract.' London 
and Hull were closed by strikes and the cargo was discharged at 
Hamburg. The carrier refused to accept the responsibility for not 
arranging for it to be forwarded to England. It was argued that the clause 
deeming delivery at Hamburg to be due fulfillment of the contract was 
inconsistent with the main purpose of the contract, but the House of 
Lords rejected the argument for reasons given by Jenkins L.J. in the Court 
of Appeal; he observed that, "It seems to me that there is a material 
difference between a deviation clause purporting to enable the ship 
owners to delay indefinitely the performance of the contract voyage 
simply because they choose to do so, and provisions such as those 
contained in clause 14(c) and (f) in the present case, which are applicable 
and operative only in the event of the occurrence of certain specified 
emergencies. The distinction is between a power given to one of the 
parties which, if construed literally, would in effect enable that party to 
nullify the contract at will, and a special provision stating what the rights 
a special provision stating what the rights and obligations of the parties 
are to be in the event of obstacles beyond the control of either arising to 
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prevent or impede the performance of the contract in accordance with its 
primary terms. 
Thus the court interpreted the clause of exemption and said that 
there is difference between two clauses, one where there is full freedom 
for ship owner to delay the performance of contract indefinitely without 
any reason at his will and the other clause where the delay or deemed 
performance is due to specified emergency which could occur, means that 
it is not at the will of the ship owner but beyond the control of the ship 
owner only in the event of occurrence of certain specified emergencies. 
In Gibaud V. Great Eastern Railway Co}^^ the plaintiff claimed 
damages for the loss of a bicycle deposited by him with the defendants at 
one of their stations. Upon leaving the bicycle he received a ticket upon 
which was printed the following condition: 
"The company will not be in any way responsible in respect of any 
article deposited the value whereof exceeds 5 / unless at the time of 
deposit the true value and nature of the article shall have been declared, 
and Id per 1 / sterling of the declared value be paid for each day or part 
of a day in addition to the ordinary cloak-room charges. 
The plaintiff did not declare that value of the bicycle, which 
exceeded 5 /, at the time of the deposit, and only paid the ordinary cloak-
room fee. The bicycle was not put by the defendants' servant in the cloak-
room, but was left in the booking hall without protection, and owing to 
this negligence was stolen. 
It was argued before the court of Appeal that the appellant was not 
bound by the conditions relieving the company from liability, because the 
company had not kept the bicycle in the place in which they have 
contracted to keep it. 
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Scrutton L.J. said that, the principle is well known and perhaps 
Lilley V. Doubleday is the best illustration, that if you undertake to do a 
thing in a certain way, or to keep a thing in a certain place, with certain 
conditions protecting it, and have broken the contract by not doing the 
thing contracted for in the way contracted for, or not keeping the article in 
the place in which you have contracted to keep it, you cannot rely on the 
conditions which were only intended to protect you if you carried out the 
contract in the way in which you had contracted to do it. In Lilley V. 
Doubleday the defendant had contracted to warehouse certain goods at 
the main warehouse. He warehoused port of them at another place and, 
without negligence on his part, they were lost from the other place where 
he contracted to keep them, he lost that protection when he warehoused 
them in a place where he had not contracted to keep them. 
Having stated this principle Scrutton LJ went on to hold that this 
principle did not apply to the facts of the case, since the contract should 
be treated as one to receive the bicycle, not one to keep it in the 
cloakroom. He further interpreted the exemption clause and said that the 
words that have been held to give protection are, "under any 
circumstances whatsoever", "In any circumstances, "under any 
circumstances" or "any injury, however caused." When I read the clause 
"will not be in any way responsible" and remember that the liability of 
the company was for negligence that is to say, they were bound to use 
reasonable care - it seems to me that those words are clearly sufficient to 
protect the company, particularly in a case where it is eminently 
reasonable that they should be protected if the man who deposits property 
of large value has not taken the trouble to pay the company for the excess 
in value of the property which he is leaving with them. For these reason 
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the court dismissed the appeal and delivered the judgement for the 
defendants - the Railway company. 
In Pinnock Bros. V. Lewis & Peat Ltd}'^^ The plaintiff bought from 
the defendants East African copra cake, which they resold to B, who 
resold to dealers, who resold to farmer who used it for feeding cattle. The 
cake was so contaminated with castor beans as to be poisonous and the 
cattle became ill. Each buyer sued his seller, and in action by the 
plaintiffs the defendants relied on an exclusion clause. 
Roche J said where a substance quite different from that contracted 
for has been delivered, that clause has no application, as such a difference 
of substance cannot be said to constitute a defect. It was said for the 
defendants that the admixture of castor beans and copra cake was so 
common that the presence of the castor beans could not be regarded as 
otherwise then a defect. "Upon the acts I am against this contention and I 
hold that the delivery in this case could not be properly described as 
copra cake at all." 
The court rejected the contention of the defendants that the defect 
was latent, the court said the word applies to such defects which are not 
discoverable by the exercise of reasonable care and this defect could have 
been discovered by the exercise of reasonable care. 
In Platform Funding V. Bank of Scotland Plc^^^ there was a civil 
appeal against the order county court judge giving the judgement for the 
claimant Platform Funding Ltd. against the defendant Bank of Scotland 
Pic, for damages. The appeal concerns the nature of the obligation 
undertaken by a surveyor who is instructed by a mortgage lender to value 
the property offered by the borrower as security for loan. The lender was 
approached by a borrower for a loan to be secured by a mortgage on a 
183 
property. Surveyor in due course provided Platform Funding with a 
valuation of a property identified in its report with address. The valuer's 
report contained the following certificate. 
"Declaration - This valuation is for the benefit of Platform 
Funding Limited, its successors, assignees and transferees... 
I certify that the property offered as security has been inspected by 
me and that the above valuation is a fair indication of the current open 
market valuation for mortgage purposes..." 
Unfortunately, however, the surveyor had not inspected the 
property, he had been misled by the borrower into inspecting and valuing 
another property on the same land. The borrower subsequently defaulted 
on his mortgage payments and the lender repossessed the property in 
order to realize its security at which point the valuer's mistake came to 
light. The lender suffered a loss of £ 30,000 which it sought to recover 
from the valuer on the basis that the valuer had accepted instructions to 
value the property, it had produced a report certifying that it had 
inspected the property. A loan had been made on the basis of that report 
and they were therefore entitled to rely on the certificate as having 
contractual effect, and that having failed to inspect the property, the 
valuer was in breach of contract. 
The county Judge found that the valuer had assumed an unqualified 
obUgation to inspect the property to which its instructions related. The 
valuer appealed to the court of Appeal contending that its duty was 
simply to exercise that degree of skill and care in and about the 
performance of its instructions as was to be expected of a reasonably 
competent surveyor and valuer and that in a case where the property was 
identified in the instructions solely by its address or some other 
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description, that applied equally to locating the property to be instructed, 
which was simply the first step in carrying out those instructions. 
The Court of Appeal held that there cannot be much plainer 
expression than the words "the property .... has been inspected by me." 
Even against a background where otherwise the obligation to inspect 
would only have been one of the taking of reasonable care to inspect. It 
cannot be accepted that those words can properly be interpreted as 
meaning: "I have taken reasonable care to inspect the property." This is 
an interpretation which should be adopted because the latter part of the 
certificate speaks of the valuation as a "fair indication." The court 
assumed that reference to "fair indication" is inconsistent with an 
obligation only to value with reasonable care. It cannot be accepted that, 
that the first part of the certificate has to be interpreted as similarly 
dealing only with an obligation of reasonable care. There is a clear 
distinction between the two halves of the sentence. The first half is a 
simple statement of fact (has been inspected by me') but the second half 
is a statement of expert opinion. There is no need either way for the 
interpretation of the one to infect the interpretation of the other. 
(4) Fundamental Term and Fundamental Breach of Contract: 
It is presumed that the parties to a contract cannot have intended an 
exemption clause, albeit clearly exempting liability, to be so wide as to 
exempt or limit the obligation to perform the contract at all, or to exempt 
liability where a person is not performing the contract but is departing 
from it, or to exempt liability for breach of the fundamental obligation or 
obligations under the contract. 
Lord Upjohn in Suisse Atlantique 's case said that, "I ought to 
make one or two observations on the question of construction of 
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exclusion or limitation clauses. It cannot be doubted that, even while the 
contract continues in force (that is when there has been no fundamental 
breach but only some lesser breach), exclusion clauses are strictly 
construed. Why this should be so is largely a matter of history and, I 
think, probably stems from the facts that in so many cases exceptions 
clauses are to be found in rather small print sometimes on the back of the 
main terms of the contract and that the doctrine of "contra proferentes" 
has been applied. But whatever the reason, that they are strictly construed 
against the contracting party seeking protection even during the currency 
of the contract cannot be doubted." 
The presumption that the parties to a contract cannot have intended 
an exemption clause is a rebuttable presumption. The presumption may 
be rebutted if there is strong and cogent evidence that the parties did so 
intend. 
Where there is a breach of fundamental term, the law has taken an 
even firmer line, for there is strong, though rebuttable, presumption that, 
in inserting a clause of exclusion or limitation in their contract, the parties 
are not contemplating breaches of fundamental terms and such clauses do 
not apply to relieve a party from the consequences of such a breach even 
where the contract continues in force. This result has been achieved by a 
robust use of a well known canon of construction that wide words which 
taken in isolation would bear one meaning must be so construed as to 
give business efficacy to the contract and the presumed intention of the 
parties, on the footing that both parties are intending to carry out the 
contract ftindamentally.'^^ 
There are certain terms in the contract which are very fundamental 
and its breach will amount to a complete non-performance of the contract. 
186 
This fundamental term is something more basic term of the contract and 
because of its breach the whole purpose of contract is defeated. If a 
person offers to buy a shirt of another, and he sends him the coat then it 
will be said that the seller did not perform his part under the contract, but 
that is not warranty there is no warranty that he should sell him coat. The 
contract is to sell shirt and if he sends him anything else, it is non-
performance of the contract against which no exemption clause could 
prevail. The principle of fundamental breach is that no party to a contract 
could exempt himself from the responsibility for a fundamental breach. A 
party could only claim the protection of an exemption clause when he is 
carrying out his contract and not when he is deviating from it or is guilty 
of a breach which goes to the root of it. Some stipulations are so 
fundamental to the contract that failure to observe them will amount to a 
"total failure of consideration. 
A party to a contract cannot rely on an exemption clause where he 
has committed a breach of contract that is considered to be particularly 
serious. Certain terms of a contract are regarded as "fundamental" and it 
is presumed that exemption clauses will not on their true construction, 
apply where such terms have been broken. Frequently this rule is applied 
to contracts for supply of goods, with the result that a person who 
supplies something essentially different from that which he contracted to 
supply is unlikely to be protected by an exemption clause. The question 
whether the thing supplied is essentially different from that bargained for 
depends, of course on a preliminary question of construction: what have 
the parties bargained for? 
Whether the phrases "fundamental breach" and "breach of 
fundamental term" are same havi/ig same meaning or they are different 
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and have different meanings? This was discussed by Lord Upjoiin in 
Suisse Atlantique case'^' he observed that, 
"There was much discussion during the argument about the phrases 
"fundamental breach" and "breach of fundamental term" and I think it is 
true that in some of the cases these terms have been used interchangeably; 
but in fact they are quite different. I believe that all of your Lordship are 
agreed and, indeed it has not seriously been disputed before us that there 
is no magic in the words "fundamental breach"; this expression is no 
more than a convenient shorthand expression for saying that a particular 
breach or breaches of contract by one party is or are such as to go to the 
root of the contract which entitles the other party to treat such breach or 
breaches as a repudiation of the whole contract. Whether such breach or 
breaches do constitute a fundamental breach depends on the construction 
of the contract and on all the facts and circumstances of the case. The 
innocent party may accept that breach or those breaches as a repudiation 
and treat the whole contract as at an end and sue for damages generally or 
he may at his option prefer to affirm the contract and treat it as continuing 
on foot in which case he can sue only for damages for breach or breaches 
of the particular stipulation or stipulations in the contract which has or 
have been broken. 
But the expression "fundamental term" has a different meaning. A 
fundamental term of a contract is a stipulation which the parties have 
agreed either expressly or by necessary implication or which the general 
law regards as a condition which goes to the root of the contract so that 
any breach of that term may at once and without further reference to the 
facts and circumstances be regarded by the innocent party as a 
fundamental breach and thus is conferred on him the alterrativc'remedies 
at his option that I have just mentioned." 
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Earlier the courts decided tlie cases of breaches on the basis of 
construction of the contract that is by interpreting the words of the 
exemption or exclusion clauses. But later in a series of cases in the 1950s 
and early 1960s, however some judges went beyond the construction 
approach and held that a party who had committed a "fundamental 
breach" or "breach of a fundamental term" could not rely on an exclusion 
clause no matter how widely it was worded. The decision in Karsales 
(Harrow) Ltd, V. Wallis,^^^ delivered by Denning L.J. is an example of 
this. In this case a man named Stinton offered a Buick car to Wallis, the 
defendant. Wallis wished to buy it, but could only afford to do so on 
credit. Stinton was not a dealer and could not arrange hire-purchase 
directly, so he sold the car to Karsales who sold it to a finance company 
who let it on hire-purchase to Wallis. Stinton retained possession of the 
car throughout, but when he delivered it to Wallis the cylinder head had 
been removed, the valves in the engine had been burnt out, two of the 
pistons had been broken, the tyres had been damaged and the radio 
removed. The car was towed to Wallis' premises late at night. Wallis 
refused to accept the car and got Stinton to take it away. The finance 
company got Karsales to take over the hire-purchase agreement, and 
Karsales sued Wallis for arrears. Karsales relied on clause 3(g) which was 
as under: 
"No condition or warranty that the vehicle is roadworthy, or as to 
its age, condition or fitness for any purpose is given by the owner or 
implied therein." 
The county court Judge gave judgement for the plaintiffs but the 
court of Appeal held that the thing delivered was not the thing contracted 
for. The excluding term therefore did not avail the plaintiffs. The court 
found that because there had been a fundamental breach of the contract 
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and hence the plaintiffs could not rely upon the exemption clause and the 
judgement was given for the defendants. 
Denning L.J. said that the law about exempting clauses has been 
much developed in recent years, at any rate about printed exempting 
clauses, which so often pass unread. Notwithstanding earlier cases which 
might suggest the contrary, it is now settled that exempting clauses of this 
kind, no matter how widely they are expressed, only avail the party when 
he is carrying out his contract in its essential respects. He is not allowed 
to use them as a cover for misconduct or indifference or to enable him to 
turn a blind eye to his obligations. They do not avail him when he is 
guilty of a breach which goes to the root of the contract. The thing to do 
is to look at the contract apart from the exempting clauses and see what 
are the terms, express or implied, which impose an obligation on the 
party. If he has been guilty of a breach of those obligations in a respect 
which goes to the very root of the contract, he cannot rely on the 
exempting clauses. He further said that the principle is sometimes said to 
be that the party cannot rely on an exempting clause when he delivers 
something "different in kind" from that contracted for or has broken a 
"fundamental term" or a "fundamental contractual obligation" but these 
are all comprehended by the general principle that a breach which goes to 
the root of the contract disentitles the party from relying on the exempting 
clause. In the present case the lender was in breach of implied obligation 
and when the defendant inspected the car before signing the application 
form, the car was in excellent condition and would go: whereas the car 
which was subsequently delivered to him was no doubt the same car, but 
it was in a deplorable state and would not go. That breach went to the root 
of the contract and disentitled the lender from relying on the exempting 
clause. 
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Thus a party could only claim the protection of an exempting 
clause when he is carrying out his contract and not when he is deviating 
from it or is guilty of a breach which goes to the very root of it. For 
example if a railway cloak-room allowed an unauthorized person to have 
access to and remove luggage of a depositor without production of 
cloakroom ticket this was a "fundamental breach" and the railway was 
not protected by an exempting clause excluding liability for loss or 
misdelivery. This example is afforded by Alexander v. Railway 
Executive . In this case the plaintiff was a stage performer together with 
an assistant x, he had been on tour and deposited in parcel office at 
railway station three trunks and obtained for each a ticket. He paid 5d for 
each trunk and obtained for each a ticket and promised to send 
instructions for their dispatch. Some weeks later, and before such 
instructions were sent, x persuaded the parcels clerk by telling a series of 
lies to allow him to open the trunks and remove several articles. X was 
subsequently convicted of larceny. The plaintiff sued the defendant for 
breach of contract and the defendants pleaded the following exempting 
term: 
"Not liable for loss, misdelivery or damage to any articles which 
exceed the value of £ 5 unless at the time of deposit the true value and 
nature thereof have been declared by the depositor and an extra charge 
paid." There was no such declaration or extra payment. 
Devlin J gave judgement for the plaintiff. He said that it is true that 
the sufficient notice had been given of the term but it did not cover 
the facts of the case. The word 'misdelivery' was not apt to describe 
a deliberate delivery to the wrong person. Nor if it did meet the 
facts, could it avail the defendants. They had been guilty of a 
"fundamental breach of a contract" in allowing x to open the trunks 
and remove their contents. 
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Devlin J., in Smeaton Hanscomb & Co. Ltd. V. Sassoon I Setty Son 
& Co.'^ '* said that "It is no doubt, a principle of construction that 
exceptions are to be construed as not being applicable for the protection 
of those for whose benefit they are inserted if the beneficiary has 
committed a breach of a fundamental term of the contract, .... I do not 
think that what is a ftindamental term has ever been closely defined. It 
must be something, I think, narrower than a condition of the contract, for 
it would be limiting the exceptions too much to say that they applied only 
to breaches of warranty. It is, I think, something which underlies the 
whole contract so that, if it is not complied with, the performance 
becomes something totally different from that which the contract 
contemplates." 
The new principle of "fundamental breach of contract" and 
"fundamental term" did not depend on the wording of the contract or 
interpretation of the exempting or exclusion clauses or construction of the 
contract. This principle which later came to be known as the "substantive 
doctrine." It is derived from various cases on carriage of goods by sea the 
"deviation" cases in which it was held that a carrier who departed from 
the agreed route lost the benefit of the exception clauses in his contract. 
The carrier thus became liable to pay for any subsequent loss of or 
damage to the goods, unless he could show either that the loss must have 
occurred even if he had stayed on course, or that the owner of the goods 
had, with fiill knowledge of the deviation and affirmed the contract. In 
Joseph Thorley Ltd. V. Orchis Steamship Co. Ltd}^^, the ship was 
deviated but had returned to its original route without incident, the goods 
were damaged while being unloaded. Nonetheless it was held that the 
deviation presented the normal exceptions applying to any subsequent 
loss, and the carrier was held liable. 
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The House of Lords in Hain Steamship Co. V. Tale & Lyle Ltd}^^ 
Observed that deviation being breach of condition entitles the owner to 
put an end of the contract with the result that the exception clauses were 
no longer in force when the loss occurred. Normally a contract remains in 
force, despite a breach of condition, until the innocent party elects to 
terminate. Lord Wright analysed the nature and effect of a contract for the 
carriage of goods by sea in this case and said, "an unjustified deviation is 
a fundamental breach of a contract of affreightment.... The adventure has 
been changed. A contract entered into on the basis of the original 
adventure; is inapplicable to the new adventure." 
In Suisse Atlantique Societe d' Armement Centrale there was a 
contract of charter party whereby a ship was to be leased for two 
consecutive years was entered into by the owners of the ship and the 
characters. The purpose of the charter party was that, on each voyage, the 
vessel should proceed in ballast to an Atlantic port in the United States 
and there load coal to be carried to a port in the Netherlands. During the 
relevant period of time the vessel made only eight voyages and spent 
some 380 days in ports of loading or discharge. There was a provision in 
the contract for payment of demurrage (delay beyond the time agreed 
upon) except where the delay was beyond the control of the charterers. 
The owners claimed that by the reason of the failure of the charterers to 
perform their contractual obligations to load and discharge they were 
deprived of earnings amounting to at least $ 580,000. The charter 
provided laytime and fixed demun-age at $ 1000 per day. The owners 
claimed that if loading and discharging had been carried out within the 
laytime, a further six voyages could have been made and they claimed 
damages for the lost of freight. The charterers contended that their 
liability was limited to the demurrage. The owners failed before Mocatta 
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J, and the Court of Appeal. In the House of Lords they raised for the first 
time the argument that the charterers had committed a fundamental 
breach and could not rely on the demurrage clause. The House of Lords 
held that no fundamental breach had been committed; and in any event a 
demurrage clause was a form of liquidated damages, and not an exclusion 
clause. The House of Lord expressed its view on the "substantive 
doctrine" of fundamental breach. 
The House was unanimous that there was no rule that an exclusion 
clause could not nullify or limit liability for even a fundamental breach. 
There was no authority for such a rule in the older cases. It is simply a 
matter of construction and provided the clause is worded clearly enough, 
even liability for a fundamental breach may be excluded. 
The "substantive doctrine" of fundamental breach which 
established that however extensive an exemption clause might be it could 
not exclude liability in respect of the breach of a fundamental term or of a 
fundamental breach. In this way this principle was considered as a 
substantive rule of law. However this rule of law approach of this 
doctrine had already been rejected by Pearson LJ. in U.G.S. Finance 
1 SK 
Limited V. National Mortgage Bank of Greece as early as 1964, where 
he observed that, 
"I think there is rule of construction that normally an exception or 
exclusion clause or similar provision in a contract should be construed as 
not applying to a situation created by a fundamental breach of contract. 
This not an independent rule of law imposed by the court on the parties 
willy-nilly in disregard of their contractual intention. On the contrary it is 
a rule of construction based on the intention of the contracting parties." 
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This view of Pearson L.J. was subsequently, unanimously 
approved and endorsed by the House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique case. 
The House of Lords said when the plaintiff had elected to affirm the 
contract, and the demurrage clause applied. The plaintiffs for the first 
time argued before the House of Lords that the defendants had been 
guilty of fiandamental breach of contract which prevented them from 
relying on a limiting term. The House of Lords rejected this argument and 
said there was on the facts, no fundamental breach, nor was the provision 
for demurrage a limiting term; it was a statement of agreed damages in 
the event of delay. Their Lordships gave considerable importance to the 
fact of affirmation of the contract by the plaintiffs. The five members of 
the House of Lords were unanimous, however the judgements of Lord 
Reid and Lord Upjohn while apparently denying the existence of a 
substantive doctrines which could be interpreted as suggesting that, had 
the contract in the Suisse Atlantique case not been affirmed but 
terminated, the exemption clauses would have ceased to apply. It seems 
that at this point their Lordships actually had in mind not exclusion 
clauses in general but the demurrage clause involved in this case. A 
demurrage clause will not apply once the ship owner has terminated by 
"sailing away" since it is only designed to apply to delays while the ship 
under the characters control. These dicta were seized upon by the court of 
Appeal in Hor butt's Plasticine Ltd V. Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd.^^'^ 
as showing that the substantive rule still applied if the contract had been 
terminated. Lord Denning MR summarized his view thus: 
"Before leaving this part of the case, I would just like to say what, 
in my opinion, is the result of the Suisse Atlantique case. It affirms the 
long line of_the cases in this court that when one party has been guilty of 
a fundamental breach of the contract, that is, a breach which goes to the 
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very root of it, and the other side accepts it, so that the contract comes to 
an end.... then the guilty party cannot rely on an exception or limitation 
clause to escape from his liability from the breach. 
If the innocent party, on getting to know of the breach, does not 
accept it, but keeps the contract in being .... then it is a matter of 
construction whether the guilty party can rely on the exception or 
limitation clause.,." 
In Photo Production Ltd. V. Securicor Transport Ltd}^^ the 
plaintiffs, the owners of a factory, entered into a contract with the 
defendants, a security organization, under which the defendants, a 
security organization, under which the defendants were to arrange for 
periodic visits to the factory during the night. On one such visit, an 
employee of the defendants started a small fire which got out of hand and 
destroyed the entire factory and contents worth about £ 615000. The 
plaintiffs brought an action and the defendants relied on exemption 
clauses including one which provided that, 
"Under no circumstances shall the company [Securicor] be 
responsible for any injurious act or default of any employee of the 
company unless such act or default could have been foreseen and avoided 
by the exercise of due diligence on the part of the company as his 
employer; nor, in any event, shall the company be held responsible for; 
(a) Any loss suffered by the customer through burglary, theft, fire or any 
other cause, except insofar as such loss is solely attributable to the 
negligence of the company's employee acting within the course of their 
employment...." 
In this case the issue was whether the termination of the contract 
prevents exclusion clause applying to the event relied on as the ground 
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for termination. Tlie court of Appeal held that in a number of cases that, if 
the innocent party terminated the contract because of a fundamental 
breach by the other that got rid of any exclusion or limitation clauses 
which would otherwise have governed the defaulter's liability. The 
argument seemed to be that because the contract had come to an end, the 
clauses had ceased to apply. The court of Appeal held that this exemption 
could not avail the defendants because they had been guilty of a 
fundamental breach but the House of Lords said, obiter, in the Suisse 
Atlantique case that this doctrine is unsound as well as commercially 
inconvenient and unanimously reversed the decision of the court of 
Appeal. Lord Wilberforce said: 
"I have no second thoughts as to the main proposition that the 
question whether, and to what extent, an exclusion clause is to be 
applied to a fundamental breach, or breach of a fundamental term, 
or indeed to any breach of contract, is a matter of construction of 
the contract." 
Thus in this case the House of Lords once again affirmed their 
opinion that the question whether or not an exemption clause protected a 
party to a contract in the event of breach or in the event of what would 
(but for the presence of the exemption clause) have been a breach, 
depended upon the construction of the contract. Even if the breach was so 
serious as to entitle the injured party to treat the contract as repudiated or 
to render further performance impossible, the other party was not 
prevented from relying on the clause. 
In Ailsa Craig Fishing Co. Ltd. V. Malvern Fishing Co. Ltd. the 
appellants were the owners of a fishing boat which sank in Aberdeen 
harbour. At the time the respondents, Securicor, were required by 
contract with a fishing boat owner's association of which the appellants 
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were members to provide a security service in the harbour, and 
specifically for the appellants' vessel. There was a clause in that standard 
form contract limiting the respondents' liability to £ 1000. The appellants 
argued that the clause should not avail the respondents as they had totally 
failed to provide any security cover at all, but the House of Lords held 
that their liability was still limited to £ 1000. Lord Wilberforce said'^ ^ 
"... one must not strive to create ambiguities by strained 
construction, as I think the appellants have striven to do. The 
relevant words must be given, if possible, their natural, plain 
meaning. Clauses of limitation are not regarded by the courts with 
the same hostility as clauses of exclusion; this is because they must 
be related to the other contractual terms, in particular to the risk to 
which the defending party may be exposed, the remuneration which 
he receives and possibly also the opportunity of the other party to 
insure." 
The need for substantive principle of fundamental breach has 
largely been obviated by the enactment of (English) Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977, although certain types of contract are excepted, either 
wholly or partly from the operation of that Act. In the Photo Production 
case, Lord Diplock stated that, if the expression "fundamental breach" 
was to be retained, it should be confined to the ordinary case of a breach 
of which the consequences are such as to entitle the innocent party to 
elect to put an end to all primary obligations of both parties remaining 
unperformed. Similarly it may be supposed that, if the expression 
"fundamental term" is to be retained, it should be employed simply as an 
alternative method of describing a promissory condition. There does not 
now exist in English law any special rule or rules applicable to cases of 
"fundamental breach" where exemption clauses are concerned. No doubt, 
in deciding whether an exemption clause is, on its true construction, 
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applicable to a particular breach, the court may reach the conclusion that 
the parties never intended the clause to apply to the breach in question 
because its nature or seriousness is such as not to fall within the 
contemplated ambit of the clause. The parties are less likely to be taken to 
have agreed that one of them shall be excused in the case of total non-
performance or a performance which is wholly at variance with the object 
of the contract as ascertained from its other terms and the circumstances 
surrounding it. But there is no separate category of "fundamental 
breaches against which exemption clauses cannot prevail, and, if 
sufficiently clear, they will do so against the most serious and deliberate 
breach.'" 
It is submitted that the standard form contracts are a mixed 
blessing. They enable business organization to save costs but they may 
enable one party to dictate terms to the other party to the contract. As a 
result, the weaker party may find that she has to agree to clauses that she 
considers unfair. These may include clauses which define what the other 
party has to do in unacceptably narrow ways. For example "exceptions" 
in an insurance policy which allow the other party to increase the price or 
which allow it to terminate the contract as its convenience without 
compensafion or prior notice, or which require a large pre-payment which 
will be forfeited if she cancels the contract. The "take-it or leave-it" 
nature of the standard form contract is the only and real problem. Always 
there has been debates about exemption or exclusion clauses in law 
reform agencies. The exemption clauses are much used both in dealings 
with private individuals and in purely commercial transactions. There is 
no doubt that in many cases they operate against the public interest. The 
.prevailing judicial attitude of suspicion or hostility to such exemption 
clauses is well founded. Exemption or exclusion clauses are introduced in 
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such a way that the affected party remains ignorant of its presence and 
finds it when it is too late. The adversely affected party even if he or she 
ioiows of the exemption clause, will often be unable to appreciate what he 
or she may lose by accepting it. In any case, he may not have sufficient 
bargaining strength to refuse to accept it. The result is that the risk of 
carelessness or of failure to achieve satisfactory standards of performance 
is thrown on to the party who is not responsible for it or who is unable to 
guard against it. By the use of these exemption or exclusion clauses in 
standard form contracts the party affected may remain ignorant of their 
presence of import until it is too late. The party may not have sufficient 
bargaining strength to reftise to accept it. This is lack of bargaining power 
in a different and more accurate sense. The weaker party does not have 
enough influence to get the terms changed. The exemption or exclusion 
clauses may deprive the party of certain specific rights which social 
policy requires that he should have. 
The problem with standard form contracts is that they may contain 
apparently contain exclusion or limitation clauses which exclude some 
right which one of the parties would otherwise have had under the law. 
Both the courts and the legislature in England have been particularly 
concerned with such clauses. English law first developed controls over 
exclusion clauses. Courts at common law observed that the exclusion and 
exemption clauses can also operate harshly and there is need to control it. 
The courts in the U.K. at very early developed the rules of 
construction of exemption or exclusion clauses in the contract and rules 
of interpretation of contract. The court developed the principle of 
"fundamental term" and "fundamental breach of contract." 
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The British Parliament also felt the need to reform the law in the 
field of contract and enacted "Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977" and 
"Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, 1999." These two 
legislations are very important in the field of commercial transactions and 
with the help of the provisions of these legislation the status of the 
individual has elevated vis-a-vis the commercial and giant organizations. 
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CHAPTER - III 
STANDARD FORM CONTRACT: STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS IN INDIA AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
The device of a new type of contract i.e. standard form contract is 
very common in today's complex structure of giant corporations with vast 
infrastructural organization. The use of standard terms and conditions is 
confined not only to contracts in commercial transactions, but contracts 
with public authorities, multinational corporations, or in banking and 
insurance business etc. 
1. Statutory provisions in India: 
At present, contracts could be declared void or voidable by a Court 
of law only if it falls under one or the others of the provisions of the 
Indian Contract Act 1872 which makes such terms void or voidable. 
There is as of today, no general statutory provision in the Indian Contract 
Act 1872 or the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 whereby the Courts can give 
relief to the consumer or the party in a weaker bargaining position by 
holding that such terms in the contracts as void on the ground of their 
being unreasonable or unconscionable or unfair. 
The Law Commission of India in its 103'^ '* Report' on "Unfair 
Terms in Contract" pointed that that the existing sections of the Indian 
Contract Act do not seem to capable of meeting the mischief caused by 
the unfair terms incorporated in contracts. It was said that "Indian 
Contract Act" as it stands today cannot come to the protection of a 
cox.'jumer. Further, the ad hoc solutions given by the Courts in response 
to their innate sense of justice without reference to a proper yardstick in 
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the form of a specific provision of the statute or known legal principles of 
law only produce uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Justice D.P. Madon when speaking for the Bench of the Supreme 
Court in central Inland V. Brojo Nath 's case regarding the unreasonable 
and unfair terms in the contract said that "while the law of contracts in 
England is mostly judge-made, the law of contracts in India is enacted in 
a statute, namely, the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In order that such a 
contract should be void, it must fall under one of the relevant sections of 
the Indian Contract Act. The only relevant provision in the Indian 
Contract Act which can apply is section 23 when it states that "The 
consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless ... the Court 
regards it as ... opposed to public policy." 
A. Indian Contract Act, 1872: 
"Unconscionable" contract under Section 16 of the Indian Contract 
Act 1872 which refers to the inequality of bargaining power between the 
parties and of unfair advantage of one party over the other, is in Section 
16 dealing with "undue influence." This section has three sub-section 
which are re-produced as under: 
"Section 16(1) A contract is said to be induced by "undue 
influence" where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that 
one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and 
uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. 
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing principle, a person is deemed to be in a position to dominate 
the will of another: 
(a) Where he holds a '•eal -ar apparent authority over the other, or 
where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other; or 
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(b) Where the makes a contract with a person whose mental capacity is 
temporarily or permanently affected by reason of age, illness, or mental 
or bodily distress. 
The other relevant provision in sub-section (3) of section 16 which 
refers to the aspect of burden of proof in 'unconscionable transactions' 
induced by undue influence. Sub-Section (3) of the Section 16 and the 
Illustration (c) are reproduced as under 
"16 (3) where a person who is in position to dominate the will of another, 
enters into a contract with him, and the transaction appears, on the face of 
it or on the evidence adduced, to be unconscionable, the burden of 
proving that such contract was not induced by undue influence shall be 
upon the person in a position to dominate the will of the other. 
Nothing in the sub-section shall affect the provisions of section 111 
of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 (1 of 1872)." 
Illustration (C): A, being in debt to B, the money-lender of his 
village, contracts a fresh loan on terms which appear to be 
unconscionable. It lies on B to prove that the contract was not induced by 
undue influence. 
Thus it may be noted that sub-section (3) of section 16 deals with 
unconscionability which is an aspect of unfairness and is linked with the 
domination of the will of another in weaker bargaining position. But this 
sub-section 16(3) does not enable the Court a right to strike down the 
unconscionable term but only enables raising a presumption. 
Now the question is what is the meaning of the term 
"unconscionable"? The word unconscionable is defined in the Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary, Third Edition, Volume II at pagc-2288, when 
used with reference to actions etc. as, 
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"showing no regard for conscience," irreconcilable with what is 
right or reasonable." 
Thus an unconscionable bargain would therefore be one which is 
irreconcilable with what is right or reasonable. We can also look for the 
meaning of the term unconscionable in Legal Glossary of Government of 
India 2001, page number 351 defines the word "unconscionable" as 
irreconcilable with what is right or reasonable." Unconscionability, in 
relation to contracts, has generally been recognized to include absence of 
a meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties to avoid the 
contractual terms which unreasonably favour one party against the other 
party. Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case can 
only be determined by consideration of all the circumstances surrounding 
the transaction. 
Regarding this aspect of burden of proof reference may be made 
here to the 103'^ '' Report of the Law Commission of India on "Unfair 
Terms in Contract (1984),^ where the Commission pointed out that sub-
section (3) of the section 16 of the Contract Act has been interpreted by 
the Privy Council in {Possathurai V. Kannappa Chettair 1919 ILR 43 
Mad 546 (PC), as meaning that both the elements of dominant position 
and the unconscionable nature of the contract will have to be established, 
before the contract can be said to be brought about by undue influence. 
This decision, though old has not been departed from. In an early Madras 
case'* it was held that unless undue influence was specifically proved, no 
relief should be granted on the ground of unconscionable nature of a 
contract. 
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Section 19: 
Under Section 19 of the Contract Act 1872 when consent to an 
agreement is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the 
agreement is contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent 
was so caused. Under Section 19-A, when consent to an agreement is 
caused by undue influence to agreement is contract voidable at the option 
of the party whose consent was so caused, and the Court may set aside 
any such contract either absolutely or if the party who was entitled to 
avoid it has received any benefit thereunder, upon such terms and 
conditions as the Court may seem just. 
Section 23: The another relevant section of the contract Act is section 23 
which can invalidable a contract but this section does not refer to 
'unconscionability' specifically. 
Section 23 of the Contract Act 1872 may be reproduced here as 
under: 
"Section 23: What consideration and objects are lawful, and what not -
The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless -
it is forbidden by law; or 
is of such a nature that, if permitted 
would defeat the provisions of any law; or 
is fraudulent; or 
involves or implies, injury to the person or property of another; or 
the Courts regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy. 
In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said 
to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is 
unlawful is void." 
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This section does not spealc of unconscionability as one of the 
grounds. This section provides that the consideration or object of an 
agreement is lawful, unless it is forbidden by law or unless they are of 
such a nature that if permitted, they would defeat the provisions of any 
law, or are fraudulent, or involve or imply injury to the person or property 
of another or the Court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy. 
The last clause in section 23 thus declares that no one can lawfully do that 
what is opposed to public policy. It comprehends the protection and 
promotion of public welfare. It is a principle of law under which freedom 
of contract or private dealings are restricted by the law for the good of the 
community. 
The Indian Contract Act does not define the expression public 
policy or what is meant opposed to public policy. From the very nature of 
the things the expressions 'public policy', 'opposed to public policy' or 
'contrary to public policy" are incapable of precise definitions. Unlike, in 
cases falling under section 16 and 19 which permits a party to avoid a 
contract, section 23 enables a Court to hold clauses opposed to any law or 
public policy to be void ab initio. 
The circumstances in which a contract is likely to be struck down 
as one opposed to public policy are fairly well established in England. 
Lord Halsbury refers to certain contracts such as contract of marriage 
brokerage, the creation of perpetuity, a contract in restraint of trade, a 
gaming or wagering contract, or what is relevant here, the assisting of the 
King's enemies, are all undoubtedly unlawful things, and these are 
grounds of public policy. 
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In Richardson V. Mellish,^ Borrough J said that public poHcy is a 
very unruly horse and when once you get astride it, you never know 
where it will carry you. 
Section 27: Section 27 of the Contract Act is concerned with a special 
category of contracts which the law treats as void, namely, an agreement 
by which any one is restricted from exercising a lawful profession, trade 
or business of any kind and is to that extent, the agreement is void. 
However, in India (unlike U.K.), an agreement not to carry on, within 
specified local limits, a business similar to the business of which goodwill 
is sold, can be enforced, provided the limits of the restraints are 
reasonable. This special provision is contained in Section 27 which is 
reproduced as under: 
"Section 27: Agreement in restraint of trade void - Every agreement by 
which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or 
business of any kind, is to that extent void. 
Exception 1: Saving of agreement not to carry on business of which 
goodwill is sold - one who sells the goodwill of a business may agree 
with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business, within 
specified local limits, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to 
the goodwill from him, carries on a like business therein, provided that 
sch limits appear to the Court reasonable, regard being had to the nature 
of the business. 
Thus the words "restrained from exercising a lawful profession, 
trade or business," do not mean an absolute restriction, and are intended 
to apply to a partial restriction, a restriction limited to same particular 
place. An agreement which unnecessarily curtails the freedom of a 
person to carry on a trade is against public policy. Restraining a person 
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from carrying on a trade generally aims at avoiding competition and has a 
monopolistic tendency and this is both against an individual's interest as 
well as the interest of the society and thus such restraints are discouraged 
by law. The agreement would be valid if it falls within any of the 
statutory or judicially created exceptions. Any agreement which is not 
covered by any of the recognized exceptions would be void. 
The Supreme Court of India in the case of Gujarat Bottling Co. 
Ltd. V. Coca Cola has pointed out the difference in the position of law in 
regard to restraint of trade in India and that in England. The rule now in 
England is that the restraints of trade whether general or partial, may be 
good if they are "reasonable and necessary" for the purpose of freedom of 
trade. In India, the question of reasonableness of restraint is outside the 
purview of section 27 of the Indian Contract Act. The Courts have only to 
consider the question whether the contract itself is or is not in restraint of 
trade. The facts of this case may briefly stated as under: 
The agreement in question here was for the grant of franchise by 
Coca Cola company to GBC to manufacture, bottle, sell and distribute 
various beverages for which the trade marks were acquired by Coca Cola. 
It was thus a commercial agreement where under both the parties had 
undertaken obligations for promoting the trade in beverages for their 
mutual benefit. The purpose of the negative stipulation contained in the 
agreement was that GBC will work vigorously and diligently to promote 
and solicit the sale of the products/beverages produced under the trade 
marks of Coca Cola. This would not be possible if GBC were to 
manufacture, bottle, sell, deal or otherwise be concerned with the 
products, beverages or any other brands or trade marks / trade names. 
Thus, the purpose of said agreement was to promote the trade and th^ 
negative stipulation sought to achieve the said purpose by requiring GBC 
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to wholeheartedly apply itself to promoting the sale of the products of 
Coca Cola. Moreover, since the negative stipulation was confined in its 
application to the period of subsistence of the agreement and the 
restriction imposed therein was operative only during the period the 
agreement was subsisting, the said stipulation, it was held, could not be 
treated as being in restraint of trade so as to attract the bar of section 27 of 
the Indian Contract Act. The Court said the 
"The question of reasonableness of restraint is outside the purview 
of section 27 of the Contract Act and need not to be gone into. Therefore, 
the present case has to be proceeded on the basis that an enquiry into 
reasonableness of the restraint is not envisaged by Section 27. On that 
view instead of being required to consider two questions as in England, 
the Courts in India have only to consider the question whether the 
contract is or is not in restraint of trade." 
Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act: 
Section 28 of the Contract Act states that agreements absolutely in 
restraint of legal proceedings are void. This section is in two clauses and 
contains two exceptions. The Section 28 is reproduced as under: 
"Section 28, Agreement in restraint of legal proceedings, void -
Every agreement, -
(a) by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing 
his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal 
proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which limits the time within 
which he may thus enforce his rights; or 
(b) which extinguishes the rights of any party therefore, or discharges 
any party thereto, from any liability, under or in respect of any contract 
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on the expiry of a period so as to restrict any party from enforcing his 
rights, is void to that extent. 
Exception 1: Saving of contract to refer to arbitration dispute that may 
arise - This section shall not render illegal a contract, by which two or 
more persons agree that any dispute which may arise between them in 
respect of any subject or class of subjects shall be referred to arbitration, 
and that only the amount awarded in such arbitration shall be recoverable 
in respect of the dispute so referred. 
Exception 2: Saving of contract to refer questions that have already 
arisen - Nor shall this section render illegal any contract in writing, by 
which two or more persons agree to refer to arbitration any question 
between them which has already arisen, or affect any provision of any 
law in force for the time being as to references to arbitration." 
Thus section saves two types of contracts under the exceptions: 
1. Exception 1 does not render void a contract by which two or 
more persons agree that any dispute which may arise between 
them shall be referred to arbitration and that the only amount 
awarded in the arbitration shall be recoverable and 
2. Exception 2 does not also render void a contract to refer to 
arbitration questions that have already arisen. 
Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act will come into play when the 
restriction imposed upon the right to sue is 'absolute' in the sense that the 
parties are wholly precluded from pursuing their legal remedies in the 
ordinary tribunals. A partial restriction will, however, be valid as 
observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hakam Singh V. Gammon 
(In^ia) -Jjtd^ In this case a clause in the agreement between the parties 
provided that, "Notwithstanding the place where the work under this 
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contract is to be executed it is mutually understood and agreed by and 
between the parties hereto that this contract shall be deemed to have been 
entered into by the parties concerned in the city of Bombay and the Court 
of law in the city of Bombay alone shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate 
thereon." 
The plaintiff filed a suit at Varanasi. The respondent contended that 
the civil Court in Bombay alone had jurisdiction, because of the terms 
contained in clause 13 of the agreement to entertain the petition. 
But the trial Judge rejected that contention observing that the 
condition in clause 13 "that the contract shall be deemed to have been 
entered into by the parties concerned in the city of Bombay has no 
meaning unless the contract is actually entered into the city of Bombay, 
and that there was no evidence to establish that it was entered into in the 
city of Bombay. The trial Judge concluded that the entire cause of action 
had arisen at Varanasi and the parties could not by agreement confer 
jurisdiction on the Courts at Bombay, which they did not otherwise 
possess. 
But the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad in exercise of its 
revisional jurisdiction set aside the order passed by the trial Court and 
held that the Court in Bombay had jurisdiction under the general law to 
entertain the suit and by virtue of the covenant in the agreement and 
clause 13 of the agreement is applicable and binding between the parties. 
The Hon'ble Supreme Court while deciding the appeal against the 
order of the High Court of Allahabad held that where two Courts or more 
have under the Code of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction to try a suit or 
proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between 
them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. 
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Such an agreement does not contravene section 28 of the Indian Contract 
Act. 
This principle laid down in the case of Hakam Singh was reiterated 
time and again in several cases. Recently in Harshad Chiman V. D.L.F. 
Universal Ud}^ this view of the Supreme Court was reiterated again in its 
judgment where the Supreme Court said that, where several civil Courts 
have territorial jurisdiction in respect of suit, parties may by agreement 
confine themselves to any one or more of such civil Courts and such an 
agreement would not be violative of section 28 of the contract Act. 
Thus now the legal position is that it is not open to the parties to 
confer jurisdiction to adjudicate on a Court which it does not possess 
jurisdiction under the Code of Civil procedure. But where two or more 
Courts have jurisdiction under the Code to try a suit, an agreement 
between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of 
such Courts is not contrary to public policy. Parties can restrict their 
choice of Courts by an agreement freely entered into between them and 
can agree to any one or two such Courts provided that the selected Court 
otherwise has jurisdiction to try the suit under the Code of Civil 
Procedure, and this agreement does not contravene section 28 of the 
contract Act. 
Under Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 a party has the 
right to file a suit, in case of any dispute, in a Court which possess the 
jurisdiction to adjudicate under the code of his choice except in the case 
of contracts to refer to arbitration disputes which may arise arbitration 
disputes which may arise or which have already arisen. Section 28 was 
amended by Indian Contract (Amendment) Act 1996 which came into 
effect from 8^*^  Jan. 1997. The amendment gave effect to the suggestions 
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made in 97 Report of the Law Commission of India on "Section 28, 
Indian Contract Act 1872: Prescriptive Clauses in Contract" (1984). 
Before the amendment in section 28 of the Contract Act Section 
28(b) was as under: 
"Every agreement, by which any party thereto is restricted 
absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, 
by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which limits 
the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is void to that 
extent." 
But after the amendment of 1997 the Section 28(b) is as under: 
"Section 28(b) - Every agreement - which extinguishes the rights of any 
party thereto or discharges any party thereto from any liability, under or 
in respect of any contract on the expiry of a specified period so as to 
restrict any party from enforcing his rights, is void to that extent." 
The 1997 Amendment to Section 28 now also prohibits clauses 
which seek to extinguish the rights of any party thereto, or discharge any 
party thereto from any liability, under or in respect of any contract on the 
expiry of a specified period so as to restrict any party from enforcing his 
rights. 
The Law Commission of India in its 13"' Report observed that such 
clauses hinged not on the interpretation of the section but on the 
construction of the contract, and that "the principle itself is well 
recognized that an agreement providing for the relinquishment of 
remedies only falls within the mischief of section 28 of the contract Act 
1872 and concluded that no change was necessary in the section 28 as it 
stood earlier." 
219 
But later the Law Commission took up the matter suo motu and 
submitted its 97'^ Report in 1984 on "Prescriptive Clauses in contract, 
proposed." The proposal to disallow prescriptive clauses (which 
extinguished rights or provided for forfeiture or rights or discharge of 
liability on failure to sue within a certain time) rested on the basis of 
economic justice avoidance of hardship to consumers and certainty of 
law. 
In Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. V. M/s Jain Studio Ltd.'^ the 
arbitration clause stated that the Arbitrator's determinations will be 'final 
and binding between the parties and it declared that the parties have 
waived the right of appeal or objection 'in any jurisdiction. It was 
contended that this objectionable clause was not severable from the 
clause which enables disputes to be referred to arbitration and that the 
entire clauses was void. 
The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, it is no doubt true that a 
Court of law will read the agreement and it is and cannot rewrite nor 
create a new one. It is also true that the contract must be read as a whole 
and it is not open to dissect it by taking out a part treating it to be contrary 
to law and by ordering enforcement of the rest if otherwise it is not 
permissible. But it is well settled that if the contract is in several parts, 
some of which are legal and enforceable and some are unenforceable, 
lawful parts can be enforced provided they are severable.'"* The Court 
held that, that part of the arbitration clause which speaks of reference of 
dispute to arbitration is severable and is not void. 
B. Sale of Goods Act, 1930 
The Sale of Goods Act, 1930 creates a large number of rights, 
duties and liabilities. These include warranties and guarantees implied by 
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the Sale of Goods Act. Section 62 of the Act permits exclusion of these 
rights, duties or liabiHties by express clause or on account of the course of 
dealings between the parties or by usage, if the usage is such as to bind 
both parties to the contract. Section 62 of the Sale of Goods Act 1930 is 
reproduced as under: 
"Section 62 Exclusion of implied terms and conditions - where any 
right, duty or liability would arise under a contract of sale by implication 
of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement or by the 
course of dealing between the parties, or by usage, if the usage is such as 
to bind both parties to the contract." 
Section 62 enables the parties to a sale to exclude liability for 
implied terms. The section recognizes three modes by which liability for 
implied terms may be negatived -
1. By express contract: Clauses by which a seller excludes his 
liability for breach of implied terms are strictly construed against him 
unless the liability is excluded by very appropriate terms. In a contract of 
sale of a car "fit for touring purposes", the seller excluded liability for "all 
guarantees and warranties," the Court held him liable as the unfitness of 
the car supplied for touring purpose was not a breach of a guarantee or 
warranty but of a condition. 
An exclusion clause is construed more forcibly against the party 
putting it forward this principle is called general contra profrentem rule. 
An example of exclusion of liability is afforded by Andrews Bros 
(Bournemouth) Ltd. V. Singer & Co. Ltd.^^ In this case the plaintiffs were 
appointed by the defendants as dealers for 'new Singer cars'. They 
contracted to buy a number of such cars under an agreement which 
provided, that all conditions, warrantees and liabilities implied by 
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statutes, common law or otherwise are excluded. The defendants 
delivered a car which was not strictly a 'new' car, as it had already been 
driven a considerable mileage to be shown to another customer. 
The Court of Appeal held that the defendants - sellers could not 
rely on the clause which dealt only with implied terms whereas the 
undertaking to supply "new Singer car" was not an implied condition but 
was an express term. 
An Pinnock Bros V. Lewis & Peat Ltd. the plaintiff bought from 
the defendants East African Copra cake, which they resold to B, who 
resold to dealers, who resold to a farmer who used it for feeding cattle. 
The cake was so contaminated with castor beans as to be poisonous, and 
the cattle became ill. Each buyer sued his seller, and in the action by the 
plaintiffs the defendants relied on an exclusion clause. 
Roche J said that where a substance quite different from that 
contracted for has been delivered, the exclusion clause has not 
application, as such a difference of substance cannot be said to constitute 
a 'defect.' 
An illustration of fundamental breach is afforded by Karsales 
(Harrow) Ltd. V. Wallis.'" In this case the contract of sale provided that 
"No condition or warranty that the vehicle is roadworthy or as to its age, 
condition or fitness for any purpose is given by the owners or implied 
herein." The seller brought the car to the buyer's premises late at night. 
On inspection the car was found in deplorable state, it had been towed 
there its cylinder head had been removed, the valves in the engine had 
been bum out, two of the pistons had been broken, the tyres had been 
damaged and the radio removed. 
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Holding that this was a fundamental breach of the contract 
disentitling the seller to rely on the exemption clause Denning L.J, said, 
"It is now settled that exempting clauses of this kind, no matter 
how widely they are expressed, only avail the party when he is carrying 
out his contract in its essential respect. He is not allowed to use them as a 
cover for misconduct or indifference or to enable him to turn a blind eye 
to his obligations. They do not avail him when he is guilty of a breach 
which goes to the root of the contact. 
Similarly a seller is not protected by a clause in a contract of sale of 
cotton reels where there is shortage in goods supplied. In Beck & Co. V. 
Szymanowski & Co}^ clause 5 of a contract for the sale of reels of sewing 
cotton provided that the goods delivered should be deemed to be in all 
respect in accordance with the contract unless the sellers were notified 
within 14 days of delivery. After 18 months the buyers complained that 
on average each reel contained only 188 yards of cotton instead of the 
stipulated 200 yards. 
The House of Lords held that the sellers were not protected by 
clause 5, which referred to "goods delivered", whereas the buyers 
complaining that a portion of goods had not been delivered. 
B. Course of dealing: The implied terms of a contract of sale can also 
be negatived by a course of dealing between the parties. There should be 
clear proof of the existence of a course of dealing. A course of dealing 
may arise with equal force from a written or parole bargain or from the 
repeated occurrence of similar methods as between the parties. In each 
case the question is as to the implication to be drawn from the past as 
applied to a new transaction, but a single transaction is not sufficient to 
establish a course of dealing. 
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In Henry Kendall and Sons V. William Lillico & Sons Ltd?^ there 
had been three or four contracts a month between two of the parties 
Grimsdale and SAPPA. The practice had been that when an oral contract 
had been made, Grimsdale would sent a contract note to SAPPA, either 
later on the same day or on the following day. On the back of the notes 
were conditions, including one that "the buyer .... Takes the 
responsibility for latent defects." The House of Lords held that it was 
reasonable to hold that when SAPPA placed an order to buy, they did so 
on the basis and with the knowledge that an acceptance of the order by 
Grimsdale and their agreement to sell would be on the terms and 
conditions set out on their contract notes. 
In McCutcheon V. David MacBrayne Ltd. the plaintiff had 
shipped his car several times on the defendants' ship between Islay and 
the mainland of Scotland. The evidence was that sometimes he was asked 
to sign a risk note, containing exempting conditions, and sometimes not 
on the relevant voyage, on which the ship sank owing to the defendant's 
negligence, the plaintiffs brother had arranged the shipment and had not 
been asked to sign a risk note. It was held by the House of Lords that 
there was no consistent course of dealings. 
Similarly in Hollier V. Rambler Motors (AMC) Ltd}^ the plaintiff 
had taken his car for servicing to the defendants' garage three or four 
times over a five year period. On previous occasions he had been asked to 
sign a service 'invoice' containing conditions, but on the relevant 
occasion this step was omitted. The Court of Appeal held that the 
previous contracts did not amount to a course of dealings incorporating 
the defendants' conditions into the oral contract. 
224 
Trade Usage: The implied terms may also be excluded by trade usage, 
provided there is cogent and convincing evidence before the Court of law 
that there exist a particular usage in that type of business or dealings 
claimed by a party to the contract. 
C. Consumer Protection Act, 1986: 
In early years when welfare legislation like Consumer Protection 
Act did not exist, the maxim caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) 
governed the market. Now with the opening of global markets and 
progressive removal of restrictions on international trade there is 
increasing competition among manufacturers which has benefited 
consumers in the form of improvement in quality of goods and services. 
In spite of various provisions providing protection to consumers through 
different enactments like Civil Procedure code 1908, Indian Contract Act 
1872, Sale of Good Act, 1930, very little could be achieved in the area of 
consumer protection. The consumer Protection Act, 1986 was thus 
framed to protect consumers from unfair trade practices of business 
community. The Act came into force in 1987 and was further amended 
from time to time. 
The preamble of the Act shows that it is an Act to provide for 
better protection of the interest of consumers and for that purpose, to 
make provision for establishment of consumer councils and other 
authorities for the settlement of consumer disputes and for matters 
connected therewith. 
When consumer Protection Act 1986 was enacted it did not 
originally contain the definition of "unfair trade practice." The concept of 
unfair trade practice was, however, interpreted according to definition of 
unfair trade practice, given in the MRTP Act 1969. However, in 1993, 
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Section 2 (1) (r) incorporated an exhaustive definition of unfair trade 
practice as given under section 36A of MRTP Act, as amended in 1984 
with a view to making consumer Protection Act 1986 a self-contained 
code and is reproduced as under: 
(r) "Unfair trade Practice" means a trade practice which, for the 
purpose of promoting the sale, use or supply of goods or for the provision 
of any service, adopts any unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice 
including any of the following practices, namely: 
1. the practice of making any statement, whether orally or in writing 
or by visible representation which, — 
(i) falsely represents that the goods are of a particular stemdard, 
quality, quantity, grade, composition, style or model; 
(ii) falsely represents that the services are of a particular standard, 
quality or grade; 
(iii) falsely represents any re-built, second-hand, renovated, 
reconditioned or old goods as new goods; 
(iv) represents that the goods or services have sponsorship, approval, 
performance, characteristics, accessories, uses or benefits which such 
goods or services do not have; 
(v) represents that the seller or the supplier has a sponsorship or 
approval or affiliation which such seller or supplier does not have; 
(vi) makes a false or misleading representation concerning the need for, 
or the usefulness of any goods or services; 
(vii) gives to the public any warranty or guarantee of the performance, 
efficacy or length of life of a product or of any goods that is not based on 
an adequate or proper test thereof; 
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Provided that where a defence is raised to the effect that such 
warranty or guarantee is based on adequate or proper test, the burden of 
proof of such defence shall lie on the person raising such defence; 
(viii) makes to the public a representation in a form that purports to be -
(i) a warranty or guarantee of a product or of any goods or services; or (ii) 
a promise to replace, maintain or repair an article or any part thereof or to 
repeat or continue a service until it has achieved a specified result, 
if such purported warranty or guarantee or promise is materially 
misleading or if there is no reasonable prospect that such warranty, 
guarantee or promise will be carried out; 
(ix) materially misleads the public concerning the price at which a 
product or like products or goods or services, have been, or are ordinarily 
sold or provided, and, for this purpose, a representation as to price shall 
be deemed to refer to the price at which the product or goods or services 
has or have been sold by sellers or provided by suppliers generally in the 
relevant market unless it is clearly specified to be the price at which the 
product has been sold or services have been provided by the person by 
whom or on whose behalf the presentation is made; 
(x) gives false or misleading facts disparaging the goods, services or 
trade of another person. 
Explanation - For the purpose of clause (1), a statement that is-
(a) expressed on an article offered or displayed for sale or on its 
wrapper or container; or 
(b) expressed on anything attached to, inserted in or accompanying, 
an article offered or displayed for sale, or on anything on which 
the article is mounted for display or sale; or 
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(c) contained in or on anything that is sold, sent, delivered, 
transmitted or in any other manner whatsoever made available 
to a member of the public; shall be deemed to be a statement 
made to the public by, and only by, the person who had caused 
the statement to be so expressed made or contained; 
2. permits the publication of any advertisement whether in any 
newspaper or otherwise, for the sale or supply at a bargain price; of goods 
or services that are not intended to be offered for sale or supply at the 
bargain price, or for a period that is, and in quantities that are, reasonable, 
having regard to the nature of the market in which the business is carried 
on, the nature and size of business and the nature of the advertisement. 
Explanation - For the purpose of clause (2), bargain price means: 
(a) a price that is stated in any advertisement to be a bargain price, 
by reference to an ordinary price or otherwise; or 
(b) a price that a person who reads, hears or sees the advertisement, 
would reasonably understand to be bargain price having regard 
to the prices at which the product advertise or like products are 
ordinarily sold; 
(3) permits: 
(a) the offering of gifts, prizes or other items with the intention of not 
providing them as offered or creating the impression that 
something is being given or offered free of charge when it is fully 
or partly covered by the amount charged in the transaction as a 
whole; 
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(b) the conduct of any contest, lottery, game of chance of skill, for the 
purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, the sale, use or supply 
of any product or any business interest; 
(c) permits the sale or supply of goods intended to be used or are of a 
kind likely to be used, by consumers, knowing or having reason to 
believe that the goods do not comply with the standards prescribed 
by competent authority relating to performance, composition, 
contents, design, construction, finishing or packaging as are 
necessary to prevent or reduce the risk of injury to the person using 
the goods; 
(5) permits the hoarding or destruction of goods or refuses to sell the 
goods or to make them available for sale, or to provide any service, if 
such hoarding or destruction of goods or refusal raises or tends to raise or 
intended to raise, the cost of those or other similar goods or services. 
(2) Any reference in this Act to any other Act or provision thereof 
which is not in force in any area to which this Act applies shall be 
construed to have a reference to the corresponding Act or provision 
thereof in force in such area." 
Under the Consumer Protection Act 1986 the method of inquiry 
into the allegation of unfair trade practice is on three levels by the three 
authorities having its own original pecuniary jurisdiction. The complaint 
is filed before the District Forum where the value of goods or services 
and for compensation claimed does not exceed rupees five lakhs. The 
District Forum after the proceeding are conducted under Section 13 is 
satisfied that the goods complained against suffer from any of the defects 
specified in the complaint about the services are proved, it shall issue an 
order to the opposite party directing him to either remove the defect 
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pointed out to or replace the goods with new ones, to remove the defects 
or deficiencies in services in question, to return to the complainant the 
price, to pay such amount as compensation for any loss suffered, to 
discontinue the unfair trade practice or the restrictive trade practice, or 
not to repeat them. 
Section 14 of the Consumer Protection Act deals with the relief 
which the District Forum is authorized to give to the aggrieved consumer. 
The District Forum has to record its satisfaction as regard the defects in 
goods, deficiency in service. It is only after recording such satisfaction 
that the District Forum can give direction in respect of the reliefs which it 
grants to consumers. The District Forum shall issue orders to discontinue 
the unfair trade practice or the restrictive trade practice or not to repeat 
them. 
D. The Competition Act, 2002 
In the pursuit of globalization, responded to opening up its 
economy, removing controls and resorting to liberalization. As a natural 
consequence of this the Indian market has to be geared to face 
competition from within the country and outside. The Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1969 had become obsolete in certain 
respects in the light of international economic developments relating 
more particularly to competition laws and the need was felt to shift the 
focus from curbing monopolies to promoting competition. Thus a need 
arose for a separate competition Act. 
A High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law was 
constituted by the Central Government which submitted its report on 22" 
May 2000 to the Central Government. The Central Government consulted 
all concerned including the trade and industry association and the general 
230 
public. After considering the suggestions of tiie trade and industry and the 
general public decided to enact a law on competition. Accordingly the 
competition Bill was introduced in the Parliament. 
The aim and object of the competition Bill was to ensure fair 
competition in India by prohibiting trade practices which causes 
appreciable adverse effect on competition in markets within India and for 
this purpose the provision for the establishment of a quasi judicial body to 
be called the Competition Commission of India (CCI). The purpose of 
this Bill was also to curb negative aspects of competition through the 
medium of competition commission of India. The aim of the Bill was also 
to repeal the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 and 
the dissolution of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practice 
Commission. The Bill provided that the cases pending before the MRTP 
commission will be transferred to the Competition Commission of India 
except those relating to unfair trade practices which were proposed to be 
transferred to the relevant for a established under the Consumer 
Protection Act, 1986. The competition Bill after having been passed by 
both the Houses of Parliament received the assent of the President on 13^ 
January 2003. It came on the Statute Book as The Competition Act 2002 
(12 of 2003). 
The preamble of the Act shows that "it is an Act to provide, 
keeping in view of the economic development of the country, for the 
establishment of a commission to prevent practices having adverse effect 
on competition, to promote and sustain competition in markets, to protect 
the interest of consumers and to ensure freedom of trade carried on by 
other participants in markets, in India, and for matters connected 
therewith or incidental thereto." 
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The scope and ambit of the competition Act 2002, is fairly wide. 
Section 3(1) of the Act, prohibits anti-competitive agreements in respect 
of production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of 
goods or provision of services, which causes or is likely to cause an 
appreciable adverse effect on the competition within India. Any 
agreement entered into in contravention of the provisions contained in 
sub-section (1) of the section 3 shall be void. The competition Act 2002 
repealed the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1969. 
Under the Competition Act 2002, it is the duty of the Competition 
Commission to eliminate practices having adverse effect on competition, 
promote and sustain competition, protect the interest of consumers and 
ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants in markets in 
India. The Commission has the power to grant a temporary injunction, 
restraining any party from carrying on such act in certain circumstances. 
The Commission may also order for award of compensation for the loss 
or damage caused to the applicant as a result of any contravention of the 
provision of Chapter II of the Act having been committed by such 
enterprise. The person has to pay a penalty for failure to comply with 
orders/ directions of the Commission. 
E. Specific Relief Act 1963 
Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act deals with discretion as to 
decreeing specific performance. The Court is not bound to grant relief 
merely because it is lawful to do so, but it is discretionary and the 
discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable guided 
by judicial principles. 
Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 may be reproduced as 
under: 
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"Section 20: Discretion as to decreeing specific performance: 
1. The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, 
and tiie Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful 
to do so; but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and 
reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a 
Court of appeal. 
2. The following are cases in which the Court may properly exercise 
discretion not to decree specific performance: 
(a) Where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the 
time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under 
which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, 
though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over 
the defendant; or 
(b) where the performance of the contract would involve some 
hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its 
non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; 
(c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances 
which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it 
inequitable to enforce specific performance. 
Explanation 1: Mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that the 
contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not 
be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of the 
clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b). 
Explanation 2: The question whether the performance of a contract would 
involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, 
except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the 
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plaintiff, subsequent to the contract, be determined witli reference to the 
circumstances existing at the time of the contract. 
(3) The Court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific 
performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or 
suffered losses in consequence of the contract capable of specific 
performance. 
(4) The Court shall not refiise to any party specific performance of a 
contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the 
instance of the other party. 
Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 provides for certain 
circumstances in which the Court may at its discretion refuse specific 
enforcement. The section says that the jurisdiction to decree specific 
performance is discretionary and the Court is not bound to give such 
relief merely because it is lawful to do so. The section however adds that 
such discretion shall not be arbitrarily exercised. It has to be exercised on 
sound and reasonable basis. Discretion should be exercised in accordance 
with justice, equity, good conscience and fairness to both the parties. 
Sub-Section (2) of Section 20 provides for situations in which the 
Court can properly at its discretion refuse to order specific performance. 
1. Unfair Contracts: The Court may refuse specific performance 
where a contract gives an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the 
defendant. The unfairness of the contract may appear from the terms of 
the contract, from the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into 
the contract or other surrounding circumstances. It is not necessary that 
the contract should be voidable. 
2. Hardslijp: The specific performance may also be refused by the 
Court where it would cause considerable hardship to the defendant which 
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he did not foresee, whereas non-performance would cause no such 
hardship to the plaintiff 
3. Inequitable: Where the circumstances of a contract are such that, 
though they do not make the contract voidable, they definitely render 
specific enforcement inequitable, the contract is one sided, an imposition 
by one upon the other, the inequitable, the parties are not on equal 
footing, are some of the circumstances which the Court considers that 
whether an order of specific performance would give rise to inequitable 
results. 
The Law Commission of India in its 103'^ '* Report opined that the 
only step that can be taken in our country to remedy the evil is to enact a 
provision in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 to deal unfair terms in 
contract. The Commission in its Report recommended the amendment of 
the Indian Contract Act, 1872, by inserting the new chapter and a Section, 
namely Chapter IVA and in it a Section 67A. The recommended section 
67A by the Commission may be reproduced here as under: 
"Section 67A: (1) Where the Court, on the terms of the contract or on the 
evidence adduced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that the contract 
or any part of it is unconscionable, it may refuse to enforce the contract or 
the part that it holds to be unconscionable. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of this section, 
a contract or part of it is deemed to be unconscionable if it exempts any 
party thereto from - the liability for willful breach of the contract, or (b) 
the consequences of negligence." 
The recommended section 67A(1) is general in nature dealing with 
'unconscionability' while section 67A(?) refers to two particular 
situations in which the law deems to provisions to be unconscionable. It 
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does not deal with unfair contracts except those that are unconscionable. 
It does not provide any guidelines which a Court has to consider to judge 
unconscionability.^'* The recommendations of the Law Commission is on 
unfair terms in contracts concerned with standard form contracts 
imposing unfair and unreasonable terms upon unwilling consumers or 
persons who had no bargaining power. The recommendation was wide 
and did not restrict itself to any particular type of contract. The 
Commission recommended the addition of a new chapter IV-A with a 
single Section in it to be inserted in the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Before 
making the recommendations the Law Commission invited suggestions 
from different High Courts of India and the Law Departments of the 
States. The Commission felt that it was better to go step by step and the 
only step that could be taken in our country to remedy the evils of unfair 
terms in the standard form contracts was to enact a provision in the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872 which could combine the advantages of English 
Unfair Terms Act and of the Uniform Commercial Code of the United 
States and the Commission had not thought of an elaborate enactment on 
the lines of English Law. 
It is submitted that the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 
and the other existing laws of which some have referred to above, are not 
sufficient to deal with the menace created by excluding and limiting 
terms in the standard form contracts. The Law Commission of India in its 
103''' Report, 1984 on "Unfair Terms in Contract" observed that the 
existing sections of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 do not seem to be 
capable of meeting the mischief caused by unfair terms incorporated in 
the standard form contracts. It was observed the "Indian Contract Act" as 
it stands today cannot come to the protection of a consumer when dealing 
with big business. Further the Ad hoc solutions given by Courts in 
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response to their innate sense of justice without reference to a proper 
yardstick in the form of a specific provision of statute law or known legal 
principles of law only produce uncertainty and ambiguity.^^ 
2. Statutory Provisions in the United Kingdom: 
The Canals and Railways Act, 1854 is regarded as the first Act 
which had statutory control over the use of exemption clauses but the Act 
contracted certain types of clauses by allowing them only if they were 
reasonable. Under the Act it was provided that the limitations of liability 
had to be reasonable. Under Road Traffic Act, 1960 the clause which 
purports to exclude liability for death or personal injury of a passenger in 
a public service vehicle is void. Section 151, provides that: 
"A contract for the conveyance of a passenger in a public service 
vehicle shall, so far as it purports to negative or to restrict the liability of a 
person in respect of a claim which may be made against him in respect of 
the death of, or bodily injury to, the passenger while being carried in, 
entering or alighting from the vehicle, or purports to impose any 
conditions with respect to the enforcement of any such liability be void." 
A similar provision may also be found in the Transport Act, 1962. 
Section 43(7) of the Act provides that: 
"The Boards shall not carry passengers by rail on terms or 
conditions which (a) purports, whether directly or indirectly, to exclude 
or limit their liability in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any 
passenger other than a passenger traveling on a free pass, or (b) purport, 
whether directly or indirectly, to prescribe the time within which or the 
manner in which any such liability may be enforced." 
Thus any term which exclude the liability either directly or 
indirectly in case of death or bodily injury or a term which prescribes the 
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time limit shall be void and shall have no effect at all on the basis of the 
provision of Transport Act, 1962. The unfair terms have been regulated in 
the United Kingdom by legislation as far back as 1854 but with a focus 
on exclusion and limitation of liability clauses. By virtue of the Supply of 
Goods (Implied Terms) Act, 1973 (SOGITA), all sellers were prevented 
from excluding or restricting liability: 
(i) Generally with respect to the implied obligation as to title. 
(ii) In relation to consumers with respect to the implied obligations of 
merchantability, fitness for purpose, correspondence with sample and 
(iii) For non-consumer sales with respect to the implied obligations of 
merchantability, fitness for purpose, correspondence with sample, only to 
the degree that it could be shown to be fair and reasonable. 
A. The Unfair Contract Term Act, 1977 (UCTA): 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 (UCTA) in general 
incorporates the provisions of Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act, 
1973 (SOGITA). Whilst it applies to both consumer and business to 
business contracts as well as to terms and notices excluding certain 
liabilities for negligence irrespective of whether the terms are negotiated 
or standard, it only covers exclusion and limitation of liability clauses and 
also indemnity clauses in consumer contracts. It makes certain exclusions 
or restrictions of no effect at all and subjects other to a test of 
reasonableness. 
"Reasonableness" means .... the term shall have been a fair and 
reasonable one to be included having regard to the circumstances which 
were, or ought to have been, known to or in the contemplation of the 
parties when the contract was made. 
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The Unfair Contract Term Act 1977 does not deal with all unfair 
contract terms but only with unfair exemption clauses. It also does not 
deal with unfair imposition of liability. This Act is divided into three 
parts. Part I applies to England, Wales and Northern Ireland; Part II 
applies to Scotland and Part III applies to the whole of United Kingdom. 
Section 2, 3, 6 and 7 are the main sections in Part I of the Act and are 
interrelated. Section 6 applies to contracts of sale and Hire purchase. 
Section 2 and 3 are of general application and are applied to any contract 
within the scope of the Act, including those covered by section 6 or 7. 
Section 2 deals with liability for negligence. Negligence is defined in 
Section 1 of the Act where it means the breach either of a contractual 
obligation, 'to take reasonable care or to exercise reasonable skill in the 
performance of the contract' or of 'any common law duty to take 
reasonable care or to exercise reasonable skill' or 'of the common duty of 
care imposed by the Occupiers Liability Act, 1957. 
Section 3 of the Act deals with two types of contract. One is where 
the contract is between the two parties, one of whom is a consumer, while 
the other type of contract is where it is between two parties, one of whom 
deals on the other's written standard terms of business. Section 3 provides 
that the person who deals with the consumers or on his own written 
standard terms of business: 
"cannot by reference to any contract term -
(a) when himself in breach of contract, exclude or restrict any liability 
of his in respect of the breach; or 
(b) claim to be entitled -
(i) to render a contractual performance substantially different 
from that which was reasonably expected of him, or 
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(ii) in respect of the whole or any part of his contractual obligation, to 
render no performance at all, 
except in so far as .. the contract term satisfies the requirement of 
reasonableness. 
This Act applies in two ways, either to make a term totally 
ineffective or to subject it to a test of reasonableness. There are certain 
terms which are made ineffective for example: 
(a) Personal injury or death - under Section 2(1) it is no longer 
possible to exclude or restrict liability in negligence for personal 
injury or death by reference to any contract terms. 
(b) In contract of sale or hire-purchase, the implied undertakings as 
to title of the seller or owner cannot be excluded or restricted. 
(c) In consumer contracts of sale or hire-purchase, the seller's or 
owner's implied undertakings as to conformity of goods with 
description or sample or as to their quality or fitness for a 
particular purpose cannot be excluded or restricted. 
(d) Under Section 7 of the Act the same rule applies to contracts 
when the goods are supplied to a consumer. 
The Unfair Contract Term Act, 1977 is primarily concerned with 
terms that exclude or restrict business liability, that is liability for breach 
of obligations or duties. Section 2 of the Act places restriction on the 
power of a party to a contract to secure exemption from business liability 
for negligence. It is prohibited to exclude or restrict liability for death or 
personal injury resulting from negligence, by reference to any term of the 
contract. 
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Section 5 of the Act prohibits the exclusion or restriction of the 
negligence liability of a manufacturer or distributor of goods by means of 
a written guarantee. Section 5(1) is based on guarantee of consumer 
goods which says, 
"In the case of goods of a type ordinarily applied for private use or 
consumption, where loss or damage, 
(a) arises for the goods proving defective while in consumer use; 
and 
(b) results from the negligence of a person concerned in the 
manufacture or distribution of the goods, liability for the loss or damage 
cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any contract or notice 
contained in or operating by reference to a guarantee of the goods. 
Thus in case of goods which are supplied for private use or 
consumption the liability of the manufacturer and distributor arising out 
of defective goods or due to negligence, cannot be excluded or restricted 
by a term in contract or a notice which may be contained in or operating 
by reference "guarantee of the goods." 
By Section 4 of the Act a person who deals as a consumer cannot, 
by any contract term, be compelled to indemnify another in respect of the 
latter's business liability for negligence or breach of contract, except in so 
far as the term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness. 
Section 6 of the Act restricts the ability of sellers of goods to 
exempt themselves from liability for breach of the stipulations implied in 
contracts of sale by sections 12-15 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1979. It 
prohibits absolutely the exclusion or restriction of liability for breach of 
the provisions of Section 12 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1979 i.e. 
stipulations as to titles. It also prohibits absolutely the exclusion or 
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restriction of liability for breach of the provisions of sections 13 to 15 of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 as amended i.e. conditions as to satisfactory 
quality, fitness for purpose and correspondence with description or 
sample, where the buyer deals as consumer. If the buyer does not deal as 
consumer, liability for breaches of sections 13 to 15 can be excluded or 
restricted but only in so far as the term satisfies the requirement of 
reasonableness. 
Section 7 of the Act is concerned with contract terms excluding or 
restricting business liability for breach of an implied obligation in a 
contract where the possession or ownership of goods passes under or in 
pursuance of the contract (other than a contract of sale of goods or hire-
purchase, or on the redemption of trading stamps). 
There are certain instances where the Act prohibits absolutely the 
exclusion or restriction of liability. The contract term which are there to 
qualify the test of reasonableness of which the guidelines are given the 
Act under section 11. 
The Court will decide whether a term is reasonable or not and 
while deciding that the term is fair and reasonable, the Court will 
consider the circumstances which were, or ought reasonably have been 
known to, or in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was 
made. 
Section 11 and Schedule 2 of the Act, provides following 
'guidelines' of circumstances to be taken into account by the Court while 
deciding the question of reasonableness of term in the contract. 
1. The strength of the bargaining positions of the relative to each 
other, taking into account alternative means.Jby which the 
customer's requirements could have been met; 
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2. Whether the customer received an inducement to agree to the 
term, or in accepting it had an opportunity of entering into a 
similar contract with other persons, but without having to accept 
a similar term; 
3. Whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have known 
of the existence and extent of the term (having regard, among 
other things, to any custom of the trade and any previous course 
of dealing between the parties); 
4. Where the term excludes or restricts any relevant liability if 
some condition is not complied with, whether it was reasonable 
at the time of contract to expect that compliance with that 
condition would be practicable; 
5. Whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to 
the special order of the customer. 
Thus these guidelines provide by the Act will help Court to come 
to a conclusion regarding the reasonableness of a term only in respect of 
the exclusion or restriction of liability for breach of the implied 
obligations as to description and quality in contracts of sale of goods and 
hire-purchase and supply contracts. The burden of proof, that the term is 
reasonable or satisfies the requirement of reasonableness lies upon the 
person who claims that it is reasonable. 
Schedule 1 of the Act contains a list of contracts to which the 
whole or part of section 2, 3, 4 and 7 do not apply. These include: 
a. contracts of insurance (including contracts of annuity); 
b. contracts relating to the creation, transfer or termination of 
interests in land; 
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c. contracts relating to the creation, transfer or termination of 
rights or interests in intellectual property such as patents, trade 
marks, copyrights etc. 
d. contracts relating to the formation or dissolution of a company 
or the constitution or rights or obligations of its members; 
e. contracts relating to the creation or transfer of securities or of 
any right or interest therein; 
f contracts of marine salvage or towage; or charter party of ships 
or hovercraft or of carriage of goods by sea, by ship or 
hovercraft (except in relation to Section 2( 1) or in favour of a 
person dealing as consumer). 
Thus the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 is the most important 
statute in the English contract law. This Act does not render any of the 
previous law redundant, and is not simple. Some of its sections which are 
main sections overlap. The key concept of the Act is the test of 
reasonableness which are to be decided by the Courts on the basis of 
guidelines given in the Act itself. This Act considerably improved the 
status of consumers and put them in a better position in comparison to the 
position before the enactment of the Act. 
B. The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, 1999 -
(UTCCR): 
These Regulations came into force with effect from 1^ ' October 
1999. Before these Regulations, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 
1994 was in force in the United Kingdom, and was effective since 1^ ' July 
1985 to 1'' October 1999. These new Regulations of 1999 replaced the 
old Regulations of 1994. These Regulations apply cnly to consumer 
contracts and only to standard form contracts. The Regulations define a 
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consumer as 'a natural person who in making a contract to which these 
Regulations apply, is acting for purposes which is outside is business.' 
The Regulations do not apply to contracts which have been 
individually negotiated. They are limited to contracts which have been 
drafted in advance. The Regulations provide that 'the fact that a specific 
term or certain aspects of it have been individually negotiated does not 
exclude the applications of the Regulations if an overall assessment of the 
contract indicates that it is nevertheless a pre-formulated standard 
contract. Unlike the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, the Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts Regulations, 1999 are not restricted to exemption 
and limitations clauses. They cover all the terms of a contract between a 
seller or supplier of goods or services and a consumer which have not 
been individually negotiated to a requirement of fairness. The 
Regulations, 1999 apply to some contracts of insurance that which were 
excluded from Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977. The 1994 Regulations 
applied only to contracts for the supply of goods and services. The 
provision producing this limitation is not there in the 1999 Regulations. 
There are two differences between the UCTA, 1977 and UTCCR, 
1999. The UCTA, 1977 does not deal in principle with all unfair contract 
terms but only with unfair exemption clauses. It does not, in general, deal 
with unfair imposition of liability. Even the exemption clauses are not 
being declared as fair or unfair but only declared as ineffective or other 
subject to a test of reasonableness. Whether a term is unfair or not cannot 
be tested by the Act of 1977. Some terms are struck down and others are 
valid if reasonable. Invalidity of a term does not depend on fairness or 
unfairness. 
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The other difference is that the Regulations can be used to struck 
down any term which is successfiaily alleged to be unfair. 
Unfairness is defined by clause 5(1) of the Regulations, 1999, 
which provides 
"Unfair term" means any term which, contrary to the requirement 
of good faith, causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations arising under the contract to the detriment of the consumer." 
However, there is a limitation provided in clause 6(2) of the 
Regulations, 1999 which says 
"In so far as it is in plain intelligible language of the assessment of 
fairness of a term shall not relate, 
a. to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract or 
b. to the adequacy of the price or remuneration as against the 
goods or services sold or supplied. 
Thus by this provision it is not open for a consumer to argue that 
the contract is unfair because of the reason that he is charged in excess or 
the price is very exorbitant. 
Section 7 of the Regulations, 1999 provides that "A seller or 
supplier shall ensure that any written term of a contract is expressed in 
plain intelligible language." Where there is doubt about the meaning of a 
term, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail. 
Clause 8(1) of the Regulations provides that an unfair term in a 
contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall not be 
binding on the consumer. Clause 8(2) provides that the contract shall 
continue to bind the parties if it is capable of continuing in .existence 
without the unfair term. 
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Section 5(5) provides that Schedule 2 contains "an indicative and 
non-exhaustive list of the terms which may be regarded as unfair." 
Thus the Regulations of 1999 (UTCCR, 1999) of U.K. operate in 
addition to Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977. The Regulations covers: 
(i) contracts involving consumers - any natural person who is acting 
for purposes other than his trade business or profession; and 
(ii) contractual terms which have not been individually negotiated, 
particularly pre-formulated standard contracts; 
(ili) Oral or written contracts; and provide that 
(iv) Written contracts must be in plain intelligible language and 
(v) Unfair terms are not binding on the consumer. 
The declared purpose of these Regulations is to protect consumers 
against one-sided contracts favouring business. They provide that: 
i. a contractual term which has not been individually negotiated is 
unfair if contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations under 
the contract, to the detriment of the consumer; 
ii. a consumer is not bound by a term which is unfair. The rest of 
the contract is binding if it is capable of continuing in existence 
without the unfair terms; 
iii. if a term is individually negotiated, it is not covered by the 
Regulations but any non-negotiated term within the same 
contract is covered; 
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iv. if a consumer believes a term to be unfair, he or she can take the 
issue to Court or can use it as a defence in Court in Court 
proceedings against them; 
V. where a term has been drawn up for general use, the United 
Kingdom Office of Fair Trading (UK OFT) (or the main 
Sectoral Regulators and 200 Local authority trading standards 
services) can seek an undertaking or apply for an injunction to 
stop business using unfair terms. 
This Regulations, 1999 do not cover: 
i. Price setting - provided it is in plain and in intelligible 
language; 
ii. terms defining the product - provided they are in plain and 
intelligible language; 
iii. terms required by law or explicitly allowed by law; 
iv. specially negotiated terms; 
V. sales by private individuals; or 
vi. terms in non-consumer contracts such as employment 
agreements. 
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (Amendment) 
Regulations, 2001 amended the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 ("the Principal Regulations") by adding the Financial 
Services Authority to the list of qualifying bodies in Part one of Schedule 
1. These Regulations also amended the principal Regulations to reflect 
changes in the names of certain of the qualifying bodies listed in Part One 
of Schedule 1 and to reflect the fact that the functions of the Director 
General of Electricity Supply and of the Director General of Gas Supply 
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have been transferred to the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority under 
Part 1 of the Utilities Act, 2000. 
The Principal Regulations provide a power for the Director General 
and the public qualifying bodies to require traders to produce copies to 
require traders to produce copies of their standard contracts, and give 
information about their use in order to facilitate investigation of 
complaints and ensure compliance with undertakings or Courts. 
The Law Commission of United Kingdom and the Scottish Law 
Commission in its joint Reports (No. Law Com No. 292 and Scot Law 
Com No. 199) on (Unfair Terms in Contracts) - 2004 recommended for a 
single Unified Act that will set out law on unfair contract terms in a clear 
and accessible way. 
The commission opined in its Report "that at present unfair terms 
in consumer contracts are governed by both Unfair Contract Terms Act, 
1977 (UCTA) and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulation, 
1999 (UTCCR). The existence of this dual regime has caused 
considerable confusion and uncertainty because: 
1. the statutory control over unfair terms are split between two pieces 
of legislation and must be located in each text; 
2. the UTCCR and UCTA contain inconsistent and overlapping 
provisions; 
3. the scope of application of each piece of legislation is different; 
4. UCTA and UTCCR use different language and terminology; 
5. UCTA is drafted in a very dense and highly technical style; and 
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6. the UTCCR are a fairly literal version of the text of the Directive 
whose language and, in some instances, concepts are not always easily 
understood by UK lawyers." 
The Commission in its Report^ ^ said that our objective is to design 
a single unified legislative regime for consumer contracts to preserve 
consumer protections currently afforded by both UCTA-1977 and the 
UTCCR, 1999. 
The issue of unfair terms in standard form contracts is a moot point 
for any law reform agency. The British Parliament passed the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act, 1977 and Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations, 1999. The Act provides the definition of the term 
"negligence" which is applicable both to tort and breach of a contract 
cases. The Act provides that any clause in a contract which excludes or 
restricts liability for negligence shall be absolutely void. In regard to 
other types of loss, not being death or physical injury, any restriction or 
excluding clause shall also be void unless it satisfies the requirement of 
"reasonableness." The 'reasonableness' would depend upon the 
unfairness of the terms in the light of the circumstances which ought to 
have been either known to or in the contemplation of the parties. The Act 
also provides that a person who deals with the consumer on standard 
terms will not be allowed to claim the protection of any clause restricting 
or excluding liability if he himself commits breach. It puts the burden of 
proof on the party who wants to take the advantage under the excluding 
clause of the contract. The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 apply to consumer contracts of all kinds in the whole of 
the United Kingdom. Though does not contain detailed guidelines as to 
how the test "fairness" should be applied but contains a list of t'^ rma'-
which may be regarded as unfair. 
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Thus in the United Kingdom these two legislations are very 
important in the field of commercial transactions. The effect of these two 
legislation is that most of the suppliers of goods or services are reluctant 
to incorporate and stipulate harsh and one-sided excluding and limiting 
terms in contracts, or agreed to withdraw or amend certain types of 
clauses in contract. These legislations elevated the status and bargaining 
power of the individuals vis-a-vis supplier of goods or services. 
3. Statutory Provisions in U.S.A.: 
The notion of unconscionability in contracts is by no means new in 
United States of America. It is incorporated as a test of enforceability in 
the Uniform Commercial Code. The general doctrine of 
unconscionability was developed in U.S.A. largely through judicial 
decisions. 
Unconscionable contract term is defined in section 208 in 
American Restatement of Law (Second) as promulgated and adopted by 
the American Law Institute dealing with the law of contracts. 
A. Section 208 - Unconscionable Contract Terms: 
"If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time contract 
is made, a Court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the 
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term or may so 
limit the application of any unconscionable term, as to avoid any 
unconscionable result." 
The doctrine of unconscionability has also been included in the 
Uniform Commercial Code of U.S.A. Though it was applicable only to 
contracts relating to sales of goods. It has been applied by analogy or as 
general doctrine to other kinds of contracts. 
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B. Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides: 
"If the Court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of 
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the 
Court may refuse the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the 
contract without the unconscionable term, or it may so limit the 
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable 
result." 
The comment to this section describes the purpose of this section 
as follows: 
"This section is intended to enable the Courts to police explicitly 
against the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable. In 
the past such policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of 
language by manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by 
determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the 
dominant purpose of the contract...." 
The Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code is addressed 
to the Court in as much as the unconscionability must be determined by 
the Court as the matter of law under this provision when it is claimed or 
appears to the Court that the contract or any clause thereof may be 
unconscionable, the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and the effect in 
order to aid the Court in making the determination. The relief granted by 
the Courts could be refiisal to enforce the entire contract or the particular 
clauses found to be unconscionable. 
The comment to Section2-302 of Uniform Commercial Code 
further says that: 
252 
"A bargain is not unconscionable merely because the parties to it 
are unequal in bargaining power, nor even because the inequality results 
in an allocation of risks to the weaker party. But gross inequality of 
bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favourable to the 
stronger party may confirm indications that the transaction involved 
elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party 
had no may show that the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real 
alternative, or did not in fact, assent or appear to assent to the unfair 
terms." 
Thus mere inequality of bargaining power is not sufficient to 
declare a contract term unconscionable. The parties are often required to 
make their contracts quickly even if there bargaining power may rarely be 
equal still the Court has power to interfere in cases falling within the 
provisions. It is quite clear that in U.S.A., there is statutory bar on 
unconscionable contracts and the interest of the parties prejudiced by 
inequality of bargaining power. 
The Uniform Commercial Code does not define unconscionability 
but indicates in the comment the basic test, whether in the light of general 
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade 
or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable 
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract. 
The unconscionability in contracts is provided as a test of 
enforceability in the Uniform Commercial Code of U.S.A. The general 
doctrine of unconscionability was developed through judicial decisions in 
the U.S.A. The doctrine of unconscionability has been included in UCC. 
Though it was applicable only to contracts relating to sales of goods. It 
has been applied by analogy or as a general doctrine to other kinds of 
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contracts. Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code gives power to 
the court to declare a unconscionable clause or a contract to be 
ineffective, the Court may refuse to enforce the clause or a contract. The 
Court shall give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to both of the 
parties and if it finds the contract or any clause unconscionable it will 
declare it ineffective. The effect of the UCC is that the supplier of goods 
and services are not inclined to stipulate unconscionable clauses in the 
contract because if the effected party goes to the court the clause would 
be declared unenforceable. Thus this UCC is important piece of 
legislation so far as unconscionable clauses are concerned. 
4. Statutory Provisions in Australia: 
There is some ability for individual relief in relation to unfair 
contracts by way of "unconscionable conduct" both at common law and 
the broader protection afforded by the Commonwealth Trade Practices 
Act, 1974 (TPA) as mirrored in State and Territory fair trading 
legislation. There are two contrasting aspects to unconscionable conduct 
as it relates to contracts: 
(i) firstly, procedural unfairness which is concerned with the 
circumstances leading up to and at the time of the making of the contract; 
and 
(ii) secondly, substantive unfairness which is concerned with the 
unfairness of the terms of the contract themselves which lead to an 
injustice. 
A. The Contract Review Act, 1980 (New South Wales): 
New South Wales (NSW) has a legislation in relation to unfair or 
unjust consumer contracts. The Contract Review Act, 1980 (CRA) 
protects persons from using unjust contracts. 
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Section 6(2) of the CRA provides that the relief under the Act is 
not available so far as contracts entered into the course of or for the 
purpose of a trade, business or profession carried on or proposed to be 
carried on by the person, other than a farming undertaking in New South 
Wales. 
Under Section 7 the Court may give relief to a party seeking it, if it 
fmds that the contract or its some provisions are unjust. The CRA 
provides that a Court can grant relief in relation to a consumer contract if 
it fmds the contract or a provision of the contract is unjust taking into 
consideration the circumstances relating to the contract at the time it was 
made. The Court can refuse to enforce any or all of the provisions of the 
contract and declare the contract void, in whole or in part. The Court may 
also make an order varying the provisions of the instrument or 
terminating or otherwise affecting its operation or effects. In general, the 
CRA provides that a Court can grant relief in relation to a contract if it 
fmds the contract or a provision of the contract to have been unjust in the 
circumstances relating to the contract at the time it was made. The CRA 
operates concurrently with the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
(UCCC).^^ 
"Unjust" is defined in the CRA as including unconscionable, harsh 
or oppressive. 
Sub-section 9( 1) of the CRA set out the matters which the Court 
must consider in determining if the contract or a term is unjust: the public 
interest and ... all the circumstances of the case, including such 
consequences of results as those arising in the event of: 
(a) compliance with any or all of the provisions of the contract, or 
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(b) non-compliance with, or contravention of, any or all of the 
provisions of the contract. 
The Court, where relevant, under Section 9(2) is also to have 
regard to procedural issues such as material inequality of bargaining 
power; relative economic circumstances; educational background; 
literacy of the parties; any unfair pressure; whether or not legal or expert 
advice was sought; but also substantive issues such as: 
(d) whether or not any provisions of the contract impose conditions 
which are unreasonably difficult to comply with or not reasonably 
necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of any party to the 
contract; and 
(g) where the contract is wholly or partly in writing, the physical form 
of the contract, and the intelligibility of the language in which it is 
expressed. 
The CRA is not limited to "standard" terms although whether a 
term was negotiated or not is a consideration for the Court. Sub-sections 
9(2)(d) and (g) in particular lean towards the substantive. A person's 
rights under the Act cannot be excluded or restricted in any way. 
Under Section 7 of the CRA where the Court finds a contract or a 
provision of a contract to have been unjust, it may, if it considers it just to 
do so, and for the purpose of avoiding as far as practical an unjust 
consequence or result: 
i. refuse to enforce any or all of the provisions of the contract; 
ii. declare the contract void, in whole or in part; 
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iii. vary any provision of the contract, in whole or in part (effective 
from the time of the malcing of the contract unless otherwise 
specified); or 
iv. require execution of an instrument that varies or terminates a 
land instrument. 
When making an order under Section 7 of the CRA the Court may 
also make orders, inter alia, for the disposition of property; the payment 
of money (whether or not by way of compensation) to a party to the 
contract; the compensation of a person who is not a party to the contract 
and whose interest might otherwise be prejudiced by a decision or order 
under the CRA; and supply or repair of goods or the supply of services. 
As well as providing a mechanism for relief by an individual 
consumer on a case by case basis, systemic relief is possible under 
Section 10 of the CRA. 
"Section 10 - where the Supreme Court is satisfied, on the 
application of the Minister or the Attorney General, or both, that a person 
has embarked, or is likely to embark, on a course of conduct leading to 
the formation of unjust contracts, it may, by order, prescribe or otherwise 
restrict, the terms upon which that person may enter into contracts of a 
specified class." 
The CRA provides the Supreme Court and the District Court with 
jurisdiction to consider contracts under the CRA (and the local Court and 
the consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal in more limited 
circumstances) The District Court's jurisdiction depends on its monetary 
jurisdictional limit. In general, the provisions of the CRA may be used 
either in actions commenced specifically or by way of defence in other 
proceedings arising out of, or in relation to, the contract. 
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B. Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC): 
In 1993 the States and Territories made the Uniform Credit Laws 
Agreement. The Queensland Parliament passed the template legislation in 
1994. Other jurisdictions followed and the uniform system came into 
effect on 1^ ' November 1996. It, therefore, applies across Australia. 
The UCCC in general applies to the provision of credit to a natural 
person or strata corporation by a credit provider who provides credit in 
the course of, or incidental to a business where a charge is made for 
providing the credit so long as the credit is predominantly for personal, 
domestic or household purposes. This applies to real property as well as 
goods and services and therefore housing loans may be covered. 
However, investment by a debtor is not for personal, domestic or 
household purposes. The UCCC also applies to consumer bases, related 
insurance contracts and related sales contracts. 
Unjust contracts can be re-opened under section 70 of the UCCC. 
The definition of "Unjust" is the same as that in the CRA, that is, it 
includes unconscionable, harsh or oppressive. 
Section 70 of the UCCC is concerned with procedural and 
substantive injustice. The list of matters which may be taken into account 
by the Court under sub-section 70(2) are very similar to those which the 
Court must take into account under sub-section 9(2) of the CRA. Whether 
or not a term was the subject of negotiation is a matter the Court can 
consider. 
If the Court considers that a matter is unjust, it may re-open the 
transaction that gave rise to the contract. It may then, inter alia: 
i. re-open an account; 
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ii. relieve the debtor from payment to the degree it considers 
reasonable; 
iii. set aside wholly or in part or revise or alter an agreement; 
iv. make an order for payment of an amount it thinks is justly due 
to the party under the contract 
Under Section 72 of the UCCC the Court may also review 
unconscionable interest, fees or charges. 
C. Trade Practices Act, 1974 
At federal level, the Trade Practices Act, 1974 implies various 
provisions into consumer contracts for sale, exchange, lease, hire or hire-
purchase. Any term that attempts to exclude these provisions is treated as 
void.^ ^ 
Section 51AB of the TPA, together with its mirror provisions in 
State and Territory fair trading legislation, prohibits conduct which is, in 
all the circumstances, unconscionable, in relation to certain defined 
situations. In deciding whether the conduct in a particular case is 
unconscionable, the Court may have regard to matters such as: 
i. the relative bargaining strengths of the parties; 
ii. whether undue influence or pressure was exerted or unfair 
tactics used; 
iii. whether the consumer was able to understand the consumer 
documentation; 
iv. whether the consumer was required to comply with conditions 
which were not reasonably necessary for the protection of 
legitimate intc^esto-af the supplier; and; 
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V. the amount for which, and the circumstances under which, the 
consumer could have acquired equivalent goods or services 
from another party. 
Under the TPA the Court can make any order it sees fit including 
compensation (but not damages); 
i. an order avoiding or refiising to enforce the contract in total or 
in part; 
ii. an order varying the contract; 
iii. an order directing the return of money or property; 
iv. an order for the repair of, or parts for goods or for the supply of 
services. 
Applications for injunctions can be made generally for the purpose 
of restraining a person from engaging in conduct in contravention of the 
TPA by both consumers and fair trading agencies on behalf of consumers. 
D. Fair Trading (Amendment) Act, 2003 (Victoria): 
In May 2003 Victoria amended its Fair Trading Act, 1999 to 
include provisions to address unfair contract terms. The provisions draw 
heavily on the United Kingdom Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations. 
The provisions cover "consumer contracts": an agreement whether 
or not in writing and whether of specific or general use, to supply goods 
or services of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or 
household use, for the purposes of the ordinary personal, household or 
domestic use of those goods or services. 
In brief:^ ^ 
260 
i. a term is unfair if contrary to the requirement of good faith and 
in all the circumstances it causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties' right and obligations under the contract, to the 
detriment of the consumer; 
ii. if a consumer believes a term to be unfair, he or she can take the 
issue to Court; a term found to be unfair is void: the rest of the 
contract continues to bind the parties if it is capable of existing 
without the term; 
iii. in assessing whether a term is unfair, the Court can have regard 
to whether the term was individually negotiated; whether it is 
prescribed term; and whether it has an object or effect set out in 
the Act; 
iv. standard form contract terms can be prescribed as unfair by 
regulation and it is an offence to use or recommend the use of a 
prescribed term; 
V. the Director can apply for an injunction where it is believed that 
a person is using or recommending the use of an unfair term in a 
consumer contract or a prescribed term; 
vi. an oral contract is covered with respect to consumer contract; 
vii. a term relating to price is covered by the provisions; 
viii. a contract to which the UCCC applies is not covered; and 
ix. business to business contracts are not covered. 
Whilst the individual consumer can take their contract to Court, the 
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal can deal with matters 
systematically in relation to standard form contracts. Unlike the United 
Kingdom, Victoria has the ability to develop a "black" list of terms 
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through regulations which prescribe unfair terms and is also able to 
prosecute if these are used. 
Under Section 163, a general provision in the Victorian Fair 
Trading Act, 1999, a written contract must be easily legible, in a 
minimum of 10 point if printed and must be clearly expressed. The 
Director can apply to the Victorian and Administrative Tribunal if it is 
believed that a term does not comply with this section. The Tribunal can 
prohibit the supplier using the provision and there is penalty for failure to 
with the order. 
Although the concept of unconscionability is expressed in wide 
terms, the Courts exercise an equitable jurisdiction according to 
recognized principles. They do not set aside bargains simply because, in 
the eyes of judges, they appear to be unfair, harsh or unconscionable. 
This equitable jurisdiction exists when one of the parties "suffers from 
some special disability or is placed in some special situation of 
disadvantage."" 
In the case of Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd. v. Amadio all 
the five judges of the High Court of Australia confirmed the existence in 
Australia, of an equitable jurisdiction to set aside contracts on the basis of 
unconscionable dealings, and three of them decided the case on this 
principle. In this case two elderly Italian migrants to Australia who were 
not familiar with the English language at the request of their son, 
executed a mortgage in favour of a bank over their land for securing an 
overdraft of a company which the son controlled. The son had 
represented to his parents that the mortgage would be limited to $ 50,000 
and for six months. The bank did not disclose to the couple that the bank 
and the company had been selectively dishonouring the company's 
rUM^Ii 
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cheque, and that they had agreed that the overdraft was to be reduced and 
cleared within a short time. The couple signed the mortgage believing it 
to be for an amount of $ 50,000 and for six months, but the document 
actually signed by the couple included a guarantee containing an "all 
moneys" clause, securing all amounts owing or which might be owed by 
the company to the bank. The bank was aware that the couple was 
misinformed about the instrument. 
The majority found that the Amadios were under a special 
disability, were not given fiill information about the extent of the 
guarantee and were ignorant about the perilous financial state of the 
company. Their son, who could have assisted them, had deceived them. 
Applying the objective test, the majority held that the bank was aware of 
the need of the Amadios to have independent advice, and in proceeding 
with the transaction in the light of this knowledge the bank had acted 
unconscionably. The knowledge of the stronger party of the other party's 
weakness was judged in this case by the objective standard. ^  
The principle of unconscionable dealings applied was summarized 
by Deane J. as follows '^* 
"The jurisdiction is long established as extending generally to 
circumstances in which: 
i. a party to a transaction was under a special disability in dealing 
with the other party with the consequence that there was an 
absence of any reasonable degree of quality between them; and 
ii. the disability was sufficiently evident to the stronger party to 
make it prima facie unfair or 'unconscientious' that he procure, 
or accept, the weaker party's assent to the impugned transaction 
in the circumstances in which he procured or accepted it. 
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Where such circumstances are shown to have existed, an onus is 
cast upon the stronger party to show that the transaction was fair just and 
reasonable. 
Under the Amadio approach, the weaker party must show that the 
stronger party acted unconscionably by reference mainly to the manner in 
which the transaction was concluded. This is the procedural question. On 
the other hand, the questions of substance, namely, the nature of the 
terms, would be concerned at the second stage of the proceedings when 
the onus is cast on the stronger party to show that the transaction was 
'fair, just and reasonable."^^ 
It is submitted that legislative provisions of different Acts in 
Australia protect persons from using unjust contracts or provisions in 
contracts. Though under section 6(2) of the Contract Review Act, 1980 
(CRA) relief is not available so far as contracts entered into the course of 
or for the purpose of trade, business or profession carried on or proposed 
to be carried on by the persons; other than a farming undertEiking, still 
there are various avenues available to the court on a finding of an unjust 
contract or contractual provisions. A Court can grant relief in relation to a 
consumer contract to have been "unjust" in the circumstances relating to 
the contract at the time it was made. The Court can refuse to enforce any 
or all of the provisions of the contract and declare the contract void in 
whole or in part, or make an order varying the provisions of the 
instrument or terminating or otherwise affecting its operation or effects. 
The CRA, 1980 operates concurrently with the Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code (UCCC). These are revolutionary legislations whose evident 
purpose is to overcome the Common Law's failure to provide a 
comprehensive doctrinal framework to deal "unjust" contracts^^. 
Consumers are provided with a mechanism which allows them to take 
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action in the situation of an unjust contract. Court's decisions may also 
have a deterrent impact on business concerns. This led to decrease I the 
use of excluding an limiting clauses in contracts and an increase in the 
consumer confidence in the market. 
It is submitted that the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 
and the other existing laws of which some have referred to above, are not 
sufficient to deal with the menace created by excluding and limiting 
terms in the standard form contracts. The Law Commission of India in its 
103''' Report, 1984 on "Unfair Terms in Contract" observed that the 
existing sections of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 do not seem to be 
capable of meeting the mischief caused by unfair terms incorporated in 
the standard form contracts. It was observed the "Indian Contract Act" as 
it stands today cannot come to the protection of a consumer when dealing 
with big business. Further the Ad hoc solutions given by Courts in 
response to their innate sense of justice without reference to a proper 
yardstick in the form of a specific provision of statute law or known legal 
principles of law only produce uncertainty and ambiguity. 
The issue of unfair contract terms is not an exclusively Indian 
phenomenon. A cursory look finds that Israel enacted the standard 
contract law in 1964, Sweden enacted Act Prohibiting Improper Contract 
Terms in 1971. In Germany there is the Law on Standard Contract Terms 
which came into effect in 1977. In Ireland there is Sale of Goods and 
Supply of Services Act, 1980. Luxembourg introduced a law identifying 
20 types of unfair term in 1983. Portugal developed law on general 
contract terms in 1985. The European Union enacted the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Directive in 1993 and Thailand enacted the unfair 
Contract Terms Act, 1997. 
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Now it is turn for tiie Government of India to respond and 
implement the 199 the Report of Law Commission of India on Unfair 
(Procedural and Substantive) Terms in Contract and implement the 
recommendations given in the Report. It is hoped that the 
recommendations of the Law Commission of India contained in 199*** 
Report-2006 will soon be implemented by the Central Government. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LAW COMMISSION 
OF INDIA 
Recommendations of the Law Commission of India: 
The Law Commission of India prepared and submitted lOS"^*^  
Report to the Government of India on Unfair Terms in Contract in 1984. 
The Report of the Commission which was concerned with standard form 
contracts imposing unfair and unreasonable terms upon unwilHng 
consumers or persons who had no bargaining power was forwarded to the 
then Minister of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India 
on 28"" July 1984. In 2006 the Commission forwarded 199'*' Report which 
was, on unfair (Procedural and Substantive) Terms in Contract, to the 
Government of India. This 199"^  Report was forwarded to the Minister of 
Law and Justice on 3 T' August 2006. 
A. One Hundred and Third Report: 
The One Hundred and Third Repot of the Commission focused on 
Unfair Terms in Contract. Although the recommendations made by the 
Commission in lOS"^  Report was concerned with standard form contracts 
imposing unfair and unreasonable terms on the individuals who are in a 
weaker bargaining position or have no bargaining power at all, the 
recommendations was wide, and did not restrict itself to any particular 
type of contract. 
The Commission in chapter 1 of the Report noted that in an 
industrial society, the individual craftsman slowly fades out, giving place 
to mass production of standardized products. Such standardization 
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ultimately leads to standardized contracts with customers, as in the case 
of large scale organization, which enter into innumerable contracts with 
individuals, it is very difficult to draw up a separate contract with each 
individual. The Commission observed that there are advantages of such 
contracts as economy and certainty. However, these standardized 
contracts are not real contracts as the characteristics, usually and 
traditionally associated with a contract, such as freedom to contract and 
consensus, are absent from these contracts. The standard terms and 
conditions prepared by one party are offered to the other on a "take it or 
leave it" basis. The main terms are put in large print, but the 
qualifications are buried in small print. As a result, these contracts turn 
out to be a case of big business enterprises legislating in a substantially 
authoritarian manner as they contain many wide exclusions and 
exemption clauses favourable to themselves. 
The law Commission discussed the true nature and the origin of 
standard form contracts and observed that these standardized contracts 
are really pretended contracts and have only name of contract. These 
contracts are produced by the printing press and the pen of the individual 
signing the dotted lines does not really represent his substantial 
agreement with the terms in it, but creates a fiction that he has agreed to 
such terms and the characteristics, usually and traditionally associated 
with a contract, such as freedom to contract and consensus, are absent 
from these so called contracts. 
The Law Commission in Chapter 2 of the Report observed that 
large business concerns get expert advice and introduce terms in the 
printed forms, which are most favourable to themselves. They contain 
many wide exclusion and exemption clauses favourable to the large 
enterprise. The Commission discussed the problem arising from such 
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contracts in standard form and the possibility of its misuse, and said the 
clauses are introduced, not always with the idea of imposing harsh terms 
as a result of superior bargaining power. 
The Law Commission further tried to explain the problem by way 
of citing some decided cases of different High Courts relating to carriers. 
The Commission cited the case oiIndian Airlines Corporation V. Jothaji 
Maniram^ in which the Madras High Court observed that a common 
carrier is a person who professes himself ready to carry goods for 
everybody. He is considered to be in position of an insurer with regard to 
the goods entrusted to him and so his liability his higher but when it is 
expressly stipulated between the parties that a carrier is not a common 
carrier that conclusively shows that the carrier is not liable as a common 
carrier and even assuming that the carrier would be deemed to be a 
common carrier or held liable as such, it was open to such a carrier to 
contract himself out of the liability as common carrier or fix the limit of 
liability. 
The law Commission also cited the case of Rukmanand V. Airway 
(India) Ltd. in which the Assam High Court held that the liability of the 
internal carrier by air, which is not governed by the Indian Carriage by 
Air Act, 1934, or by the Carriers Act, 1865, is governed by the English 
Common Law and not by the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Under the 
English Common Law, the carrier's liability is not that of a bailee only 
but that of an insurer of goods, so that the carrier is bound to account for 
loss or damage caused to the goods delivered to it for carriage, provided 
the loss or damage was not due to an act of God or King's enemies or to 
some inherent vice in the thing itself The Common Law, however, 
allows the carrier almost an equal freedciTi to limit its liability by any 
contract or the conditions under which the carrier accepted delivery of the 
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gods for carriage. The terms could be far reaching and indeed the party 
could claim exemption even if the loss was caused on account of 
negligence or misconduct of its servants or even if the loss or damage 
was caused by any other circumstances whatsoever, in consideration of a 
higher or lower amount of freight charged. The Law Commission 
observed that, howsoever amazing a contract of this kind may appear to 
be yet that seems to be the state of law as recognized by the Common 
Law of England and adopted by Courts in India. The clause in a contract 
of carriage by air giving complete immunity to the carrier from liability 
could not be impugned on the ground that it was hit by section 23 of the 
Indian Contract Act, 1872 because according to the High Court the Indian 
Contract Act had no application to the case nor could it be said to be 
opposed to public policy. 
The Law Commission also cited the case of Indian Airlines 
Corporation V. Madhuri Chaudhury' in which the Calcutta High Court 
dealt a case of a passenger travelling by air inside India. The plane 
crashed causing death of the passenger and his widow sued for damages. 
The air ticket exempted the carrier from liability on account negligence of 
the carrier or of the pilot or of other staff There was evidence that the 
conditions exempting the carrier were duly brought to the notice of the 
passenger and that he had every opportunity to know them. It was held by 
the Calcutta High Court that the obligation imposed by law on common 
carriers in India is not founded upon contract, but on the exercise of 
public employment for reward. The liability of common carriers in India 
is not affected by the Contract Act, 1872. Therefore, no question of 
testing the validity of this exemption clause with reference to section 23 
of the Contract Act would at all arise. The Contract Act does not profess 
to be a complete code dealing with the law relating to contracts. An 
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exemption clause of this kind was not hit by any section of the Contract 
Act, be it section 23 or any other section, because the Contract Act itself 
had no application. No Act applies to internal carriage by air. The 
Warsaw Convention did not apply, nor was there any Statute which 
prevented or limited the scope or content of such an exemption clause. 
Both in respect of Contract Act and tort the present exemption clause set 
out was good and valid and it legally excluded all liability for negligence. 
It could not be held bad under Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872. 
The Commission again cited a case of Singhal Transport V. 
Jasaram in which the Rajasthan High Court held that whenever on the 
face of the goods, ticket, words to the effect "For conditions see back" are 
printed, the person concerned as a matter of law, held to be bound buy the 
conditions subject to which the ticket is issued, whether he takes care to 
read the conditions if printed on the back or to ascertain them if it is 
stated on the back of the ticket where they are to be found. Where on the 
other hand, the words printed on the face of the ticket do not indicate that 
the ticket is issued subject to certain conditions but there are merely 
words to the effect "see back" then it is a question of fact whether or not 
the carrier did that, which was reasonably sufficient to give notice of the 
conditions to the person concerned. From the Law Commission's point of 
view the crucial question was that assuming that the individual person 
knew the conditions, if he wanted to change them could he negotiate and 
do so? If he cannot get the conditions changed or cannot negotiate in that 
condition how the Courts can come to his rescue? 
The Law Commission in chapter third of the Report cited the view 
of Shankaran Nair J of Madras High Court where the learned Judge in his 
dissenting judgment^ as early as 1909 expressed the opinion that section 
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23 of the Indian Contract Act hits such exemption clauses, but this view 
has been rejected by the High Courts in later decisions. 
The Law Commission also cited some cases in which the Courts 
valiantly tried to come to rescue the weaker party. In the case of 
Maddala. Thathaih V. Union of Indict the Madras High Court held that a 
clause in a contract for the supply of jaggery by the appellant to the 
Railway administration of the respondent, which empowered the 
administration to cancel the contract at any stage was void and 
unconscionable. This judgment of the Madras High Court was confirmed 
by the Supreme Court but on a different ground. The Supreme Court did 
not pronounce on the validity of the clause in the contract. The 
Commission also cited another case of Lily White V. Munuswamy^ in 
which the Madras High Court come across the matter of the laundry 
receipt of the appellant which contained the condition that in the event of 
loss or damage to the article given for washing, the customer would be 
entitled to claim only 50 per cent of the market price or the value of the 
article. The respondent's new saree was lost. The Court gave relief to the 
customer, holding that the condition would place a premium upon 
dishonesty inasmuch as it would enable the cleaner to purchase new 
garments at 50 per cent of the price and that would be not in public interest. 
The Commission was of the view that the Indian Contract Act, 
1872 in which position it is today is not adequate to meet the situation 
created by the frequent use of standard form contract in which there are 
exclusion and exemption clauses. The Commission said that the entire 
basis of a contract, that it was freely and voluntarily entered into by the 
parties with equal bargaining power, completely falls to the ground when 
it is practically impossible for one of the parties not to accept offered 
terms. In order to render freedom of contract a reality and particularly of 
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one whose bargaining power is less than that of the other party to the 
contract, various measures Hke labour legislation, money-lending laws 
and rent Acts have been enacted, but there is no general provision in the 
Contract Act itself under which Courts can give relief to the weaker 
party. The existing sections in the Contract Act in the opinion of the 
Commission seem to be incapable of meeting the mischief. 
The Law Commission analysed Section 16, 23 , 28 and 74 of the 
Indian Contract Act, 1872 and was of the view that the net result is that 
the Indian Contract Act, as it stands today, cannot come to the protection 
of the consumer when dealing with big business. Further, the ad hoc 
solutions given by Courts in response to their innate sense of justice 
without reference to proper yardstick in the form of a specific provision 
of statute law or known legal principle of law only produce uncertainty 
and ambiguity. 
The Law Commission in Chapter 4 of the Report considered the 
experience in other countries especially in United Kingdom and the 
United States of America. The Commission referred the observation of 
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Denning L.J. in John Lee Son V. Railway Executive where the learned 
Judge said that, "there is the vigilance of the Common Law which while 
allowing freedom of contract watches to see that it is not abused." 
Various principles based upon the fundamental concept enunciated 
by Denning L.J. have been utilized. The Commission cited the principles 
developed by the Common Law as: 
a. that there should be reasonable notice to the other party of the 
conditions; 
b. that the notice should be contemporaneo.us with the contract; 
c. that there should be no fundamental breach of contract; 
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d. that the contract would be strictly construed as against the 
bigger organization and in favour of the weaker party; and 
e. that the terms of a contract should not be unreasonable on the 
face of it. 
The Commission said that the Courts at Common Law resorted to 
what are known as "contra proferentem rule" and the important stratagem 
of the doctrine of fundamental breach which was propounded by Denning 
L.J. in Karsales V. Wallis^ where the learned Judge stated that, "It is now 
settled that exempting clauses of this kind, no matter how widely they are 
expressed, only avail the party when he is carrying out his contract in its 
essential respect. He is not allowed to use them as a cover for misconduct 
or indifference or to enable him to turn a blind eye to his obligations. 
They do not avail him when he is guilty of a breach which goes to the 
root of the contract." 
The Commission said this view has received a severe blow in the 
House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique's'^ case when Lord Reid observed 
that there is no indication that the Courts are to consider whether the 
exemption is fair in all the circumstances or is harsh and unconscionable 
or whether it was freely agreed by the customer ... it appears to me that 
its solution should be left to Parliament." Lord Wilberforce also said that 
if fundamental or total breach means a departure from the contract, the 
question will arise how great a departure and if it means supply of a 
different thing, the question will be how different. 
The Law Commission also discussed some relevant provisions of 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 of the U.K. The Commission 
considered that how the problem was dealt in the U.S.A. The 
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Commission cited section 575 of the Restatement of Law of Contract in 
the United States which provides: 
"Section 575 - 1. A bargain for exemption from liability for the 
consequences of a willfijl breach of duty is illegal and a bargain for 
exemption from liability or the consequences of negligence is illegal if: 
a. the parties are employer and employee and the bargain relates to 
negligent injury of the employee in the course of employment, 
or 
b. one of the parties is charged with a duty of public service, and 
the bargain relates to negligence in the performance of any part 
of its duty to the public, for which it has received or been 
promised compensation. 
2. A bargain by a common carrier or the other person charged with a 
duty of public service limiting to a reasonable agreed valuation of the 
amount of damages recoverable for injury to property by a non-willful 
breach of duty is lawfiil. 
The Commission also considered and cited section 2.302 of 
Uniform Commercial Code of the United States of America which 
provides: 
"Section 2.302 -
(i) if the Court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of 
the contract to have been unconscionable at t6he time it was 
made, the Court may refuse to enforce the contract or it may 
enforce the remainder of the contract without unconscionable 
clause or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause to avoid any unconscionable result. 
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(ii) When it is clamed or appears to the Court that the contract or any 
clause thereof may be unconscionable, the parties shall be 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its 
commercial setting, purpose and effect, to aid the Court in 
making the determination. 
The Law Commission recommended the addition of a new Chapter 
IV-A with a single section into the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Before 
making the recommendations, the Commission had invited public 
comments on its proposal to insert a new section 67-A into the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872. The Commission received replies from the Registrars 
of High Courts, Judges of High Courts and the legal Remembrancer and 
Secretary Law Departments of State Governments. The Registrar of 
Bombay High Court (Appellate side), the Legal Remembrancer and 
Secretary, Government of Haryana and the Law Department, Government 
of Orissa have agreed with the proposal. One Judge of a High Court has 
stated that the word "unconscionable" has acquired a definite meaning in 
the law of Contracts. The Law and Judiciary Department, Government of 
Maharashtra has, while agreeing with the proposal, suggested a more 
elaborate provision on the lines of the English law. 
The Commission took the note of the suggestions and was thankful 
for the response. However, the Commission felt it is better to go step by 
step and so had not thought of an elaborate enactment on the lines of 
English law in that Report. The Commission's view was that the only 
step that could be taken in our country to remedy the evils of unfair terms 
in standard form of contracts was to enact a provision into the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872 which would combine the advantages of English Law 
of Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 and Section 2.302 of Uniform 
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Commercial Code of U.S.A. The Commission did not think it appropriate 
and proper to enact a separate law as in U.K. 
Recommendation of the Commission: 
The Law Commission recommended the amendment of the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872 by inserting the following new Chapter having a 
single section. That Section reads as follows; 
"Chapter IV A 
Section 67A:(1) where the Court, on the terms of the contract or on 
the evidence adduced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that the 
contract or any part of it is unconscionable, it may refuse to enforce the 
contract or the part that it holds to be unconscionable. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of this section, 
a contract or part of it is deemed to be unconscionable if it exempts any 
party thereto from 
(a) the liability for willful breach of the contract, or 
(b) the consequences of negligence." 
Thus the Law Commission in its 103"* Report of 1984 opined that 
the existing sections of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 do not seem to be 
capable of meeting the mischief caused by unfair terms incorporated in 
contracts. It was stated that Indian Contract Act, 1872 as it stands today 
cannot come to the protection of a consumer who is dealing with big 
business. Further the ad hoc solutions given by the Courts in response to 
their innate sense of justice without reference to a proper yardstick in the 
form of a specific provision of statute law or known legal principle of law 
only produce uncertainty and ambiguity. This subject of unfair terms in 
standard form contracts, in view of its importance was taken up by the 
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Commission on its own. It recommended, after a study of the problem, 
the enactment of a provision in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 combining 
the advantages of the English law and the law of the U.S.A. on the 
subject. 
B. One Hundred and Ninety Ninth Report: 
The subject of "Unfair Terms in Contract" has attained grave 
importance in recent times not only in relation to consumer contracts but 
also in regard to the other contracts. In 1984 the Law Commission of 
India in its 103'^ '* Report on "Unfair Terms in Contract" submitted to the 
Ministry of Law and Justice, suggested that a single section 67A be 
inserted after the amendment in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 with two 
sub-sections invalidating exclusion of liability for negligence and for 
breach of contract. That section 67A, however, did not contain any 
general provision to deal with unfairness. 
The Law Commission noted that there have been significant 
developments since 1984. Detailed Statutes have been enacted or 
proposed and there are voluminous Reports of Law Commissions such as 
the Report of the Law Commission of England and Scotland (2C04), the 
Report of the South African Law Commission, 1998, the interim Report 
of the British Columbia Law Institute, 2005, the Discussion Paper of the 
Standing Committee of Officers of Consumer Affairs, Victoria 
(Australia), 2004, Report of the New Zealand Law Commission, 1990 
and Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1987 etc. 
In view of these developments in other countries, the Law 
Commission of India has taken up a detailed study of the subject suo 
motu. The Law Commission has referred to the Statutes and Law 
Commission Reports of various countries in relation to unfair terms and 
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prepared its 199'*^  Report and a draft of the proposed Bill annexed to the 
Report and submitted it to the Ministry of Law and Justice Government 
of India 31" August 2006. In the 199"" Report and the proposed Bill the 
Law Commission has defined "procedural unfairness" and "substantive 
unfairness" separately and have also provided separate guidelines for 
each of them. 
The Law Commission observed that the subject of "Unfair 
(Procedural and Substantive) Terms of Contract" has assumed great 
importance currently in the context of tremendous expansion in trade, 
business and consumer rights. In the last two decades, several countries 
have gone in for new laws on the subject in order to protect consumers 
and even smaller businessmen from bigger commercial entities. Several 
Law Commissions across the world have taken up the subject for study 
and recommended new legislations. The Law Commission of India in its 
lOS''^  Report (1984) on "Unfair Terms in Contract", had dealt with the 
subject and proposed insertion of section 67A into the Indian Contract 
Act, 1872. In as much as new concepts have been built into the subject in 
the last two decades, the Law Commission of India has taken up the 
subject afresh for further study in its 199 Report which was submitted to 
the Government of India in 2006. 
The main highlight of this Report is the consideration of Unfair 
Terms of Contract by separating the "procedural unfairness" and the 
"substantive unfairness" in the matter of contracts or their terms. In the 
statutes in force or Bills prepared by other Law Commissions, while it is 
recognized that contracts or their terms may be unfair either on account of 
"procedural unfairness" or on account of "substantive unfairness", the 
discussion as well as the provisions of the Statutes/Bil's do'»^ not treat 
these aspects separately. In fact, in some countries, while the distinction 
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is realized, there is no consideration of the concepts separately and in the 
opinion of the Law Commission of India, the result is that several 
sections combine "procedural unfairness" and "substantive unfairness." 
In this 199"^  Report the Law Commission tried to segregate the 
procedural and substantive unfair provisions of other countries in separate 
chapters. The Law Commission also kept the concepts separately in the 
proposed Bill annexed to this Report. 
Procedural Unfairness: 
In the opinion of the Law Commission "procedural unfairness" is 
found where there is unfairness in the manner in which the terms of the 
contract are arrived at or are actually entered into by the parties, or in the 
circumstances relating to the events immediately before the entering into 
the contract, or in the conduct of the parties, their relative position, or 
literary knowledge, or whether one party had imposed standard terms on 
the other hand or whether the terms were not negotiated. These and other 
circumstances relate to procedural unfairness. 
Substantive Unfairness: 
Substantive unfairness, in the opinion of the Law Commission is 
found where a term by itself may be either one-sided, harsh or oppressive 
or unconscionable and therefore unfair. One party may have excluded 
liability for negligence or for breach of contract or might have imposed 
terms on the other which are strictly not necessary or might have given to 
himself power to vary the terms of the contract unilaterally etc. Such 
terms could be unfair by themselves. 
The Law Commission observed that the Indian Contract Act, 1872 
h.as several provisions relating to voidable contracts. These provisions 
deal with undue influence, coercion, fraud, mistake and misrepresentation 
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etc. These provisions are indeed "procedural" provisions already 
contained in the Act. Likewise, the Contract Act deals with "void" 
contracts or "void" terms. These are "substantive" provisions already 
contained in the Act. Similarly, the Specific Relief Act, 1963 contains 
provisions for granting relief where there is procedural or substantive 
unfairness. 
The Law Commission in its 199"" Report of 2006 and the Bill 
annexed to this Report proposed to provide additional provisions of 
"procedural unfairness" and "substantive unfairness and remedies for 
removing such types of unfairness. These new remedies can be granted 
by the civil Courts, arbitral tribunals and the consumer fora under the 
Consumer Protection Act, 1986. 
The Law Commission of India referred the Joint Report of British 
and Scottish Law Commissions (2004) where it was stated that both 
"substantive unfairness" (the substance and effect of the term) and 
"procedural unfairness" (the circumstances existing at that time) must be 
taken into account. The Law Commission of India also referred that 
Goldring and others have complained that the Australian Unfair Terms 
Statutes have failed to distinguish between procedural and substantive 
unconscionability. The Discussion Paper, 2004 from Victorial (Australia) 
refers to the above statutes and stated that "the current regimes in 
Australia have created some confusion in practice because of their failure 
to distinguish between procedural and substantive unfairness. 
The Law Commission of India observed that its proposal for 
introducing unfair or unconscionable terms in India would not isolate the 
contracting parties nor inhibit foreign investment and trade. Such a 
concern was raised by number of respondents but was rejected in the 
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Report given by the South African Law Commission on "Unreasonable 
Stipulations In Contracts And The Rectification of Contracts (1998)" on 
the ground that when several countries have made laws to curb 
unreasonable contracts, South Africa would stand at a disadvantage if it 
did not have such laws. 
The Law Commission stated that in the light of above criticism in 
several countries it has felt that it is necessary. 
(1) to segregate the existing provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 
1872 and the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 in so far 
as they relate to viodable contracts and void contracts, respectively 
into "procedural provisions" and "substantive provisions", and 
(2) to add to these 
(a) a specific definition of "procedural unfairness" and provide 
specific guidelines forjudging if there is procedural unfairness, and 
(b) a specific definition of "substantive unfairness" and provide 
specific guidelines forjudging if there is substantive unfairness. 
(3) to list remedies which can be granted to relieve parties from 
procedural and substantive unfairness. 
In Chapter two of this Report the Law Commission considered the 
present state of law regarding unfair and unconscionable terms in India 
and said that at present, contracts could be declared void or voidable in a 
Court of law if it falls under one or other of the provisions of the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872 which make such terms void or voidable. There is, as 
of today, no general statutory provision in the Indian Contract, 1872, or 
the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 whereby the Courts can give relief to the 
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consumer/weaker party by holding such terms in contracts as void on the 
ground of their being unreasonable or unconscionable or unfair. 
The Law Commission considered and analysed some sections of 
the Indian Contract Act, 1872 such as Sections 16, 23, 27 and 28. It was 
observed by the Commission that one of the relevant provisions of the 
Indian Contract Act, 1872 which refers to the inequality of bargaining 
power between the parties and of unfair advantage of one party over the 
other, is contained in section 16 dealing with "undue influence." The 
situation is a mix up of procedural and substantive unfairness. The 
Commission said that Section 16(3) of the Contract Act, 1872 refers to 
the aspect of burden of proof in "unconscionable transactions" induced by 
undue influence. It deals with unconscionability which is an aspect of 
"substantive" unfairness but links it up with "procedural" unfairness of 
domination of will. It must be noted that Section 16(3) does not enable 
the Court, to strike down the unconscionable terms, but only enables 
raising a presumption. 
The Law Commission then discussed illegality and public policy 
under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The Commission said 
this section deals with "substantive" matters which invalidable a contract 
but does not refer to "unconscionability" specifically. The section does 
not speak of "unconscionability" as one of the grounds. In each of these 
cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful 
provided in Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872. Every agreement of 
which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. This Section 
provides that the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless 
it is forbidden by law or unless they are such a nature that if permitted 
would defeat the provision of any law; or are fraudulent or in^'olvcor 
imply, injury to the person or property of another, or the Court regard it 
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as immoral or opposed to public policy. The last clause in the section 23 
thus declares that no man can lawfully do that which is opposed to public 
policy. It comprehends the protection and promotion of public welfare. It 
is a principle of law under which freedom of contract or private dealings 
are restricted by the law for the good of the community. 
The Commission said that Indian Contract Act, 1872 does not 
define the expression "public policy" or what is meant by being "opposed 
to public policy". From the very nature of things the expression "public 
policy", "opposed to public policy" or "contrary to public policy" are 
incapable of precise definition. 
Unlike in cases falling under Section 16 of the Contract Act which 
permits a party to avoid a contract, Section 23 enables a Court to hold 
clauses opposed to law or public policy, to be void ab initio. 
The Law Commission cited the case of Gherulal V. Mahadeo Das 
(AIR 1959 S.C. 781). The Commission said that orthodox view on public 
policy in India was explained nearly fifty years ago by Subba Rao J (as he 
then was). In this case the Supreme Court cautioned against expansion of 
grounds in practice though in theory, they could be expanded. The 
Supreme Court had observed that, "Public policy or the policy of law is 
an elusive concept. It has been described as an "untrustworthy guide," 
"variable quality," "unruly horse" etc., the primary duty of the Court of 
law is to enforce a promise which the parties have made and to uphold the 
sanctity of contracts which form the basis of society; but in certain cases 
the Court may relieve them of their duty on a rule founded on what is 
called the public policy.... Though it is permissible for the Courts to 
expand public policy and apply them to different situations, it should be 
invoked in clear and incontestable cases of harm to the public; though the 
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heads are not closed and though theoretically it may be permissible to 
evolve a new head under exceptional circumstances of changing world, it 
is advisable in the interest of stability of society not to make any attempt 
to discover new head in these days. 
The Commission further observed that, however, a more flexible 
and liberal approach was advocated by the Apex Court in the case of 
Central Inland Water Transport (AIR 1986 SC. 1571) where the Court 
observed that, "public policy is not the policy of a particular Government, 
it connotes some matter which concerns the public good and public 
interest. The concept of what is for the public good or in the public 
interest or what would be injurious or lawful to the public good or the 
public interest has varied from time to time. 
The Law Commission in its 103'^ '' Report (1984) had considered the 
question, whether there was a possibility of striking down an 
"unconscionable bargain" by resorting to "public policy" under section 
23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The Commission was, however, of 
the view that Section 23 was not of help in meeting the situation. It also 
observed that Courts have held (as he law in 1984 was) that the heads of 
public policy cannot be extended to a new ground in general, with certain 
exceptions, and that the terms of a contract exempting one party from all 
liability was not opposed to public policy. 
The Law Commission in its 199"^  Report (2006) also analysed 
Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and said that Section 27 
concerns a special category of contracts which the law treats as void, 
namely, an agreement by which any one is restrained from exercising a 
lawful profession, trade or business of any kind and is to that extent, the 
agreement is void. However, in India (unlike U.K.), an agreement noi to 
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carry on, within specified local limits, a business similar to the business 
of which goodwill is sold, can be enforced, provided the limits of the 
restraints are reasonable. The Commission observed that an agreement 
which unnecessarily curtails the freedom of a person to carry on a trade is 
against public policy. Restraining a person from carrying on a trade 
generally aims at avoiding competition and has a monopolistic tendency 
and this is both against an individual's interest as well as the interest of 
the society and thus such restraints are discouraged by law. The 
agreement is void whether it imposes total restraint or partial restraint. 
However, in U.K., all agreements in restraints of trade are void unless 
there is some justification for the restraint which could make it 
reasonable. If the restraint was reasonable in the interest of the 
contracting parties and also in the interest of the public, the agreement 
would be valid. The Indian law however, is stricter. The agreement would 
be valid if it fell within any of the statutory or judicially created 
exceptions. An agreement which is not covered by any one of the 
recognized exceptions would be void. 
The Commission also cited the case of Gujarat Bottling Ltd. V. 
Coca Cola (1995) 5 SCC 545, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India 
pointed out the difference in the position of law in regard to restraint of 
trade in India and that in England. The rule now in England is that the 
restraints of trade whether general or partial, may be good if they are 
reasonable and necessary for the purpose of freedom of trade. In India, 
the question of reasonableness of restraint is outside the purview of 
Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The Courts have only to 
consider the question whether the "Contract" itself is or is not of restraint 
of trade. 
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The Commission also analysed the Section 28 of the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872 and discussed the ouster of jurisdiction of Courts to 
adjudicate. It said that Section 28 of the Contract Act states that the 
agreements absolutely in restraint of legal proceedings is void. Section 28 
will come into play when the restriction imposed upon the right to sue is 
"absolute" in the sense that the parties are wholly precluded from 
pursuing their legal remedies in the ordinary tribunals. 
The Commission cited the case of Hakam Singh V. Gammon 
(India) Ltd. (AIR 1971 S.C. 740) and said that a partial restriction will be 
valid as observed by the Apex Court. In this case a clause in the 
agreement between the parties provided that "the Court of law in the city 
of Bombay alone shall have jurisdiction to the adjudicate thereupon." The 
plaintiff filed a suit at Varanasi (U.P.) but the same was dismissed in 
view of the above stated agreement. The Court held that the agreement 
was not opposed to public policy and it did not contravene section 28 of 
the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and therefore the suit filed at Varanasi was 
rightly dismissed. 
The Commission observed that under section 28 of the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872, the citizen has the right to have his legal position 
determined by the ordinary tribunals, except in the case of contacts to 
refer to arbitration disputes which may arise or which have already arisen. 
Section 28 affirms the Common Law and its provisions appear to embody 
a general rule recognized in the English Courts which prohibits all 
agreements purporting to oust jurisdiction of the Courts. Section 28 was 
amended by Indian Contract (Amendment) Act 1996 which came into 
effect in 1997. The amendment gave effect to suggestions made in the 
97'*^  Report of the Law Commission of India on "Section 28, Indian 
Contract Act: Prescriptive Clauses in Contract (1984). 
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The Commission said that the Supreme Court laid down that it is 
not open to the parties by agreement to confer jurisdiction on a Court 
which it does not possess under the code. But where two Courts or more 
have jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure to try a suit or 
proceedings, an agreement between the parties that the dispute between 
them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. 
Such agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Indian Contract 
Act, 1872. 
The Law Commission also einalysed Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and 
observed that this Act creates a large number of rights duties and 
liabilities. These include the warranties and guarantees implied by the 
law, i.e. the Sale of Goods Act. But Section 62 of that Act permits 
exclusion of these rights, duties or liabilities by express clause or on 
account of the course of dealings between the parties, or by usage, if the 
usage is such as to bind both parties to the contract. The Law 
Commission said "in our view, it becomes necessary to examine Section 
62 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and consider whether, in the present 
context of substantive unfairness, such exclusion should be deemed to be 
unfair." 
The Law Commission discussed about the judicial review of 
contracts entered by an authority which is a "State" within the meaning of 
Article 12 of the Constitution of India and the application of Article 14 of 
the Constitution. The Commission observed that apart from sections 16, 
23, 27 and 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 the High Courts and the 
Apex Court have invoked Article 14 of the Constitution of India to strike 
down certain unreasonable terms of contract entered into by the 
Government or Public Sector Undertakings or Statutory bodies which fall 
within the meaning of the word a "State" in Article 12 of the Constitution 
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of India. The Courts exercised the power of judicial review under Articles 
226 and 32 of the Constitution of India. The Courts have confined the 
exercise of such power to strike down clauses in public service 
employment contracts. However, the Courts have declared that they 
would not extend this principle to strike down clauses in commercial 
contracts. 
The Law Commission observed that it has to be noted that the 
above stated method of invoking Article 14 of the Constitution of India in 
the last two decades by the Supreme Court was not available when the 
103'^ '^  Law Commission Report was submitted in 1984. The question 
naturally arises as to why a similar wider beneficial statutory provision 
should not be treated as necessary to protect parties those who enter into 
commercial contracts with "non-state" entities though Article 14 is not 
applicable. The Commission pointed out that, however, there are certain 
legislation apart from the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which prevent one 
party to a contract from taking undue or unfair advantage of the other. 
Instances of this type of legislation are the Usurious Loans Act, 1918, 
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Consumer (Protection) Act, 1986, the 
Competition Act, 2002 and the Specific Relief Act, 1963 but these Acts 
deals with specific situation or special types of contracts whereas, in this 
Report the Commission pointed out that it has considered the need for 
general provisions covering all types of contracts relating to unfairness. 
The Law Commission then analysed and considered the above Acts 
in detail and it was of the view that the provisions of the Indian Contract 
Act, 1872 and other existing laws, which the Commission considered in 
detail, are not sufficient to meet the problems of today. The Law 
Commission was in agreement with its earlier 103"* Report (1984) where 
it was observed that the provision of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and 
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other laws are not sufficient to meet the problems of today. In this 199^ 
Report it further said, "not only that, we feel further that we have to 
introduce more provisions than were contemplated in the 103'^ '* Report 
(1984). 
The Law Commission in Chapter III of the 199'*^  Report considered 
the use and misuse of the standard form contracts and their nature. It 
observed that, the device of a new type of contract i.e. standard form 
contract is very common in today's complex structure of giant 
corporations with vast infrastructural organization. The use of standard 
terms and conditions is not confined only to contracts in commercial 
transactions, but contracts with public authorities multinationals 
corporations or in banking business etc. The Commission observed that 
there are also dangers inherent in standard form contracts. The parties to 
the contract are not on equal terms and the one party to the contract signs 
on the dotted line having no opportunity to negotiate over the terms and is 
also unfamiliar with the terms or language employed by the other party to 
the contract and also freedom of contract and consensus ad idem are 
significantly absent in these standard form contracts. 
The Law Commission analysed the views of the Apex Court on 
contracts by Government and Public Institutions and the Article 14 of the 
Constitution of India and the Judicial Review under Article 226 of the 
Constitution. It observed that yet another angle to these contracts arises 
not only from the traditional aspect of consent or unconscionability, but 
also from the point of arbitrariness, where the contract is entered into by a 
department of Government or a public sector undertaking or the other 
public body. Here in as much as the party so stipulating is a Government 
or public sector undertaking, the question can arise if the aggrieved party 
can resort to Article 14 of the constitution of India and the "arbitrariness" 
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doctrine laid down in Royappa's case (AIR 1974 SC 555). But, here 
parties could go to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution 
or under Article 32 to the Supreme Court. While views have been 
expressed particularly in the Central Inland Water Transport case (AIR 
1986 SC 1571), and in Delhi Transport case (AIR 1991 SC 101), that 
such unreasonable clauses in contracts of employment could be struck 
down by the Courts, it has, however, been stated in these very cases by 
the Supreme Court that the Court is not prepared to extend the principle 
of "arbitrariness" to "commercial contracts" in the same manner as it has 
extended the principle to terms imposed unilaterally by a statutory 
employer on its employee. 
The Commission further said that apart from contracts in standard 
form, there may be individual contracts of an ad hoc nature, entered into 
between individual parties, which are not like multi-national companies 
or big commercial houses within India where one-sided or unreasonable 
conditions may be imposed in situations where the bargaining power is 
unequal. Even in such cases, some power must be given to the Courts to 
remedy the situation. Therefore, the 'unfairness', if any, in such standard 
form contracts falls for consideration. 
The Law Commission in Chapter IV of its 199'^  Report analysed 
and considered the judicial pronouncements in India on unfair terms. It 
observed that the Courts in India has, in several cases come to the rescue 
of the parties but in majority of cases arising out of inequality of 
bargaining the weaker party enters into contracts which are not on equal 
terms, the Courts may not be able to help because all such cases do not 
fall within the four comers of sections 16, 23 or 27 of the Indian Contract 
Act, 1872. 
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The Commission analysed the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Central Inland Water Transport's case (AIR 1986 SC 1571) and said that 
the unfairness of contractual terms by "authorities" which fall within the 
meaning of the word "State" in Article 12 of the Constitution of India 
figured in several service matters before the Supreme Court. The 
irrationality or arbitrariness of clauses in such contracts was considered in 
the context of Article 14. The Apex Court for the first time in 1986 made 
an attempt in this case to broaden the applicability of unconscionability 
outside the boundaries laid down by Section 16 of the Indian Contract 
Act, 1872. the Court emphasized on the requirement of "reasonableness" 
in the terms of the contract by discussing three principles namely -
"unconscionability," "distributive justice and unreasonableness" and 
"inequality of bargaining power" and considered the issue under three 
headings. In this case Justice Madon considered the development of law 
and held that an instrumentality of the state cannot impose 
unconstitutional conditions in service rules vis-a-vis its employer to 
terminate the services of a permanent employee without reasons merely 
on a three months notice and found the clause to be unconscionable, 
unfair, unreasonable and against public policy and public interest and 
thus violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 
The Law Commission referred the decision of the Supreme Court 
in the case of Uptron India Ltd. V. Shammi Bhan (AIR 1998 SC 1681) 
where it was said that is now well settled that the services of a permanent 
employee whether employed by the Government or Government 
Company or Government Instrumentality or Statutory Corporation or any 
other Authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of 
India cannot be terminated abjiiptly and arbitrarily either by giving him a 
month or three month's notice or pay in lieu thereof or even without 
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notice, notwithstanding, that there may be a stipulation to that effect 
either in the contract of service or in the certified standing orders. 
The Law Commission also cited the decisions in the cases of Delhi 
Transport Corporation (AIR 1991 SC 101), West Bengal State Electricity 
Board V. Desh Bandhu Ghosh (1985(3) SCC 116), L.I.C. of India V. 
Consumer Education and Research Centre (1995(5) SCC 482) and Pawan 
Alloys Pvt. Ltd. V. U.P.S.E.B. (AIR 1997 SC 3910), and concluded, "it 
will be seen that the Apex Court either applied Article 14 of the 
Constitution of India in cases where unreasonable term were imposed by 
any entity which was a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 or 
applied Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The only substantive 
development was that the Court was not confined to existing heads of 
public policy. Though in certain cases it was observed that Article 14 
could not be applied to commercial contracts entered by entities which 
were a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of 
India, in some cases Section 23 was invoked against such entities to grant 
relief. The various decisions rendered by the Court would reveal that the 
above procedures were adopted because the Court was otherwise 
handicapped in giving relief because of the absence of a general power 
given by a Statute to strike down "unreasonable clauses." 
The Law Commission in Chapter V of its 199'^  Report took a 
comparative study of the laws, on unfair terms in Contract, of a few 
countries including U.K., U.S.A. and Australia. The Commission 
observed that the law relating to unfairness, arising from inequality of 
bargaining power was developed around the globe, as a separate ground 
on which contracts can be set aside. Classical legal theory viewed 
standard form contracts no differently than individually negotiated 
contracts, and enforced them according to their terms, no matter how 
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harsh or unjust the term were. Under the classical theory, Courts created a 
conclusive presumption that the signing party understood the terms. This 
result was based on the "duty to read" doctrine, which was also 
developed out of the paradigm of individually negotiated contracts. 
However, legal scholars and Courts recognized the fundamental 
differences between standard form contracts and the classical models of 
individually negotiated contracts. The Commission cited the observation 
of Professor Karl Llewellyn (Book Review, 52 Harvard Law Review 700, 
704 (1939) where the learned author noted the importance of protecting 
the weaker party's reasonable expectations when interpreting standard 
form contracts. 
The Law Commission then discussed the unconscionability and 
equity jurisdiction of the Courts in the United Kingdom. The Commission 
observed that there is long established jurisdiction to set aside harsh and 
unconscionable bargains. Courts of equity, in the eighteenth century often 
set aside express contractual provisions on grounds of unconscionability. 
However, nearly all these cases fell into certain special classes, that is 
mortgages and bonds and the sale of mortgage of revisionary interest. The 
equity jurisdiction was used to be unduly exercised to reopen all bargains. 
The equity jurisdiction was invoked to setting aside grossly unfair 
contracts entered into by poor and ignorant persons. Towards the end of 
nineteenth century, the equitable jurisdiction fell into disuse partly 
because conditions changed and partly because the Moneylenders Act of 
1900. The Law Commission discussed the unconscionability at Common 
Law in the United Kingdom and also cited the cases of Lloyds Bank Ltd. 
V. Bundy (1974 3 All ER 757, A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. V. 
Macaulay (1974 3 All ER 6 1 6 \ ^ d Levison V. Patent Steam Carpet 
cleaning Co. Ltd. (1977 3 All ER 490). The Law Commission analysed 
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the legislations of the United Kingdom. The Commission discussed the 
basic features of Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 (UCTA) and the basic 
features of Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, 1999 
(UTCCR). The Commission also discussed the joint Report of the Law 
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission (2004) on unfair terms in 
contract where the Law Commission took up the task to consider as how 
to replace these above two legislation i.e. UCTA, 1977 and UTCCR, 
1999 with a single unified Act that will set out the law on unfair contract 
terms in clear and accessible way. The Commission set out 
recommendations for a unified to apply to consumer contracts, for 
business contracts in general, and extending the wider controls of the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations to Contracts with small 
business. 
The Law Commission in its 199"^  Report also discussed unfairness 
in regard to specific performance of contract terms at Common Law, in 
chapter VI. The Law Commission said that under Common Law, if a term 
is unfair, the Court may exercise discretion not to enforce the terms or the 
contract but the Court cannot declare the terms or contact as void. Under 
Common Law "fairness" was always a necessary condition for specific 
performance of contracts. The Commission cited the observation of Lord 
Hardwicke in the case of Buston V. Lista (3 Atk 386) where the learned 
Judge said that, "Nothing is more established in this Court than that every 
agreement of this kind ought to be certain, fair and just in all its parts. If 
any of those ingredients are wanting in the case, this Court will not decree 
specific performance." 
The Law Commission referred the celebrated commentary of Fry 
on "Specific Performance" (6"" Ed. 1921) (Indian Reprint 1997) which 
deals exclusive (para 387) with want of Fairness in the contract in 
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Chapter V. The learned author says that there are many instances in 
which, "though there is nothing that actually amounts to fraud, there is 
nevertheless a want of that equality and fairness in the contract which, as 
we have seen, are essential in order that the Court may exercise its 
extraordinary jurisdiction in specific performance. 
In Chapter VII of the 199* Report the Law Commission considered 
the need to have procedural and substantive divide. The Commission said 
that several authors have criticized existing statutes as not having met the 
challenge of dealing with "procedural unfairness" and "substantive 
unfairness" separately and in not defining these words nor in providing 
separate guidelines forjudging each of them. Most statutes do refer in the 
same sections to substantive and unfairness aspect of the contract, though 
there is no independent treatment. Courts are, therefore, unable to focus 
upon these issues in depth or lay down clear-cut principles. In this VII 
Chapter the Law Commission dealt with the criticism in regard to the 
absence of separate statutory focus on these two concepts. 
The Law Commission observed, "it appears to us that if any 
legislation is to be more effective and realistic, it is necessary to make 
separate provisions dealing with "procedural and substantive" unfairness. 
We are aware that in certain quarters it has been considered that it is 
difficult to put these concepts in separate compartments in a statute but 
we do not agree. We have not found any difficulty. In fact, as pointed by 
several authors, the focus should not be confined only to "procedural 
unfairness" and we must move forward to deal with "substantive 
unfairness also rather than merely state that where parties have signed 
contracts with the eyes wide open, if such contracts contained a term 
which was unfair in itself, the par*^ y h^d himself or itself to blame. This 
was the method of interpretation of contracts at a time when principles of 
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substantive unfairness were not effectively developed. Today, we find in 
practice that there are a large number of substantively unfair terms in 
different types of contracts i.e. contracts or terms which are by 
themselves unfair. Therefore, the law must be reformed to be able to 
stretch its hands to rectify such substantive unfairness." 
The Law Commission in Chapter VIII of its 199'^  Report had a 
closer focus on the procedural unfairness in various countries, though 
they have not been expressly segregated in any particular statute. The 
Commission referred Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 of U.K. and 
observed that this Act came forward with a test of "reasonableness" in 
Section 11. Section 11(1) stated that the term must be "fair and 
reasonable" having regard to the circumstances which were or ought 
reasonably to have been, known to or in contemplation of the parties 
when the contract was made. This related obviously to "procedural" 
unfairness. The Commission ftirther said that Schedule 2 of the UCTA, 
1977 also contain provisions which deal partly with procedural and partly 
with substantive unfairness though they are mixed up. Those that refer to 
"procedural" unfairness are clauses (a), (b) and (c). Clause (a) refers to 
the strength of the bargaining position, clause (b) as to whether the 
customer received inducement to agree to a term, and clause (c) to 
whether the customer knew or ought to have known of the existence of 
the term. 
The Commission also analysed the Unfair Terms Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999 (UTCCR) of U.K. and observed that 
Regulation 5 and 6 deals with procedural unfairness while schedule 2 of 
the Regulation refers to several guidelines to be considered while judging 
unfairness but they all deal with substantive unfairness. 
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The Law Commission cited tlie new Draft Bill 2004 of U.K. and 
Scottish Law Commission annexed to the Law Commission Report which 
deals with several matters concerning procedural unfairness. The 
Commission said that sub-section (2) to (4) of Section 4 of the Bill 
required that in respect of "consumer" contracts, the subject matter and 
the price are unfair if they are not transparent and as reasonably expected 
by the consumer. These are procedural safeguards. Section 14 of the Bill 
refers to the "fair and reasonable test" and contains the manner in which 
both "procedural" and "substantive" aspects of unfairness have to be 
tested. Section 14(4)(1) refers to procedural aspects. As far as the time at 
which fairness or reasonableness is to be reckoned, para 3.96 of the 
Report reiterates that it is the time of the contract that is relevant and one 
has to take into account the substance and effect of the terms in all the 
circumstances of the contract. 
A. INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872 (Procedural Unfairness): 
The Law Commission said that the Indian Contract Act, 1872 refers to 
several aspects of procedural unfairness. Section 13 requires consent of 
all the parties to a contract for its formation. 
Section 14 deals with "free consent" and states that a "consent" is 
free where it is not caused by 
1. Coercion, as defined in Section 15, or 
2. Undue influence, as defined in Section 16, or 
3. Fraud, as defined in Section 17, or 
4. Misrepresentation, as defined in Section 18, or 
5. Mistake, subject to Secdon 20, 21 and 22, or 
6. Undue influence as defined in Section 19-A. 
299 
Section 19 states that contracts vitiated by coercion, fraud or 
misrepresentation are voidable. In this Section, "undue influence was 
initially there but was deleted by Section 3 of Act 6 of 1889 and under the 
same Act of 1889, Section 19A was inserted to say that any contract 
vitiated by "undue influence" may be set aside either wholly or subject to 
conditions. Section 20 states that a contract is "void" if both parties are 
under a mistake as a matter of fact. 
These are provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which deal 
with "procedural" unfairness. 
B. INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872 (Substantive Unfairness): 
The Law Commission said that there are several provisions of the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872 which deal with substantive unfairness of the terms of 
a contract. There are terms which are by themselves unfair. 
Section 10 states that all agreements are contracts if they are made 
by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful 
consideration and with a lawful object and are not expressly declared to 
be void. 
Section 23 says that the consideration or object of an agreement is 
lawful, unless it is forbidden by or is of such a nature, that, if permitted, it 
would defeat the provisions of law; or is fraudulent or involves or implies 
injury to the person or property of another, or the Court regard it as 
immoral, or opposed to public policy. Such agreements whose object or 
consideration is unlawftil are void. 
The Law Commission also referred to Section 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 
29, 30 and 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and said that these are the 
provisions in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which can be said to deal 
with substantive unfairness. 
300 
C. SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963 (Procedural Unfairness): The 
Law Commission said that principles of "fairness" are the basis of 
Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which deals with the 
"Discretion as to decreeing specific performance." Discretion, says sub-
section 1 is not to be arbitrary but sound and reasonably guided by 
judicial principles. Subsection (2) enumerates certain guidelines in which 
the Court may properly exercise not to decree specific performance. 
Clauses (a) and (c) of sub-section (2) of section 20 deal with procedural 
unfairness, 
D. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (Substantive Unfairness): Law 
Commission said that there are two provisions in section 20 of the 
Specific Relief Act, 1963 in part of clause (a) and in clause (b) which 
relate to substantive unfairness and they are: 
Under clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20. 
(a) where the terms of the contract are such that the contract though 
not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant: 
or under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 
(b) when the performance of the contract would involve some 
hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee whereas its non-
performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff 
The Law Commission observed that provisions of Indian law as to 
procedural and substantive unfairness are not sufficient and it is, 
therefore, proposed to deal with certain new provisions regarding 
unfairness, both procedural and substantive, which require to be 
incorporated into the statute law, in addition to what are contained in the 
Contract Act, 1872 and the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 
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The Law Commission in cliapter XI of its 1QQ''' Report discussed 
and justified the need to define "General Procedural Unfairness" and 
General Substantive Unfairness under the Indian law. It said that no 
country in its legislation has so far enacted procedural and substantive 
aspects of unfairness distinctively in its statutes. Several writers have 
stated that legislations have to focus on these aspects separately than to 
make a "mish mash" of both in each section. 
The Law Commission gave a brief sketch of how it wants to go 
about such segregation in the proposed Bill. The Commission referred to 
existing "procedural" provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and of 
Specific Relief Act, 1963 to be "listed" in the Bill. The Commission said 
that there are several sections of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which deal 
with "voidable contracts" (procedural unfairness) that are: 
(a) section 15 which deal with coercion, 
(b) section 16 which deal with undue influence, 
(c) section 17 which deal with fraud, 
(d) section 18 which deal with misrepresentation, 
(e) section 19A which deal with undue influence. 
Similarly, so far as procedural provisions are concerned, the 
Specific Relief Act, 1963, contains some provisions which refer to the 
manner of enforcement of voidable contracts in 
(a) second part of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 
(b) clause (6) of sub-section (2) of section 20 
(c) clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 27. 
The Law Commission deliberately used the word "listed" because 
it proposed just to highlight the "procedural" or "substantive" nature of 
the provisions of these two statutes. The Law Commission did not 
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propose to interfere with them or involve them in the "unfairness" 
principle. It merely proposed to refer to these as "procedural provisions." 
The Law Commission is of the view that the existing provisions of 
the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the Specific Relief Act, 1963 are not 
exhaustive. The Commission said that there can be other situations than 
those in these Acts where, due to the conduct of the parties or the 
circumstances under which the terms of the contract are arrived at or the 
other contract is entered into which may have resulted in some unfair 
advantage or unfair advantage to one of the parties. The Commission 
proposed to describe as "general procedural unfairness" in the Bill. 
The Law Commission said, "the provisions of the Specific Relief 
Act, 1963 are again not exhaustive. In fact dealing with section 20 of that 
Act, the Supreme Court in Sardar Singh V. Krishna Devi, AIR 19095 SC 
491, it stated that the circumstances specified in section 20 are only 
illustrative and not exhaustive. The Court would take into consideration 
the circumstances in each case, the conduct of the parties and the 
respective interest under the Contract Act." It further said if the provision 
of the Contract Act 1872 are not exhaustive on "procedurally unfairness", 
it follows that the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 are equally 
not exhaustive. 
The Law Commission proposed that the law relating to voidable 
contracts under the Contract Act, 1872 and the Specific Relief Act, 1963 
need not be disturbed, it will be necessary and will be permissible to add 
new provisions for purpose of "general procedural unfairness." 
The Law Commission referred to the Black's Law Dictionary, f 
Ed. (1999) where "procedural unconscionability" is defined as under: 
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"Procedural unconscionability" as unconscionability by resulting 
from improprieties in contract formation (such as oral misrepresentation 
or disparities in bargaining position) rather than from the terms of the 
contract itself This type of unconscionability suggests that there was no 
meeting of the minds. 
The Law Commission said that existing "substantive" provisions of 
the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the Specific Relief Act, 1963 are not 
exhaustive and several sections of the Contract Act that are substantive in 
nature and they refer to "void" contracts are sections 10, 20, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 56. These are to be listed in the proposed Bill. The 
Law Commission proposed, without modifying these provisions, to just 
"list" them as examples of the class of contracts which are substantive. 
Likewise, in the Specific Relief Act, 1963, there is again need without 
disturbing the provisions, to classify certain provisions as relating to the 
class of contracts which are "substantive" that are contained in Sections 
18 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 
The Law Commission again referred to Black's Law Dictionary 
where the "substantive unconscionability" is defined as: 
"Unconscionability resulting from actual contract terms that are 
unduly harsh, commercially unreasonable, and grossly unfair given the 
existing circumstances." 
The Law Commission proposed to list existing substantive 
provisions of the two Acts, Indian Contract Act 1872 and Specific Relief 
Act, 1963 merely as "substantive provisions." The Commission also 
proposed to have a new and separate provision-which deals with "general 
substantive unfairness." To supplement the same the Commission 
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proposed another section which will give guidelines which have to be 
considered for deciding if a contract or term is "substantively unfair." 
The Law Commission proposed to define "general substantive 
unfairness" (without prejudice to the specific provisions of the Indian 
Contract Act 1872 and the Specific Relief Act, 1963) in the following 
words: 
"a contract or a term thereof is substantively unfair it such contract 
or the term thereof is in itself harsh, oppressive or unconscionable to one 
of the parties." 
In the XII and last chapter of its 199"" Report (2006) the Law 
Commission discussed the recommendations for the Draft Bill 2006 on 
unfair (Procedural and Substantive) Terms in Contract. The Law 
Commission proposed to bring in new provisions to deal with 
"procedural" and "substantive" unfairness, and that at the same time the 
Commission did not want to disturb the existing provisions of the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872 and the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 
The Law Commission in fact proposed to merely list existing procedural 
and substantive provisions of these Acts for the purpose of mere 
classification and did not want to disturb them. 
Initially, the Law Commission proposed to give certain general 
definitions of "procedural unfairness" and "substantive unfairness" but so 
far as the existing procedural provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, 
and the Specific Relief Act, 1963 are concerned the Commission did not 
use the word "unfairness" lest it may be wrongly understood that the 
existing provisions are subject to new definitions. Instead the Law 
Commission proposed just to describe the respective provisions as merely 
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"procedural" and "substantive" and avoided the word "unfairness" while 
referring to these sections. 
In view of the development in other countries the Law Commission 
of India has taken up a detailed study of the subject suo motu. The 
Commission referred to the Statutes and Law Commission Reports of 
various countries in relation to unfair terms. 
The Law Commission is of the view that the law on unfair terms 
will not affect foreign investment. It observed that our business and 
commerce will be put to serious disadvantage if we do not have a law 
regulating unfair terms of contract. 
The Law Commission in its 199**^  Report (2006) discussed in detail 
the existing provisions as regards voidable and void contracts under the 
Indian Contract Act, 1872, as well as non-enforcement of contracts where 
there is unfairness or hardship, as contained in the Specific Relief Act, 
1963. The Law Commission proposed that the provisions of these two 
statutes need not be disturbed. The Commission proposed, in addition, 
separate set of general provisions to deal with unfair terms of contracts. It 
said that in view of the need to protect consumers and particularly to 
grant protection from the disadvantages of extensive introduction of 
standard terms of contracts which are one-sided, it has become necessary 
to evolve general principles regulating unfairness in contracts. It is in this 
area that there are new legislations in other countries. These new laws on 
unfairness elsewhere contain several important provisions intended to 
protect the weaker party against the stronger. Further, those statutes also 
contain a long list of guidelines to adjudge unfairness. 
The Law Commission observed that it has become necessary to 
provide additional provisions in India for redressal against unfair terms of 
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contracts, apart from the existing provisions contained in the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872 and Specific Relief Act, 1963. While a law to deal 
with unfairness in contracts is necessary, the more important aspect is the 
division of unfairness into "procedural" and "substantive" unfairness. 
Such a division has not been done in any country so far, but there are 
several articles by jurists that such a division is necessary. 
General '^procedural'' unfairness and guidelines thereto: 
The Law Commission in Section in Section 5 of the proposed Draft 
Bill 2006 defined the procedural unfairness" as a contract or a term 
thereof is procedurally unfair if it has resulted in an unjust advantage or 
unjust disadvantage to one party on account of the conduct of the other 
party or the manner in which or the circumstances under which the 
contract has been entered into or the term thereof has been arrived at by 
the parties. 
In Section 6 of the Draft Bill 2006 the Law Commission provided 
separate statutory guidelines to enable the Court to decide on procedural 
unfairness. 
General ^^substantive" unfairness and guidelines thereto: 
Likewise the Law Commission introduced a provision in Section 
12 of the Draft Bill 2006, relating to "general substantive unfairness" 
which says that a contract or a term thereof shall be treated as unfair if the 
contract or terms thereof are by themselves harsh, oppressive or 
unconscionable. 
Section 13 of the proposed Draft Bill contains guidelines to 
adjudge substantive unfairness. 
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In addition to this, the Law Commission referred to three specific 
situation in sections 9, 10 and 11 of the proposed Bill where 
"substantive" unfairness has to be presumed. 
(i) Section 9 of the Bill corresponds to section 67A as proposed in the 
103"' Report of the Law Commission of India (1984) and it invalidates. 
(a) exclusion or restriction of liability for negligence; and 
(b) exclusion or restriction of liability for breach of contract. 
So far as exclusion of liability for breach of contract is concerned, 
the Commission added the words "without adequate justification" in the 
light of similar provisions abroad. 
(ii) The Law Commission also proposed in Section 10 that exclusion 
or restriction of the rights, duties or liabilities referred to in section 62 of 
the sale of Goods Act 1930 shall be deemed to be substantively unfair 
unless there is adequate justification therefore. 
(iii) The Law Commission also proposed section 11 in the Bill and if 
deals with the unfair practice of incorporating choice of law clauses in 
contracts needlessly requiring the application of foreign law, despite the 
fact that the contract has no foreign element at all. 
These are three sections 9, 10 and 11 which deal with specific type 
of "substantive" unfairness in addition to the general provision of 
substantive unfairness in section 12 of the proposed Bill of 2006. 
The Law Commission also proposed a provision in section 14 as 
regard burden of proof in the case of "general substantive" unfairness 
falling within clause (b) of section 9 (exclusion of liability for breach of 
contract) and section 10 (exclusion of liabilities etc. as are referred in 
section 62 of sale of Goods Act, 1930) and the burden will be on the 
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person relying on such exclusions or restrictions referred to in those 
sections to prove that there is adequate justification for exclusion of 
liability. 
Another provision of considerable importance, which is found in 
other countries is that the provisions of the proposed Act will apply also 
to "executed contracts". But, unlike similar provisions elsewhere, the 
Law Commission stated that for that purpose, the Court will have to 
consider whether and to what extent restitution is possible and where 
such restitution is not possible, either wholly or partly, whether 
compensation can be granted. 
Another provision which is similar to the one which is found 
abroad is no relating to the Court's power to raise an issue of unfairness 
or a term thereof on its own, even if the parties have not raised such a 
plea. 
The Law Commission also proposed that the Court can grant 
various reliefs if there is procedural or substantive unfairness. The relief 
includes non-enforcement of contract or its terms, declaring the terms as 
not enforceable or void, varying the terms so as to remove unfairness, 
refund of consideration or price paid, compensation or damages and 
permanent injunction and mandatory injunction etc. 
The Law Commission said that the proposed Bill will not apply to 
service contracts between employer and workmen under the labour laws 
in force, nor to public employment under the Central Government or 
State Governments or their instrumentalities or employment under public 
sector undertakings of the Central or State Governments, or to 
employments under Corporations or bodies established by or under any 
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Statutes made by Parliament or State legislatures or to international 
treaties or agreements. 
The Law Commission also listed the existing "procedural" 
provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and Specific Relief Act, 1963 
which are procedural in nature in sections 3 and 4 and the existing 
"substantive" provisions of those Acts in sections 7 and 8 of the proposed 
Draft of the Bill. The Commission did not disturb the existing provision 
of these Acts. 
The Law Commission proposed that the new provisions of the Act 
will be applicable to Civil Courts, consumer fora under the Consumer 
Protection Act, 1986 and to the Arbitral Tribunals under the Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act, 1996. There is also proposal to make the proposed 
Act to be applicable to contracts entered into after the commencement of 
the proposed Act. The Law Commission hoped that the proposed Bill 
which for the first time divides unfair terms into "procedural" and 
"substantive" terms will meet an urgent need of persons who are parties 
to contracts in the markets today as well as to other contractual 
transactions. 
The proposed Bill on Unfair (Procedural and Substantive) Terms in 
Contract, 2006 is annexed herewith as annexure). 
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C. ANNEXURE 
Unfair (Procedural and Substantive) Terms in Contract Bill, 2006 
A Bill to declare certain provisions of the laws relating to contracts 
and specific performance, as procedural and substantive, to further define 
unfairness in contracts, as procedural and substantive, to determine 
impact of unfairness on contracts, to provide guidelines for such 
determination and to enable Courts to grant certain reliefs to relieve 
parties from the effect of unfairness in contracts. 
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Fifty Seventh Year of the 
Republic of India as follows:-
Chapter I 
Preliminary 
Short title, extent and commencement 
1. (1) This Act may be called the Unfair (Procedural and 
Substantive) Terms of Contracts Act, 2006. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir. 
(3) It shall come into force on such date as the Central 
Government may [by notification in the Official Gazette] 
appoint. 
Definitions 
2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.-
(a) 'contract' means a contract as defmed in clause (h) of section 2 
of the Indian Contract Act 1872 (9 of 1872) and includes an 
agreement as defmed in clause (e) of section 2 of that Act. 
(b) 'Court' means a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction and 
includes every Consumer Dispute Redressal Agency referred to 
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in section 9 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986) 
and an Arbitral Tribunal referred to in clause (d) of sub-section 
(1) of section 2 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 
(26 of 1996). 
(c) words and expressions not defined in this Act and defined in the 
Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872) shall have the meanings 
assigned to them respectively in that Act. 
Chapter II 
Procedural Provisions and Procedural Unfairness 
Procedural provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872) 
3. The following provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 
1872) are procedural, namely:-
(a) Section 15 which deals with coercion, 
(b) Sections 16 and 19A which deal with undue influence, 
(c) Section 17 which deals with fraud, 
(d) Section 18 which deals with misrepresentation, 
(e) Section 19 which deals with agreements without free consent. 
Procedural provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963) 
4. The following provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 
1963) are procedural, namely:-
(a) clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 in so far as it deals 
with the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the 
contract or the other circumstances under which the contract 
was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, 
gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant. 
(b) clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 20 which deals with a 
defendant who entered into the contract under circumstances 
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which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it 
inequitable to enforce specific performance, 
(c) clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 27 which deals with a 
contract voidable or terminable by the plaintiff and where any 
person interested in the contract sues to have it rescinded and 
such rescission is adjudged. 
General procedural unfairness 
5. Without prejudice to the provisions of sections 3 and 4, a contract 
or a term thereof is procedurally unfair if it has resulted in an unjust 
advantage or unjust disadvantage to one party on account of the conduct 
of the other party or the manner in which or circumstances under which 
the contract has been entered into or the term thereof has been arrived at 
by the parties. 
Guidelines for purposes of determining general procedural 
unfairness under section 5 
6. For the purposes of section 5, the Court may take into account the 
following circumstances, namely:-
(1) the knowledge and understanding of the promisee in relation to 
the meaning of the terms thereof or their effect; 
(m) the bargaining strength of the parties to the contract relative to 
each other; 
(n) reasonable standards of fair dealing or commonly accepted 
standards of dealing; 
(o) whether, or not, prior to or at the time of entering into the 
contract, the terms were subject to negotiation or were part of a 
standard terms contract; 
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(p) whether or not it was reasonably practicable for the party 
seeking relief to negotiate for the alteration of the contract or a 
term thereof or to reject the contract or a term thereof; 
(q) whether expressions contained in the contract are in fine print 
or are difficult to read or understand; 
(r) whether or not, even if he or she had the competency to enter 
into the contract based on his or her capacity and soundness of 
mind, he or she 
(i) was not reasonably able to protect his or her own interests or 
of those whom he or she represented at the time the contract 
was entered; 
(ii) suffered serious disadvantages in relation to other parties 
because he or she was unable to appreciate adequately the 
contract or a term thereof or their implications by reason of age, 
sickness, physical, mental, educational or linguistic disability, 
emotional distress or ignorance of business affairs. 
(s) whether or not independent legal or other expert advice was 
obtained by the party seeking relief under this Act; 
(t) the extent (if any) to which the provisions of the contract or a 
term thereof or their legal or practical effect were accurately 
explained by any person, to the party seeking relief under this 
Act; 
(u) the conduct of the parties to the contract in relation to similar 
contracts or courses of dealing to which any of them had been 
party; or 
(v) whether a party relied on the skill, care or advice of the other 
party or a person connected with the other party in entering into 
the contract. 
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Chapter III 
Substantive provisions and substantive unfairness 
Substantive provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872) 
7. The following provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 
1872) are substantive, namely:-
(a) Section 10 which deals with agreements which are contracts if 
made by free consent of parties competent to contract, for a 
lawful consideration and with a lawful object, not otherwise 
expressly declared to be void, 
(b) Section 20 which deals with both the parties to an agreement 
who are under a mistake, 
(c) Sections 23 and 24 which deal with consideration or objects of 
an agreement which are not unlawful, 
(d) Section 25 which deals with an agreement without consideration, 
(e) Section 26 which deals with an agreement in restraint of 
marriage of any person, other than a minor, 
(f) Section 27 which deals with an agreement in restraint of trade, 
(g) Section 28 which deals with an agreement in restraint of legal 
proceedings, 
(h) Section 29 which deals with an agreement which is 
uncertain, 
(i) Section 30 which deals with an agreement by way of wager, 
and 
(i) Section 56 which deals with an agreement to do an act 
impossible in itself 
Substantive provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 
1963) 
8. The following provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 
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1963) are substantive, namely :-
(a) Clause (a) of section 18 where on account of fraud, mistake of 
fact or misrepresentation, the written contract of which 
performance is sought, is in terms or effect different from what 
the parties agreed to, or does not contain all the terms agreed to 
between the parties on the basis of which the defendant entered 
into the contract, 
(b) Clause (a) of subsection (2) of section 20 in so far as it deals 
with the terms of a contract which gives the plaintiff an unfair 
advantage over the defendant, 
(c) Clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 20 which deals with the 
performance of a contract which would involve some hardship 
on the defendant which he had not foreseen, where its non-
performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff 
Exclusion or restriction of certain liabilities to be substantively 
unfair 
9. A contract or a term thereof shall be deemed to be substantively 
unfair if it 
(a) excludes or restricts liability for negligence; 
(b) excludes or restricts liability for breach of express or implied 
terms of a contract without adequate justification therefor. 
Exclusion or restriction of rights, duties or liabilities referred to in 
section 62 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (3 of 1930) to be 
substantively unfair unless there is adequate justification 
10. In contracts to which this Act applies as stated in sub-section (1) of 
section 18, any exclusion or restriction of the rights, duties or liabilities 
referred to in section 62 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (3 of 1930) shall 
be deemed to be substantively unfair unless there is adequate justification 
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therefore. 
Choice of law clauses 
11. Where a contract contains terms applying or purporting to apply 
the law of a foreign country despite the contract being in every respect 
wholly unconnected with the foreign country, such terms shall be deemed 
to be substantively unfair. 
General substantive unfairness 
12. Without prejudice to the provisions of sections 7 and 8, a contract 
or a term thereof is substantively unfair if such contract or the term 
thereof is in itself harsh, oppressive or unconscionable to one of the 
parties. 
Guidelines for purposes of determining general substantive 
unfairness under sections 9 to 12 
13. For the purposes of sections 9 to 12, the Court may take into 
account the following circumstances, namely:-
(i) whether or not the contract or a term thereof imposed 
conditions which are,-
(i) unreasonably difficult to comply with, or 
(ii) are not reasonably necessary for the protection of the 
legitimate interests of any party to the contract; 
(j) whether the contract is oral or wholly or partly in writing; 
(k) whether the contract is in standard form; 
(1) whether the contract or a term thereof is contrary to 
reasonable standards of fair dealing or commonly accepted 
standards of dealing; 
(m) whether the contract, agreement or a term thereof has 
resulted in a substantially unequal exchange of monetary 
values or in a substantive imbalance between the parties; 
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(n) whether the benefits to be received by the disadvantaged 
party are manifestly disproportionate or inappropriate to 
his or her circumstances; 
(o) whether the disadvantaged party was in a fiduciary 
relationship with the other party; or 
(p) whether the contract or a term thereof 
(i) requires manifestly excessive security for the 
performance of contractual obligations; or 
(ii) imposes penalties which are disproportionate to the 
consequences of a breach of contract; or 
(iii) denies or penalises the early repayment of debts; or 
(iv) entitles a party to terminate the contract 
unilaterally without good reason or without paying 
reasonable compensation; or 
(v) entitles a party to modify the terms of a contract 
unilaterally. 
Burden of proof 
14. If a contract or a term thereof excludes or restricts liability as stated 
in clause (b) of section 9 or excludes rights, duties and liabilities referred 
to in section 62 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (3 of 1930) as stated in 
section 10, it is for the person relying on such exclusion or restriction to 
prove that it is not without adequate justification. 
Provisions of the Act to apply for executed contracts 
15. The Court may grant relief on the basis of sections 5, 6, 9 to 14 of 
this Act in relation to a contract notwithstanding that the contract has 
been wholly or partly executed and for that purpose it may consider 
whether and to what extent restitution is possible in the facts and 
circumstances of the case and where such restitution is not, either wholly 
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or partly possible, whether any compensation is payable. 
Court's power to raise an issue of unfairness of contract or a term 
thereof 
16. A Court may, in proceedings before it, raise an issue as to whether 
a contract or its terms are unfair under sections 5, 9 to 12, even if none of 
the parties has raised the issue in its pleadings. 
Relief that may be granted by Court 
17(1) Without prejudice to the provisions in the Indian Contract Act, 
1872 (9 of 1872), Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Sale of Goods 
Act (3 of 1930) or to the provisions of any other law for the time being in 
force, where the Court comes to the conclusion having regard to sections 
5, 6, 9 to 14 that a contract or a term thereof is either procedurally or 
substantively unfair or both, the Court may grant anyone or more of the 
following reliefs:-
(b) refusing to enforce the contract or the term thereof; 
(b) declaring the contract or the term is unenforceable or void; 
(c) varying the terms of contract so as to remove the unfairness; 
(d) refund of the consideration or price paid; 
(e) compensation or damages: 
(f) permanent injunction: 
(g) mandatory injunction: or 
(h) any other relief which the interests of justice require as a 
consequence of the non-enforcement of the contract or the term 
thereof which is unfair provided that where the contract or its 
term is procedurally unfair as stated in section 5, the person who 
suffers the disadvantage may, at his option, insist that the 
contract or term shall be performed, and that he shall be put in 
the position in which he would have been if the conduct, manner 
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or circumstances referred to in that section did not permit the 
disadvantageous term to form part of the contract. 
(2) For the purpose of granting the rehefs under subsection (1), the 
Court may determine if any of the terms of the contract which are 
unfair are severable and thereafter whether and to what extent and in 
what manner, the remaining terms of the contract can be enforced or 
given effect to. 
Applicability of the Act and exemptions 
18. The provisions of this Act (other than sections 3, 4, 7 and 8) 
(1) shall apply to all contracts entered into after the commencement of 
this Act; and 
(2) shall not apply to 
(f) contracts and relations between employers and workmen 
under the labour laws in force; 
(g) public employment under the Central Government or a State 
Government or their instrumentalities or under local 
authorities; 
(h) employment under public sector undertakings of the Central 
Government or a State Government; 
(i) employment under corporations or bodies established by or 
under statutes made by Parliament or State Legislatures; 
(j) contractual terms in respect of which measures are provided 
in international treaties or agreements with foreign countries 
to which the Central Government is a signatory. 
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CHAPTER - V 
JUDICIAL PROTECTION AND TREATMENT 
A contract can be defined as a legally enforceable agreement or a 
set of promises which the law will enforce. The law of contract is that 
branch of the law which determines the circumstances in which a promise 
shall be legally binding on the person making it. A promise may be 
defined as a declaration or assurance made to another person, stating that 
a certain state of affairs exists or that the maker will do or refrain from 
doing, some specified act and conferring on that other a right to claim 
fulfillment of such declaration or assurance. A promise is more than a 
mere statement of intention, for it imports a willingness on the part of the 
promisor to be bound to the person to whom it is made. A contract is a 
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a 
remedy, or performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a 
duty. 
The dominant characteristic of the law of contract is that it is for 
the parties to make their own agreement and that therefore the fiinction of 
the Courts is to ascertain and to give effect to the rights and obligations to 
which the parties have agreed. Hovv'ever, there is a discernible tendency 
for the Courts and for Parliament to intervene and impose restrictions 
upon this freedom of contract in certain circumstances, for example, 
where this is in the public interest or in circumstances where the principle 
of freedom of contract has proved unrealistic. 
During the course of negotiations leading up to the making of a 
contract oral statements may be maae and documents purporting to 
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contain contractual terms may be introduced by the parties. Whether 
these statements or documents are legally binding depends upon whether 
a reasonable man would consider them to have been so intended. The 
meaning and effect of contractual statements and documents is also 
dependent upon the view which a reasonable man would take of the 
parties intentions. 
As distinct from an oral representation which creates contractual 
obligations, a mere representation is an oral statement made in the course 
of negotiations by one of the parties but which is not intended by him to 
be legally binding and which cannot be reasonably understood by a 
reasonable bystander to have been so intended. There is no liability for 
mere representations which are neither fraudulent or negligent. Whether 
or not a statement is a mere representation or a term of the contract will 
depend upon circumstances surrounding the transaction but where the 
terms of a contract are contained in a document, there is a presumption 
that the terms of that document are exclusive of the agreement. A promise 
made by one party, and not withdrawn before final agreement, will be 
treated as a term of the oral contract. On the other hand there may be 
some vague commendatory statements known as "puffs" to which no 
legal liability attaches - Statements which are regarded as unsafe to rely 
on because they are merely vague commendations, and also because they 
are obviously not to be taken literally. For example if a seller of car says 
that, 'this car goes like a bomb' or a seller says that, 'this washing powder 
washes whiter than white', these statements are regarded by the Courts as 
mere puffs and not a statements of facts. 
When the parties have reached a binding oral agreement, the 
express terms of that agreement will normally consist of any promises 
made by either party during the course of negotiations and not withdrawn 
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before final agreement. At least three questions may arise. Firstly, did a 
particular statement amount to a promise, secondly if the statement was a 
promise, what was being promised? Thirdly, did the oral contract 
incorporate a set of written terms, printed perhaps on a notice or ticket? If 
a set of conditions is contained in a document which has been signed by 
the parties, the conditions form part of the contract. The problem comes 
with unsigned documents such as tickets or notices which purport to state 
some or all of the terms of the contract. If the parties explicitly agree that 
the conditions shall apply the conditions will be incorporated by 
reference. The problem comes where they are not referred to. 
In order for the provisions of an unsigned document introduced 
during the course of negotiations to govern the contractual relations of 
two parties, it is necessary for the party relying on the document to show 
that it was intended by the parties to be a contractual document and that 
the other party had reasonable notice of its term. Then it is for the Court 
to decide the dispute whether the term is incorporated in the contract or 
not or a particular document is a contractual document or not. 
It is necessary to understand the complexities involved in the 
judicial handling of the standard form contracts. The Court's view is to 
safeguard the interests of the parties in the light of the circumstances of a 
particular case. For that purpose it is necessary to examine a few leading 
judicial opinions delivered by the Courts not only in India but in England 
also. To understand the judicial protection and treatment it becomes 
necessary to discuss some leading cases decided by the English Courts as 
well as by Indian Courts. An attempt may be made here to note and 
specify the factors constituting the effective cause of judicial 
determination. 
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It is an underlying theme of the Common Law that contracts freely 
entered into will be enforced by the Courts. The doctrine of contract has 
two key aspects: that every person is free to enter into a contract with any 
person they choose and to contract on any terms they want. Presumably it 
could also be said that every person has the freedom to refuse to contract 
if either the terms or the other party are not suitable. This doctrine, along 
with the principle of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) arose from the 
law merchant because the Courts saw their role as one of upholding 
contracts.' However, this philosophy implies that the parties are able to 
negotiate on an equal footing, have equal bargaining power, are equally 
able to negotiate the terms of the contract and are equally able to look 
after their own interests. The parties should also have a ftill understanding 
of the consequences of their actions and the terms of the contract. In 
reality, this may not always be the case. 
Lack of true consent has been addressed over time through the 
development of the common law principles of illegality, incapacity, 
duress, undue influence, mistake, misrepresentation and deceit. The 
acknowledgement of the existence of "harsh and/or unconscionable" 
contracts can be traced back to seventeenth century England where relief 
was sought with respect to "catching bargains with expectants", that is 
where heirs o noble families entered contracts to borrow money against 
their future inheritance, often at extraordinary cost. The doctrine of 
unconscionable conduct, of which unconscionable contracts are one 
aspect has developed since that time. Case law indicates that three factors 
need to be present for equity to intervene in a contractual situation on the 
basis of unconscionable conduct: 
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(i) One party was at a serious disadvantage in relation to the second 
party and the second party knew, or should have known in the 
circumstances, that this was so; 
(ii) the second party has exploited or taken advantage of this situation; 
and 
(iii) the resulting contract is unconscionable or oppressive. 
Circumstances indicating a "serious disadvantage" would include 
drunkness, age and infirmity, lack of education, illiteracy or poor English, 
intellectual disability, low income, emotional vulnerability and 
psychological problems. The fundamental principle is that equity will not 
permit a party having a legal right to exercise it in such a way that the 
exercise amounts to unconscionable conduct. Where they find that there 
has been unconscionable dealing, the Courts are able to grant relief 
through their equitable jurisdiction. 
a. Unsigned Documents: In relation to the unsigned documents the 
Court's view is that in order for the provisions of an unsigned document 
introduced during the course of negotiations to govern contractual 
relations of two parties, it is necessary for the party relying on the 
document to show that it was intended by the parties to be a contractual 
document and that the other party had reasonable notice of its terms. The 
document must be introduced at or before the making of the contract and 
must be of such a nature that a reasonable person would expect it to 
contain terms governing the contract. In order for the terms of an 
unsigned document to be binding, it is necessary for the party against 
whom the terms of the unsigned document are sought to be enforced to 
have knowledge of those terms or to have been given reasonable notice of 
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the existence of such terms. What constitutes reasonable notice will 
depend upon the circumstances of each case. 
The exclusion clause may be contained in an unsigned document 
such as a ticket or a notice. The Court's view is that in such cases 
reasonable and sufficient notice of the existence of the exclusion clause 
should be given. For this requirement to be satisfied is that, the clause 
must be contained in a contractual document i.e. one which the 
reasonable person would assume to contain contractual terms and not in a 
document which merely acknowledges payment such a receipts or 
vouchers. The Court must be satisfied that the reasonable notice of the 
terms had been given to the other party. If there is no reference on the 
face of a ticket to the fact that there are conditions printed on the back, 
the Courts have consistently held that such a notification is defective. 
There are some cases on this point which are popularly known as "ticket 
cases" of which few may be cited here. 
It is the duty of a party to a contract delivering a document to give 
adequate notice to the offeree of the printed terms and conditions. Where 
this not done, the Courts view is that the acceptor will not be bound by 
the terms. This principle was laid down by the House of Lords in a 
leading case of Henderson v. Stevenson. 
In this case the plaintiff bought a steamer ticket on the face of 
which were these words only: "Dublin to Whitehaven"; on the back there 
were printed some conditions, one of which excluded the liability of the 
company for loss, injury or delay to the passenger or his luggage. The 
plaintiff had not seen the back of the ticket, nor was there any indication 
on the face of the ticket about the conditions on the back. The plaintiffs 
luggage was lost in the shipwreck caused by the fault of the company's 
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servants. He was held entitled to recover his loss from the company in 
spite of exemption clauses. 
The House of Lords explained the principle and observed that the 
plaintiff could not be said to have accepted a term which he has not seen, 
of which he knew nothing and which is not in any way ostensibly 
connected with that which is printed and written upon the face of the 
contract presented to him. The principle behind this judgment is that if a 
party to a contract does not know about the terms of the contract he 
cannot be said to have given his assent to the terms which are unknown to 
him hence he is not bound by these terms and conditions in the absence of 
any clear and specific notice to him about the terms of the contract. 
In a similar case of Parker V. South Eastern Railway Company^ 
the plaintiff deposited a bag in a cloak-room at the defendants' railway 
station. He received a paper ticket which read "see back". On the other 
side were printed several clauses including a condition that: 
"The company will not be responsible for any package exceeding 
the value of £10. The plaintiff presented his ticket on the same day but his 
bag could not be found. He claimed £24 10s as the value of his bag and 
the railway company pleaded the limitation clause in his defence. The 
plaintiff admitted that he knew there was writing on the ticket, but stated 
that he had not read it, and did not know or believe that the writing 
contained conditions. 
In the Court of Appeal, Mellish LJ gave the following opinion: 
(i) If the person receiving the ticket did not see or know that there was 
any writing on the ticket, he is not bound by the conditions. 
(ii) If he knew there was writing, and knew or belie'v^d that the writing 
contained conditions, then he is bound by the conditions. 
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(iii) If he knew there was writing on the ticket, but did not know or 
beHeve that the writing contained conditions, nevertheless he would be 
bound, if the delivering of the ticket to him in such a manner that he 
could see there was writing upon it, was reasonable notice that the writing 
contained conditions. 
Thus in this case the view of the Court is that where a person 
receiving a ticket did not know that the ticket contains any writing. On it 
he is not bound by the conditions of the ticket but on the other hand if he 
knows that the writing on the ticket contains conditions he is bound by 
those conditions. The principle is that of knowledge, that if he has 
knowledge or reasonable notice of the terms on the ticket he is bound and 
if there is no notice he is not bound by the terms. It is the third rule given 
by the Mellish LJ which is very difficult in its application. This rule is 
also known as the "reasonable sufficiency of notice" rule. 
In another similar and leading case of Chapelton V. Barry Urban 
District Councif there was deck chairs were stacked by a notice asking 
the public who wished to use the deck chairs to get tickets and retain 
them for inspection. The plaintiff paid for two tickets for chairs, but did 
not read them. On the back of the ticket were printed words purporting to 
exempt the council from liability. The plaintiff was injured when a deck 
chair collapsed. The plaintiff merely glanced at the tickets and slipped 
them into his pocket without reading them. At the hearing, he said in 
evidence that he had no idea that there was any conditions on the tickets. 
The defendants at the hearing of the case filed by the plaintiff for 
damages relied upon an exemption clause on the ticket which said, "The 
Council will not be liable for any accident or damage arising from the 
hire of chairs." 
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The Court of Appeal found that the exemption clause did not avail 
the council and is ineffective because a reasonable man would not have 
expected the ticket to contain contractual terms but would have regarded 
it merely as a receipt. Slesser L.J. referred the observation of Mellish U 
in Parker V. South Eastern Railway Company^ where he said that "a 
receipt or ticket may not contain terms of the contract at all but may be a 
mere voucher. For instance, if a person driving through a turnpike-gate 
received a ticket upon paying the toll, he might reasonably assume that 
the object of the ticket was that by producing it he might be free from 
paying toll at some other turnpike-gate and might put it in his pocket 
unread." 
Slesser L.J. fiirther said that in my opinion the object of the giving 
and the taking of this ticket was that the person taking it might have 
evidence at hand by which he could show that the obligation he was 
under to pay 2d for the use of the chair for three hours had been duly 
discharged and it is altogether inconsistent, in the absence of any 
qualification of liability in the notice put up near the pile of chairs, to 
attempt to read into it the qualification contended for. He observed that 
this ticket is no more than a receipt, and is quite different from a railway 
ticket which contains upon it the terms upon which a railway company 
agrees to carry the passenger. 
In this case the Court differentiated the tickets and said that this 
ticket is different from a railway ticket because the reasonable person 
would not suppose this ticket which is for the hire of chairs for three 
hours, to contain contractual terms and will suppose it as a mere voucher 
or a receipt. The principle behind this case is also the same that if a party 
is not aware of have no idea that the ticket contains contractual terms then 
in the opinion of the Court he is not bound by those terms. Thus the view 
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of the Courts is that the exclusion clause should be in a contractual 
document if a party wants to rely on it and not in a ticket or voucher. The 
tickets and vouchers were regarded by the Courts as merely 
acknowledgements of the payment and not more than that. 
In Richardson, Spence & Co. V. Rowntree^ a term limiting the 
liability of a steamship company to $ 100 in a steamship ticket was held 
not be incorporated. The ticket given to the plaintiff was so folded that 
the writing inside could not be read and the conditions were obliterated in 
part by a stamp in red ink. When the plaintiff claimed damages for 
personal injuries, the defendants relied on a clause printed inside the 
ticket limiting their liability to $ 100. The Jury found that the plaintiff 
knew that there was writing on the ticket but not that it contained 
conditions; and that the defendants had not done what was reasonably 
sufficient to give the plaintiff notice of the conditions. The House of 
Lords also held that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment. In this case 
also the view of the Jury as well as of the House of Lords was that when a 
person was not aware that the writing on a ticket contained conditions he 
is not bound by those conditions or exclusion clauses. The judgment is 
based on the same principle as laid down in Parker's case. 
In Sugar V. London Midland and Scottish Railway Company', the 
ticket had the words on it "For conditions see back". These words were 
printed on the face of the ticket, but these words were obliterated by the 
date stamp. It was held that no steps reasonably sufficient to bring the 
conditions to the notice of the passenger had been taken. These two cases 
have the similar facts and the same views and findings of the Courts 
based on the same principle which is the knowledge or information of 
terms to the other party. If a party is ignorant about the terms which is on 
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a ticket or voucher or he is unable to see it because of the printing 
problem or a stamp on it, then he is not bound by those conditions. 
In the chapelton's case the chair of the plaintiffs collapsed when 
he sat on it owing to the negligence of the defendants. In that case the 
view of the Court of appeal was the clause did not protect the defendants. 
The Court regarded the ticket of the council as mere a "voucher or 
receipt." In the normal case the person hiring a chair would not receive a 
ticket until after he had sat on the chair, so it was reasonable to regard the 
notice as an offer of the terms on which the chairs were to be hired, and 
the ticket as a mere receipt to show the person had paid. The mere 
"voucher or receipt" point is sometimes treated as an independent 
principle, but seems really to be an application of the reasonable notice 
requirement. Thus the common law approach and view is that unless the 
person actually knew of the terms, a notice which is given only after the 
contract has been concluded is of no effect. This principle was ftirther 
o 
applied in Olley V. Marlborough Court Ltd. In this case the plaintiff 
booked in for a week's stay at the defendants' hotel. A stranger gained 
access to her room and stole her mink coat. There was a notice on the 
back of the bedroom door which stated that "the proprietors will not hold 
themselves responsible for articles lost or stolen unless handed to the 
managers for safe custody." 
The Court of Appeal held that the notice was not incorporated in 
the contract between the proprietors and the guest. The contract was made 
in the hall of the hotel before the plaintiff entered her bedroom and before 
she had an opportunity to see the notice. Thus in this case the plaintiff 
was not affected by the exclusion clause in the notice in her hotel 
bedroom because of the reason that she had already made the contract 
earlier at the reception desk in the hall of the hotel. 
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A graphic illustration of this rule also came in Thornton V. Shoe 
Lane Parking Ltd? In this case the plaintiff drove into the defendants' car 
park and was given a ticket by an automatic machine, which stated that it 
was issued subject to conditions displayed inside the car park. The 
conditions inside the car park were in small print and one of them 
excluded liability for damages to vehicle or injury to customers. The 
plaintiff was injured due partly to the defendant's negligence. The 
plaintiff was not held to be bound by the notice displayed inside the 
premises. Though the defendant argued that the conditions excluded their 
liability but the view of the Court of Appeal was that the ticket came too 
late, as by that stage the plaintiff had driven up the entrance ramp as 
Megaw LJ said, "it was practically impossible for him to withdraw from 
his intended entry. 
Lord Denning said that the clause was so wide and destructive of 
rights that in order to give sufficient notice, "it would need to be printed 
in red ink with a red hand pointing to it, or something equally startling." 
Thus the common law rule is that the existence of the exclusion 
clause must be brought to the notice of the other party or at the time the 
contract is entered into but not afterwards when the contract had already 
been made. Any exclusion or exemption clause or term which came into 
the notice of the other party afterwards is of no use and is ineffective as 
far as the rights and liability is concerned under or on the basis of the 
contract. 
In Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. V. Stiletto Visual Programmes 
Ltd.,^^ the defendants on advertising agency required photographs of the 
1950s for a presentation for a client, from the plaintiff The plaintiff sent 
47 photographic transparencies accompanied by a delivery note which 
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contained a number of conditions written prominently in the capitals on 
it, to the defendant on the same day. Condition 2 provided that a holding 
fee of £ 5 per day for each transparency will be charged if retained longer 
than 14 days. The defendant did not return the transparencies on time and 
the plaintiff sued for the holding fee payable under condition 2 which 
amounted to £ 3785. 
The Court of Appeal held that condition 2 had not been 
incorporated into the contract. Interfoto had not taken reasonable steps to 
bring such an unusual, unreasonable and onerous term to defendant's 
notice. The plaintiff were awarded only £3.5 per transparency per week 
on a quantum meruit basis. 
In some cases where there has been insufficient notice, an 
exclusion clause may nevertheless be incorporated where there has been a 
previous consistent course of dealing between the parties on the same 
terms. 
In Spurting V. Bradshaw , the defendant delivered eight barrels of 
orange juice to the plaintiff who were warehousemen. A few days later 
the defendant received a document from the plaintiff which 
acknowledged receipt of the barrels. It also contained a clause exempting 
the plaintiff from liability for loss or damage "occasioned by the 
negligence, wrongful act or default caused by themselves, their 
employees or agents. When the defendant collected the barrels they were 
empty. The defendant refused to pay storage charges and was sued by the 
plaintiffs. 
It was held that although the defendants did not receive the 
document containing the exclusion clause until after the conclusion of the 
contract, the clause had been incorporated into the contract as a result of a 
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regular course of dealings between the parties over the years. The 
defendant had received similar documents on previous occasions and he 
was now bound by the terms contained in the document. 
This case is different compared to the case of Interfoto. In that case 
there was no previous dealing between the parties and secondly in the 
opinion of Court the rate of payment after the period of stipulated 14 days 
was very high and exorbitant but in this case there was consistent 
dealings between the parties and there was no objection as to the storage 
charges of the plaintiff. Thus where there is consistent dealings between 
the parties then the exemption clause may be deemed as incorporated in 
the contract. It is necessary that there should be regular dealings and not 
irregular, one or two dealings between the parties probably will not 
suffice the purpose of the party who wants to take the advantage of the 
exemption clause. 
In McCutcheon V. David MacBrayne^^ the plaintiff had shipped his 
car several times on the defendants' ship between Islay and the mainland 
of Scotland. The evidence before the Court was that sometimes he was 
asked to sign a risk note containing exempting conditions, and sometimes 
not. On the relevant voyage, on which the ship sank owing to the 
defendant's negligence, the plaintiffs brother had arranged the shipment 
and had not been asked to sign a risk note. 
The House of Lords held that MacBrayne could not rely on the 
conditions in their form because they had not proved that McCutcheon 
knew of the terms of the relevant condition and there was no consistent 
course of dealing between the parties. 
Even if there is no course of dealing between the parties an 
exclusion clause may still become part of the contract through the trade 
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usage or custom. The clause is incorporated on the basis of a custom in 
the trade or on some other basis. The common law view is that, for a 
trade custom to form an implied term of a contract, the custom must be 
generally accepted by those doing business in the particular trade in the 
particular place, and be so generally known that an outsider making 
reasonable enquiries could not fail to discover it. It will thus become 
binding on a newcomer to the trade. 
In British Crane Hire Corporation Ltd. V. Ipswich Plant Hire 
Ltd}^ both the parties were companies engaged in hiring out earth-
moving equipment. The plaintiffs supplied a crane to the defendants on 
the basis of a telephone contract made quickly, without mentioning 
conditions of hire. The plaintiff later sent a copy of their conditions but 
before the defendants could sign them, the crane sank in marshy ground. 
The conditions, which were similar to those used by all firms in the 
business, said that the hirer should indemnify the owner for all expenses 
in connection with use. 
The Court of Appeal held that the terms would be incorporated into 
the contract, not by a course of dealing, but because there was a common 
understanding between the parties, who were in the same line of business, 
that any contract would be on these standard terms. The defendants were 
held liable for the expense involved in recovering the crane. Lord 
Denning opined that in view of the relationship of the parties, when the 
defendants requested this crane urgently and it was supplied at once-
before the usual form was received, the plaintiffs were entitled to 
conclude that the defendants were accepting it on the terms of the 
plaintiffs' own printed conditions which was to follow in a day or two. 
L>^;xi Reid in McCutcheon V. David MacBrayne Ltd}'^ quoting from the 
Scottish Textbook Gloag on contract said: 
336 
"The judicial tasic is not to discover the actual intentions of each 
party: it is to decide what each was reasonably entitled to conclude from 
the attitude of the other." 
As a result of the doctrine of privity of contract, the Courts held 
that a person who is not a party to the contract (a third party) was not 
protected by an exclusion clause in that contract, even if the clause 
purported to extend him. Employees are regarded in this context as third 
parties. 
In Adler V. Dickson^^ the plaintiff was a passenger on ship under a 
contract which excluded the liability of the company. There was a general 
clause that "passengers are carried at passengers' entire risk" and a 
particular clause that the company will not be responsible for any injury 
whatsoever to the person of any passenger arising from or occasioned by 
the negligence of the company's servant. While the plaintiff was 
mounting a gangway, it moved and fell and she was thrown onto the 
wharf from a height of 16 feet and sustained serious injuries. She brought 
an action for negligence, not against the company, but against the master 
and boatswain of the ship. 
The Court of Appeal held that, while the clauses protected the 
company from liability, they could avail no one else. The ratio decidendi 
of the Court was that the ticket did not, on its true construction purport to 
exempt the master or boatswain. 
The common law approach to these type of stipulations in the 
contract is that in the carriage of passengers as well as of goods, the law 
permits a carrier to stipulate for exemption from liability not only for 
himself but also for those whom he engages to carry out the contract and 
this can be done by necessary implication as well as by express words. 
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When such a stipulation is made, it is effective to protect those who 
render services under the contract although they are not parties to it, 
subject however to an important qualification: the other party must assent 
to exemption of those persons. His assent may be given expressly or by 
necessary implication. The common law is clear that a party is not to be 
deprived of his rights at common law except by a contract freely and 
deliberately entered into by him. 
In Scruttons Ltd. V. Midland Silicones Ltd}^ a shipping company 
(the carrier) agreed to ship a drum of chemicals belonging to the plaintiff. 
The contract of carriage limited the liability of the carrier for damage to £ 
179. The drum was damaged by the negligence of the defendants, a firm 
of stevedores, who had been engaged by the carriers to unload the ship. 
The plaintiffs sued the defendants in tort for the full extent of the damage 
which amounted to £593. The defendants claimed the protection of the 
limitation clause. Diplock J found for the plaintiffs and his judgment was 
upheld both by the Court of Appeal held that the defendants were not 
parties to the contract of carriage and so they could not take advantage of 
the limitation clause. 
b. Signed Documents: 
As a general rule, a person who signs a document containing 
contractual terms is precluded from denying that he is bound by the terms 
of that document and that he had notice of the terms contained therein. 
However, there are circumstances in which, owing to a mistake as to the 
nature of the document or to a misrepresentation by the other party, the 
signatory can avoid liability. As a general rule, the common law treats 
standard form contracts as any other contract. Signature or some other 
objective manifestation of intent to be legally bound will bind the signor 
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to the contract whether or not they read or understood the terms. The 
reality of standard form contracting, however, means that many common 
law jurisdictions have developed special rules with respect to them. In 
general, Courts will interpret standard form contracts contra proferentem 
(literally against the proffering person) but specific treatment varies 
between jurisdictions. 
Where an oral misrepresentation, whether innocent or fraudulent, 
as to a term of a document is made prior to signature, then the signatory 
of the document is not bound by that term to the person who makes the 
representation. If a person signs a document having contractual effect 
containing an exclusion clause, it will automatically form part of the 
contract, and will be bound by its terms. This is so even if he has not read 
the document and regardless of whether he understands it or not. 
In L' Estrange V. Graucob^^ the plaintiff bought a cigarette machine for 
her cafe from the defendant and signed an order form which contained, in 
small print, a number of conditions, one of which was that 'any express 
or implied condition, statement or warranty, statutory or otherwise not 
stated herein is hereby excluded.' She received in exchange a printed 
confirmation order. The machine did not work satisfactorily and the 
plaintiff brought an action in the county Court in which she claimed that 
the machine was not fit for the purpose for which it was sold. The county 
Court judge held that the sellers could not rely on the printed condition, 
and the defendant appealed. The plaintiff claimed that she had not read 
the form and did not know what it contained. 
Scrutton L.J. considered some earlier decided cases and also 
referred the case oi Andrews Bros. Ltd. V. Singer Co. Ltd. where in the 
contract of sale a clause which excluded only implied conditions. 
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warranties and liabilities, and it was held in that case, that the clause did 
not apply to an express term describing the article and the seller was not 
exempted from liability where he delivered an article of a different 
description. He said that this clause in question here in this case would 
seem to have been intended to go further than any of the previous clauses 
and to include all terms denoting collateral stipulations in order to avoid 
the result of these decisions. 
In the course of argument in the county Court reference was made 
to the railway passenger and cloak-room ticket cases. But the Scrutton 
L.J. said that these cases have no application when the document has been 
signed. When a document containing contractual terms is signed, then, in 
the absence of fraud or I will add misrepresentation, the party signing it is 
bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether he has read the document or 
not. 
However even a signed document can be rendered wholly or partly 
ineffective if the other party to the contract made a misrepresentation as 
to its effect. In Curtis V. Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co. the 
plaintiff took a wedding dress to the defendants for cleaning and was 
asked to sign a document exempting the defendants from liability "for 
any damage howsoever arising". She asked why she had to sign and was 
told that it was because the defendants would not accept liability for 
damage to beads or sequins on the dress. The plaintiff then signed. The 
dress was returned with a stain on it that had not been there before. In 
fact, the document purported to exclude liability for any damage to 
clothing however caused. The defendants denied liability relying on the 
clause. The Court of Appeal held that the statement made to the plaintiff 
misrepresented the effect of the clause and prevented the defendants from 
relying on it. 
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Even where an exclusion clause has been incorporated into a 
contract, it may not have been incorporated in a collateral contract. In 
Andrews V. Hopkinson the plaintiff saw a car in the defendant's garage, 
which the defendants described as: "It's a good little bus. I would stake 
my life on it." The plaintiff agreed to take it on hire-purchase and the 
defendant sold it to a finance company who made a hire-purchase 
agreement with the plaintiff. When the car was delivered the plaintiff 
signed a note saying he was satisfied about its condition. Shortly 
afterwards, due to a defect in the steering, the car crashed. The plaintiff 
was stopped from suing the finance company because of the delivery note 
but he sued the defendant. It was held that there was a collateral contract 
with the defendant who promised the car was in good condition and in 
return the plaintiff promised to make the hire-purchase agreement. 
Therefore the defendant was liable. 
This principle is particularly applicable to cases of hire-purchase 
where a dealer sells the article to a hire-purchase finance company which 
then lets it on hire to the hirer. If the dealer gives a warranty, which 
induces the hirer to enter into the contract of hire, this warranty is 
enforceable against the dealer by the hirer, even though the actual 
contract of hire purchase is not made between them. 
In the United Kingdom the laws relating to the contracts is same as 
in India. The laws relating to contracts accept the basic principle of 
freedom of contract, that the parties should be free to agree on any terms 
they like provided that their agreement is not to do any illegal task or 
forbidden by any law or otherwise contrary to public policy. Consensus 
ad idem is the basic theme and underlines all the contracts. Consensus ad 
idem or meeting of minds is one of the essential requisites of the 
formation of a valid contract. But in practice one may not be able to find 
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it due to inequality of bargaining power between the contracting parties. 
The parties may not have sufficient bargaining power to protect their 
interest or parties are not always sufficiently well informed. The doctrine 
of common law and the Court of equity were inadequate to deal with the 
problem that emerged with the development of standard form contracts, 
essentially the printed contracts drawn up in advance by one party for the 
use on more than one occasion. There is long established jurisdiction to 
set aside and unconscionable bargains. Courts of equity, in the eighteenth 
century often set aside express contractual provisions on the grounds of 
unconscionability. However, nearly all these cases fell into certain special 
classes, that is, mortgages and bonds and the sale of mortgage of 
reversionary interests. The equity jurisdiction was invoked for setting 
aside grossly unfair contracts entered into by poor and ignorant persons. 
Towards the end of nineteenth century, the equitable jurisdiction fell into 
disuse partly because of conditions that changed and partly because of the 
enactment of the Moneylenders Act, 1990. This act gave statutory control 
over some of the activities formerly regulated by the equity jurisdiction. 
Unconscionability at common law in the United Kingdom - The 
law in the U.K. about unconscionability bargains has been stated in 
Halsbury's Law of England which is: 
"Where by reason of the unfair manner in which it is brought into 
existence (Procedural Unfairness) as where it was induced by undue 
influence, or where it came into being through an unconscientious use of 
the power arising out of the circumstances and conditions of the 
contradicting parties; in such cases equity may give a remedy; but where 
by reason of the fact that the terms of the contract are more unfavourable 
to one party than to the other (contractual Iriibalance), contractual or 
inadequacy of consideration is not, however, in itself a ground for relief 
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in equity, but it may be an element in establishing such fraud as will 
avoid the transaction, or the transaction may be so unconscionable as to 
afford in itself evidence of fraud. A bargain cannot be unfair and 
unconscionable, however, unless one of the parties to it has imposed the 
objectionable terms in a morally reprehensible manner, that is to say in a 
way which affects his conscience, as by taking advantage of the weakness 
or necessity of the other." 
An unfair and untenable or irrational clause in a contract is 
regarded as unjust and amenable to judicial review at common law. At 
common law a party to the contract facing unconscionable term is being 
relieved from such contract. In Gillespie Bros & Co. Ltd. V. Roy Bowles 
Transport Ltd. , Lord Denning for the first time construing the indemnity 
clause in a contract questioned that are the Courts to permit party to 
enforce his unreasonable clause, even when it is so unreasonable, or 
applied so unreasonably, as to be unconscionable and said: 
"When it gets to this point, I would say, as I said many years ago 
.... there is the vigilance of the common law which while allowing 
freedom of contract, watches to see that it is not abused. It will not allow 
the party to exempt himself from his liability at common law when it 
would be quite unconscionable for him to do so." 
Lord Denning in John Lee & Son V. Railway Executive while 
interpreting and analyzing a term in a contract had observed this which he 
later reiterated in the Gillespie's case that, "... above all there is the 
vigilance of the common law which, while allowing freedom of contract, 
watches to see that it is not abused." 
In Lloyds Bank Ltd. V. Bundy^'^ Lord Derming enunciated the 
principle of inequality of bargaining power and observed that one who 
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enters into a contract on terms which are very unfair or transfers property 
for a consideration which is grossly inadequate, when his bargaining 
power is grievously impaired by reason of his own needs or desires or by 
his own ignorance or infirmity .... the one who stipulates for any unfair 
advantage may be moved solely by his own self-interest, unconscious of 
the distress he is bringing to the other .... One who is in extreme need 
may knowingly consent to a most improvident bargain, solely to relieve 
the strains in which he finds himself It would not be meant to suggest 
that every transaction is saved by independent advice. But the absence of 
it may be fatal. 
In Schroeder Music Publishing Co. V. Macaulay the House of 
Lords considered and outlined the theory of unreasonableness or 
unfairness of a bargain and the need to relieve a party from a contract, 
where the relative bargaining power of the parties was not equal. The 
House of Lords held that a party to a contract would be relieved from the 
terms of the contract. The doctrine of restraint of trade, which may render 
a contract wholly or partly void as contrary to public policy. In this case a 
song writer had contracted with the publisher on the terms more onerous 
to him and favourable to the publisher. The song writer was relieved from 
the bargain of the contract on the theory of restraint of trade opposed to 
public policy. Lord Diplock Observed, 
"It is in my view, salutary to acknowledge that in 
refusing to enforce provisions of a contract where by one 
party agrees for the benefit of the other party to exploit or 
to refrain from exploiting his own earning power, the 
public policy which the Court is implementing is not 
some 19^ '^  century economic theory about the benefit to 
the general public of freedom of trade, but the protection 
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of those whose bargaining power is weak against being 
forced by those whose bargaining power is stronger to 
enter into bargains that are unconscionable." 
In Photo Production Ltd. V. Securicor Transport Ltd. considering 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, Lord Wilberforce during the course 
of his speech emphasized the unequal bargaining power as an invalidating 
factor upheld the contract in that case since it was commercial bargain 
between the two competent parties to enter into a contract on equal 
bargaining power. Lord Scarman agreeing with Lord Wilberforce 
described that a commercial dispute between the parties well able to look 
after themselves, in such a situation what the parties have agreed 
expressly or impliedly is what matters, and the duty of the Court is to 
construe their contract according to their tenor. It was held that the parties 
have equal bargaining power and intervention of the Court to relieve the 
party from the contract was not called for. 
The common law approach is that where an individual is a party to 
a contract not having equal bargaining power compared to the other party 
who have strong bargaining power and the terms of the contract in the 
opinion of the Court is unconscionable, then the Court always intervened 
to get the party in a weaker bargaining position, relieved from the 
unconscionable contract, but where the parties are on equal position i.e. 
have equal bargaining power the Courts did not intervene because of 
equal bargaining power and also because of the commercial contract 
between the parties. 
What the parties to the contract meant to say or write is a question 
of construction of the words used having regard to the tenor of the 
agieemeht and to the surrounding circumstances. However, a number of 
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rules of construction have been developed to assist the Courts to ascertain 
the meaning of the words and phrases in various circumstances. The 
practice of imposition of unfair terms in the contract by the big 
enterprises compelled the Courts at common law to evolve certain canons 
of construction which normally work in favour of party seeking to 
establish liability against the party in a superior bargaining position 
seeking to claim the benefit of exclusion clause in the contract. 
The purpose of interpretation of a term in a contract is to seek, 
search and explore simple and plain meaning of the words in cases where 
the meaning of the contract or its term is doubtful, ambiguous, obscure or 
not clear. The practice of the common law Courts had been to choose the 
simple literal meaning between the various possible meaning available. 
Thus where the words of a contractual document or meaning of the terms 
in a contract was clear the Courts at common law approved it but where 
the alternative construction was equally open then the Courts chosen that 
alternative which was consistent with the rules normally applicable to the 
contracts of that particular class or category and that the other alternative 
which was to introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion was accordingly 
rejected by the Courts. 
The "contra proferentem" rule is the principle whereby the words 
or terms of a written contract are construed more strictly, forcibly and 
narrowly against the party putting forward the document of contract. This 
rule of construction had been applied by the common law Courts where, 
there was doubt or ambiguity in the phrases used in the contractual 
documents. The Courts in cases of doubts or ambiguity resolved against 
the party who put forward the written document and in favour of the other 
party. Ambiguous words in exemption clauses had been construed in the 
way least favourable to the party who relied on it. The approach of the 
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Courts at common law had been to construe a clause which exempted a 
party from liabilities, which would normally be of his, against him, contra 
proferentem and had resolved ambiguities in favour of the other party. 
An example of the contra proferentem rule being applied is 
Andrews Bros Ltd V. Singer & Co. Ltd. In this case the defendant was a 
manufacturer of motor vehicle and the plaintiff was a retailer. The 
plaintiff ordered a new vehicle from the defendant and the defendant 
tendered a vehicle which, though never resold, had undergone a 
considerable mileage in being demonstrated to prospective purchasers. 
The plaintiff noticed that the car had done a considerable mileage but 
took it notwithstanding. Later plaintiff brought an action against the 
defendant alleging that it had delivered a car which was not in accordance 
with the contract. The contract provided that "all conditions, warranties 
and liabilities provided by statutes, common law or otherwise are 
excluded." 
The Court of appeal held that the defendants could not rely on the 
exemption clause, which dealt only with implied terms since the 
obligation to deliver a new car was an express term. 
In Beck & Co. V. Szymanowski & Co. the clause 5 of the contract 
for the sale of reels of sewing cotton provided that the goods delivered 
should be deemed to be in all respects in accordance with the contract 
unless the sellers were notified within 14 days of delivery. After 18 
months the buyers complained that on average each reel contained only 
188 yards of cotton instead of the stipulated 200 yards. The House of 
Lords held that the sellers were not protected by the clause 5 which 
referred to "goods delivered" whereas the buyers were complaining that a 
portion of the goods had not been delivered. 
n 
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A particular application of the contra proferentem approach is also 
found in a group of cases involving the question of whether the clause 
covers negligence. In White V. John Warwick & Co. Ltd}^ the plaintiff 
hired a bicycle from the defendants. Clause 11 of the agreement provided 
that, "nothing in this agreement shall render the owners liable for any 
personal injuries...," 
The plaintiff was thrown from the bicycle and injured when the 
saddle tilted as he was riding it. The Court of Appeal held that the 
defendants were liable for negligence: clause 11 excluded their strict 
liability in contract, but they were also under a duty in tort to take 
reasonable care, and clause 11 did not cover that. 
So also in Hollier v. Rambler Motors (AMC) Ltd}^ the plaintiff 
took his car to a garage for repairs, as he has done on several previous 
occasions. Normally he signed a form which provided that, "the company 
is not responsible for damage caused by fire to customers' cars on the 
premises." On the occasion in question he did not sign the form. His car 
was damaged in a fire caused by the negligence of the garage. The Court 
held that the form was not incorporated into the contract by a previous 
course of dealings. The Court was of the view that even if this provision 
was incorporated into the contract it would not operate to provide a 
defence. The Court further said that if the defendants were seeking to 
exclude their responsibility for a fire caused by their own negligence, 
they ought to have done so in for plainer language than the language 
which is used here in the form. 
The decision of this case was criticized when the decision came 
and it might not be decided the same way today on the construction point. 
The House of Lords subsequently deplored strained construction, which 
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is not so necessary now that the Courts have power to hold a clause 
unreasonable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. Section 2 of the 
UCTA deals with Exemption of Liability for negligence. Section 2(2) 
provides that liability for negligence for any other kind of loss or damage 
can be excluded provided the term or notice satisfies the requirement of 
reasonableness. UCTA itself seems to take this approach in one section 
that is section 11 which provides that, the requirement of reasonableness 
is that "the term shall have been a fair and reasonable one to be included 
having regard to the circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to 
have been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties when the 
contract was made." 
It is presumed that the parties to a contract cannot have intended an 
exemption clause albeit clearly exempting liability, to be so wide as to 
exempt or limit the obligation to perform the contract at all, or to exempt 
liability where a person is not performing the contract but is departing 
from it, or to exempt liability for breach of the fundamental obligation or 
obligations under the contract. 
Lord Upjohn in Suisse Atlantique's case^^ observed that, 
"I ought to make one or two observations on the question 
of construction of exclusion or limitation clauses. It 
cannot be doubted that even while the contract continues 
in force (that is when there has been no fundamental 
breach), exclusion clauses are strictly construed. Why 
this should be so is already a matter of history and, I 
think, probably stems from the facts that in so many 
cases exceptions clauses are to be found in rather small 
print sometimes on the back of the main terms of the 
contract and that the doctrine of "contra proferentes" has 
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been applied. But whatever the reason, that they are 
strictly construed against the contracting party seeking 
protection even during the currency of the contract 
cannot be doubted." 
There are certain terms in the contract which are very fundamental 
and its breach will amount to a complete non-performance of the contract. 
This fundamental term is something more basic term of the contract and 
because of its breach the whole purpose of the contract is defeated. A 
party to a contract cannot rely on an exemption clause where he has 
committed a breach of contract that is considered to be particularly 
serious. Certain terms of a contract are regarded as "fundamental" and it 
is presumed that exemption clauses will not on their construction, apply 
where such terms have been broken. Frequently this rule has been applied 
to contracts for supply of goods, with the result that a person who 
supplied something essentially different from that which he contracted to 
supply was not protected by an exemption clause. The question whether 
the thing supplied is essentially different from that bargained for depends, 
of course on a preliminary question of construction: what have the parties 
bargained for? 
Earlier the Courts in the United Kingdom decided the cases of 
breaches on the basis of construction of contract, that is by interpretating 
the words used in the exemption or exclusion clauses. But later in the 
1950s and early 1960s, however, some judges went beyond the 
construction approach and held that a party who had committed a 
"fundamental breach" or "breach of a fundamental term" could not rely 
on an exclusion clause no matter how widely it was worded. The decision 
in Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. V. Wallis^^ delivered by Denning LJ is an 
example of this. In this case the defendant agreed to purchase a car from 
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the plaintiff on hire-purchase. When the car was dehvered to the 
defendant it was totally in damaged condition and the defendant refused 
to take the possession of car. When sued for the arrears the defendant 
refused to pay the installments. The plaintiff relied on the clause of the 
hire-purchase contract which provided: 
"No condition or warranty that the vehicle is roadworthy, or as to 
its age, condition or fitness for any purpose is given by the owner or 
implied therein." 
The county Court Judge gave judgment for the plaintiffs but the 
Court of Appeal held that the thing delivered was not the thing contracted 
for. The excluding term therefore did not avail the plaintiffs. The Court 
found that because there had been a fundamental breach of the contract, 
and hence the plaintiffs could not rely upon the exemption clause, and the 
judgment was given for the defendant. 
Thus a party could only claim the protection of an exempting 
clause when he is carrying out his contract and not when he is deviating 
from it or is guilty of a breach which goes to the very root of it. 
For example if a railway cloak-room allowed an unauthorized 
person to have access to and remove luggage of a dispositor without 
production of cloak-room ticket this was a "fundamental breach" and the 
railway was not protected by an exempting clause excluding liability for 
loss or misdelivery.^^ 
Devlin J in Smeaton Hanscomb & Co. Ltd. V. Sassoon I Setty Son 
& Co.^'^ said that "it is no doubt, a principle of construction that 
exceptions are to be construed as not being applicable for the protection 
of those for whose benefit they are inserted if .the beneficiary has 
committed a breach of a fundamental term of the contract ... I do not 
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think that what is fundamental term has ever been closely defined. It must 
be something, I think narrower than a condition of the contract, for it 
would be limiting the exceptions too much to say that they applied only 
to breaches of warranty. It is, I think, something which underlies the 
whole contract so that, if it is not complied with, the performance 
becomes something totally different from that which the contract 
contemplates." 
The principle of "fundamental breach of contract" and 
"fundamental term" did not depend on the wording of the contract or 
interpretation of the exempting or exclusion clauses or construction of the 
contract. This principle which later came to be known as the "substantive 
doctrine" is derived from various cases on carriage of goods by sea, the 
"deviation" cases in which it was held that a carrier who departed from 
the agreed route lost the benefit of the exception clauses in his contract. 
The carrier thus became liable to pay for any subsequent loss of or 
damage to the goods, unless he could show either that the loss must have 
occurred even if he had stayed on course or that the owner of the goods 
had, with full knowledge of the deviation and affirmed the contract. In 
Joseph Thorley Ltd. V. Orchis Steamship Co. Ltd?^ the ship was deviated 
but had returned to its original route without incident, the goods were 
damaged while being unloaded. Nonetheless it was held that the deviation 
prevented the normal exceptions applying to any subsequent loss, and the 
carrier was held liable. 
The House of Lords in Hain Steamship Co. V. Tate & Lyle Ltd}^ 
observed that deviation being breach of condition entitles the owner to 
put an end of the contract with the result that the exception clauses were 
no longer in force when the loss occurred. Normally a contract remains in 
force, despite a breach of condition, until the innocent party elects to 
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terminate. Lord Wright analysed the nature and effect of a contract for the 
carriage of goods by sea in this case and said, "an unjustified deviation is 
a fundamental breach of a contract of affreightment .... The adventure 
has been changed. A contract entered into on the basis of the original 
adventure, is inapplicable to the new adventure." 
Prior to 1964, the common law considered that a fundamental 
breach could not be excluded or restricted in any circumstances as this 
would amount to giving with one hand and taking with the other. This 
became elevated to a rule of law. However, this rule of law approach was 
rejected in UGS Finance Limited V. National Mortgage Bank of Greece 
on the basis that it conflicted with freedom of contract and the intention 
of the parties. The question of whether a clause could exclude liability for 
a fundamental breach was held to be question of construction. In this case 
Pearson LJ observed that, "I think there is rule of construction that 
normally an exception or exclusion clause or similar provision in a 
contract should be construed as not applying to a situation created by a 
fundamental breach of contract. This not an independent rule of law 
imposed by the Court on the parties willy-milly in disregard of their 
contractual intention. On the contrary it is a rule of construction based on 
the intention of the contracting parties." 
The "substantive doctrine" of fundamental breach which earlier 
before the decision of this case established that, however extensive an 
exemption clause might be, it could not exclude liability in respect of the 
breach of a fundamental term or of a fundamental breach was discarded 
by Pearson LJ in UGS Finance case. This view of Pearson LJ was 
subsequently unanimously approved and endorsed by the House of Lords 
TO 
in Suisse Atlantique's case . In this case the plaintiffs for the first time 
argued before the House of Lords that the defendants had been guilty of 
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fundamental breach of contract which prevented them from relying on a 
limiting term. The House of Lords rejected this argument and said that 
there was on the facts no fundamental breach, nor was the provision for 
demurrage a limiting term. It was a statement of agreed damages in the 
event of delay and when the plaintiffs had agreed and elected to affirm 
the contract, and the demurrage clause applied. Their Lordships gave 
considerable importance to the fact of affirmation of the contract by the 
plaintiffs. The five members of the House of Lords were unanimous, 
however the judgments of Lord reid and Lord Upjohn while apparently 
denying the existence of a substantive doctrine which could be interpreted 
as suggesting that, had the contract in the Suisse Atlantique case not been 
affirmed but terminated, the exemption clause would have ceased to 
apply. It seems that this point their Lordships actually had in mind not 
exclusion clauses in general but the demurrage clause involved in this 
case. A demurrage clause will not apply once the ship owner has 
terminated by "sailing away" since it is only designed to apply to delays 
while the ship under the charterers control. This dicta were seized upon 
by the Court of Appeal in Harbutt 's Plasticine Ltd. V. Wayne Tank and 
Pump Co. Ltd?"^ as showing that the 'substantive rule" still applied if the 
contract had been terminated. Lord Denning MR Summarized his view 
thus: 
"Before leaving this part of the case I would just like to say what, 
in my opinion, is the result of the Suisse Atlantique case. It affirms the 
long line of the cases in this Court that when one party has been guilty of 
a fundamental breach of the contract, that is, a breach which goes to the 
very root of it, and the other side accepts it, so that the contract comes to 
an end ... then the guilty party cannot rely on an exception or limitation 
clause to escape from his liability from the breach. 
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If the innocent party, on getting to know of the breach, does not 
accept it, but keeps the contract in being ... then it is a matter of 
construction whether the guilty party can rely on the exception or 
limitation clause." 
It was unfortunate that the first modem consideration of the topic 
by the House of Lords have involved a typical facts and arguably not 
presented a fundamental breach situation at all. A further difficulty was 
that their Lordships attached considerable significance to the fact that the 
plaintiffs had affirmed the contract. This led some to think that exemption 
clauses might be disregarded in deciding whether there had been a 
sufficient breach to entitle the injured party to terminate the contract and 
that if he did so the excluding or limiting clauses could be treated as 
ineffective. This lack of total clarity in the speeches in the House of Lords 
was followed by a series of decisions in the Court of Appeal, which 
behaved as if the House of Lords had never spoken at all. Harbutt's case 
decided by the Court of Appeal is one of them and it continued to treat 
fundamental breach as a rule of law.''° 
This indiscipline was corrected in Photo Production Ltd. V. 
Securicor Transport Ltd.^^ In this case the issue was whether the 
termination of the contract prevents an exclusion clause applying to the 
event relied on as the ground for termination. The Court of Appeal held 
that in a number of cases that if the innocent party terminated the contract 
because of a fundamental breach by the other, that got rid of any 
exclusion or limitation clauses which would otherwise have governed the 
defaulter's liability. The argument seemed to be that because the contract 
had come to an end, the clauses had ceased to apply. The Court of Appeal 
held that this exemption could not pvail t-he defendants because they had 
been guilty of a fundamental breach but the House of Lords said, Obiter, 
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in the Suisse Atlantique case tliat this doctrine is unsound as well as 
commercially inconvenient and unanimously reversed the decision of the 
Court of Appeal. 
Lord Wilberforce said that: 
"I have no second thoughts as to the main proposition that the 
question whether, and to what extent, an exclusion clause is to be applied 
to a fiindamental breach, or breach of a fundamental term, breach, or 
indeed to any breach of contract is a matter of construction of the 
contract." 
Thus in this case the House of Lords once again affirmed their 
opinion that the question whether or not an exemption clause protected a 
party to a contract in the event of breach or in the event of what would 
(but for the presence of the exemption clause) have been a breach, 
depended upon the construction of the contract. Even if the breach was so 
serious as to entitle the injured party to treat the contract as repudiated or 
to render further performance impossible, the other party was not 
prevented from relying on the clause. 
In Ailsa Craig Fishing Co. Ltd. V. Malvern Fishing Co. Ltd.'*^ the 
appellants were the owner of a fishing boat which sank in Aberdeen 
harbour. At the time the respondents, Securicor, were required by 
contract with a fishing boat owner's association of which the appellants 
were members to provide a security service in the harbour, and 
specifically for the appellants' vassel. There was a clause in that contract 
limiting the respondents' liability to £ 1000. The contract was in standard 
form. The appellants argued that the clause should not avail the 
respondents as they had totally failed to provide any security cover at all. 
356 
but the House of Lords held that their liability was still limited to £ 1000. 
Lord Wilberforce said that, 
".... One must not strive to create ambiguities by strained 
construction, as I think the appellants have striven to do. The relevants 
words must be given, if possible, their natural, plain meaning clauses of 
limitation are not regarded by the Courts with the same hostility as 
clauses of exclusion; this is because they must be related to the other 
contractual terms, in particular to the risk to which the defending party 
may be exposed, the remuneration which he receives and possibly also 
the opportunity of the other party to insure." 
The need for substantive principle of fundamental breach has 
largely been obviated by the enactment of Unfair Contract Terms Act, 
1977, although certain types of contract are excepted either wholly or 
partly from the operation of the Act. The basic purpose of UCTA, 1977 is 
to restrict the extent to which liability in a contract can be excluded for 
breach of contract and negligence, largely by reference to a 
reasonableness requirement, but in some cases by a specific prohibition. 
The Act does not apply to insurance contracts, the sale of land, contracts 
relating to companies, the sale of shares and the carriage of goods by sea 
(Schedule I) or to international supply contracts (S.26). 
In Photo Production's case Lord Diplock observed that if the 
expression "fundamental breach" was to be retained, it should be 
confined to the ordinary case of a breach of which the consequences are 
such as to entitle the innocent party to elect to put an end to all primary 
obligations of both parties remaining unperformed. Similarly it may be 
supposed that if the expression "fundamental term" is to be retained, it 
should be employed simply as an alternative method of describing a 
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promissory condition. There does not now exist in English law any 
special rule or rules applicable to cases of "fundamental breach" where 
exemption clauses are concerned. No doubt, in deciding whether an 
exemption clause is, on its true construction applicable to a particular 
breach, the Court may reach intended the clause to apply to the breach in 
question because its nature or seriousness is such as not to fall within the 
contemplated ambit of the clause. The parties are less likely to be taken to 
have agreed that one of them shall be excused in the cases of total non-
performance or a performance which is wholly at variance with the object 
of the contract as ascertained from its other terms and the circumstances 
surrounding it. But there is no separate category of "fundamental 
breaches" against which exemption clauses cannot prevail, and, if 
sufficiently clear, they will do so against the most serious and deliberate 
breach.'*'' 
Most of the provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 
apply only to what is termed "business liability". This is defined by 
Section 1(3) as liability arising from things done by a person in the course 
of a business or from the occupation of business premises. The exceptions 
are provided in Sections 6 and 7 where the Act also applies to private 
contracts. The Act gives greatest protection to consumers. Under Section 
12(1) a person "deals as a consumer" if he does not contract in the course 
of a business while the other party does contract in the course of a 
business; and if it is a contract for the supply of goods, they are of a type 
ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption. 
In R & B Customs Brokers Co. Ltd. V. United Dominions Trust 
Ltd!^'^, the plaintiffs bought from the defendant finance company a car 
ciipplied to it by a motor dealer. The plaintiffs, a private company, bought 
the car for the personal and business use of its directors. It had done two 
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or three times before. The conditional sale contract between the plaintiff 
and defendant excluded any implied conditions as to the condition or 
quality of the car or to its fitness for purpose. The car leaked. 
The Court of Appeal held that there was a breach of Section 14(3) 
of the S.G.A. 1979, unless that section was excluded by the terms of the 
contract; and that the plaintiff company was dealing as a consumer, so 
that the obligations under Section 14(3) could not be excluded. The Court 
reached this conclusion, though, surprising applying the same test as is 
used to decide whether of false description has been applied in the course 
of business under the Trade Description Act, 1968: if the transaction is 
only incidental to the business activity rather than integral to it, it is not 
done 'in the course of business' unless a degree of regularity is 
established which had not been shown on the facts. 
Whether this is a sensible outcome may, with respect, be doubted. 
It is true that many small businesses have no more influence in the 
market, and are no more sophisticated as bargainers, than private 
consumers; but the Court of Appeal's approach means that any occasional 
and incidental purchase by a business of goods "of a type ordinarily 
supplied for private use or consumption" will be a consumer sale, 
however, large or sophisticated the buyer. The firm was acting as a 
consumer and that to buy in the course of a business "the buying of cars 
must form as the very least an integral part of the buyer's business or a 
necessary incidental thereto." It was emphasized that only in those 
circumstances could the buyer be said to be on equal footing with his 
seller in terms of bargaining strength. The view of the Court of Appeal 
that where a transaction was only incidental to a business activity, a 
degree of regularity was ••equired before a transaction could be said to be 
an integral part of business carried on and so entered into in the course of 
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that business. Since, here the car was only the second or third vehicle 
acquired by the plaintiffs, there was not a sufficient degree of regularity 
capable of establishing that the contract was anything more than part of a 
consumer transaction. Therefore this was a consumer sale and the implied 
conditions could not be excluded. 
This decision of the Court of Appeal is not easy to reconcile with 
the later decision of the Court of Appeal, in Stevenson V. Rogers.'^^ In this 
case, the defendant was a fisherman who in 1988 sold his fishing boat to 
the plaintiff The plaintiff sought to bring an action on the implied term 
contained in section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1979. The defendant 
argued that although he was in business as a fisherman, he was not in the 
business of selling ships and that therefore the sale was not a business 
sale. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument. They distinguished the 
R&B Customs case on the ground that although both cases involved the 
meaning of the word "business" the word was contained in different 
statutes and therefore did not necessarily have the same meaning. 
Under Section 11(4) of the UCTA, 1977, where the exclusion 
clause seeks to limit liability rather than exclude it completely, the Court 
must have regard to two factors: the resources available to meet the 
liability, and the extent to which insurance cover was available to the 
party aiming to limit liability. 
In George Mitchell V. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd.'^^, the plaintiff a 
farmer bought cabbage seeds from the defendant's national seed 
company. The plaintiff planted the seed but the seed was defective and 
crop was a total failure. The plaintiff claimed over £ 60,000 as damages 
for the breach of contract based on the loss of the crop. The defendant 
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attempted to rely on a clause in the contract which purported to limit their 
liability to the cost of the seeds at £ 201.60, 
The House of Lords held that although the clause was part of the 
agreement and covered this event, it was however, unreasonable. The 
reasons for this were: that it appeared that the normal practice of the 
seller was not to rely on the limitation clause, but to negotiate settlements 
of reasonable claims the breach was due to the seller's negligence and the 
seller could have insured against the loss without materially raising his 
charges. 
In St. Albans District Council V. International Computers Ltd!^^ a 
computer firm was sued by the local authority that had hired them to 
assess population figures on which to base community charges. The 
standard contract used by the computer firm contained a limitation clause 
restricting liability to £ 100,000. The database supplied to the plaintiff 
was seriously inaccurate and resulted ultimately in the local authority 
sustaining a loss of £ 1.3 M. The judge at first instance had held that this 
clause was ineffective because it failed the reasonableness test in UCTA, 
1977. Some of the factors that led to this finding were as follows: 
1. the parties were of unequal bargaining power; 
2. the figure of £ 100,000 maximum liability was small in 
relation to the potential risk and the actual loss in the case; 
3. the defendants held an aggregate of £ 50 M insurance cover 
world-wide; and 
4. the defendants were in a better position to insure (indeed had 
done so and no doubt passed the cost on their customers). 
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In the Court of Appeal the ICL had two arguments: First they 
argued that the council did not "deal" on ICL's written standard terms of 
business, since the council had negotiated over the term of the contract 
before entering it. This failed because, it was held that a party "deals" 
when he enters the contract, irrespective of whether there had been prior 
negotiations. Furthermore, ICL's general conditions remained effectively 
untouched at the end of the negotiations. Secondly, they argued - again 
unsuccessfully - that the clause satisfied the reasonableness test. The 
Court of Appeal, reiterated what was said by the House of Lords in 
George Mitchell's case, to the effect that the trial judge in balancing the 
various factors in deciding the test of reasonableness is satisfied is doing 
something very close to exercising a discretion. Thus the defendant's 
standard conditions of business limited its liability in the circumstances 
which applied to £ 100,000. This limitation was held by the Court of 
Appeal to be unreasonable. In the circumstances of the case the 
defendant's potential liability was far in excess of £ 100,000 and it was 
insured for a much large sum. 
In Stewart Gill V. Horatio Mye/^, the plaintiff made a contract to 
provide a conveyor system for the defendant, with payment of 
installments. The plaintiffs claimed the last 10% but as the conveyor had 
faults, the defendant wished to set off its claim against the payment. The 
plaintiffs standard terms provided that customers could not withhold 
payment because of any "payment, credit, set off, counterclaim, 
allegation of incorrect or defective goods or any other reason 
whatsoever." 
The Court of Appeal held that the clause was not within Section 3 
of the UCTA, 1977 but as it restricted remedies it was within section 
13(l)(b). It was subject to the test of reasonableness and reading the 
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clause as a whole, it was too wide and stopped the defendant using a 
genuine set off. The clause was therefore unreasonable and the plaintiff 
could not rely on it. 
A party to a contract may try to disguise an exclusion clause, even 
though the effect of such a clause is to exclude liability. Section 13(1) of 
the UCTA tries to stop this and prevents: 
a. making the liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive or 
onerous conditions; 
b. excluding or restricting any right or remedy in respect of the 
liability or subjecting a person to any prejudice in consequence of 
his pursuing any such right or remedy; 
excluding or restricting rules of evidence or procedure. 
Such clauses are void or must be reasonable if they exclude or 
restrict liability respectively. Section 13 of the UCTA for example, will 
apply to terms 
(i) imposing a time limit for making claims; 
(ii) limiting a buyer's right to reject defective goods and 
(iii) stating that acceptance of goods shall be regarded as proof of their 
conformity with the contract. 
In Phillips Products Ltd. V. Hylanc^^ the plaintiffs hired an 
excavator and driver from the second defendants, the plant ovmer. The 
contract, by clause 8, provided that drivers "supplied by the owner ... 
shall for all purposes in connection with their employment in the working 
of the plant be regarded as the servants or agents of the hirer who alone 
shall be responsible for all claims arising in connection with the operation 
of the plant by the ... drivers." 
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The driver negligently drove the excavator into collision with and 
damaged the plaintiffs' building. On the plaintiffs' claim for damages for 
negligence against the driver and the second defendants the judge giving 
judgment for the plaintiffs, held that clause 8 did not satisfy "the 
requirement of reasonableness" in section 2(2) of Unfair Contract Terms 
Act, 1977 and, accordingly, the second defendants were precluded from 
relying on the clause as exempting them from liability for negligence. 
In recent cases certain guidelines regarding reasonableness have 
emerged, in addition to those provided by the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 
1977, which may be of general application. For example the test of 
reasonableness must be applied to the term as a whole and not merely on 
that part of it which is relied upon by the party. Although it is not 
necessary to apply the guidelines laid down in Schedule 2 of Unfair 
Contract Terms Act, 1977 to the test of reasonableness required under 
Section 6 and 7, they are now regarded as being of general application. 
Under the UCTA 1977, the reasonableness must be determined at the 
time of the contract and subsequent reliance is not relevant. Although the 
Act uses the words "except in so far as the term satisfies the requirement 
of reasonableness," the powers of the Court under this provision of the 
Act are limited to declaring the term either to be effective or of no effect. 
The Courts cannot alter the terms of the contract nor they re-write the 
terms. They can only interpret or declare it effective or ineffective. 
The Courts have made great efforts to elevate the status of the party 
in a weaker bargaining position and protected the individual against the 
practices of using the unfair terms in the contracts especially in standard 
form by the party in stronger bargaining position and also protected the 
individuals against the persons, firms c- companies who persist in a 
course of conduct which was detrimental to their interest. While doing so 
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the Courts kept the basic rules of the law of contract, established long 
ago, intact. 
Many Courts in the United Kingdom while adjudicating showed 
remarkable skill in reaching 'just' decision by interpreting and construing 
ambiguous clauses of the contract against their maker before the 
enactment of the Unfair Terms Act, 1977 and even after the enactment. 
The test of reasonableness is a strong weapon in the hands of Courts to 
come to a 'just' decision. This Act had made the job of the Court 
somehow easy and the individuals who were the sufferers earlier now 
feels more safe and secure against the terms which are found to be unfair 
or one-sided. 
In India the Courts of law could declare a contract void or voidable 
only if it fall under one or other provision of the Indian Contract Act 
1872. The relevant provisions are contained in sections 16, 19-A, 23, 27 
and 28 of the contract Act. There is not a single provision in the contract 
Act or the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 whereby the Courts can give relief to 
the consumer or the party in a weaker bargaining position by holding any 
term of the contract as unreasonable or unfair. 
Standard form contract mostly contain such unfair terms in it and 
the party in a weaker bargaining position is not in a position to negotiate 
regarding the terms which he thinks are unfair or unreasonable. The 
existing provisions contained in the contract Act are not adequate to come 
to the rescue of the weaker party against harsh and one-sided contract 
only beneficial to the party in the strong bargaining position. The judicial 
response in India has been that the Courts very often came to the rescue 
of the parties fi-om the menace of unreasonable and unfair terms in 
standard form of contracts relating to the sale and purchase of goods. 
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contracts of employments also the contracts relating to hiring of services 
and the contracts of insurance etc. But on the basis of past experience one 
may say that in the majority of cases where the weaker party under 
pressure of situation and the circumstances generally economic or due to 
ignorance arising out of inequality of bargaining power, enters into such 
contracts and the Court, though willing to help the party in a weaker 
position, are unable to do so in the absence of any specific provision in 
the contract Act 1872 or any other law. Courts sometimes resorted to take 
help from the principles of public policy. The Courts declared some 
contracts as against public policy but much reliance cannot be placed on 
this because the public policy is very vague term and it is also not 
possible to define it. In the absence of any specific law the Courts too are 
unable to give relief to the aggrieved party if he is a victim of a contract 
which has unfair or unreasonable term. 
The Assam High Court in Rukmanand Ajitsaria V. Airway India 
Ltd.^^ held that the liability of internal carrier by airways who is not 
governed by the Indian Carriage by Air Act, 1934 or by the Carriers Act 
1865 is governed by the English Common Law since adopted in India and 
not by the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 
A Division Bench of Assam High Court headed by Sarjoo Prasad 
C.J. and H. Deka J., held that the clause in a contract of carriage by air 
gave the carrier-company complete immunity from liability and it could 
not be impugned on the ground that it is hit by section 23 of the Indian 
Contract Act, because the Contract Act has no application to the case not 
it can be said to be opposed to public policy. Exemption clauses of this 
nature have been upheld by the Courts and there being no other statutory 
bar as provided under the Indian carriage by Air Act which have no 
application to this case. 
366 
In the case of Indian Airlines Corporation V. Madhury 
Chowdhuri there was a claim in the suit for damages for a death of a 
passenger in a plane crash. The exemption clause of the airline provided 
that "the airline shall be under no liability whatsoever to passenger, 
his/her heirs, legal representative or dependents for death, injury or 
delay...." 
The Calcutta High Court held that the obligation imposed by law 
on common carriers in India is not founded upon contract, but on the 
exercise of public employment for reward. The liability of common 
carriers in India is not affected by contract Act. Therefore, no question of 
testing the validity of this exemption clause with reference to section 23 
of the contract Act at all arise. The contract Act does not profess to be a 
complete code dealing with law relating to contracts. An exemption 
clause of this kind was not hit by any section of the Contract Act be it 
section 23 or any other section because the contract Act itself had no 
application. 
The Rajasthan High Court in Singhal Transport V. Jesararri^ has 
held that, "wherever, on the face of the goods, tickets words to the effect 
for conditions see back" are printed the person concerned is a matter of 
law held to be bound by the conditions subject to which the ticket is 
issued whether he takes care to read the conditions if they are printed on 
the back or to ascertain them if it is stated on the back of the ticket where 
they are to be found. Where on the other hand the words printed on the 
face of the ticket do not indicate that the ticket is issued subject to certain 
conditions but there are merely words to the effect "see back" then it is 
question of fact whether or not the carrier did that which was reasonably 
sufficient to give notice of the condition to the person concerned. If 
however, conditions are printed on the back of the ticket, but there are no 
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words at all on the face of it to draw the attention of the person concerned 
to them then it has been held he is not bound by the conditions. 
This view taken by the Rajasthan High Court is based on the 
principle evolved and developed by common law of reasonable 
sufficiency of notice. Under the principle if a person is aware of terms of 
the contract at the time or before making the contract, he is bound by the 
terms otherwise if he is not aware of the terms and conditions of the 
contract he is not bound by them. The Madras High Court in Indian 
Airlines Corporation V. Jathaji Maniram^^ has held that a common 
carrier is a person who profess himself ready to carry goods for 
everybody. He is considered to be in the position of an insurer with 
regard to the goods entrusted to him and so his liability is higher. 
But when it is expressly stipulated between the parties that a carrier 
is not a common carrier that conclusively shows that the carrier is not 
liable as a common carrier. And even assuming that the carrier would be 
deemed to be a common carrier or held liable as such it was open to such 
a carrier to contract himself out of the liability as common carrier or fix 
the limit of liability. 
As early as in 1909 Shankaran J. in the case of Shaikh Mohd. 
Ravuther v. B.I.S.N. Co.^^, in his dissenting judgment expessed the 
opinion that Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 hits such 
exemption clauses but his view has been rejected by the High Courts in 
later decisions i.e. Rukmanand V. Airways (India) Ltd.^^ and Indian 
Airlines Corporation V. Madhuri Chowdhury 
CO 
The Madras High Court in Maddala Thathiah V. Union of India 
held that a clause in the contract for the supply of jaggery by the appellant 
to the Railway Administration of the respondent which empowered the 
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administration to cancel the contract at any stage was void and 
unenforceable. 
The Court was of the view that the clause did not indicate that the 
Railway should give any reasons, still less, valid and sufficient reasons 
for the cancellation of the contract. The clause purported to confer an 
absolute and arbitrary on one of the parties to cancel the contract, and was 
therefore void and unenforceable. 
This view of the Madras High Court was confirmed and upheld by 
the Supreme Court^' but on a different ground. The Supreme Court did 
not pronounce on the validity of the clause in the contract. The Court 
said. 'In view of the construction we have placed on the contract between 
the parties it is not necessary to decide the other contention urged for the 
appellant that the stipulation in the note amounted to a term in the 
contract and, therefore, was valid, a contention to which the reply of the 
respondent is that any such term in a contract which destroys the contract 
itself according to the earlier terms is void as in that case there would be 
nothing in the alleged contract which would have been binding on the 
appellant. We are of the opinion that the order of the High Court is 
correct." 
In another case before the Madras High Court''^ the laundry receipt 
of the appellant contained the condition, on the reverse of the bill which 
was handed over by the firm of launderers to his customer when receiving 
the article, that the customer would be entitled to claim only 50 per cent 
of the market price or value of the article in case of loss. A garment of a 
customer given for cleaning was lost due to the negligence. The firm 
insisted that in accordance with the terms, they were bound to pay only 
50 per cent of the market value of the lost garment. The question that 
369 
arose for the consideration before the Court was whether the condition 
printed on the bill was valid in law and if it could be enforced as between 
the parties. 
The High Court said that it appears very clear that a term which is 
prima facie opposed both to public policy and to the fundamental 
principles of the law of contract cannot be enforced by a Court, merely, 
because it is printed on the reverse of a bill and there is a tacit acceptance 
of the term when the bill was received by the customer. Certainly, the 
conditions printed on the reverse of a bill may well govern or modify any 
simple contract, such as the contract in the present case which was to 
entrust an article for dry cleaning and to pay due charges for that service, 
subject to the obligation on the part of the businessman to perform the 
process properly and to return the articles safe and intact. But if a 
condition is opposed which is in flagrant infringement of the law relating 
to negligence, and a bill containing this printed condition is served on the 
customer, the Court will not enforce such a term which is not in the 
interest of the public and which is not in accordance with public policy. 
In International Oil Co. V. Indian Oil Corpf"^ there was a contract 
of agency to supply Koresene between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
The defendant reserved a right under to contract to cancel the plaintiffs 
dealership at any time without assigning any reason. On cancellation of 
the agency by the defendant, the plaintiff filed a suit. The suit was 
decreed on the ground that the term in the contract to cancel the 
dealership of the plaintiff, was an unfair term. 
In appeal filed by the defendant the only question that arose for 
consideration before the High Court was whether the Indian Oil 
Corporation can terminate the agency with the plaintiff without any 
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notice. The Madras High Court was of the view that such a clause in the 
contract is absolutely illegal, irregular and void. It is unfair on the part of 
the corporation to terminate the agency without due regard to the equities 
of an agent and without just provocation to cancel. 
In matters between the parties to contracts of sale of goods or 
services there are terms in contracts in standard form regarding restricting 
choice of jurisdiction to adjudicate the matters between them or terms in 
standard form contract for selecting a particular Court to adjudicate, 
different High Courts had divergent observations till this was decidedly 
resolved by the Apex Court in the case oiHakam Singh V. Gammon.^^ A 
few illustrative cases may be cited here. 
In a civil revision of-S. Manuel Raj and Co. V. J. Manilal & Co.^^, 
the question for consideration before the Gujarat High Court was, 
whether a party signing an order form, wherein it was printed in bold 
letters "subject to Madras jurisdiction", is bound by it and the jurisdiction 
of other Court is excluded? 
The Gujarat High Court observed that where one of the parties to a 
contract signs a printed form printed by the other party containing the 
words subject to the jurisdiction of a place and sends the order form to the 
other party it must be assumed that, that party agreed that a particular 
agreed place is for the settlement of disputes. It is not open to a person 
who signs an order form of the opposite party containing the printed 
words to say that the printed words are not part of the contract. When the 
attention of the Court was drawn towards a judgment of Madras High 
Court in Patel Bros V. Vadilal Kashidas Ltd.^^ in which the Madras High 
Court observed that the words "subject to Bombay jurisdiction" printed 
on a document which evidenced the contract did not exclude the 
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jurisdiction of any other Court and that the ouster of jurisdiction of a 
Court to which a person is entitled to resort to under the Civil Procedure 
Code or any other statute can not be a matter of assumption or 
presumption but one to be proved by express words contained in the 
contract or at least by necessary or inevitable implication. 
To this finding of Madras High Court, the Gujarat High Court said 
that, to take the view taken by the learned Judge of Madras High Court 
would be to upset the commercial practice of India and unless such a 
position is necessary in view of the wording of any particular section the 
Court view of the wording of any particular section the Court is not 
prepared to upset the commercial practice of India unless the law requires 
to do so. There is nothing in the law to hold that the expression "subject 
to jurisdiction of Q" printed at the top of a form may not bind "M" who 
signed the order form. 
But later, the same Gujarat High Court held otherwise. A note of 
caution was sounded by Justice M.P. Thakkar of Gujarat High Court, as 
he then was, in Snehalkumar Sarabhai V M/s Economic Transport 
Organization^^ observing that, "a new approach to this question deserves 
to be made for the ouster clause is calculated to operate as an engine of 
oppression and as a means to defeat the ends of justice." 
In this case opponent - defendant a public carrier, had failed to 
deliver a consignment of goods worth Rs. 1207.92 Ps to the petitioner-
plaintiff without any just cause and on merits was liable to reimburse him 
for the loss. The trial Court at Ahmedabad had reftised to pass a decree 
granting relief solely on the ground that there was a printed clause at the 
back of transport receipt obliging the consignor to institute a suit in the 
Calcutta Courts only. 
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The Hon'ble High Court observed that, "Not frequently the Courts 
slam the door of the temple of justice in the face of a pilgrim (who has 
admittedly been wronged) at the behest of the proved wrongdoer solely 
on the ground that he has knocked at a different door. So often the Court 
considers itself to be helpless and turn away the hapless pilgrim under a 
mistaken assumption that entry is barred from the said door. The present 
case illustrates the point..." 
The Gujarat High Court was of the view that while the parties can 
lawfiilly enter into an agreement to restrict a dispute to a particular Court 
having jurisdiction that stipulation though valid cannot take away the 
jurisdiction. The ouster clause can operate as estoppel against the parties 
to the contract. It cEinnot tie the hands of the Court and denude it of the 
power to do justice. The High Court came down heavily on the practice 
of excluding the jurisdiction of a Court which it possesses otherwise. The 
Court observed that the parties can lawfully enter into an agreement 
restricting a dispute to a particular Court having jurisdiction and 
ordinarily the Courts would respect the agreement but the stipulation can 
be ignored by the excluded Court if it is considered to be oppressive 
having regard to surrounding circumstances and the stakes involved. 
In Hakam Singh V. Gammon (India) Ltd!'^ the Hon'ble Supreme 
Court said it is not open to the parties by agreement to confer by their 
agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it does not possess under the 
Code of Civil Procedure. But where two Courts or more have under the 
Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding, an 
agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be 
tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an 
agreement does not contravene section 28 cf the- Indian Contract Act 
1872. 
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To the same effect there is a decision of Andhra Pradesh High 
Court in B.A. Transport Co. V. Bankatlaf'^ where the Hon'ble High Court 
said that the parties by a concluded £ind binding agreement can choose to 
have the jurisdiction of one of the Courts where part of the cause of 
action arose, and can exclude the other Court. The condition precedent 
for such exercise of choice is that part of the cause of action should arise 
in the Court where the parties agreed to have the disputes adjudicated and 
also in the Courts excluded by agreement. The contract between the 
parties with regard to the exclusion of jurisdiction of a Court can either 
express or implied but the contract should be unequivocal and should be 
precise and definite. The contract is binding and conclusive on the parties 
to the agreement but it cannot be fastened on the third parties unless it is 
satisfactorily shown that the third party is privy to the contract or acted 
upon the contract consciously knowing the fact and implications of the 
said agreement. It must be shown that the third party is made aware of the 
implications of the agreement. 
In a civil revision of M/s Patel Roadways Pvt. Ltd. v. The Republic 
fro 
Forge Co. Ltd. the Andhra Pradesh High Court said that in the absence 
of proof that the parties agreed that only a particular Court should have 
jurisdiction, it cannot be postulated that such a condition should be 
deemed to be an integral part of the agreement. 
These above two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court have 
been approved by a Full Bench of the Andhra High Court in M/s East 
India Transport Agency v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.^^ where the High 
Court said, "we approve these two decisions and further said that in the 
event of entrustment of goods to a carrier under a consignment note and a 
claim arising out of such a contract, the third party to the consignment 
note is not bound by the terms and conditions contained in the 
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consignment note the dispute unless it is shown that such a third party's 
attention is specifically drawn to such a clause contained in the 
consignment note and he is made aware of its implications. Such a term 
excluding the jurisdiction the Court cannot bind a third party unless it is 
shown that he acted upon the contract consciously knowing the effect and 
implications of such a contract/^" 
A case having similar facts also came up for consideration before 
the Kerala High Court. In the case of Economic Transport V. United 
India Insurance Co. Ltd. In this case also a way bill or receipt contained 
printed words "subject to Calcutta jurisdiction only." The question arose 
before the High Court of Kerala that whether these printed words 
constitute an agreement to oust the jurisdiction of all Courts other than 
the Calcutta Court and whether the exclusion clause would be valid? 
The High Court held that when there is a choice of forum, it is 
certainly open to the parties to agree on an exclusive forum for settlement 
of disputes. But such an agreement must be clearly spelled out either by 
express words or by necessary implication. Ouster of jurisdiction cannot 
be lightly assumed or presumed. If there is such a agreement it will 
certainly operate as estoppel against the parties to the contract. If it is 
merely a unilateral affirmation or statement made by one of the parties as 
long as it is not shown that the statement has been accepted by the other 
party as a term or condition of the agreement, it cannot be held that there 
is an agreement to confer exclusive jurisdiction of any Court. The Court 
was of the view that particular caution is necessary in regard to such a 
clause contained in a printed form as in this case. Where a printed form is 
signed by both the parties or where a form printed by one party is signed 
by other party and forward by the latter to the former and the printed form 
contains clear words conferring exclusive jurisdiction on a Court at any 
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particular place or ousting jurisdiction of the Court at any otlier place, it 
may, in view of the High Court, not be difficult to hold that the parties 
have agreed on such a term. The High Court said that even in such cases, 
Courts must remember that people often sign order forms containing a 
good deal of printed matter without caring to read what is printed. It 
cannot always be said that everything which is printed may be deemed to 
form part of the contract. The Court further gave the example of a 
situation where a form printed by one party is signed only by that party 
and delivered to the other party, without anything more it will be difficult 
for the Court to hold that there has been consensus ad idem in regard to 
the particular clause. There should be some other material to indicate 
acceptance or consent of the party who received the printed form, then 
the Court is free to infer that the clause formed part of the agreement. 
Parties to a contract are free to choose one out of the two or more 
forums to get matter adjudicated, if more than one Court have concurrent 
jurisdiction. By an agreement between the parties they can restrict forum 
to one of the Courts having such jurisdiction. Ouster of Court's 
jurisdiction should not be easily construed and could not be assumed or 
presumed very easily. Ouster of jurisdiction must be proved by express 
words or by necessary or inevitable implications. In the case of A^s Road 
Transport Corporation V. M/s Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. the question that 
arose for consideration before Bombay High Court was whether a 
consignment note which was not signed either by the consignee or by the 
consignor operates as a special contract given though the carrier had not 
brought such terms specifically to the notice of the consignor or 
consignee? The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court said that the 
most important question that has to be answered is: Did the defendant do 
what was sufficient to draw the plaintiffs attention to the relevant 
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condition before the contract was concluded? In the facts of the present 
case the last condition was to restrict the jurisdiction to a particular Court 
out of the two Courts having concurrent jurisdiction. 
The High Court said that in order that terms or conditions on the 
overleaf of a consignment note passed by common carrier be binding on 
the consignor or consignee and in order that it should operate as a special 
contract between the consignor or consignee on the one hand and the 
carrier on the other hand, the consignment note must be signed by the 
consignor and consignee and constitute a contractual document or at least 
must be identified as an integral part of the contractual document. In case 
of unsigned document and unsigned consignment notes containing 
clauses limiting the liability of the carriers as well as excluding the 
jurisdiction of certain Courts and restricting it to specific Courts only, 
such clauses, terms or conditions must be brought to the notice of the 
consignor of the goods. If such terms or conditions are not brought to the 
notice specifically would not be bound by these terms and it would be 
open for them to file a suit in any competent Court having jurisdiction 
other than one mentioned in the clauses excluding jurisdiction of other 
Courts. The High Court agreed with principles laid down and developed 
by common law and observed that when more than one Courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction to try a suit in order to exclude jurisdiction of one 
Court such condition required explicit warning. It must be brought to the 
notice before hand and preferably printed in red ink or printed by a hand 
in the red ink on the face of the document as observed by Lord Denning 
MR. 
In the A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. V. A.P. Agencies Salerri'^ the 
question for the consideration bcfort the Hon'ble Supreme Court was 
whether the clause in the agreement of sale between the parties ousted the 
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jurisdiction of the other Court except that in the agreement? In this case 
the clause in the agreement provided that, "any dispute arising out of this 
sale shall be subject to Kaira (Gujarat) jurisdiction." 
The Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that where such an 
ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of 
jurisdiction of other Courts. When the clause is clear, unambiguous and 
specific accepted notions of contact would bind the parties and unless the 
absence of ad idem can be shown, the other Courts should avoid 
exercising jurisdiction. The Court further observed that as regards 
construction of the ouster clause when words like "alone", "only", 
"exclusive", and the like have been used there may be no difficulty. Even 
without such words in appropriate cases the maxim "expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius" - expression of one is the exclusion of another may be 
applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. 
In such a case mention of one thing may imply exclusion of another. 
When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude 
all other from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore 
to be properly construed. The Court said that if such a contract is clear, 
unambiguous and explicit and not vague it is not hit by Sections 23 and 
28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. This cannot be understood as parties 
contracting against the Statutes. Mercantile law and practice permit such 
agreements. 
In the matter of Patel Roadways Limited V. M/s Prasad Trading 
Co.^^ the question that arose for consideration before the Apex Court was 
whether in view of the relevant clause in the contract between the parties 
the Courts at Bombay alone had jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the 
other Courts at Madras where the two suits were instituted was ban cd? 
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The Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained and 
interpreted the Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code and the 
Explanation annexed to it. The Bench also reiterated its views given 
earlier in the case of Hakam Singh V. Gammon'^ and Globe Transport 
Corp V. Triveni Engg. Works (1983) 4 SCC 707, and observed that 
where two Courts or more have under the code of Civil Procedure 
jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding on agreement between the parties 
that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not 
contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not contravene Section 
28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 
This view was expressed by the Supreme Court for the first time in 
Hakam Singh V. Gammon. This was the first leading case of the Apex 
Court on the point of conferring jurisdiction on a Court. After this 
decision in a number of cases this principle was followed. This was 
followed in Globe Transport Corp. V. Triveni Engg. Works (1983) 4 SCC 
707, A.B.C. LaminartPvt. Ltd. V. A.P. Agency Salem (1989) 2 SCR 1-AIR 
1989 S.C. 1239, Patel Roadways V. Prasad Trading Co. AIR 1992 S.C. 
1514, R.S.D. V. Finance Co. Ltd V. Shree Vallab Glass Works Ltd (1993) 
2 SCC 130, New Moga Transport Co. V. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 
(2004) 4 SCC 677. 
Again this principle was followed by the Hon 'hie Supreme Court 
in Harshad Chiman Lai V. D.L.F. Universal LtdJ^ In this matter there 
was an appeal against the order passed by the Additional District Judge, 
Delhi, in an original suit and confirmed by the High Court of Delhi in 
Civil Revision holding that Delhi Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit 
and the plaint should be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the 
proper Court. In this case also the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated and 
expressed the same views as laid down in the matter of Hakam Singh V. 
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Gammon that it is not open to the parties to confer jurisdiction by their 
agreement, on a Court which it does not possess under the Code of Civil 
Procedure. The Court was of the view that jurisdiction of civil Courts is 
created by statute and cannot be created or conferred by the consent of 
the parties upon a Court which has not been granted territorial or 
pecuniary or other jurisdiction by statute. Under Section 28 of the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872, the parties by their agreement are not permitted to 
totally exclude the jurisdiction of civil Court which has been created by 
statute. The Court further explained the principle that however, where 
several civil Courts have territorial jurisdiction in respect of a suit, parties 
may by agreement confine themselves to any one or more such Civil 
Courts and such an agreement would not be violative of section 28 of the 
Indian Contract Act, 1872. 
Similar views were also expressed by the Allahabad High Court in 
77 
M/s P.R. Transport Agency V. Union of India. The important question 
that arose for consideration before the High Court was whether by ouster 
clause in the agreement, can parties oust the jurisdiction of the High 
Court provided under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? In this 
case there was an e-auction for certain coal in different lots. The 
petitioner submitted its tender or bid in the said e-auction and the 
petitioner's bid was accepted for 4000 metric tons of coal. There was a 
clause in the agreement which provided that any dispute arising out of 
this scheme shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Jharkhand High 
Court. The petitioner's contention was that the communication of the 
acceptance of the tender was received by him at District Chandauli Uttar 
Pradesh, and the contract from which the dispute arose was completed at 
Chandauli Uttar Pradesh hence the Allahabad High Court had territorial 
jurisdiction to adjudicate. 
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The Division Bencli of Allahabad High Court accepted the 
contention of the petitioner and observed that the Section 20 of the Civil 
Procedure Code for the Civil Courts and Article 226 of the Constitution 
of India for the High Courts permit the exercise of territorial jurisdiction 
where the cause of action wholly or in part arises within their territories. 
But there is one vital difference namely that while the jurisdiction to pass 
a decree accrues to the civil Court only upon institution of filing a plaint 
and the civil Court cannot act suo motu, but under Article 226 of the 
Constitution of India the power to issue writs, orders or directions is not 
necessarily dependent upon filing a writ petition. The High Court has the 
power to act suo motu if an appropriate matter comes to its knowledge 
may be received by the High Court by means of writ petition or 
otherwise. The High Court was of the view that the power of judicial 
review given to the High Courts by Article 226 of the Constitution of 
India and being a basic feature of the Constitution cannot be curtailed 
even by Statutes as held by the Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra 
Kumar V. Union of India (AIR 1997 S.C. 1125). Therefore, the said 
constitutional power of the High Court to issue writ suo motu cannot be 
curtailed by an agreement between the litigants. 
In line with the already established legal position Chhatisgarh High 
no 
Court in M/s Shriram Steels, Raipur V. M/s Vandana Trailers, Sakti, 
held that making of contract gives rise to a cause of action and a suit can 
be filed at a place where the cause of action arises. Thus the suit can be 
instituted at a place where the contract is made or concluded. 
Thus on the basis of the analysis of the above decided cases of 
different High Courts and the Hon'ble Supreme Court the established 
legal position on the basic, of judicial response is that the parties by their 
agreement are not permitted to totally excluded the jurisdiction of civil 
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Court which has been created by the statutes. But the parties may by 
agreement restrict their choice to one or more such Courts which 
otherwise possess territorial jurisdiction under the code of Civil 
Procedure. The other condition is that where there is a clause for vesting a 
jurisdiction in particular Court authorized to adjudicate the disputes 
between the parties, in a printed form, order form or consignment note 
etc. the other party must be aware of the clause of the contract. If the 
other party is not aware of the clause then he will be not bound by that 
term. The knowledge of the other party may be proved by his signature 
on the document but where, there is unsigned document then the fact of 
knowledge may be proved by cogent and convincing evidence that the 
other party was made aware of the clause restricting jurisdiction. 
The parties cannot rest jurisdiction in a Court which it does not 
have under the Code of Civil Procedure. Where several Courts have 
territorial jurisdiction in respect of a suit, parties may by their agreement 
confine themselves to any one of such civil Courts and such an agreement 
is not violative of section 28 of Indian Contract Act, 1872, the Code of 
Civil Procedure or any other law of the land. 
Standard form contracts very often have terms which are 
unconscionable, unfair and unreasonable but this not so that every time 
where there is a contract in standard form it is unfair, but these types of 
contracts which have terms, unfair or unreasonable are found in various 
types business. Whether the contracts of sale of goods, contracts of hiring 
services or the contracts of employment and insurance, the unfair terms 
may be found. Existing provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 are 
not enough and sufficient to deal the menace created by these types of 
contracts having unfair terms. The Courts in ^ndia- had on several 
occasions took the stand against these unfair and unreasonable terms and 
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rescued the weaker party from the menace of unreasonable terms in 
standard form contracts. If a case does not fall within any of the section 
of Contract Act or any other statute, then the Courts, though willing to 
help the party in a weaker bargaining position, in the absence of any 
specific law are unable to help. 
The unfairness of contractual terms by the "authorities" which are 
"State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India 
arose for consideration before the Supreme Court. The irrationality or 
arbitrariness of the clauses in such contracts was considered in the 
context of Article 14 of the Constitution. 
In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath 
Ganguly'^ the Supreme Court for the first time considered the principle of 
unconscionability outside the purview of section 16 of the Indian Conract 
Act and tried to broaden its limits. In this case the appellant was a 
Government Company. There was another company carrying the same 
business as the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, a scheme of 
arrangement was made between the said Corporation and that company 
with the approval of the High Court of Calcutta. Under the scheme of 
arrangement, an officer of the company could accept the job in the 
Corporation or in the alternative, leave the job and receive a meagre 
amount by way of compensation. Rule 9(i) of the relevant Rules of the 
Corporation provided that the services of officers could be terminated by 
giving three months' notice. The petitioner's service was terminated and 
he challenged this rule as arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution 
and alleged that a term in contract of employment of this kind entered 
into a by a private employer which was unfair, unreasonable and 
unconscionable was bad in law. 
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This clause (i) in Rule 9 was struck down by the High Court. Then 
the Corporation appealed before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
considered the meaning of unconscionability and to explain its meaning 
the Apex Court relied upon the "Restatement of Law (Second)" as 
promulgated and adopted by the American Law Institute (Volume II) 
dealing with the law of contracts and Section 208 defining 
'Unconscionable Contracts Term". The Court also discussed and 
explained the concept of "distributive justice" i.e. the removal of 
economic inequalities and rectifying the injustice resulting from dealings 
or transactions between unequals in the society. 
The Court also explained the concept of unreasonableness and 
inequality of bargaining power with the help of some decided English 
cases as Gillespie Bros. & Co. Ltd. V. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd. (1973) 
I All ER 193, Lloyds Bank Ltd V. Bundy (1974) 3 All ER 757, Schroeder 
Music Publishing Co. V. Macaulay (1974) 3 All ER 616. After discussing 
above judgments of English Courts and the law in U.K. and U.S.A. the 
Court observed that there might be myriad situations which result in 
unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing wholly 
disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. These cases can neither 
be enumerated fully nor illustrated. The Court must judge each case on its 
own facts and circumstances. The Court said the above principle would 
apply where the inequality of bargaining power is the result of the great 
disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties or where the 
inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the 
parties or not, or where the weaker party is in a position in which he 
could obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms 
imposed by the stronger party or go without them or where a man had no 
choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract 
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or to sign on the dotted line in the prescribed or standard form or to 
accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however, unfair, unreasonable 
and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules might be. 
Thus the Supreme Court held and declared that clause (i) of Rule 9 
of the "Service Discipline and Appeals Rules 1979" of the Central Inland 
Water Corporation Ltd. is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract 
Act, 1872 as being opposed to public policy and is also Ultra Vires 
Article 14 of the Constitution of India to the extent that it confers upon 
the Corporation the right to terminate the employment of a permanent 
employee by giving him three months' notice in writing or paying him 
the equivalent of three months' basic pay and deamess allowance in lieu 
of such notice. 
In Uptron India Ltd. V. Shammi Bhan^'^ the Division Bench of the 
Supreme Court held that conferment of "permanent" status on an 
employee guarantees security of tenure. It is now well settled that the 
services of a permanent employee, whether employed by the 
Government, or Government Company or Government instrumentality or 
Statutory Corporation or any other "Authority" within the meaning of 
Article 12, cannot be terminated abruptly and arbitrarily, either by giving 
him a month's or three months' notice or pay in lieu thereof or even 
without notice, notwithstanding that there may be a stipulation to that 
effect either in the contract of service or in the certified Standing 
Orders.^' 
In the matter of Delhi Transport Corporation V. D.T.C. Mazdoor 
Congress the question that arose for consideration before the 
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was, whether the Regulation 
9(b) of Delhi Transport Authority (Condition of Appointment and 
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Service) Regulations (1952) framed under Section 53 of the Delhi Road 
Transport Act, 1950 which provided for termination of services of 
permanent employees on giving simply one month's notice or pay in lieu 
thereof without recording any reason and without holding any inquiry 
was constitutionally valid? 
The ratio of Brojo Nath 's case was upheld per majority in this 
case. The majority view was taken by four judges and minority view by 
Sabyasachi mukharji C.J. The Supreme Court held that there is no 
hesitation to conclude that the impugned Regulation 9(b) of the 
Regulations is arbitrary, unjust, unfair and unreasonable offending Article 
14, 16(1) 19(l)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. It is also opposite to the 
public policy and thereby is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract 
Act, 1872.^ '* 
In this case the Supreme Court reiterated his views as expressed in 
Brojo Nath's case and the Court approved the judgment of that case and 
held that the ratio in that case was correctly laid and requires no 
reconsideration and the cases are to be decided in the light of the law laid 
above. 
O f 
In Ramana Dayaram Shetty V. International Authority of India a 
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that in a welfare State a 
regulating and dispensing special services including contracts, the citizen 
derives rights or privileges by entering into favourable relations with the 
Government. The Government therefore cannot anchor its role as a 
private person. The exercise of power or discrimination to award contract 
etc. must be structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory 
standards or norms. 
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In West Bengal State Electricity Board V. Desk Bandhu Ghosh , 
the first respondent, a permanent employee of the West Bengal Electricity 
Board filed a writ petition out of which the appeal arose in the Calcutta 
High Court to quash an order dated March 22, 1984 of the Secretary, 
West Bengal State Electricity Board terminating his services as Deputy 
Secretary with immediate effect on payment of three months' salary in 
lieu of three months' notice. The order was made under Regulation 34 of 
the Board's Regulations which enabled the Board to terminate the 
services of any permanent employee. 
The Calcutta High Court struck down the first paragraph of 
Regulation 34 and quashed the order of termination of services of the 
employee, the first respondent. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the 
Regulation is totally arbitrary and confers on the Board a power which is 
capable of vicious discrimination. It is a naked "hire and fire" rule the 
time for banishing which altogether from employer - employee 
relationship is fast approaching. It is only parallel is to be found in the 
Henry VIII class so familiar to administrative lawyer. 
In M C. Mehta V. Union of India a Constitution Bench of the 
Supreme Court held that it is dangerous to exonerate Corporations from 
the need to have constitutional conscience which makes governmental 
agencies whatever their mien amenable to constitutional limitations; the 
Court must adopt such standards as against the alternative of permitting 
them to flourish as an imperium in emperio. It was further observed that 
law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society 
and keep abreast with the economic developments taking place in the 
country. As new situations arise the law has to evolve in order to meet the 
challenge of such new situations. Law cannot afford to remain static. Tiie 
Court has to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which arise 
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in highly industrialized economy. Therefore, when new challenges are 
thrown open, the law must grow as a social engineering to meet the 
challenges and every endeavour should made to cope with the 
contemporary demands to meet socio-economic challenges under rule of 
law and have to be met either by discarding the old and unsuitable or 
adjusting legal system to changing socio-economic scenario. 
Similar views were expressed by Justice K. Ramaswamy in the 
QQ 
case of DTC v. DTC Mazdoor Congress where he observed that the law 
of contract, like the legal system itself, involves a balance between 
competing sets of values. Freedom of contract emphasizes the need of 
stability, certainty and predictability. But, important as is values are, they 
are not absolute, and there comes a point where they "face serious 
challenge' against them must be set of values of protecting the weak, 
oppressed and the thoughtless from imposition and oppressed. Naturally, 
at a particular time, one set of values tends to be emphasized at the 
expense of the other as the time changes the values get changed and the 
old values are under replacement and new values take their due place. 
Though certainty and predictability in ordinary commercial contract law 
is emphasized and insisted upon the need for progress of the society and 
to removing the disabilities faced by the citizens and their relations when 
encounter with the State or its instrumentalities are in conflict with the 
assured constitutional rights demand new values and begin to assert 
themselves, for no civilized system of law can accept the implications of 
absolute sanctity of contractual obligations and of their immutability. 
In LLC. V. Escorts Ltd. a Constitution Bench of the Supreme 
Court observed that if the action of the State is related to contractual 
obligation or obligations arising out of the tort, the Court may not 
ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law character 
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attached to it. Broadly speaking, the Court will examine actions of State if 
they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from examining them if 
they pertain to the private law field. The question must be decided in each 
case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the state 
or instrumentality of the state is engaged when performing the action, the 
public law or private law or private law character of the action and host of 
other relevant circumstances. 
In Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons V. Board of Trustees of the Port 
of Bombay^ the Supreme Court said that Corporation must act in 
accordance with certain constitutional conscience and whether they have 
so acted must be discernible from the conduct of such Corporation. Every 
activity of public authority must be informed by reasons and guided by 
the public interest. All exercise of discretion or power by public authority 
must be judged by that standard. Even in contractual relations the Court 
cannot ignore that public authority must have constitutional conscience so 
that any interpretation put up must be to avoid arbitrary action, lest the 
authority would be permitted to flourish as imperium in imperio. 
Whatever be the activity of the public authority, it must meet the test of 
Article 14 and judicial review strikes an arbitrary action. 
Also in Mahabir Auto Stores V. Indian Oil Corporation^^ the 
Hon'ble Supreme Court said that the State when acting in its executive 
power, enters into contractual relations with the individual, Article 14 of 
the Constitution of India would be applicable to the exercise of the 
power. The action of the State or its instrumentality can be checked under 
Article 14. Their action must be subject to rule of law. If the 
governmental action even in the matter of entering or not entering into 
contracts, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness the same would be 
unreasonable. 
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Also in L.I.C. of India V. Consumer Education & Research 
Centre^^ the Supreme Court observed that every action of the public 
authority or the person acting in public interest or any act that gives rise 
to the public element, should be guided by public interest. It is the 
exercise of the public power or action hedged with public element (sic 
that) becomes open to challenge. If it is shown that the exercise of the 
power is arbitrary, unjust and unfair, it should be no answer for the State, 
its instrumentality, public authority or person whose act have the insignia 
of public element to say that their actions are in the field of private law 
and they are free to prescribe any conditions or limitations in their actions 
as private citizens, simpliciter do in field of private law. Its actions must 
be based on some rational and relevant principles. It must not be guided 
by irrational or irrelevant consideration. Every administrative decision 
must be hedged by reasons. 
In Brojo Nath 's case^^ Justice D.P. Madon of the Supreme Court, 
as he then was, when speaking for the Bench in this case said under 
which head would an unconscionable bargain fall? To this question he 
answered himself and said. If it falls under the head of undue influence, it 
would be voidable but if it falls under the head of being opposed to public 
policy, it would be void. He observed further that, the Contract Act 1872 
does not define the expression "public policy" or "opposed to public 
policy." From the very nature of the things, the expression "public 
policy", "opposed to public policy," or "contrary to public policy" are 
incapable of precise definition. Public policy however, is not the policy of 
a particular government. It connotes some matter which concerns the 
public good and the public interest. The concept of what is for the public 
good or in the public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the 
public good or the public interest has varied from time to time. As new 
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concept take place of old, transactions which were once considered 
against pubHc poUcy are now being upheld by the Courts and similarly 
where there has been a well recognized head of public policy the Courts 
have not shirked from extending it to new transactions and changed 
circumstances and have it times not even flinched from inventing a new 
head of public policy. There are two schools of thought - the "narrow 
view" and the "broad view" school. According to the former Courts 
cannot create new heads of public policy whereas the latter countenances 
judicial law making in this area. The adherents of "the narrow view" 
school would not invalidate a contract on the ground of public policy 
unless that particular ground had been well established by authorities.''* 
Supreme Court in Gherulal Prakash V. Mahadeodas Maiya^^ 
observed that the doctrine of public policy is governed by precedents, its 
principles have been crystallized under the different heads and though it 
was permissible to be expound and apply them to different situations it 
could be applied only to clear and undeniable cases of harm to the public. 
Although theoretically it was permissible to evolve a new head of public 
policy in exceptional circumstances such a course would be inadvisable 
in the interest of stability of society. 
In Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. V. District 
Registrar Cooperative Society , a person became member of a 
cooperative society formed for the purpose of constructing house for 
residential use of its members. The membership was confined to the Parsi 
Community. No member was free to sell the property obtained by way of 
membership to anyone outside the parsi community. He challenged this 
particular provision in the byelaws alleging that it is infringing his 
fundamental flight guaranteed by Article 19(l)(c) of the Constitution of 
India and thus against the public policy. 
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The Supreme Court did not agree with the contention and observed 
that Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 provides that where 
consideration and object are not lawful the contract would be void. But 
for section 23 to apply it must be forbidden by law or it must be of such a 
nature that it would defeat the provision of any law or it is fraudulent or it 
involves or implies injury to the person or property of another or the 
Court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy. 
The Court fiirther held that if we proceed on the basic premise that 
public policy in relation to a cooperative society is to be looked for within 
the four comers of the Act, the very enactment under which the very 
society is formed, a bye-law that does not militate against any of the 
provisions of the Act cannot be held to be opposed to public policy unless 
it is immoral or offends public order. In the context of Section 23 of the 
Contract Act, 1872, something more than possible or plausible argument 
based on the constitutional scheme is necessary to nullify an agreement 
voluntarily entered into by person. 
In State of Rajasthan V. Basant Nahata^^ the Supreme Court 
observed that public policy is not capable of being given a precise 
definition. What is "opposed to public policy" would be a matter 
depending upon the nature of the transaction. The pleadings of the parties 
and the materials brought on record would be relevant so as to enable the 
Court to judge the concept as to what is for public good or in the public 
interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or the 
public interest at the relevant point of time as contra-distinguished from 
the policy of a particular government. A law dealing with the rights of a 
citizen is required to be clear and unambiguous. Doctrine of public policy 
is contained in a branch of common law, iTis governed by the precedents. 
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The Apex Court reiterated the same view as in Gherulal Prakash's 
case^ ,^ that doctrine of pubHc poHcy is governed by precedents and its 
principles have been crystalHzed under different heads and though it was 
permissible to expound and apply them to different situations, it could be 
applied only to clear and undeniable cases of harm to public. Although 
theoretically it was permissible to evolve a new head of public policy in 
exceptional circumstances, such a course would be inadvisable in the 
interest of stability of society. 
The Supreme Court further prescribed some guidelines that a 
contract being "opposed to public policy" is a defence under Section 23 
of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the Courts while deciding the 
validity of a contract has to consider: 
a. Pleadings in terms of order VI, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
b. Statute governing the case. 
c. Provisions of Part III and IV of the Constitution of India. 
d. Expert evidence if any. 
e. The materials brought on record of the case. 
f Other relevant factors, if any. 
Thus the Court laid down the general principles regarding the 
public policy that since it is not possible to define the term "public 
policy," then the essential flinction to decide what is public policy cannot 
be delegated to executive through subordinate legislation. The power to 
decide what is against public policy is with the judiciary. The Legislature 
of a State, however, may lay down as to which acts would be immoral 
being injurious to the society. Such a legislation being substantive nature 
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must receive the legislative sanction specifically and not through a 
subordinate legislation or executive instructions. The doctrine which is so 
vague or uncertain cannot and does not provide any guideline 
whatsoever, and the executive while making a subordinate legislation 
cannot be permitted to open new heads of public policy in its whims. 
In BCPP Mazdoor Sangh V. N.T.P.C.'^^ there was a dispute of 
employees were transferred to a private concern (BALCO) on the basis of 
a bi-partite agreement entered into between the two concern. The services 
of 236 employees, appointed before this agreement, were also transferred. 
The employees challenged this agreement in the High Court of 
Chhatisgarh on the ground that it unilaterally changed the service 
conditions of even those employees who were not a party to the 
agreement. The High Court dismissed all writ petitions of the employees 
then the employees appealed against the order of the High Court and filed 
appeals in the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court referred to its earlier judgment in Brojo 
Nath '5'^^ case in which it was held that in the vast majority of cases, 
however, such contracts are entered into by the weaker party under 
pressure of circumstances, generally economic which results in inequality 
of bargaining power. Such contracts will not fall within the four comers 
of the definition of "undue influence" given in section 16(1). Further the 
majority of such contracts are in a standard or prescribed form or consist 
of a set of rules. They are not contracts between individuals containing 
terms meant for those individuals alone. Contracts in prescribed or 
standard forms or which embody a set of rules as a part of the contract are 
entered into by the party with superior bargaining power with a large 
number of persons who have far less bargaining power or no bargaining 
power at all. Such contracts which affect a large number of persons or a 
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group or groups of persons if they are unconscionable, unfair and 
unreasonable are injurious to public interest. The Court said that such a 
contract is only voidable would be compel to each person with whom the 
party with superior bargaining power had contracted to go to Court to 
have the contract adjudged voidable. This would only result in 
multiplicity of litigation which no Court should encourage and would also 
not be in the public interest. Such a contract or such a clause in a contract 
ought, therefore, to be adjudged void. 
The Supreme Court held that materials placed clearly show that 
clause 14 in the appointment letter and obtaining undertakings from the 
employees is against the public policy and contrary to Section 23 of the 
Indian Contract Act as well as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution 
of India for the reason that undue influence was exercised by NTPC 
management and the selected candidates to accept the terms and 
conditions stipulated therein. By virtue of clause 14 the status of these 
public servants have been sought to be changed which is again violative 
of Article 14. 
In Meena Sahu V. Life Insurance Corporation of India^^^ the 
respondent (LIC) issued a life insurance policy to the husband of the 
petitioner, after taking clearance from the development officer and the 
doctor appointed by the L.I.C. The policy holder died within two years of 
taking the policy due to jaundice. The deceased being a man of 36 years 
was supposed to be a healthy person. The medical examiner's 
confidential report enclosed with the policy in question revealed no sign 
or symptoms of suffering from any physical disorder more particularly of 
jaundice were found in the medical examination of life assured by doctor 
cf-the corporation nor the L.I.C. had produced any evidence to show that 
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there was misrepresentation of facts which if known earlier would have 
stopped the L.I.C. from issuing the policy. 
The L.I.C. has repudiated the claim on the ground of suppression 
of material facts. The pleas taken by the respondent corporation for 
avoiding its liability under the policy in question were that the deceased 
made a declaration in the proposal form that the statements and the 
answers contained therein were true in every particular and that the 
assured suppressed the material facts about his health. 
The High Court observed and said that the L.I.C. of India cannot 
disclaim the liability to make payment of assured amount under life 
policy for the acts and omissions of its development officer or medical 
practitioner appointed by it to examine the deceased before accepting the 
proposal. The L.I.C. cannot wriggle out of contract by saying that it was 
void or voidable at its option. 
In Akshoy Kumar Paul V New India Assurance Company , the 
appellant bought a medi-claim policy in 1999, which was renewed in 
2000, 2001 and 2002 without any difficulty. Unfortunately, in February 
2003, the petitioner suffered a heart attack and was hospitalized. He 
preferred a claim under the medi-claim policy which was paid by the 
insurance company. In August 2003 when the petitioner sought renewal 
of medi-claim policy, the same was renewed, but after excluding the 
cover for cardiac ailments of the petitioner. Such renewal was continued, 
subject to exclusion clause for the next year also. In August 2005 when 
the petitioner sought renewal without the condition of exclusion, the 
insurance company refused to do so and insisted that the exclusion clause 
should continue to operate. The petitioner approached the Court on the 
ground that his consent for cover, which excluded cardiac ailments, was 
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taken under compulsion. He argued that he had no choice but to consent 
to or to remain without the policy. 
The Court accepted that the petitioner was forced and/or 
pressurized into consenting to the exclusion of the cover for cardiac 
ailments. Otherwise he would be left without any insurance cover at all. 
The Court said that the consent given by the petitioner in August 2003 
and August 2004 was not free or willful and directed the insurance 
company to renew the policy without excluding any disease already 
covered for the year August 2005 and August 2006 onwards. 
It is submitted that on the basis some decisions of the different 
High Courts and the Supreme Court, that apart from some Sections of the 
Indian Contract Act, 1872 as Section 16, 23, 27 and 28 the Courts have 
invoked Article 14, 16 and 19 of the Constitution of India to strike down 
certain unreasonable terms of contract entered by the Government, its 
instrumentalities, Public Sector undertakings and Statutory Bodies which 
are "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 
Different High Courts and the Supreme Court exercised the powers given 
under Articles 226 and 32 respectively of the Constitution of India. These 
powers are given only to Supreme Court and the High Courts. This is the 
power of judicial review which the Courts exercised on different 
situations. The Courts have confined and restricted the area of exercising 
this power only in cases when it was felt necessary to strike down a 
clause in public service employment and in the opinion of Courts the 
clauses in the service contracts were unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair. 
The Courts are not inclined to extend this principle to strike down unfair 
and unreasonable clauses in commercial contracts. The Court 
differentiated between public law and private law. Theic is no law in 
India which can deal with the menace of unfair terms mostly found in 
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standard form contracts. The individual who is a victim of unfair terms in 
consumer contracts is unable to get redressed. The Courts refrained from 
interfering in commercial contracts. Though the Courts are willing to do 
the needful for individual consumers who suffers in the hands of big 
commercial organization but due to dearth of enactments in this field they 
are toothless and are unable to help the individuals in weaker bargaining 
position. 
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CHAPTER - VI 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
Conclusion and Suggestions 
The use of standard form contracts is very common by big 
commercial organizations, Governments and its instrumentalities, public 
corporations, banks and insurance companies. Standard form contracts 
having pre-printed and pre-drafted terms and conditions have become 
common in almost every branch of industry and commerce, consumer 
contracts, employment, hire-purchase, insurance, travel and courier 
services etc. But the contracts entered by these big organizations with the 
individuals or consumers are not at equal footing, one party i.e. the 
consumer is bound to sign on the dotted line with no opportunity for that 
party to negotiate over the terms and conditions of the contract at all. 
Though the basic concept has been "freedom of contract" a concept 
nurtured by the increasing commerce and the laissez faire theories of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The principles which came out from 
this concept have been applied in a society in which freedom of contract 
has become in many respects more fictitious, imaginary and mythical 
than a reality. It is also true that the most contracts are formed as a result 
of an "agreement" though not in a true and strict sense but in the widest 
sense. The individual has a legal right to choose to enter into a contract or 
not to make a contract. More and more such transactions have consisted 
in the presentation by one side to the other of standard terms and 
conditions. Big business organization and traders are preparing contracts 
which have pre-printed and pre-drafted terms and conditions and are 
imposing to their customers. The individual may be completely 
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unfamiliar with the terms or language employed by the other party 
drafting the terms and conditions of the contract. This problem of 
standard terms is multiplied by use of exemption and exclusion clauses in 
a language which is Greek to a common man. Firstly individuals in most 
of the cases are not able to read and understand the standard terms 
because of dearth of time and the compulsion to sign the contract at the 
earliest and if they read they are not in a position to anticipate the impact 
of the standard terms before hand. 
Secondly if they understood the terms properly and its ftiture 
impact they are not in a position to get the terms changed to their favour 
and convenience. The freedom of choice as to contractual terms assumed 
by the classical doctrines of the law has in many such situations virtually 
ceased to exist. The characteristics, usually and traditionally associated 
with a contract, of consensus ad idem and 'freedom of contract' are 
significantly absent in these so called standard form contracts. Not 
invariably, but usually, the freedom to contract through standard terms 
and conditions is that of one party only. 
We live in days when standardized conditions cover large fields of 
human activity. They have become a means whereby powerful interests 
seek to dictate to the public the conditions on which they will do 
business. The public cannot amend the terms or conditions of these big 
business organizations they simply refuse to budge. The party in a weaker 
bargaining position is offered by the party in strong bargaining position 
the contract on the terms: "take it or leave it". Accept my conditions or go 
without. The conditions thus come to resemble a legislative Code or a 
private legislation applicable to all who wants to take part in the business 
or coiiipelled to buy goods or services of these big and giant commercial 
organizations. Such contracts arise not merely in business and commerce 
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sectors. When a person wants to be a member of a club or trade 
association or a trade union, the contract is made on the rules set by the 
organization. Nevertheless, although such contracts are more by-laws 
than a contract, there is no doubt that this set of rules contains the 
contract between the members. In the same way, the workers enters into a 
contract of employment the terms of which are often derived not from 
any individual bargain between him and his employer but expressly or by 
implication from the collective agreement between his trade union and 
the employers. 
The contracts in standard form are usually pre-printed contracts 
that are only "contracts" in name. The standard terms and conditions 
unilaterally drafted by one party to the contract, which has strong 
bargaining power, are offered to the other party who has weaker or in 
most of the cases no bargaining power at all, on a "take it or leave it" 
basis, rather the terms are forced on the other party. The individual 
participation consists of a mere adherence to the document drafted 
unilaterally and insisted upon by the powerful enterprises who could 
abuse their position under the garb of free will. The conditions imposed 
by one party on the other are never put into discussion. One has just to fill 
the blanks and sign on the dotted line. They party who has strong 
bargaining power prepares and prints the contract and in most of cases 
misuses this opportunity and incorporates such term in these standard 
form contracts most favourable to him and sometimes the supplier of 
goods and services seek to exclude or limit their possible legal liability by 
the insertion of exclusion or exemption clauses in the standard form 
contracts offered by them. 
It is very pertinent to note"that in all above cited situations the 
bargaining power of the parties are unequal, on the one side there is the 
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ordinary individual and on tiie other side is the powerful business and 
commercial organization or powerful association who have terms and 
conditions similar to a legislation with desirable goods or services to 
supply. One has either to forgo the benefit, goods or services, or sign on 
the dotted line accepting all the terms and conditions. There is no 
opportunity or room for negotiation over the terms of the contract or any 
element of bargaining in these types of transactions. There is no meeting 
of minds or consensus ad idem present in the transactions. In most of the 
cases an individual finds himself to have agreed and thereby bound by the 
terms which he had not even read, let alone of understanding the terms of 
the contract and in some cases the individual might have not even seen 
the terms of the contract in the so called contractual document. 
Sometimes business enterprises maneuvering for position to get 
advantageous position plays tricks on ordinary person they instead of 
writing terms and conditions of the contract on the contractual document, 
write only one sentence on the foot of the document as "T&C apply". An 
ordinary person is unable to understand the meaning of this sentence and 
he thinks that this is something written for his benefit or future advantage. 
But later when any dispute arises between the parties the individual is 
being told by the powerful commercial organization that he had agreed to 
the terms and conditions of the organization and signed it after the 
reasonable notice of the terms and condition given to him. He is being 
also told that "T&C" stands for terms and conditions of the contract and 
his signature on the document is the proof of his agreement to the terms 
and conditions. "T&C" is not any official or universally recognized 
abbreviation or abbreviated form of the word "Terms and Condition." 
This is simply a business trick played by the commercial organization just 
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to mislead the individual and hide the actual and harsh terms of the 
contract. 
The terms and conditions of the standard form contracts are so 
divised that the individual purchaser is literally at the mercy of the 
supplier of the goods and the warrantees or guarantees proves later on 
simply as a hollow drum or mirage or an illusion or hope that cannot be 
realized. The manufacturer is authorized to decide whether the 
malfunctioning was or was not the result of a manufacturing defect. There 
is nothing that may ensure proper exercise of this power by the 
manufacturing company. Thus the company occupies the position of a 
judge in his own cause and may abuse the power with impunity. Whether 
the consumer will get the benefit of guarantee in case of any 
manufacturing defect for which the company is responsible will depend 
on the mercy of the company. Individuals who are in unorganized group 
of business are badly affected by these so called contracts which are in 
standard form and have exemptions and exclusion clauses only beneficial 
to one party who has strong bargaining position and detrimental to the 
other party who has relatively weaker bargaining position. 
The common law subject to some restrictions based on public 
policy, permits persons to make whatever contractual bargains they 
please and will enforce those bargains. This general principle, of which 
underlying assumptions are that persons entering into contracts are of 
equal bargaining power and read and understand what they sign, ignores 
the fact that under modem conditions many transactions, particularly of 
hire-purchase and every transaction of taking a policy cover from an 
insurance company or every transaction of banks are entered into by 
ignorant persons whose only choice is either not to enter into the contract 
at all or to enter into it on the terms of a standard agreement drafted by 
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the big commercial organization and containing numerous clauses printed 
in minuscule characters which the individual do not in fact read and if he 
did, he would be incapable of understanding and if he understood he 
would not in a position to negotiate over the terms or get it altered or 
changed to suit his requirement. In such a situation, too, even if the 
consumer has a choice of parties with whom to contract, he is likely to 
find that all of them offer the same standard terms. 
In consequence the judges in the U.K. tried to apply and adapt the 
doctrines of common law so as to do justice in the new conditions. For 
instance, in interpreting contracts they lean contra proferentem - against 
the party putting forward a term (especially in standard form) inserted 
especially for his protection, and they will not, if it can be avoided, allow 
an exemption clause. Over the years, however, exemption and exclusion 
clauses have become wider and wider, giving the powerful party 
increasing greater protection against liability for what would normally be 
a breach of his contract. The Court's respect for the principle of "freedom 
of contract" has limited their ability adequately to control such clauses, 
and it may be that statutory intervention is the only way to deal 
satisfactorily with what is widely recognized as a real problem. 
In the United Kingdom various legislative measures have been 
taken for the welfare of the consumers. The Misrepresentation Act, 1967, 
for instance, provides for compensation in case of innocent 
misrepresentation, which could be previously claimed only in case of 
fraud. The Road Traffic Act, 1960 makes provision for safeguarding the 
interest of travelling public. But the most important Act in this field is 
Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977. This Act considerably limits the ability 
of the contracting parties to use exemption or exclusion clauses for gain 
at the expense of the other party. Such exclusion or exemption clauses 
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have been declared void by the Courts. Further it does not permit the 
reopening of an agreement if the terms of the contract are unfair. 
In U.K. there is also the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 - (UTCCR) which applies to consumer contracts and 
only to contracts in standard form. This Regulations define a consumer as 
a natural person who in making a contract to which these Regulations 
apply is acting for purposes which are outside his business. 
In trying to give effect to the intention of the parties the Courts in 
the United Kingdom have emphasized that an exemption clause must not 
be interpreted so that it conflicts with the primary objects of the contract. 
In a number of cases before 1966 the Courts stated the principle as a rule 
o law operating independently of any construction put upon the words of 
the exemption clause: however extensive the exception clause may be, it 
has no application if there has been a breach of a fundamental term. The 
decision of Denning L.J. in Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. V. Wallis (1956) 2 
All ER 866) is an example of this where the learned judge stated that "it 
is now settled that exempting clauses of this kind, no matter how widely 
they are expressed, only avail the party when he is carrying out his 
contract in its essential respects. He is not allowed to use them as a cover 
for misconduct or indifference or to enable him to turn a blind eye to his 
obligations. They do not avail him when he is guilty of a breach which 
goes to the root of the contract." 
But in the Suisse Atlantique case (1966 2 All ER 61) the House of 
Lords held that there is no such independent rule, not only because it 
would be an unjustifiable interference with freedom of contract but 
because it would be uncertain in scope and would not satisfactorily 
discriminate between cases where the parties have bargained as equals in 
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reaching an agreement to exclude liability, and those where the 
exemption is harsh and unconscionable. 
In Photo Production Ltd. V. Securicor Transport Ltd. (1980 1 All 
ER 556) the House of Lords once again affirmed their opinion that the 
question whether or not an exemption clause protected a party to a 
contract in the event of breach or in the event of what would (but for the 
presence of the exemption clause) have been a breach, depended upon the 
construction of the contract. Even if the breach was so serious as to entitle 
the injured party to treat the contract as repudiated or to render further 
performance impossible, the other party was not prevented from relying 
on the clause. 
Exemption clauses can cause injustice by depriving a contracting 
party of the benefit he reasonably expected to receive from the contract. 
The power of judges have grown over the years but still it is limited. 
Understandably, the Parliament of the U.K. has intervened from time to 
time. Statutory control has generally taken the form of separate Acts 
dealing with particular types of contract. 
In Richardson, Spence & Co. V. Rowntree (1894 AC 217) where 
the Minnie Rowntree paid the appellants passage money for a voyage on 
their steamer, and received a ticket folded so that no writing was visible 
unless she opened it. The ticket contained conditions limiting the liability 
of the appellants for damages for personal injuries to 100 dollars. In an 
action brought by her for damages for personal injuries it was held that 
the condition formed no part of the contract, and that she was entitled to 
judgment for $ 100. 
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In order that a notice may be treated as adequate it is necessary that 
it must be pointed prominently so that it may not escape from the eyes of 
a common man wishing to enter into a contract. 
The requirement of reasonable notice is based on the principle of 
"consensus ad idem" a meeting of mind, that is one of the essential 
requisites of the formation of valid contract. A person entering into a 
contract should be able to know all of the terms and conditions of the 
contract, and if all the terms of the contract are not at one place or at a 
place where the contract is being made, then it is the duty of the other 
party to give adequate notice of all the terms of the contract. 
In Olley V. Marlborough Court Ltd. (1949, 1 All ER 127) the 
negligence of the hotel staff resulted in the loss of some personal article 
of the plaintiff. In a suit for damages the Court said that, "a party desiring 
exemption from liability must communicate such terms and conditions 
prior to or in the process of completion of the contract and not at any time 
subsequent to the conclusion of the contract." 
At the time of ticket cases it was notorious that people hardly ever 
troubled to read printed conditions on a ticket or delivery note or similar 
document. That remains the case now. In the intervening years the printed 
conditions have tended to become more and more complicated and more 
and more one-sided in favour of the party who is imposing them, but the 
other parties, if they notice that there are printed conditions at all, 
generally still tend to assume that such conditions are only concerned 
with ancillary matters of form and are not of importance. In the ticket 
cases the Courts held that the common law required that reasonably steps 
be taken to draw the other parties' attention to the printed conditions or 
they would not be part of the contract. 
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Denning L.J. in Spurting Ltd V. Bradshaw (1956 2 All ER 121 at 
125) stated that, 
"Some clauses which I have seen would need to be printed in red 
ink on the face of the document with a red hand pointing to it before the 
notice could be held to be sufficient." 
Another judicial principle is that the contract must be free from 
misrepresentation and where such misrepresentation existed then even the 
signature on the contract will not bind the person, signing such contract. 
In Curtis V. Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co. Ltd. (1951, 1 All ER 
631) Denning L.J. observed that "this case is of importance because of 
the many cases nowadays when people sign printed forms without 
reading them, only to find afterwards that they contain stringent clauses 
exempting the other side from their common-law liabilities. In every such 
case it must be remembered that, if a person wishes to exempt himself 
from a liability which the common law imposes on him, he can only do it 
by an express stipulation brought home to the party effect and assented to 
by him as part of contract." 
Yet another significant principle laid down by the Courts is that the 
term of the contract must be reasonable and should not be opposed to 
public policy. In Lilly White V. Munnuswami ~ (A.l.R. 1966 Mad. 13) the 
Madras High Court held that a term which is prima facie opposed both to 
public policy and to the fiindamental principles of the law of contract 
cannot be enforced by a bill and there is tacit acceptance of Court merely 
because it is printed on the reverse of a the term when the bill was 
received by the customer. 
There is also a practice found in many business concerns who deal 
in the supply of goods or rendering services, that they have contracts or 
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order forms in which there so called term of the contract which is an 
incomplete sentence in minuscule character written at the foot of bill or 
order form that is "subject to (name of place) jurisdiction." For example, 
"subject to Delhi jurisdiction". This type of practice is also found in the 
business by the carriers who transport goods, in their consignment note or 
receipt these types of written words may be found. When any dispute 
arises between the parties they first of all takes the defence that the 
particular Court alone has the jurisdiction to try the suit or adjudicate 
upon the matter. 
The Supreme Court in Hakam Singh V. M/s Gammon India Ltd. 
(A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 740) laid down that it is not open to the parties by 
agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it 
does not possess under the Code of Civil Procedure. But where two 
Courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try 
a suit or proceeding, an agreement between the parties that the dispute 
between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public 
policy. Such an agreement does not Contravene Section 28 of the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872. 
But Justice M.P. Thakkar of Gujarat High Court (as he then was) in 
Snehal Kumar Sarabhai V. M/s Economic Transport Organization (A.I.R. 
1975, Guj. 72) observed that, "a new approach to this question deserves 
to be made for the ouster clause is calculated to operate as a engine of 
oppression and as a means to defeat the ends of justice. Not frequently the 
Courts slam the door of the temple of justice in the face of a pilgrim (who 
has admittedly been wronged) at the behest of the proved wrongdoer 
solely on the ground that he has knocked at a different door. So often the 
Court coiisiders itself to be helpless and turns away the hapless pilgrim 
under a mistaken assumption that entry is barred from the said door. 
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Justice M.P. Thakkar sounded a note of caution and came down heavily 
on the practice of excluding the jurisdiction of a Court which it possesses 
otherwise. The Court observed that the parties can lawfully enter into an 
agreement restricting a dispute to a particular Court having jurisdiction 
and ordinarily the Courts would respect the agreement but the stipulation 
can be ignored by the excluded Court if it is considered to be oppressive 
having regard to surrounding circumstances and the stakes involved. 
The principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case 
of Hakam Singh V. Gammon was reiterated in a number of cases later on. 
Recently in Harshad Chiman Lai V. D.L.F. Universal Ltd. (A.I.R. 2005 
S.C. 4446) the Supreme Court again observed that it is not open to the 
parties to confer jurisdiction by their agreement on a Court which it does 
not possesses under the Code of Civil Procedure. The parties can restrict 
their choice by specific agreement to anyone of the two or more Courts 
only in cases where the selected Court otherwise possesses the 
jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Thus the established legal position is that the parties by their 
agreement are not permitted to totally exclude the jurisdiction of civil 
Court which has been created by statute. But the parties may by their 
agreement restrict their choice to one or more such Courts which 
otherwise possesses territorial jurisdiction under the Code of Civil 
procedure. The parties cannot vest jurisdiction in a Court which it does 
not have under the Code of Civil Procedure. Where several Courts have 
territorial jurisdiction in respect of a suit, parties may by their agreement 
confine themselves to anyone of such civil Courts and such an agreement 
is not violative of section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 
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In the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. V. Brojo 
Nath Ganguly (A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1571) the Hon'ble Supreme Court for 
the first time considered the principle of unconscionability outside the 
purview of section 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and tried to 
broaden its limits. The Court discussed unconscionability, distributive 
justice and inequality of bargaining power. The Court also explained the 
concept of unreasonableness and referred to some decided English cases 
as Gillespie Bros & Co. Ltd. V. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd. (1973) I All 
ER 193, Lloyds Bank V. Bundy (1974) 3 All ER 757 and Schroeder Music 
Publishing Co. V. Macaulay (1974) 3 All ER 616. After discussing these 
judgments of English Courts and the law in the U.K. and in the U.S.A. 
the Court observed that there might be myriad situations which result in 
unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing wholly 
disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. The Supreme Court said 
that these cases can neither be enumerated fully nor illustrated. The Court 
must judge each case on its own facts and circumstances. The Court 
fiirther said that, "this principle would apply where the inequality of 
bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the economic 
strength of the contracting parties or where the inequality is the result of 
the circumstances whether of the creation of the parties or not, or where 
the weaker party is in a position in which he could obtain goods or 
services or means of livelihood only upon the terms imposed by the 
stronger party or go without them or where a man had no choice, or rather 
no meaningfiil choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the 
dotted line in the prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as 
part of the contract, however, unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a 
clause in that contract or form or rules might be." 
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The ratio of Central Inland case was upheld per majority in the case 
of Delhi Transport Corporation V.D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (A.I.R. 
1998 S.C. 1681). The Supreme Court held in this case that, "there is no 
hesitation to conclude that the impugned Regulation 9(b) of the 
Regulations 1952 framed under Section 53 of the Delhi Road Transport, 
Act 1950 which provided for termination of services of permanent 
employees on giving simply one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof 
without recording any reason and without holding any inquiry is 
arbitrary, unjust unfair and unreasonable offending Article 14, 16(1) (19) 
(1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. It is also opposite to the public 
policy and thereby is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 
1872." 
The principle laid down in the case of Central Inland was followed 
again by the Supreme Court in B.C.C.P. Mazdoor Sangh V. N.T.P.C. 
(A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 336). In this case the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, 
"in the vast majority of cases, however, such contracts are entered into by 
the weaker party under pressure of circumstances, generally economic 
which results in inequality of bargaining power. Such contracts will not 
fall within the four comers of the definition of "undue influence" given in 
section 16(1) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Further the majority of 
such contracts or in a standard or prescribed form or consist of a set of 
rules. They are not contracts between individuals containing terms meant 
for those individuals alone. Contracts in prescribed or standard forms or 
which embody a set of rules as a part of the contract are entered into by 
the party with superior bargaining power with a large number of persons 
who have far less bargaining power or no bargaining power at all. Such 
contracts which affect a large number of persons or a group or groups of 
persons if they are unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable and injurious to 
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public interest should not be treated voidable, but such contracts or 
clauses in contracts ought to be adjudged as void. In this case also the 
Supreme Court held that on the basis of materials placed before the Court 
clearly shows that the disputed clause of the service contract is against the 
public policy and contrary to section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 
as well as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 
Justice D.P. Madon of the Supreme Court (as he then was) when 
speaking for the Bench in the case of Central Inland (A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 
1571) asked a question that, "under which head would an unconscionable 
bargain fall?" To this question he answered himself and said, "if it falls 
under the head of undue influence, it would be voidable but if it falls 
under the head of being opposed to public policy, it would be void." He 
further said that the Indian Contract Act, 1872 does not define the 
expression "public policy" or "opposed to public policy." From the very 
nature of the things, the expression "public policy", "opposed to public 
policy" or "contrary to public policy" are incapable of precise definition. 
Public policy, however, is not the policy of a particular government. It 
connotes some matter which concerns the public good and the public 
interest. The concept of what is for the public good or in the public 
interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or the 
public interest has varied from time to time. As new concept take place of 
old, transactions which were once considered against public policy are 
now being upheld by the Courts and similarly where there has been a well 
recognized head of public policy the Courts have not shirked away from 
extending it to new transactions and changed circumstances and have it 
times not even flinched from inventing a new head of public policy. 
Earlier the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gherulal Prakash V. 
Mahadeodas Maiya (A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 782) observed that, the doctrine of 
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public policy is governed by precedents, its principles have been 
crystallized under the different heads and though it was permissible to 
expound and apply them to different situations it could be applied only to 
clear and undeniable cases of harm to the public. Although theoretically it 
was permissible to evolve a new head of public policy in exceptional 
circumstances such a course would be inadvisable in the interest of 
stability of society. 
The Supreme Court in State ofRajasthan V. Basant Nahata (A.I.R. 
2005 S.C. 3401) again took the discussion regarding "public policy" out 
of the confines of statute to the general area, and observed that public 
policy is not capable of being given a precise definition. What is 
"opposed to public policy" would be a matter depending upon the nature 
of the transaction. The pleadings of the parties and the materials brought 
on record would be relevant so as to enable the Court to judge the concept 
as to what is for public good or in the public interest or what would be 
injurious or harmful to the public good or the public interest at the 
relevant point of time as contra-distinguished from the policy of a 
particular government. The Supreme Court said that a law dealing with 
rights of a citizen is required to be clear and unambiguous. Doctrine of 
public policy is contained in a branch of common law, it is governed by 
the precedents. The Supreme Court reiterated its views as it observed in 
the case of Gherulal Prakash's case and prescribed some guidelines that a 
contract being "opposed to public policy" is a defence under section 23 of 
the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the Courts while deciding the validity 
of a contract has to consider: 
(a) pleadings in terms of order VI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure: 
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(b) Statute governing the case; 
(c) Provisions of Part III and IV of the Constitution of India. 
(d) Expert evidence if any; 
(e) The materials brought on record of the case. 
(f) Other relevant factors, if any. 
The Supreme Court stated that since it is not possible to define the term 
"public policy" then the essential function to decide what is public policy 
cannot be delegated to executive through subordinate legislation. The 
power to decide what is against public policy is with the judiciary. The 
doctrine which is so vague or uncertain cannot and does not provide any 
guideline whatsoever and the executive while making a subordinate 
legislation cannot be permitted to open new heads of public policy in its 
whims. 
It is very pertinent to note here that in all these cases referred to 
above, which are only a tip of an iceberg, one may very easily draw a 
conclusion that in all these cases there is a one-sided affair. The 
commercial companies whether big or small impose terms for which the 
individual has only one option that is either to accept it or go without the 
goods or services. If he accepts the terms as it is, he is bound by the terms 
whether he likes it or not. He cannot even discuss the terms let alone 
about the alteration of the terms and conditions. He is committed to the 
terms beyond recall. If a person wants to travel or wants to insure his 
property or he wants to dry clean his clothes or wants to transport his 
goods through a carrier, or whatever it may be, he is bound to accept the 
terms and conditions laid down by the business organization or else go 
without the benefit of the services. The "freedom of contract" here seems 
to be ceased to exist. There is no trace of the classical principle of 
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"consensus and idem" or meeting of mind. The terms and conditions 
imposed by the commercial organization is similar to the legislative Code 
or one may say it a "private legislation." These private legislation is even 
more rigid than a statute because of the reason statutes are being amended 
by the parliaments and legislative assemblies but these private legislation 
are not even considered by the commercial organization to amend and 
only amended, to insert more harsh and oppressive terms in it. These so 
called private legislations are amended only when the commercial 
organization wants to insert more harsh, oppressive and one-sided terms 
and conditions in it. There is nothing to stop the commercial 
organizations and corporations inserting and stipulating any terms they 
like to their advantage. 
Though it is true that the commercial organizations have right to 
look after their business interests but at the same time they are also bound 
to do their business on such terms which are fair, reasonable and not 
arbitrary. Commercial organizations are anxious to protect themselves 
from claims and the only way by which they can do it is to insert 
stringent terms and conditions in their pre-drafted standard form contract 
which are wide enough to bar even a well founded and true claim. If any 
individual objects to any term of the contract to any big commercial 
organization such as insurance company, telecom service provider, carrier 
company or a bank they simply say that these are the rules of our 
organization and that it cannot be changed or altered for anybody 
whosoever he may be. They presume the terms of the contract as if it is 
the rules of any Ordinance or a Regulations and they will say that they are 
not going to budge. Government undertakings, its instrumentalities and 
corporations are also not exception to this practice of using unfair and 
arbitrary terms in contracts of employment. They also have terms in 
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service contracts which are unreasonable and arbitrary. The Courts have 
reflected enlightened concern for the delicate balance between the 
unquestioned need to preserve the integrity of agreements and desirability 
to require basic fairness in order that mutual assent is equated to 
meaningful assent. 
It is submitted humbly that on the some decisions of the different 
High Courts and the Supreme Court that apart from some sections of the 
Indian Contract Act, 1872 as Sections 16, 23, 27 and 28 the Courts have 
invoked Article 14, 16, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India to strike 
down certain unreasonable terms of the contract entered by the 
Government, its instrumentalities, Public Sector Undertakings and 
Statutory Bodies which are "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of 
the Constitution of India. Different High Courts and the Supreme Court 
exercised the powers given under Articles 226 and 32 respectively of the 
constitution of India. These powers are given only to Supreme Court and 
the High Courts. This is the power of judicial review which the Courts 
exercised on different situations. The Courts have confined and restricted 
the area of exercising this power only in cases when it was felt necessary 
to strike down a clause in public service employment and in the opinions 
of the Courts the clauses in the service contracts were unreasonable, 
arbitrary or unfair. The Courts are not inclined to extend this principle to 
strike down unfair and unreasonable clauses in commercial contracts. The 
Courts differentiated between public law and private law. There is no law 
in India which can deal with the menace of unfair terms mostly found in 
standard form contracts. The individual who is a victim of unfair and 
unreasonable terms in consumer contracts is unable to get himself 
redressed. The Courts refrained from interfering in commercial contracts. 
Though the Courts are willing to do the needful for the consumers who 
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have inferior or no bargaining power at all who suffer in the hands of 
commercial and business organization but due to dearth of statutes in this 
field the Courts are toothless and hence helpless and thus unable to help 
individuals in inferior bargaining position. The only welcome and 
substantive developments have been that the Courts was not confined to 
only existing heads of public policy. In certain cases it was observed that 
Article 14 could not be applied to commercial contracts entered by the 
organization which were a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the 
Constitution of India, in some cases Section 23 was invoked against such 
organization to grant relief The Court felt itself without any specific 
power given by the statutes to strike down unreasonable clauses in 
contracts and have been unable to help the individual consumers who 
suffers due to the unfair and unreasonable clauses in consumer contracts. 
The Law Commission of India in its 103'^ '^  Report on "Unfair 
Terms in Contract (1984), observed that the entire basis of a contract, that 
it was freely and voluntarily entered into by parties with equal bargaining 
power, completely falls to the ground when it is practically impossible for 
one of the parties not to accept the offered terms. In order to render 
freedom of contract a reality and particularly of one whose bargaining 
power is less than that of the other party to the contract, various measures 
like labour legislation, money lending laws and rent Acts have been 
enacted but there is no general provision in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 
itself under which the Courts can give relief to the weaker party. The 
existing sections in the Contract Act do not seem to be capable of 
meeting the mischief 
The Law Commission further observed that the net result is that the 
Indian Contrc.c-t Act, 1872, as it stands today, cannot come to the 
protection of the consumer when dealing with big business. Further, the 
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ad hoc solutions given by Courts in response to their innate sense of 
justice without reference to a proper yardstick in the form of a specific 
provision of statute law or Icnown legal principle of law only produce 
uncertainty and ambiguity. The Law Commission in its 103"^*^  Report 
recommended the amendment in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and 
insertion of chapter IV A with a single section 67A in it which would 
combine the advantages of the English Unfair Terms Act and Section 
2.302 of the Uniform Commercial Code of the United States. 
The Law Commission of India again in its 199'^  Report on Unfair 
(Procedural and Substantive) Terms in Contract (2006) discussed in detail 
the existing provisions as regards voidable and void contracts under the 
Indian Contract Act, 1872 as well as non-enforcement of contracts where 
there is unfairness or hardship, as contained in the Specific Relief Act, 
1963. The Law Commission in its 199 Report suggested that the 
provisions of these two statutes need not be disturbed. The Commission 
proposed, in addition, separate set of general provisions to deal with 
unfair terms of contracts. The law Commission observed that there is 
need to protect consumers and particularly to grant protection from the 
disadvantages of extensive introduction of standard terms of contracts 
which are one-sided it has become necessary to evolve general principles 
regulating unfairness in contracts. 
The Law Commission in its 199^ *^  Report agreed with its earlier 
observation in its 103'^ '' Report of 1984 where it was opined that the 
provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and other laws are not 
sufficient to meet the problems of today. The Commission was of the 
view that there is now need to introduce more provisions than were 
contemplated in its 103*^  Report of 19S4. The Law Commission prepared 
a draft of the Proposed Bill on "Unfair (Procedural and Substantive) 
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Terms in Contract Bill, 2006" and recommended for its enactment. The 
Law Commission segregated the provisions in the bill which deal with 
"Procedural" and "Substantive" unfairness and it said that this type of 
division of unfairness is very necessary. 
But the recommendations of the Law Commission of India whether 
it were in 103"^  Report 1984 or in 199* Report 2006 fell into deaf ears of 
the Government. Central Government did not pay any heed to the 
recommendations of the Law Commission. Government's lackadaisical 
approach is responsible for the non-implementation of the 
recommendations of the Law Commission. Governments are more keen 
to pass and enact those laws and ordinances for which they are getting 
political mileage or increase in its vote bank tally. 
Another reason for the non-implementations of the 
recommendations seems to be that all big business houses give donations 
and finance the elections of the major political parties expected to form 
Governments at the centre and in the States. That is why when these 
political parties come into power and form Government they are reluctant 
to pass those laws which could annoy the political party, its well wishers 
and financers. 
Sometime Governments are compelled to enact the law for which 
there is out-cry and public protest. In early eighties when on the daily 
basis there were incidents and the news reports of bride burning. There 
were pressures on the Government from all the sides. There were also a 
spurt of cases of cruelty on married women in their in-laws houses. The 
Central Government swung into action and amended Indian Penal Code, 
1860 and inserted section 498-A in it in 1983 which deals with the cruelty 
by the husband and his relatives against his wife. Similarly the Central 
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Government again amended the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in 1986 and 
inserted the Section 304-B which deals for the punishment for dowry 
deaths, and also amended the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and inserted 
Section 113B in 1986, which deals with the provision relating to 
"presumption as to dowry death." In the same way the Central 
Government feeling the pressure from the women's organization passed 
the "Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005" in 2005. 
Thus one may say that the Government is enacting those laws for 
which there is pressure or out-cry or they are getting political mileage and 
getting the credit for its enactments. The individual consumer is in 
unorganized sector and there no organization who or which could raise 
the voice for him. No political party and no organization are raising the 
voice against the menace of unfair terms in consumer contracts. Ordinary 
person is unaware of its rights and he does not know that there are 
recommendations of the law Commission of India and once implemented, 
the problems faced by him day-to-day can be put to an end or it may be 
removed upto some considerable extent. Thus there is a need of 
enlightenment for the consumers they should be united and should start a 
powerful campaign against these practice of unfair terms in standard form 
contract, and should compel the Central Government to implement the 
recommendations of the Law Commission of India contained in its 199"^  
Report of 2006. 
The researcher has noticed that the main point that emerges at the 
end of discussion is that we are at present inclined to give more 
materialistic interpretation to the law and its purpose. It is no longer 
recognized that any restriction on "freedom of contract" should derive its 
validity on any higher ideals like the "Law of nature" or the "law of 
reasonableness." 
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Certain suggestions are humbly mentioned here with due respect to 
the framers of laws and the jurists. 
The recommendations of the Law Commission of India contained 
in its 199'*^  Report on Unfair (Procedural and Substantive) Terms in 
contract should be implemented by the Central Government at the 
earliest. 
Till the recommendations is not implemented the Courts should be 
more susceptible to pain felt by consumers and individuals by these 
unfair and unreasonable terms of standard form consumer contracts and 
quell, suppress and subdue the menace of unfair and unreasonable terms 
of standard form contracts which are giving undue advantage to parties 
who have superior bargaining power and only disadvantages to the party 
who is in a inferior bargaining position. The Courts should hold the terms 
valid only when it is reasonable and fair and declare it voidable or void 
when in its opinion it is unreasonable or unfair. The Courts should look 
and consider all the circumstances under which the contract was entered 
upon. The Court should not only consider the contractual document and 
terms but the overall circumstances, situations and substantive as well as 
procedural unfairness also. 
Considering the magnitude of the problem posed by these unfair 
and unreasonable terms, it is also essential that some special measures 
would have to be devised to eliminate the abuse of freedom of contract in 
relation to these 'standard form contracts." There should be setting up of 
a "office of fair trading" on the British pattern in each revenue district 
headed by a retired judicial officer of a cadre not below of a district 
judge. In this administrative office there should be also members and 
representative of commerce and industry. This office of fair trading 
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should have powers of a magistrate and should be able to deal with 
complaints and take action against those erring businessmen and 
commercial offices of the district who indulge in unfair trade practices by 
using unfair terms in standard form contracts. This office should have the 
power to take action on the written complaint or getting information 
otherwise or suo motu against the use of unfair terms in any business and 
commercial establishment and get the unfair business practice 
discontinued. There should also be a "office of fair trading" at State level 
and anybody aggrieved by the order of the "district fair trading office" 
may appeal to the "State Office of the fair trading." The one important 
thing that is the jurisdiction of the civil Court should be barred 
specifically in this matter so that this office of fair trading may function 
freely, fearlessly and without any impediment and shackles. The only 
judicial jurisdiction should be of the High Court of that state against the 
order of the "State office of fair trading." 
In addition to this, this "office of fair trading" should have the 
authority to scrutinize all the advertisements and ternis and conditions 
printed in it and on the receipts and the guarantee cards etc. After the 
scrutiny this office should issue a certificate of "fairness", only then they 
should be allowed to be issued to the consumers. For the setting up of a 
new business, the businessmen and traders should be required to get their 
proposed terms and conditions in standard form contracts be checked by 
the "office of fair trading first, and only after receiving the certificate of 
"fairness" from the "district office of fair trading" they should be allowed 
to start their business. 
Successive regimes at the centre have failed either to implement 
the recommendations of the Law Commission of India contained in its 
lOS'"* Report on "Unfair Terms in Contract" (1984) and in its 199* Report 
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on "Unfair (Procedural and Substantive) Terms in Contract" 2006 or to 
enact a separate body of law which could deal the menace of unfair and 
unreasonable term in standard form contracts. Due to dearth of statutes in 
this field to think for the betterment of consumers and individual sufferers 
in the hands business organization will be day-dreaming. We hope the 
Central Government will consider the problem faced by the general 
public and will implement the recommendations of the law Commission 
and will do the needful very soon. 
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